COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Shadows Over the Horn: Press Freedom in Eritrea

Photo: Eritrean Prison

Eritrea remains the only country in Africa not to have a single private news agency.  In a surprisingly frank and lengthy recent interview with Sweden’s Tv4, Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afewerki, attacked independent journalists in his country “as funded by the CIA.”  President Afewerki brushed off questions about jailed journalist Dawit Isaak, an Eritrean with Swedish nationality, stating that Sweden has “no right” to raise the issue. The President said that Sweden’s demands for more accountability surrounding the case was “part of a larger campaign waged by the CIA against Eritrea.” Regarding the case of Isaak, President Afewerki, obviously annoyed by the interviewer’s insistence, said “I don’t even care, I don’t even know what he is doing. He did a big mistake and he is accountable for what he did and I don’t waste time knowing what he is doing.” As for a free and fair trial, Afewerki replied, “We will not release him nor take him to trial. We know how to deal with him and others like him.”

Indeed, Eritrea has dealt with journalists in some of the most harsh and brutal ways of any nation in recent years. Starting in 2001, all independent media was closed and journalists were targeted in a widespread campaign to suppress freedom of expression and, more particularly, criticism of the ruling party, which was deemed “harmful to national security.” Afewerki, a former guerilla commander who helped secure his country’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has become Africa’s largest jailer of journalists and fourth largest worldwide after China, Cuba, and Burma. Though estimates are difficult given government secrecy and repression, Reporters without Borders has reported that there were at least 17 journalists imprisoned in Eritrea at the start of 2009. In addition, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, several journalists have died in custody since the 2001 crackdown. Moreover, countless others have fled the country into Sudan.

One of the latest journalists to be imprisoned is Daniel Kibrom, a journalist employed by Eritrea’s state-owned Eri TV. Kibrom has been held since October 2006 in a prison camp in the south of the country, where he is serving a sentence of five years of forced labor for trying to cross the border into Ethiopia, according to a report by Reporters Without Borders. According to a former prison guard who escaped Eritrea, Kibrom is likely working on a farm or quarry owned by a party elite or Afewerki ally.

In another incident in February 2009, Eritrean authorities ordered a raid on the premises of Radio Bana, a small station in the heart of the capital that puts out educational programs under the sponsorship of the education ministry. Its entire staff of around 50 journalists were arrested and taken without explanation.  Some of the staff were released, but several remain in custody.

Eritrea was also put on Reporters without Borders’ Internet Enemies list due to the government’s insistence on blocking foreign news websites and blogs critical of the regime and its monitoring of internet cafes with armed guards. Moreover, attacks on press freedom are only one of a series of worrying trends in Eritrea. In its report State Repression and Indefinite Discrimination in Eritrea, Human Rights Watch outlines appalling human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, abysmal detention conditions, forced labor, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship. During the Tv4 interview Afewerki stated, “We will not have elections at any time like the European model. We have our own ways of allowing participation. [Elections] are not an option.” Questioning the democratic bona fides of Europe and North America, Afewerki said bluntly, “Democracy is a way of cheating people.”

Tv4’s interview with Afewerki revealed the deep-seated paranoia in which the Eritrean government operates, particularly through its sense of betrayal towards the West, which has favored Ethiopia as a strategic regional partner, and through its own antipathy towards Ethiopia, against which it fought a decades-long war of independence. In its 2007 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that “the government continued to raise the specter of Ethiopian aggression to justify its absolute control over the media.” Moreover, in 2007, Bush administration officials called Eritrea a “state-sponsor of terror,” further isolating the regime and making it suspicious of Western motives.

Though often overlooked, Eritrea has become one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Basic rights and freedoms are flouted as opposition members and members of the press are jailed or pushed into exile.  In November 2009, Eritrea will be compelled to explain its poor human rights record to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its Universal Periodic Review. One of the most important foci for the review should be Eritrea’s obligations under article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed and ratified. The review will give activists and concerned countries another opportunity to speak out against human rights violations in Eritrea and make the names of journalists imprisoned there be heard. Those names include: Mattewos Habteab, Temesgen Gebreyesus, Dawit Isaak, Isaac Abraham, Girmay Abraham, Dimtsi Hafash, Mulubrhan Habtegebriel, Meles Negusse, Fessehaye "Joshua" Yohannes (presumed dead), Dawit Habtemichael, Yusuf Mohamed Ali, Medhanie Haile, Temesgen Ghebreyesus, Emanuel Asrat, Said Abdulkader and Tura Kubaba.

