COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Despite Lackluster Performance, Kenyan MPs Demand Extravagant Pay Raise

Photo credit: Flickr user DEMOSH

In the midst of a contentious campaign period leading up to an August 4 constitutional referendum, members of Kenya’s Parliament (MPs) have voted to award themselves a pay raise of almost 25 percent, an increase that places them among the highest-paid legislators in the world. MP salaries will rise to 1,091,000 shillings ($12,841) a month, an amount considerably higher than many of their European counterparts—lawmakers in the United Kingdom, for example, are paid $8,445 a month. Even more dramatic is the discrepancy between the MPs and those they represent. A majority of Kenyans live in dire poverty, and the proposed increase would set MP income at fully 240 times Kenyan GDP per capita.

Kenya’s current government formed in April 2008, in the wake of the violent 2007 election crisis.  After an election officially declared “irredeemably polluted,” the Grand Coalition Government was formed to quell the crisis and put into place much-needed reforms of the country’s political system. The 2010 Countries at the Crossroads report detailed the crisis and outlined the meager progress made on the core challenges that the new government vowed to tackle: among other things, electoral reform has stalled, ethnic divisions continue to be profound, and little progress has been made on the complex, vexing problem of land reform.

In stark contrast to this record of inaction, MPs hastened to propose the salary increases before the August 4 referendum as the new constitution would remove lawmakers’ ability to set their own salaries. Defense of the increase—and the rare spirit of near-complete unity shown in parliament—is based on changes in MPs’ tax status. Until recently, parliamentarians enjoyed tax-free status on virtually all income, but public discontent over the issue rose dramatically, leading MPs to finally resign themselves to annual taxation of 227,000 shillings ($2,671) in annual taxes, which will be more than covered by the salary increase of 350,000 shillings ($4,119). The other defense of the increases asserts that the widespread expectation that legislators provide for their constituents entitles them to higher levels of income. High salaries are appropriate, under this reckoning, because legislators distribute their income among constituents in the form of school fees, funeral expenses, and other costs.  House Speaker Kenneth Marende defended the increases, stating “I envision a Kenya where the priest, teachers, and the police will be properly remunerated; not just the politician…Ask yourself: is your contribution impunity? Corruption? Ethnicity? Let’s support each other.”  This change, it seems, starts at home.

Anticipating resistance from the public and the executive, which can delay or veto the bill, legislators are attempting to force the government into approving the proposed increase by refusing to pass legislation on any government activities. In particular, they are refusing to pass the Appropriations Bill, which authorizes virtually all government spending. Absent legislative approval of the bill before August 31, the government will be effectively left with no legal options to draw money for its daily operations.

Not surprisingly, many (if not most) Kenyans do not support the raise. The proposal sparked outrage among civil servants, who have threatened to go on strike if the government approves the increase. In a recent editorial, two civil society leaders condemned the bill as a clear indicator that legislators have forsaken their civic duties in the face of bald greed. Officials of the NGO Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice assert that “Parliament is meant to constitute a general check upon executive power, instead of perpetrating fraud upon the very people it purports to serve.  Otherwise, who will guard the guardians?” These and other civil society leaders are calling upon the government to shoot down the proposal regardless of the MPs’ threats. Indeed, government resistance has already surfaced in the Minister of Finance’s declaration that the budget has exhausted all available resources and that new salaries could be financed only through additional borrowing or higher taxes, to the detriment of the Kenyan economy.

This controversy comes at a crucial time, as the country prepares to vote on the most significant political reforms in its recent history. The nongovernmental Kenya Human Rights Commission describes the draft constitution as imperfect but an important improvement over the current constitution, given that it “embodies fundamental principles necessary for the realization of accountability within the Government of Kenya.” This support is far from universal, however. Violence is again threatening to tarnish the political scene, as tensions rise between the new constitution’s supporters and detractors. As the National Cohesion and Integration Committee’s Alice Nderitu warned of the growing threat, “It's tense but manageable... but it's only manageable to the extent that the law enforcement officers don't work alone. When we start talking about death, you know the threat of violence is real.”

Given the power-sharing government’s scant progress on the goals it set for itself and the growing threat of referendum-related violence—let alone the presidential election scheduled for 2012—Kenya’s legislators clearly have much work to do to achieve the political stability deemed essential two years ago. In light of such formidable challenges, the pay raise is symbolic of the ongoing disconnect between the priorities of Kenyan society and the country’s governing class, a gap that continues to threaten the country’s progress and stability.

The Battle Rages on: Media Wars (and their Soldiers) in Ecuador and Argentina

Photo Credit: Flickr user Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

By: Natalie J. Kitroeff

In the aftermath of years of economic and political turmoil, some Latin American states find themselves entrenched in a new kind of battle: a no holds-barred media war. The recent surge in the number of left-populist governments in power in the region has deepened polarization, with economic elites strongly opposing the new leaders’ political and economic platforms. In some cases, the media has been the primary battleground on which these broader political disputes are fought. Ecuador and Argentina are two such countries; in each, the context of the rancorous press wars merits examination, including historical causes, the implications of increasing state influence in the media, and the fierce backlash that government action has engendered.

The circumstances surrounding the media in Ecuador and Argentina are microcosms of the power struggles that define their respective political realities. In Ecuador currently, and in Argentina before the passage of the 2009 Audiovisual Service Communication Law (SCA), antiquated laws established during periods of dictatorship governed the media landscape. In both countries, the dictatorship–era laws allowed for government censorship of the press, mandated broadcasts of official messages, and facilitated almost complete control over the media by a few economic elites. With the advent of democracy, enforcement of the laws became more lax, yet in each country the private media remains concentrated in the hands of a limited number of powerful companies.

Oligopolistic owners have generally been opposed to the leftist economic and social policies implemented by President Rafael Correa in Ecuador and the dual Argentine administrations of former president Nestor Kirchner and his wife, current president Cristina Fernandez. These policies, especially changes to the tax code and steps to expand the role of the state in the economy, tend to conflict with the business interests of the media conglomerates and their investors, which in part accounts for their harsh criticism of many government programs.

Like politicians everywhere, the Correa and Fernandez governments are acutely aware of the power of the media. Both governments are highly sensitive to criticism and disinclined to compromise with media outlets, who they view as the primary opposition force in political environments characterized by disorganized opposition parties. In response to the onslaught of criticism, particularly in the television and print sectors, Correa and the Kirchners have intervened in the media in distinct ways that international observers and human rights groups describe as occasionally repressive and in some cases undemocratic.