PEN American Center has actively fought for the rights of many of the above mentioned journalists with a letter writing campaign found here.

Photo Credit: Release International

Chavez's Post-Referendum Offensive

Hugo Chavez has continued his attacks on his chief television adversary, Globovision, with a personal phone call two weeks ago to the station’s executives warning them to “behave correctly.” Invective against Globovision is nothing new, with Chavez frequently calling for its closure and even labeling its work as “media terrorism.” The station has been a vociferous critic of Chavez and has been accused by the president of trying to thwart the efforts of the elected government and even promoting his assassination. In an address to Latin American diplomats in Washington last April, Andrés Izarra, a former media executive and now Venezuelan government official, likened Globovisión's coverage to Rwandan radio broadcasts that helped provoke genocide in 1994. 

Chavez has recently stepped up his criticism of the channel, matching words with actions. This month, the station was slapped with a US$4.19 million fine for alleged unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the station’s top executive’s home was raided in May by more than 100 Venezuelan police officers accusing him of running a car smuggling ring  (Globovision’s President, Guillermo Zuloaga, co-owns a Toyota dealership). Both investigations were undertaken at the request of pro-Chavez lawmakers. New charges were brought against the station for supposedly breaking the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television (Ley Resorte), a vague law criticized by human rights groups for its potential to hinder media freedoms.

Indeed, the media has been a battleground since Chavez’s election in 1998 and, more acutely, since a brief 2002 coup. RCTV, Venezuela’s oldest television channel, was not allowed to renew its terrestrial broadcast license in 2007 after being accused of supporting the coup against Chavez and the subsequent oil strike that sought to topple the government. The recent campaign against Globovision is also directly linked to the network’s involvement in opposition activities. In the case at hand, Globovision has been accused of giving air-time to opposition organizations including Women for Liberty and Democratic Renewal, without paying the requisite taxes. 

RCTV, Globovision, and two other networks, Televen and Venevision, had openly supported the unseating of Chavez and played key roles in the 2002 coup attempt through media blackouts and selective coverage. Few contest the fact that RCTV and other stations have taken sides, often aggressively, against Chavez, with commentators openly calling for his demise. Pressure on the government by Televen and Venevision eased notably in following years, however, and unsurprisingly, they have been the target of far less official attention.

"I'm happy that the institutions are working, we have to keep moving against impunity. Let them say what they'll say," Chavez is quoted as saying by AFP. Indeed, several weeks before, Chavez ordered the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to “fulfill your obligation” and take action against Globovision in light of their breaking a story on a minor recent earthquake which the government had not yet reported. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in particular, makes clear that Chavez’s notion of “institutions working” apparently does not include the idea of separation of powers.

Such moves against Globovision must be seen in light of a broader effort by the Chavez government to deepen the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” after the February referendum that removed term limits for public officials, thus allowing Chavez to run for a third term in 2012. Chavez terms this new push the “third phase” of the revolution.

Following the election, Michael Shifter, of the US-based think-tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that “[Chavez is] going to be very emboldened. He’s going to move ahead in radical fashion with his revolution.” Shifter’s words were prescient.

Chavez’s efforts to bolster the revolution post-referendum have principally focused on a specific set of issues: 1. Reining in unruly media outlets, especially Globovision; 2. Undermining the power of both private and public sector unions; 3. Continuing with his agenda of nationalization and expropriation of foreign companies operating in Venezuela; 4. Weakening opposition parties; and 5. Accruing powers for the central government at the expense of local governments.

Chavez’s attempts at undermining the power of unions that oppose or contradict his revolutionary vision is not new. In its report, A Decade Under Chavez, Human Rights Watch states,"The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by promoting state interference in union elections, refusing to bargain collectively with established unions, and engaging in favoritism toward pro-government unions. It has also punished workers with job dismissals and blacklisting for legitimate strike activity. And it has supported the creation of alternative labor organizations that undercut the country's labor laws, risk undermining established unions, and leave workers particularly vulnerable to political discrimination."

This judgment was echoed by a Freedom House report from last year, Freedom of Association Under Threat. A bill that was recently introduced in the National Assembly would cripple unions by eliminating collective bargaining and giving powers in regards to labor matters to “worker’s councils,” usually controlled by ruling party members.

Chavez has also continued his plan to nationalize both foreign and domestic companies. In March, Chavez expropriated local operations of US food giant Cargill, accusing the company of avoiding price controls. While the petrochemicals industry has already witnessed substantial intervention, along with steel, cement, electricity and telecommunications, the May announcement that a set of privately owned oil services firms would be taken over marked a new foray into the country’s dominant economic sector.

Chavez has also continued to undermine democratic freedoms through attacks on opposition members and weakening the country’s local leaders. Manuel Rosales, the main opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and recently elected mayor of Venezuela’s second largest city, was recently forced to seek asylum in Peru after being charged with corruption. Other prominent opposition members including former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel have also been placed under investigation on corruption charges. In addition, Chavez has stepped up his offensive against regional governors, who won victories in some important states in last November’s regional and local elections, by pushing a law through the Parliament which would see their powers diminished by regional “vice presidents” subordinate to the President.

With oil prices rising again, opposition members fleeing the country, and media outlets in the crosshairs, it looks as though there is little to slow Chavez’s offensive in the short term. In a recent statement reported by Reuters, Chavez stated to his party stalwarts: "I've said it before and I repeat, we must keep up the offensive, bulldozing the counter-revolution. We can no longer be the idiots we were." If Chavez has made one thing clear during his ten years in power, it’s that when he says he’ll do something, it probably will happen. Such is the personalist nature of 21st century socialism.

Photo Credit: Flickr user !Que comunismo!

Evolution of Lebanon's Hizbullah Remains Uncertain

As the results of the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections came in, outsiders were surprised to find that Hizbullah, the Shiite Islamist group, and its allies – the favourites to win – had been beaten and had seemingly accepted their continued fate in opposition. Regardless of the results, the relatively smooth voting process was a victory for Lebanese democracy and human rights; however, the internal situation in Lebanon remains precarious and a continued parliamentary majority for the Western-oriented, Sunni-led March 14th alliance will not likely challenge Hizbullah’s continuing reign over large portions of Lebanese territory.

For the last half a century Lebanon has been the Middle East’s battleground, where various factions from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to the Syrian and Israeli intelligence services have fought proxy wars in order to weaken real and perceived threats from their foes. Even before the civil war began in 1975, there had been severe clashes between Lebanon’s three dominant ethno-religious groups, Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims, which resulted in the creations of militias outside of the state military for the protection of each sect as well as the subjugation of their opponents – a zero-sum game that has continued to some degree ever since. The PLO took up residence in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in 1970, upsetting the delicate Christian-Shiite-Sunni balance, and began attacking Israel, prompting a number of military retributions and an occupation that ended only in 2000. Hizbullah’s history runs in parallel with Lebanon’s violent past. Founded in 1982 as a group for the protection of the Shiite community in southern Lebanon that had been abandoned by the state to face Israeli retribution alone, Hizbullah quickly emerged as a formidable anti-Israeli force, an efficient provider of services for Shiites living in the south and east of the country, and an effective defender of Shiite interests within Lebanon.

Understanding the rise of Hizbullah requires navigating the complex history of Shiism in the Middle East and in Lebanon in particular. Shiites, which comprise 10% of the Muslim population worldwide, have historically been discriminated against by the Sunni majority in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Bahrain. Though Shiites were given political space in post-independence Lebanon, Shiite political leaders tended to be unrepresentative political bosses who ran large patronage networks and oversaw the increased impoverishment of their respective population.   

With the increasing politicisation of Palestinians in the south of Lebanon (where most Shiites live) in the late 1960s, the reassertion of Shiism in Iran after 1979, and the rise of Islamism after the hopes of pan-Arabism faded with the death of Nasser,  Shiite politics in Lebanon underwent massive changes. The rise of the Amal movement witnessed the assertion of popular Shiite political power into Lebanese politics for the first time. Yet as the Iranian revolution gained strength and extended its reach, Amal’s secular oriented leadership was challenged by its religious offshoot which would eventually come to be known as Hizbullah (or, “the Party of God”).  Though Hizbullah’s stated goal was the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese territory, it quickly became a provider of social services to Shiites who would witness the organization’s commitment to their security firsthand during the civil war.