The most significant of the efforts to expand state influence in the press have been projects to enact new media laws. Both governments claim that the principal objective of their respective communications laws is to replace ineffective dictatorship–era legislation and break up monopolies held by media giants. While Ecuador’s proposed communications law approaches the issue by “explicitly prohibiting monopolies and oligopolies in media ownership,” Argentina’s SCA seeks to diversify ownership of the press through less direct means, mainly by reforming the process by which media licenses are distributed. In mandating more frequent renewal of licenses for all media outlets and allowing a broader range of groups access to such licenses, the law promises to democratize the highly concentrated private media. While many civil society actors consider these goals to be legitimate—even opposition groups recognize the importance of revising old media regulations—the legitimacy of various provisions in the laws are disputed. 

Of most concern in Argentina is the implementation of new licensing requirements established in the SCA. The opposition contends that tasking the distribution of licenses to a broadcast regulatory body whose members are appointed by a process that “ensure[s] ruling party control”, promises to tighten the government’s grip on the media and limit press freedom. Opposition to the Ecuadorian communications law has been serious enough to stall debate and a final reading in the National Assembly for months. Opposition forces and international human rights groups’ critique has centered around the vague wording of stipulations that critics say pave the way for the regulation of information disseminated by news outlets by a communications council that, like the SCA’s regulatory committee, will have close links to the incumbent government. Press freedom advocates also call for the revision of articles that require high educational qualifications in order to work in journalism.

Less concretely, criticism of both laws essentially amounts to a fear that their implementation could result in too much state control over the press. Given the constant attacks on the private media by both the Correa government and both Kirchner administrations, these suspicions are not entirely unfounded. Since 2008, both Kirchner and Fernandez have been engaged in what has become a vicious personal battle with the media conglomerate Grupo Clarin, which owns 73% of all broadcast licenses in Argentina as well as the nation’s most prominent newspaper. The government has subjected the company to an onslaught of tax audits, accused its owner of adopting babies stolen during the dictatorship, and attempted to limit the circulation of its newspapers by intervening in the directorate of Prensa Papel, the newsprint paper company of which Clarín is the largest shareholder. 

The Correa government’s response to critical coverage is similarly hostile, and arguably more aggressively interventionist. Since his election in 2006, Correa has brought under state ownership three national TV stations, two prominent newspapers, and one radio broadcaster. While the state-owned  outlets affirm their independence, recent firings and resignations over journalists’ disagreement with a government program in the state-run paper El Telegrafo casts some doubt on the impartiality of the media under government control. A ferocious ad campaign designed by the regime to discredit the private media that ran during the World Cup this July only exacerbated tensions between the government and the private press.

The raging media wars in Argentina and Ecuador should be understood, therefore, as products of both structural and politically contingent elements of democracy in these countries. Rather than merely the power grab the opposition portrays them as, the contests are manifestations of longstanding political clashes between left-populist governments and the traditional economic elite. However, as citizens of almost any Latin American country can testify, governments in the region tend to use power aggressively for political ends. The heightened sensitivity of both Correa and Fernandez toward critical media coverage compounds tensions between progressive populists and the ever-powerful, right-leaning elite deeply rooted in the countries’ political and economic pasts. With the media playing such an active political role in so many countries, this combustible mix is likely to plague political systems across Latin America for years to come.

Jordan Convicts Three Former Government Officials on Charges of Corruption

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In a first for the country, Jordan convicted three former government officials on charges of corruption on July 6. The group includes a former finance minister, a senior advisor to the prime minister, and a former head executive of the state’s oil refinery, all of whom were sentenced to three years in jail after being found guilty of taking bribes from a prominent Jordanian businessman. These convictions have the potential to be a promising step forward in the country’s ongoing anticorruption efforts; however, a number of concerns must be addressed before these developments can be taken as a solid advance against corruption.

Jordan ranked #49 out of a possible 180 in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, and levels of corruption there rank favorably to those of the country’s regional peers, but corruption remains a serious impediment to transparent political and economic development in the country. Freedom House’s 2010 Countries at the Crossroads report indicated that the environment to protect against corruption, procedures and systems to enforce anticorruption laws, and the existence of anticorruption norms, standards, and protections were all lacking, resulting in a poor anticorruption and transparency score of 2.48 out of a possible 7.

It is clear that Jordanians are deeply concerned about the impact of corruption on political development. A 2008 poll conducted by Amman’s Center for Strategic Studies, for example, shed light on the perceived impact of corruption. Asked what the most prominent obstacle was to democracy in Jordan, 17.4% of respondents chose “the spread of financial and administrative corruption, favoritism and nepotism.” 

The Crossroads report details one particularly troubling element, the existence of extensive and entrenched patronage networks that distribute jobs, land, lucrative contracts, subsidies and other benefits. Jordan’s monarchy has consistently used these networks to reward allies and supporters and to withhold valuable resources and access from its detractors. Patronage networks organized along political lines are not problematic simply because they are inequitable, but are also harmful because they essentially create an informal social support system that marginalizes those that do not support the government. This has the dual effect of unduly handicapping a large proportion of the population in their access to jobs and other resources, while simultaneously eroding the government’s capacity to effectively deliver public goods to its citizenry.

The government seems to have recognized these concerns and has taken some modest steps toward reform. The king has vowed to cut corruption dramatically and created an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2006. Though the group has examined over 1,000 allegations of corruption, it is hardly independent, as the King himself appoints the commission’s six members. Jordan signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2005 and in 2006 hosted the conference of state parties to that convention. Soon after signing the convention, a number of reforms intended to increase transparency and accountability were enacted; however, continued implementation of these measures has been weak. The trial of public officials for corruption is especially rare, and the recent convictions could potentially represent an initial step toward fuller implementation of anticorruption measures.

Multiple issues call into question the true depth of Jordan’s anticorruption efforts, however, including the recent convictions. Chief among critics’ concerns about the recent convictions is that the trial took place in a special security court, as opposed to a civil court. The special status of this case could suggest that the government considers it exceptional and does not intend to make a habit of trying high-level officials. Comprehensive anticorruption reform cannot be ad hoc, but rather requires the development of a transparent and independent anticorruption system with institutionalized laws and procedures. It is troubling that the government missed an opportunity to strengthen the organizations and procedures already in place by failing to apply them in the recent case. The head of Transparency International’s Jordan chapter, Mamdouh Abbadi, seems to share this sentiment, explaining, “We do not want the government to be choosy in tackling corruption, but rather we want to see a continuing process. We would like more cases referred to the court of cassation and not a military court, which is a special court.”

The fact that journalists were barred from the court also raised concerns. Analysis of the case has been limited within the Kingdom, and the function of Jordanian media outlets in anticorruption efforts is unclear. Media actors tend to report on cases only after they have reached courts, as opposed to acting as watchdogs for corruption as it occurs.  Jordanian media laws play a role in this failure, as the criticism of a court ruling is a felony offense that carries the possibility of jail time. Not surprisingly, comprehensive in-country news analysis of corruption proceedings is rare.