Hizbullah’s defining moment - and ironically, the first stage of its forced transformation – came in 1992 , when, after 15 years of civil war, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon. An internal debate within the organization as to whether or not stand for elections ensued. Several of the organization’s ruling clerics were opposed to running for elections on the basis of it being “un-Islamic,” yet important leaders such as the current Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, opted for running. Hizbullah representatives trounced their Shiite counterparts in the south and the Bekaa valley to the east in a deeply flawed election that was largely stage managed by Syria. Beyond their immediate relevance, the 1992 elections effectively brought Hizbullah into the Lebanese political fold, splitting the organization into two parts and ensuring broader Shiite representation in the Serail. Indeed, Hizbullah’s decision was also a signal that it would, at least for the time being, abandon attempts to forcefully impose an Islamic government on the country.

Hizbullah’s second transformative moment came in 2000 when, after a nearly two decades long war of attrition, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon. However, with Israel’s departure from Lebanon, Hizbullah lost its original raison d’être. Although the group disputed the withdrawal as complete, arguing over a piece of land called the Shebaa Farms, some soul-searching began within the organisation and in Lebanese society as a whole. Although Hizbullah’s overall existence was never brought into question given that it operates on a number of non-military levels, issues concerning its maintenance of a significant arsenal in peacetime were raised, and proved to be a serious source of contention in Hizbullah’s relationship with the state and with the international community Indeed, after a spate of political assassinations of Syrian opponents in Lebanon, possibly carried out with implicit or explicit help from Hizbullah, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1559, whose third operating paragraph calls for the disbanding of all militias operating in Lebanon. Given Hizbullah’s quasi-monopoly on force in Lebanon, the resolution was never carried out.

The tense relationship between the state and Hizbullah was exacerbated with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Hitherto Hizbullah had been politically protected by its Syrian patrons, who had occupied Lebanon at the international community and Lebanese state’s behest in 1976. Over the next two decades, Hizbullah had little concern for domestic politics as Damascus ensured that the Lebanese state and military were weak. Furthermore, it was largely due to Syrian influence that Hizbullah was not required to disarm along with the other sectarian militias in 1989 under the Taif Agreement, allowing it to become the strongest military actor in Lebanon. With Sunni leader Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 and the mass anti-Syrian protests known as the Cedar Revolution that paralysed the country and prompted the Syrian departure, Hizbullah was forced to  openly declare its support for Syria  and lead an opposition movement (March 8^th) against the pro-Western ruling alliance (March 14^th).

The fissure has had serious consequences for Lebanese politics and society. First, it has divided Lebanese society into two camps creating unlikely divisions and even more unlikely allies. Second, it has exacerbated religious tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, who are clearly divided into their respective alliances, with the Christian population spanning both. Third, it has worked to pit Iran against the Sunni Muslim world, particularly Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and France in a bid to define the future of the Lebanese state.

This split has also had unintended consequences for Hizbullah. In the past it had avoided involvement in the sectarian bloodletting, but as various groups sought to fill the security vacuum caused by Syria’s departure and Hizbullah looked to assert the demographic weight of the Shiite population, it began using its militia domestically. The situation exploded in May 2008, when the March 14 government attempted to fire the Hizbullah aligned head of security at Beirut’s international airport. Furthermore, the government sought to investigate Hizbullah’s private telecom network that it had created to wage war against Israel. After repeated assurances that it would never turns its arms on Lebanese citizens, Hezbollah and its allies took to the streets conquering large swathes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon while the Lebanese army looked on helplessly, fearing internal divisions would plunge the country into a larger crisis. The government was quick to back down in the face of a coup, but the political damage had already been done. In the end, the Doha Agreement ended the fighting and gave Hizbullah and its allies a veto in the cabinet, a position Hizbullah had long sought.

Though Hezbollah’s acceptance of its electoral defeat in June was comfort to some observers, it represented a temporary maintenance of the status quo. Yet the Lebanese political arena under the current dual alliance system continues to evolve.  With the return of General Michel Aoun, the Maronite Christians are abdicating their traditional support of the state for vague promises from Hizbullah. General Aoun, like a good many Christians who came to prominence as a military leader, seeks to be president – the constitution requires the office holder to be thus. However, unlike his predecessors, Aoun has allied with Hizbullah, formally signing a memorandum of understanding in February 2006, whereas previously the Christians had always supported the sovereign state. With this move he risks trading long-term influence for short-term safety. Likewise, the fourth main ethno-religious group in Lebanon, the Druze, have attempted to hedge their bets by improving relations with Shiites, although it is unlikely that this fiercely independent faction will formally align itself to one side anytime soon.