Despite these and other weighty concerns, the recent convictions are promising and can hopefully be taken as a signal of more reform to come. But as experiences with high-profile convictions in many other countries indicate, unless the government seizes momentum and continues to enact and implement reforms, the impact of the convictions will remain limited.

Peruvian President Sharply Criticized for Rejection of Indigenous Consultation Law

Photo Credit: Flickr User Distra

By: Natalie J. Kitroeff

Peruvian president Alan Garcia has again outraged human rights groups, members of the political opposition, and indigenous citizens, this time by refusing to sign legislation passed by Peru’s Congress that would have expanded the role of the country’s indigenous community in decisions regarding extractive industries-linked projects on their ancestral lands. By sending the law back to Congress late on Monday, June 21—just days before a two-month recess—Garcia effectively blocked any near-term resolution of the contentious matter.

The bill, known as the Consultation Law, promised to bring the Peruvian government into compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169, which mandates consultation with indigenous peoples regarding policies that pertain to their lives and livelihoods and, more specifically, their ancestral landholdings. Though Peru has been a signatory to the convention for over 15 years, indigenous and human rights groups maintain that the government has failed to institute the mechanisms needed to comply with its provisions. The sometimes tragic implications of this institutional failure are reflected in the steep rise in social conflicts in Peru in recent years, most graphically illustrated by the violent clash between Amazonian indigenous groups and the national police in Bagua province in June 2009.

Garcia’s refusal to enact the Consultation Law represents both a missed opportunity and another spark that could potentially ignite Peru’s social powder keg. The administration’s emphasis on promoting foreign investment in resource extraction projects has ratcheted up tensions, especially among residents of the barren slopes of the Andes and those living in Peru’s vast Amazonian lowlands. According to a report released by Peru’s human rights ombudsman, as of May 2010 there are 255 social conflicts in the country, only 54 percent of which are “in the process of dialogue.” According to the report, the majority of the current disputes are related to environmental disputes, and some 40 percent of the conflicts have already generated at least one instance of political violence.

These figures reflect the government’s failure to provide effective formal channels for Peruvian citizens to make demands and enforce their rights. In the absence of such official mediation mechanisms, indigenous and other marginalized groups have long resorted to social protest as a means by which to communicate their grievances to the country’s political and social elites. Indeed, the incidence of social conflict has increased even as Peruvian GDP has expanded and poverty rates have gradually decreased, in large part due to the primacy of extractive industries in the country’s export basket. The inability of the regime to respond effectively to each seemingly local and sui generis dispute further exacerbates the problem. Absent effective mediation channels or evident political will to intervene proactively, seemingly resolvable disputes tend to become unstable and often violent. All too often, high-level dialogue fails to occur until after violence has occurred.

The confrontation between indigenous protesters and police in Bagua province on June 5, 2009 is the most dramatic example of this pattern. The clash occurred after several months of peaceful protest by various indigenous organizations in response to a set of decrees adopted by the Garcia administration that would have promoted resource extraction projects on historically indigenous lands. The groups maintained that the laws violated not only their basic human rights but also their right to be consulted on policies affecting ancestral lands, as guaranteed under ILO 169. Tensions exploded when police initiated actions to forcibly remove demonstrators from the main road leading into Bagua. While official figures claim that 23 police officers and 9 indigenous protesters were killed in the clashes, with nearly 200 additional injuries, Human Rights Watch reported that “the number of civilian deaths is still uncertain…[and] some witnesses allege law enforcement agents threw bodies of several protesters into the river.” According to both domestic and international human rights observers, the process of bringing to justice those involved in the attack has also been one-sided, with indigenous protesters receiving harsher punishment than police officers or their superiors—both police commanders and civilian politicians—with oversight responsibility during the standoff.

According to official statements released by the office of the presidency, Garcia rejected the law because it would impede national development and grant too much control over political decisions to indigenous peoples, thereby undermining the sovereign power of the state. In an effort to refute Congress and even the ILO itself— which expressed support for the law in a meeting last week—the office of the presidency released documents explaining Garcia’s objection to the legislation by citing various ways  in which it does not comply with the specific stipulations of convention 169. Analysts have noted, however, that in this document the president misconstrues the meaning behind both the ILO convention and the Consultation Law and that the objections are therefore debatable or outright unsubstantiated.

The Peruvian Congress, racked by corruption scandals and constant political maneuverings during its current term, has figured among the institutions with the lowest approval ratings in recent years. Passage of the Consultation Law, therefore, could have provided the legislature’s image a boost. More importantly, it represented a groundbreaking step toward establishing the formal channels for the state to engage in dialogue with indigenous and other local communities prior to the initiation of major projects—a step utterly necessary to stem further social conflict. Garcia’s objections to the law have been criticized by observers as indicative of the leadership’s resistance to granting indigenous groups any sort of institutionalized influence over political decision-making processes. Rejecting this law on the eve of a two-month congressional recess suggests that Garcia is more concerned with avoiding rather than resolving the issue. This response is indicative of the significant obstacles, in terms of both institutional capacity and political will, that continue to hinder Peru’s progress toward overcoming the wide social, economic, and political breaches that hinder its progress toward improved democratic governance.

Indonesian Sex Tape Scandal Reopens Debate on Free Speech

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On June 23, Indonesian pop star Nazril “Ariel” Ilham was arrested for his appearance in two sex tapes that since early June have been distributed rapidly throughout the country via social networking sites and cell phones. He was charged under both the 2008 Anti-Pornography law and the Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which provides for sanctions of up to six years imprisonment for the electronic dissemination of insulting information. In response to the scandal, government officials have expressed their desire to revisit the issue of internet controls. In February of this year, a bill imposing stricter regulations on the internet was introduced, but it was ultimately shelved due to substantial civil society opposition. When commenting on the scandal, Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring of the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party spoke of plans to introduce a filter to block internet users from accessing sites featuring pornography, blasphemy, gambling, and violence. Furthermore, President Susilo Yudhoyono stated, “We have increasingly realized that our nation should not stay naked and be crushed by the information technology frenzy, because there will be many victims.” The House commission in charge of information and defense then ordered the Ministry of Information to resume work on a draft internet content regulation measure. In addition, the government also responded to the incident by sending out teams to set up firewalls in over 2,000 internet cafes, authorizing school officials to search students’ cell phones for the tapes, and beginning to remove online links to the videos. While some Indonesians supported the government’s efforts to protect the morality of the country’s internet users, others expressed fears that freedoms of speech and information were being violated. Meanwhile, Ariel and his girlfriend claim to be the victims of defamation, stating that the tapes were fabricated as a form of character assassination.

The response to the sex tape scandal highlights the presence of strong crosscurrents in Indonesian society and politics when it comes to issues related to freedoms of the press and expression. When social issues are at play, the sparring often pits those who promote the adoption of Sharia law-inspired norms in the country, which is 85 percent Muslim, against those who promote secularism. This tension is playing a part in the current scandal, and Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party have been at the forefront of the calls to impose new censorship regulations in order to protect societal morality. The scandal also sparked nationwide protests by conservative Islamic groups condemning the celebrities’ behavior. The still-lingering legacies of the Suharto dictatorship, which came to an end in 1998, also fuel these tensions and complicate democratic progress, as longstanding law and  undemocratic practices, which often serve the interests of the same political elite that have dominated Indonesian politics for decades, face resistance from reformers and a burgeoning civil society.

The tensions regarding internet freedom are illustrative of similar complications regarding Indonesia’s progress on media freedom in general. It is important to note that Indonesia’s media environment is generally free. Since the end of the dictatorship, the country’s media landscape has become increasingly vibrant. Independent media outlets have grown from 300 to 800 since 1998, and the government has recently passed laws to better protect media freedom, one of which notably removed a provision allowing for punishment for slander against the government. Nevertheless, restrictions remain, especially within the legal environment, which is still marred by frequently employed criminal defamation laws. The government has even expanded the penalties for criminal defamation in recent years, most notably through the 2008 Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which increased prison terms and fines for those who commit defamation online. In addition, the antipornography law provides for journalists, along with ordinary citizens, to be jailed for disseminating pornography, which is vaguely defined as “any means of public communication or demonstration which stimulates sexual arousal and/or infringe public moral.” And although the 2008 Freedom to Access Public Information Law marked an important advance, it sets out a one-year jail term for those who “misuse” information. This legal environment has resulted in infringements on the rights of journalists and ordinary citizens alike. In one extreme case in February, 18-year-old Farah Nur Arafah was convicted of defamation and received a suspended jail sentence for calling a friend a “pig” and a “dog” on Facebook. This follows the 2009 case of Prita Mulyasari, who was jailed after an email message in which she claimed that a hospital had misdiagnosed her mumps was made public, prompting the hospital to sue.

In addition to regulating general media content, the government has acted to restrict reporting on certain contentious issues, most notably the separatist movements in Papua and the southern Molucca islands. For example, a French journalist who was filming a peaceful student protest in Papua was arrested earlier this month for allegedly attempting to portray Indonesia in a negative light by filming an illegal protest. A similar case occurred in 2009, when four Dutch journalists were detained for covering a demonstration held without a permit. Unsurprisingly, domestic residents who voice separatist sentiments face even harsher limits on freedom of expression. A recent Human Rights Watch report on political prisoners in Papua and the Moluccas revealed that over 100 activists are currently imprisoned for peacefully expressing their pro-independence views.

While Indonesia has made great strides towards consolidating democratic practices in the short period of time that has passed since the end of the dictatorship, Indonesia’s leaders must ensure that further improvement on key governance issues does not become a casualty of the political tensions explored above. In addition to the battles over freedom of speech, Indonesia has yet to adequately address such daunting challenges as rampant corruption and weak rule of law, all of which will require enormous time, effort, resources and political will. Democratic transitions always bring a wide array of political issues, some of which inevitably lend themselves to deep culture clashes or even demagoguery. Finding ways to address these political tensions while maintaining pluralism and protecting basic principles will be a long-term project.

Castresana Resigns, the Fight Against Corruption in Guatemala Intensifies

By Natalie J. Kitroeff

Carlos Castresana, the Spanish judge at the helm of the UN International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption in Guatemala (CICIG), resigned from his post on June 7th, striking a major blow to efforts at combating corruption and the growing influence of organized crime in the fragile country. Explaining his sudden decision, Castresana cited unwillingness on the part of the administration of President Alvaro Colom to implement important recommendations made by the CICIG, most recently with regard to the appointment of Conrado Reyes to the position of Attorney General. Castresana has accused Reyes of maintaining close ties with Guatemala’s organized criminals, particularly those involved with narcotrafficking and illegal adoption, and in a press conference following his resignation called on Colom to remove Reyes from his post immediately.

Another proximate cause of Castresana’s resignation appears to be the smear campaign launched against the judge, an effort that intensified in the aftermath of the CICIG’s arrest and prosecution of ex-president Alfonso Portillo on charges of money laundering in January. According to Castresana, powerful groups have tried to publicly discredit his character and cast a shadow on the work of the CICIG, which has begun to chip away at their long-held political dominance through its removal of more than 1,700 police officers connected to organized crime and arrest of 140 corrupt officials over the past three years. While these are only small steps toward dismantling the sophisticated organized crime networks that have penetrated the Guatemalan government, judiciary, and penal system, they represent critical first steps toward confronting the entrenched power of these groups.

The strong link between politics and crime in Guatemala is rooted in legacies of the country’s 36-year civil conflict that ended with the signing of peace accords in 1996. During the conflict, many members of the military erected criminal networks that continue to operate behind the scenes, untouched by institutions that have proven highly vulnerable to corruption and informal influence. The notable presence of former soldiers and army officers in positions of political power, a phenomenon that is in part a result of the justice system’s failure to hold ex-combatants accountable for human rights abuses, further guarantees unfettered access by shadowy figures into positions of political and economic power. With only 2 percent of crimes ever solved in Guatemala, impunity is both a symptom and a cause of the continued involvement of public officials in criminal activities.

Given the lack of deterrence, corruption has unsurprisingly become a structural feature of politics in Guatemala. Despite marginal improvements in the area of anticorruption and transparency since 2006, the Guatemala report in Freedom House’s Countries at the Crossroads 2010 edition reflects the formidable challenges the government still faces if it wants to confront the country’s deeply ingrained culture of corruption. The extradition and arrest of former president Portillo and the resignation of Eduardo Meyer Maldonado from Congress in 2008 represent rare examples of public officials held accountable for the abuse of public office for personal gain, as the embezzlement of government money represents a common source of corruption in the country. Despite these high-profile examples, the effect of widespread corruption and virtual impunity for those involved in illicit dealings has been to corrode national institutions and impede effective democratic governance in Guatemala.