Though Hezbollah has certainly proven that it is willing to respect Lebanese democracy in some ways, it is clear that the central government’s lack of a monopoly on force is a constant threat to Lebanese democracy and stability. This should certainly be a cause for concern for governance-watchers. Some observers take concern even further. For instance, Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a fellow at Chatham House, declares that “the (Lebanese) state is not the state, the actual state is the state of Hizbullah. That’s the functioning state, it has an army which is efficient, well funded and well trained... it is the de facto power.” Furthermore, Mr. Hussain suggests that the eventual goal of Hizbullah is a state in which which Shiites reign supreme.

Whatever the true intentions, the concept of a ‘resistance movement’ coexisting alongside the Lebanese state is problematic at best.  Given Hezbollah’s overwhelming force and superior arsenal, there is little chance that the militia will be defeated on the battlefield. And although the strategy of trying to bring Hezbollah further and further into the Lebanese political fold appears to be working on the surface, it is a task fraught with danger and will not likely result in the group surrendering its arms.

Though it is still unclear if Hezbollah will be given formal veto power in the next cabinet, it remains that by force of arms, Hezbollah maintains a de facto veto power unknown in liberal democracies – a veto power which it did not hesitate to use in May 2008 and may not hesitate to use in the future.

In the end, Hezbollah will need to have a third transformative moment in which it finally decides whether to be a party for Lebanon or a party that is beholden to its financial and ideological masters Iran and Syria. It will also need to decide if it will remain a party of grievance or a party of broad appeal. Other actors, both within Lebanon and without, will be influential in this decision, but Hizbullah largely has the power to choose its path. Military strength, after all, brings with it the responsibility to make historic decisions.

Photo Credit: Flickr user hazy jenius

Nicaragua's Ortega Brings No Revolution to Women's Rights

In May, the UN Committee against Torture called for Nicaragua to reconsider its absolute ban on abortion. The Committee ruled that the ban, which has been in effect since 2006, infringed on the rights of women and girls by prohibiting abortion in cases in which pregnancy threatened the mother’s life as well as in cases of rape. Moreover, as Amnesty International argues, the ban on abortion violates the right of women not to be subject to “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” The UN Committee against torture is not the first UN body to admonish Nicaragua for this law; as of today, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the UN Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women have all rebuked Nicaragua for its blanket abortion law and have reminded the country of its obligation to uphold human rights.

The persistence of this particular violation of women’s rights should come as no surprise. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's authoritarian tendencies have presented themselves with increasing frequency since the Contra War of the 1980s. In previous posts, we explored the president’s most recent authoritarian behavior, citing Ortega’s vigorous impingements on press freedom, flagrant manipulation of electoral laws, and wanton disregard for the democratic electoral process. On June 11, the Millennium Challenge Corporation directly punished Nicaragua for its deplorable governance trend by canceling the final $60 million of a $175 million aid agreement. In addition, his malign approach to women's rights is nothing new. While Ortega once supported abortion, he displayed his preference for political expediency by changing his position to ally himself with the Catholic Church during the run up to the 2006 presidential election. Most notorious, however, is Ortega's possible involvement in a sexual abuse scandal involving his stepdaughter. While his stepdaughter ultimately withdrew her case from consideration, she has not withdrawn her accusations. In addition to committing the above transgressions, Ortega has more recently trampled on women's rights by ignoring requests to rescind the absolute ban on abortion, aggressively harassing feminist activists, and largely turning a deaf ear to issues such as discrimination.

The fact that the country’s respect for women’s rights has begun to backslide is particularly disheartening considering the lamentable state of gender equality even before Ortega assumed the presidency in 2007. As the Countries at the Crossroads Report on Nicaragua noted, as of 2006 women were inadequately protected against sexual abuse and were not supported by any notable state commitment to reverse rampant discrimination. In cases of abuse, women were frequently referred to civil society organizations for further help after lodging complaints with the national police. Although constitutional safeguards exist, high levels of both discrimination and harassment against women in the workplace have persisted since this time. More recently, the State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report on Nicaragua stated that while laws criminalizing rape and domestic violence exist, the laws against domestic violence were selectively enforced. Both the country’s Special Prosecutor for Women and the national police reported that violence against women increased in 2008. As is the case in other Latin American countries, a strong “machista” culture is firmly ingrained in Nicaraguan society, which fuels and exacerbates the aforementioned problems.