In recognition of the inability of domestic institutions to tackle these pervasive problems, the UN Secretary General and the Guatemalan government agreed to set up an international commission to address corruption in general, and the illegal activities of clandestine security groups in particular.  Established in 2007 in spite of resistance on the part of powerful sectors of Guatemalan society, the CICIG represents the country’s best hope of dismantling the organized crime networks that hold Guatemalan institutions hostage. Charged with investigating the operations of clandestine security groups as well as assisting in the prosecution of their members, the commission’s mandate is broad relative to tribunals of its kind in other contexts. As a result of its ability to effect institutional reform and bring individuals involved in organized crime to justice, the CICIG has been touted as a “model worth replicating in other states seeking international assistance to strengthen the rule of law”. Though its enforcement capabilities are limited, and its recommendations have not always been enacted by the Oscar Berger (2004-08) or Colom (2008-) administrations, observers note the positive influence the commission has had in strengthening institutional capacity to implement the rule of law in Guatemala.

Castresana’s resignation is indicative of the challenges that persist for the CICIG – specifically, the lack of political will to institute real reform and the power held by criminal networks intent on undermining the progress the commission has made thus far. There is, however, a silver lining to this otherwise troubling turn of events. In response to Castresana’s plea for the ousting of Reyes, the international community and civil society groups found common cause in applying considerable pressure on the Colom government to comply with the demand. The mobilization of these groups achieved its desired effect, as the Constitutional Court, acting in accordance with its mandate to uphold the rule of law, ruled to dismiss Reyes just three days after Castresana’s resignation in a rare, and therefore impressive, display of institutional responsiveness to Guatemalan citizens. The ability of civic groups to collaborate with each other and with the international community, as well as the responsiveness of the country’s political leadership, are demonstrative of the gains registered in terms of the struggle for accountability and the fight against corruption in Guatemala. It appears, therefore, that this brief period of political crisis has not undermined the credibility of the CICIG—and in fact may have strengthened it by illustrating the ongoing need for its assessments. Indeed, if Guatemalan institutional powers cooperate with the new commissioner, the CICIG may yet continue to bolster the country’s potential to consolidate democratic governance.

The Ever Increasing Expansion of China's Internet Controls

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While Google’s departure from China generated the headlines and international attention, recent months have also witnessed other important developments related to the expansion and institutionalization of internet controls in China. The People’s Republic already has the most sophisticated, multilayered internet control apparatus in the world. In April 2009 Freedom House published a pilot study of digital media freedom in 15 countries. The findings on  China highlighted the fact that not only is there pervasive filtering of political and religious content, but also extensive “outsourcing” of censorship to private companies and proactive “guidance” of online discussion by government-paid agents.

Control is not absolute: in particular, one aspect of the internet landscape that contributes positively to free expression is users’ ability to anonymously post comments online. Despite the party-state’s sophisticated content controls, the sheer volume of internet traffic and the speed with which information can spread has created some space for exposés of local government malfeasance and open political discussion. In one case in August 2009, a local newspaper in Shaanxi published a short article about lead poisoning among children caused by pollution from a nearby smelting plant. The popular web portal Netease quickly reposted the story (portals are barred from producing their own content), drawing national attention to the incident. However, in response to this and other incidents where news reflecting poorly on government oversight spread quickly, both central and local authorities have taken steps to boost the effectiveness of internet controls.

Looking at developments in recent months, there have been several notable trends regarding the new media environment and regulatory framework:

•    Institutionalizing “outsourcing”: In practice, most internet service and mobile phone providers cooperate closely with the authorities to monitor users, censor content, and transmit private communications to security forces upon request. This is either because the providers are state-controlled or because they face license revocation if they do not comply. Nonetheless, as the system is not foolproof (in some cases, due to intentional “negligence” on the part of moderators), the government has taken measures to strengthen provider liability with the force of law. On April 29, the National People’s Congress passed an amendment to the state secrets law requiring internet service providers and operators to work closely with security officials on investigating leaks of “state secrets.” The new amendment states that internet companies must immediately block any leak they encounter and report the violation to state authorities or else face punishment. The amendments did little to clarify the vague and arbitrary process for defining “state secrets,” a term that has been applied to a wide range of content and used to sentence activists to long prison terms without due process.

•    Increased restrictions on anonymity: For months, information has been circulating that news websites had begun requiring real name registration for users wishing to post comments on articles. On April 30, Wang Chen, head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO, one of the primary bodies overseeing internet controls), verified for the first time that major news and business portals had indeed implemented a new no-anonymous comment rule. He also announced that the authorities intend to extend the practice to other sites including online forums and chat rooms and are currently “exploring an identity authentication system” for such websites. In a similar development, a March 19 article in the Chongqing Evening News reported that the local political-legal committee was preparing to implement a new program that would subject microblogs, cell phone text messages, and some forms of instant messaging to monitoring. The plan would also reportedly require real name registration by users logging into such services. Though the full details and timeline of the plan are not yet clear, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “this is the first time [real name registration] regulations are being applied to microblogs and QQ groups [a form of instant messaging], two of the most popular forms of online communication in China.”

•    Creation of another Internet control agency: In mid-April, the Chinese government confirmed that it had created two new entities under the SCIO: Bureau 8, which would regulate foreign news and information outlets doing business in China, and Bureau 9, a new Internet News Coordination Bureau. The latter joins Bureau 5, which until now was the SCIO’s only arm dealing solely with online content. According to the New York Times, the old bureau will continue its work pushing the party line on domestic websites, while the new one will likely devote its efforts to monitoring user-generated content, particularly social networking sites and online forums, which have been harder for the government to control than news sites. An official statement announcing the bureau’s creation described its responsibilities as “’guidance, coordination and other work related to the construction and management of Web culture.’”

•    Decentralization of online monitoring and manipulation: In addition to central agencies expanding their capacity to control online content, local governments—often seeking to limit exposure of official malfeasance—have been ramping up their own internet control apparatus. The above-mentioned monitoring plan in Chongqing is to be implemented by local police forces. Meanwhile, as officials realize that they cannot censor everything undesirable that appears on the web, a key element of their internet control strategy in recent years has been to proactively manipulate online discussions using government-paid commentators. These are often termed the “50 Cent Party,” a reference to the small payment received for each progovernment posting. According to David Bandurksi of the China Media Project: “Internet commentators…have now been trained up and used by all sorts of government units at all levels, and they are one of the most open dirty secrets of Internet control in China.” Bandurski goes on to describe how on May 18, several news outlets reported that Guangzhou’s corps of “city inspectors,” a security agency whose officers have been criticized for their sometimes brutal methods of enforcing order, would likely be receiving its own squad of internet commentators. The head of Guangzhou’s City Inspectors Committee, Li Yangui, was quoted as saying that the team’s goal would be to “track and analyze online public opinion, preventing the spread of undesirable information and thereby generating positive guidance of public opinion.”  In a similar vein, Lanzhou’s Western Business Post reported in January that the Gansu’s provincial authorities had decided to establish a squad of 650 online progovernment commentators.

These developments raise a number of questions related to governance – how much do these added resources cost? What public services might the funds otherwise be dedicated towards? How many users will be more likely to face retribution for their online writings given fewer possibilities for anonymity? How many items of public interest—from information about tainted food products to environmental disasters to the torture of petitioners or the harmlessness of Falun Gong practitioners—won’t be posted and circulated because potential authors fear repercussions if they must use their real names?

The answers to these questions are not easily found. But one governance-related point is certain – the authorities don’t necessarily want users to know about these new restrictions on privacy and free expression. Indeed, as an indication of the opacity surrounding censorship decisions in China, party and government bodies issued censorship directives to restrict comments and circulation of the very news items announcing the above developments.

 On April 28, the government reportedly banned the media from “hyping content” referencing the internet-related amendments to the state secrets law and ordered that all such discussions be deleted from forums and news comment spaces. In January, shortly after its publication, the above-mentioned news story from the Western Business Post was quickly “expunged from the Internet.” According to Jonathan Ansfield of the New York Times, the head of the new bureau under the SCIO had participated in meetings with foreign diplomats and Chinese officials for weeks, but public acknowledgment of the structural change came only in early April after the Times queried the government about the new agency.

The officials’ desire to restrict publicity of the expansion of internet controls is not surprising. Beyond the Communist Party’s general tendency towards secrecy, such wariness responds at least in part to past experiences, when notice of new restrictions prompted significant popular backlash and ultimately, forced retraction of controls. One of the most dramatic examples was the Green Dam fiasco last year. In May 2009, the government announced regulations that would require the installation of censorship and surveillance software called Green Dam Youth Escort on all computers sold in China. Activists, lawyers, and ordinary users mobilized quickly to protest the directive. With added pressure from the international business community and human rights groups, the authorities were forced to withdraw the orders in June, though installation reportedly continued in schools and internet cafés.

So what might the future hold? As Qian Gang of the China Media Project explains: “China’s Internet is a chaotic space. There are times when controls are more strict, and other times when controls momentarily relax. Some places in China are controlled more tightly by local party leaders, while others are more open.”

“The only true constant is the government’s determination to exercise control.”

Corruption Aggravates Flailing Ugandan AIDS Fight

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A recent New York Times article examined Uganda’s deteriorating war against AIDS. Major clinics have begun to deny treatment as funds from the U.S. and other international donors have dried up due to both the global economic recession’s impact on donors and frustration with the course of the war against the incurable disease, which now affects 33 million people worldwide. In the face of this fatiguing challenge, major donors such as the United States and Great Britain have shifted their attention to diseases that are more treatable and cheaper to combat, especially child-killers like diarrhea and measles. However, another reason for the freeze on U.S. funding for AIDS in Uganda is the lack of transparency in the distribution of funds. In fact, the U.S. considered increasing Uganda’s funding by $38 million, but decided against it after Ugandan ministers were found to be siphoning off funds received from other donors. Although the ministers were forced to pay back the money, they were not jailed for their crimes. The entire situation is a particularly tragic example of Uganda’s serious corruption problem and its deleterious effects.

Corruption in Uganda is endemic, especially within the public sector, where the line between the official and private interests of government officers is blurred. Several high profile abuse of office cases have surfaced in Uganda in the past few years, many of which involved the theft of public health funds. From 2006-2009, several Ugandan ministers were accused of diverting money donated by global health organizations, prompting an important lender, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, to end two grants. However, the problem is not unique to the public health sector. Ugandan officials have also been implicated in the diversion of funds from the army and the National Social Security Fund. Public corruption is also strongly linked to shoddy procurement practices, which are estimated to cost the government roughly $100 million a year and recently led important donors such as the U.S., the EU, and the World Bank to voice concerns that Uganda’s newly discovered oil reserves will not trickle down to Ugandan citizens but instead be lost to corruption. Furthermore, graft occurs not only at the high levels of government, but extends to local government institutions, where district councils are prone to misusing government money earmarked for rural development and demanding bribes in return for basic services. All of these facets of Uganda’s corruption problem serious harm the country’s development prospects. 

According to the Countries at the Crossroads report on Uganda, the government has made some preliminary attempts to address this problem, largely by reinforcing its institutional anticorruption framework through such measures as the creation of the Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court. The government of President Yoweri Museveni has also for the most part allowed the Inspectorate of Government, the main anticorruption body, to act independently in an energetic recent campaign against corruption, during which it arrested 37 officials and seized public assets that were diverted by officials for their personal use. However, laws governing corruption in Uganda are unevenly enforced, with justice dispensed according to political considerations and thereby failing to challenge a culture in which high-level corruption is generally tolerated. Hence the country’s abysmal performance in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranked Uganda 130 out of 180 countries.

As the current shortage of funding for AIDS demonstrates, the consequences of Uganda’s failure to promote a climate of transparency and accountability are severe. In this case and in others, Uganda’s corruption problem has had a concrete effect on citizens’ lives and well being. Ugandans with AIDS have been turned away from hospitals due to drug shortages, with the attendant ill effects on their personal health but also indirect effects: denied coverage leads to drug sharing among family members and accelerated development of drug-resistant AIDS strains. Given foreign aid’s perennial political unpopularity in many donor nations, recession-induced fiscal retrenchment might well have caused a reduction in funds regardless. However, tales of graft and misdirected funds provide a basis for arguments that such assistance is a “waste” of taxpayer money. Moreover, Uganda’s failure to increase its efforts to combat corruption may lead donors to reconsider a broader range of assistance efforts, including the fight against other diseases as well as other social or economic projects. 

Unfortunately, similar corruption issues were identified in most of the African countries examined in Crossroads’ 2010 edition. While the gravity of these countries’ graft problems varies, comprehensive steps towards uprooting corruption have generally been absent. Indeed, from 2006-2010, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Kenya, and South Africa all registered declines in their Anticorruption and Transparency scores. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe improved their scores slightly, but both remain at extremely low levels. Only Tanzania was singled out as having made notable progress, and even then, it remains highly vulnerable to ongoing graft. Other countries may thus soon find themselves in the same situation as Uganda as donors take pause before disbursing scarce funds to countries with poor transparency and corruption records. The course of the global economy is largely out of the hands of most developing countries, so economic downturns will always carry the risk of donor cutbacks. But states that fail to adequately assure clean government allow donors to more easily rationalize such decisions. Due to the particularly daunting challenge posed by AIDS, funds for treatment could be especially at risk. In the New York Times article cited above, Ambassador Eric Goosby, the U.S. global AIDS coordinator, stated, “I’m worried we’ll be in a ‘Kampala situation’ in other countries soon.” One can only hope that part of the Kampala lesson is that other countries’ domestic effort to encourage corruption-free governance is seen as an essential part of the fight.

Oaxaca Ambush Highlights Another Governance Challenge for Mexico

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Drug-related violence has dominated recent reporting on Mexico. However, in addition to the country’s struggle with organized crime networks, multiple governance issues continue to hamper political, social, and economic progress. Two areas of persistent deficits are minority issues, particularly indigenous rights, which are often violated despite Mexico’s formal recognition of its “multicultural” status; and a lack of democratic accountability at the state level. 

A recent attack on humanitarian workers in Oaxaca state illustrates the severity of these problems. On April 27, gunmen attacked a convoy of 25 Mexican and European activists who were bringing food and supplies to the inhabitants of San Juan Copala, a self-defined autonomous indigenous community that has been under siege since January by a paramilitary group known as the Union for the Wellbeing of the Triqui Region (UBISORT). The militia has been tied to the state-level Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the party that led Mexico unchallenged between 1929 and 2000 and continues to reign in Oaxaca under the leadership of Governor Ulises Ruiz. Of the 25 workers, two were shot and killed: Jyri Jaakkola, a Finnish human rights observer, and Beatriz Alberta Carino, the director of a local NGO. At least two others were injured, and six were missing. Four of the missing persons, including two missing journalists, surfaced on Thursday. A survivor reported that the attackers revealed themselves as members of UBISORT and claimed to act with the governor’s support. The identity and motive of the group, however, have not been verified, and the state government has denied involvement. 

The incident focuses attention on the complicated situation in San Juan Copala, where a struggle pits indigenous movements against pro-government paramilitaries, powerful local political caciques, and the Ruiz-led state government, as well as each other. Violence in the area erupted following the formation of San Juan Copala in 2007 as an autonomous indigenous territory comprised of 5 municipalities dominated by the Independent Movement for Triqui Unity and Struggle (MULTI), along with 15 other Triqui municipalities sympathetic to the MULTI. The remaining 16 Triqui municipalities are predominantly controlled by the Movement for Triqui Unity and Struggle (MULT), a rival Triqui movement from which the MULTI split in 2006, and remained outside the autonomous territory. The Triqui autonomy movement seeks to secure political, social, and cultural rights long denied to locals by the Oaxaca state government. Indeed, the Triqui region is one of the most marginalized in what is already one of Mexico’s poorest states. The MULTI has allied itself with the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO), a radical association comprised of 300 local organizations that oppose the government due to the failure of local institutions and officials to promote development and social welfare, along with the government’s rampant corruption problem, its suppression of opposition voices, and its generally undemocratic structure. In Oaxaca, politics continues to be dominated by rivalries between local caciques who fight for state resources and control within the PRI. Other states’ governance is similarly tarnished, and the more poor and remote the territory, the weaker state presence—let alone effective institutions—is likely to be. These areas, however, are where the highest concentrations of indigenous Mexicans are often found, setting the stage for abuses against a broad range of political, social, economic, and cultural rights.

Since its formation, San Juan Copala has been subject to sieges and violent attacks by the UBISORT, which contests the autonomy of the municipality and the authority of its elected officials. The municipality’s existence as a legal entity has also been rejected by the government. State authorities have failed to address the longstanding conflict, which has allowed the situation to escalate and fueled the popular belief that the UBISORT is acting with either the tacit approval or the direct support of the government. At the end of last year, pro-government media outlets began to spread word that San Juan Copala had ceased to exist, an assertion the community’s authorities repeatedly disputed. Meanwhile, violence and tension increased at the end of last year, and a siege has left San Juan Copala’s inhabitants without basic services in recent months. Nineteen people have been killed since November 2009.

In the aftermath of the recent attack, the government has not yet evidenced a greater willingness to respond to the violence. The Washington Office on Latin America has reported that government authorities did not enter the area of the attack until the day after it occurred. In addition, state authorities initially denied knowledge of any disappearances following the attack and refused to organize a rescue. Instead, state authorities have faulted the humanitarian workers for bringing about the attacks by putting themselves in a dangerous situation and even implicated Gabino Cue Monteagudo, the opposition candidate for state governor, in the attack. Following the incident, Evencio Martinez, the Oaxaca state secretary of the interior, stated that “whoever organized this caravan will have to answer for it, whoever invited these people ... without taking precautions, because I think these people did not know what the situation and problems in the area were….They [the caravan members] will have to answer, too, for having accepted the invitation." In turn, Governor Ruiz remarked that “they are people who work with the opposition candidate, the opposition candidate has shown that he supports the APPO, that he supports violence, that he supports these type of situations that, instead of making proposals to transform the state…”

This is not the first time human rights issues have engulfed Ruiz’s administration. As Amnesty International states, “Oaxaca authorities have for many years been unwilling to investigate grave human rights violations in that State.” For example, at least 20 people were killed by state police and an armed pro-government group during a series of anti-government demonstrations organized by the APPO in the second half of 2006 that sought to force Governor Ruiz to resign. Among those killed was American journalist Brad Will. The state’s negligence in the investigation of Will’s murder is illustrative. While evidence implicated a group of pro-government gunmen in the murder, the state failed to fully investigate the men, instead imprisoning Juan Manuel Martinez, an APPO activist who was eventually exonerated in February 2010. Human rights groups have alleged that the armed men were never charged due to ties between the group and Governor Ruiz.

Importantly, the federal government has also failed to fully investigate the 2006 violence and hold the Ruiz government accountable for human rights violations. In February 2008, the attorney general announced that it would shelve investigations into the cases of seven victims of the protest violence due to a lack of evidence. Later that year, the attorney general also rejected the National Human Rights Commission’s judgment that the Oaxaca state investigation into Brad Will’s murder was shoddy. In January 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that Governor Ruiz was responsible for violating individual human rights guarantees during the 2006 violence. However, the decision failed to set out any punishment and lacked coercive power due to a constitutional provision that limits the court’s power to investigating and identifying public officials who violate the rights of Mexican citizens rather than determining sanctions, a task that is reserved for executive and legislative authorities at the federal and state levels. Such authorities have failed to act on the ruling, empowering Ruiz to act with impunity. The Oaxaca case thus highlights the federal government’s failure to hold state authorities accountable for their abuses.

The situation in Oaxaca points to several problems restraining Mexico’s democratic advancement. Although Mexico has made gains toward promoting party pluralism and electoral accountability at the federal level, similar progress has not been achieved in the states. In at least 13 of Mexico’s 31 states, the PRI has yet to suffer gubernatorial defeat. States such as Oaxaca essentially remain fiefdoms, with little democratic accountability, making attempts to promote good governance at the subnational level exceedingly difficult. The federal government ostensibly has power to rein in rogue governors, but has failed to challenge local power holders in a number of places, Oaxaca among them.  In a positive recent development, the Mexican Senate recently passed a human rights law that would enshrine protections upheld by the American Convention on Human Rights into the Mexican constitution and limit the use of force by security forces in operations against organized crime. However, the Oaxaca government’s response to the human rights in San Juan Copala, which has been tainted by denial and indifference, underscores the fact that any attempt to advance comprehensive human rights reform in the country will be seriously hindered unless a culture of greater accountability is fostered at all government levels.

Deadlines and Deadlock Push Nepal toward the Brink

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On May 1, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Nepal’s main opposition party, plans to launch a nationwide protest against the ruling government in support of a new “national government for peace” and a “people’s constitution.” The aim of the protests, which the Maoists assure will be peaceful, is to force current prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal out of office—thereby opening the door for the formation of a Maoist-led government—and ensure that a new constitution is drafted by the May 28 deadline. If Kumar’s ouster is not achieved, the Maoists will initiate an indefinite general strike on May 2 that will shut down businesses, schools, and roads. This impending political unrest is linked to the expiration of the interim constitution on May 28. In April 2008, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected as an interim body with a two-year term in which to draft a new constitution. As the deadline approaches, however, it has become increasingly probable that the CA will be unable to complete the new constitution, each article of which must be approved by a two-thirds majority. On April 15, Jhala Nath Khanal, the chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist-Leninist Party (CPN-UML), which has jointly headed the government along with the Nepali Congress party since 2009, became the first leader to admit this fact, stating that “it is not possible to produce the constitution if we follow the procedures of the CA, in view of differences among the political parties over crucial provisions to be enshrined in the new statute.”

Heated disputes between the Maoists, whose party is the largest in the CA with 38 percent of the seats, and the ruling party coalition have been the norm since Nepal transitioned from a monarchy to a democratic republic in 2008. The political evolution of the Maoists, who transitioned from a rebel faction in Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil war to the country’s ruling party in 2008, has been a tumultuous one.  During their period of rule from August 2008-May 2009, the Maoists continuously behaved as if still engaged in a civil war, using threats of renewed revolution to promote their agenda. Several opponents and observers have accused the Maoists of opposing party pluralism, instead favoring a system with communist facets. Furthermore, the party often seemed to flout its commitment to democratic ideals, interfering in the judiciary by appointing pro-Maoist candidates to posts and dismissing criminal cases against Maoist cadres. Nepal’s other major parties proved unable or unwilling to work productively with the Maoists, partly due to the existence of debilitating internal problems including their exclusive, non-democratic nature, their failure to develop cohesive policy platforms and agendas, and their weak ties to the electorate. Ultimately, the Maoist prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, or Prachanda, resigned after his attempt to dismiss army chief Rookmangud Katawal due to his opposition to the integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepalese Army prompted the president to intervene and two parties to desert the Maoist-led ruling coalition, leaving the coalition with a minority. As the Countries at the Crossroads 2010 report notes, this clash was illustrative of the weakness of Nepal’s institutional checks and balances.  Since their exit from government leadership, the Maoists, led by Prachanda, have remained uncooperative, organizing several protests against a coalition government they accuse of thwarting the peace process. As such, the government has been frequently paralyzed.

Such political antics have undermined the country’s ability to build democratic institutions and address post-conflict challenges, especially within the realm of rule of law. Although formal civilian control over the military was established in 2006, the army has retained some autonomy, and not much progress has been made toward the integration of some 21,000 Maoist cadres into the Nepalese Army. Furthermore, crime and insecurity remain dire concerns, especially in the unstable Terai region. In addition, few efforts have been made to address the crimes committed during the civil war, partly due to the fact that the parties have used this continued lack of accountability to shield their leaders and loyalists. In addition, little progress has been made on the restitution of lands that were seized during the civil war, the majority of which remain in Maoist hands.

Most importantly, partisan wrangling has consistently thwarted the CA process, which is meant to determine crucial institutional issues. Constitutional debate has deteriorated into mud-slinging as the Maoists argue that the ruling coalition is abandoning Nepal’s marginalized sectors in the new constitution; opponent counter that the Maoist aim is to destroy the CA process, keep their own army, and ultimately take over the state.  Major issues on which the two groups have failed to come to agreement include the questions of a presidential or parliamentary system and whether the country’s federal structure should be ethnically- or geographically-based (the Maoists favor the former).  As a result, the process has deadlocked, setting the stage for escalation. Ordinary Nepalese citizens, meanwhile, have become increasingly disillusioned with their government and skeptical of the possibility that a new constitution will ever be agreed on. As former parliamentary speaker Daman Dhungana states, “In the public eye, most of the leaders and their parties are already a discredited lot.”

A peaceful and timely resolution to Nepal’s dangerous predicament is still possible. Some optimistic experts argue that a provision in the interim constitution allows the current government to remain in place, while others claim that the interim constitution will retain its authority until the new constitution is completed. However, another group contests these claims, arguing that the CA cannot amending the interim constitution, and that the failure to deliver a new constitution by May 28 would bring about the end of power for the CA and the government it oversees, plunging the country into a crisis of leadership.  Regardless of legalities, the Maoists have expressed their strong opposition to any extension of the CA and the government unless Kumar resigns.

The failure of Nepal’s parties to cooperate now seriously threatens the survival of Nepal’s nascent democracy. A political vacuum and the eruption of renewed violence are distinct possibilities if the deadline is not met. While Maoist leaders have remained formally committed to completing the constitution before May 28, their confrontational tactics put the sincerity of their dedication to promoting Nepali democracy and peace in doubt. Furthermore, in apparent contradiction to their pledges to oppose the government exclusively through nonviolent means, there have been reports that Maoist cadres have begun to ramp up their combat training in preparation for a major falling out.  In the past few days, several European nations, the United States, and Nepali citizens have urged Nepal’s political parties to work together to avoid the looming crisis by reaching agreement on a draft version of the new constitution. In the face of such pressure, Nepal’s major parties agreed on April 28 to increase their efforts to move past deadlock. The CPN-UML offered to renounce its leadership in the government if the parties are able to satisfactorily address all major issues and the Maoists agree to cancel their strike. In turn, the Maoists agreed to call off the strike if consensus on all major issues is reached by April 30. While the last ditch effort to compromise is encouraging, the parties are left with mere days to resolve differences they have been consistently unable to tackle throughout the CA’s mandate.