One of the most alarming examples of the government’s deficient attitude towards women’s rights is its belligerent conduct towards women’s rights organizations. Since 2006, the government has aggressively attacked women’s rights advocates. As Human Rights Watch notes, women’s rights organizations protesting the ban on abortion have been investigated and intimidated by the government, which ramped up its campaign against these organizations in 2008. Last year, 9 women’s rights advocates were criminally investigated, while the offices of the organizations they represented were raided due to questionable allegations regarding funding sources. Reporters without Borders also claimed that Sofia Montenegro, the director of the Autonomous Women’s Movement, had been the victim of a government smear campaign. Despite the looming threat of government persecution, women’s organizations have remained dedicated to their quest to revoke the law. In late May of this year, 500 women protested the abortion law outside of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. 

 The excessive harassment of feminist activists and NGOs is part of a larger government campaign against freedom of association. Due to the fact that Nicaraguan women often rely on NGO support in cases of domestic abuse and rape, the government’s quest to suppress the activities of these organizations has especially regrettable consequences.

Ortega’s war against feminist organizations provides additional evidence that the Sandinista revolution’s dedication to social change is extremely subordinate to his desire to accrue and maintain power.  On a superficial level, the Sandinista government has in some ways upheld its commitment to the empowerment of women by launching healthcare, anti-poverty, and literacy programs. A recent article lauded the strides made by the Nicaraguan government to address the country’s pronounced gender inequality through its literacy campaign. Nicaraguan women, who make up somewhere between 15 and 52 percent of the country’s illiterate population, have garnered notable benefits from this program. However, as the article notes, seemingly positive government policies such as this one are being carried out against a backdrop of increased violence against Nicaraguan women and could even be considered a veil for the government’s abusive actions.

Due to the restrictive, oppressive climate being generated by the Ortega regime, any sustained progress on women’s rights seems highly unlikely at this time. Ortega has firmly locked Nicaragua in a downward spiral on governance matters. As Ortega continues to wage war against his adversaries, feminist activists and women’s rights organizations will number among his victims, and the comprehensive change Nicaragua needs will remain far from realization. 

Photo Credit: Flickr user svengaarn

Greed and Graft Grow in Sub-Saharan Africa

According to Transparency International’s recently released 2009 Global Corruption Barometer, corruption continues to wreak havoc on Sub-Saharan Africa’s governance record. Notably, of the 9 sub-Saharan countries examined in the report, Crossroads countries including Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, numbered among the states most afflicted by petty bribery. In all of these countries, over 23% of respondents reported paying a bribe within the last year. Furthermore, in line with this finding, respondents in most of the countries named the civil service as one of the most corrupt sectors, with the majority labeling it the single most corrupt institution. On a slightly more positive note, in most of the Crossroads countries examined, citizens remain relatively confident in their governments’ anti-corruption efforts. In sub-Saharan Africa, 64% of respondents were satisfied with their governments’ anti-corruption programs. Unfortunately, as the New York Times reports, the political will to combat corruption in these countries is swiftly fading. In addition, the positive public perceptions pale in comparison to the generally bleak picture of rampant regional corruption painted by the report.

Of the Crossroads countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone and Uganda are in particularly dire straits. Alarmingly, 62% of respondents in Sierra Leone and 55% of respondents in Uganda reported paying a bribe in the last year. Along with Cameroon and Liberia, they were the only countries included in the survey to reach the 50% mark. These new findings, in combination with their rankings of 158 and 126, respectively, in Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, place Sierra Leone and Uganda among the most corrupt countries in the world. Their dismal performance in the recent Barometer report merits a closer examination of corruption in these two countries, along with the prospects for an amelioration of the problem in the future.

In Sierra Leone, pervasive corruption affects all levels and sectors of society. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption largely drove the collapse of the state before war was launched against the Revolutionary United Front in 1991, and the lingering legacies of the extensive patronage networks and general mismanagement that plagued the country until the end of the war in 2002 continue to hamper reform efforts. Petty corruption remains unhindered due to extensive bureaucratic red tape, a phenomenon that illuminates the country’s poor performance in the Barometer’s bribery category. Furthermore, the report explains that as of 2006, state efforts were extremely lackluster, in part due to both the inability of the auditor general to filter her reports through the various government ministries and the failure of the attorney general to prosecute cases reported by the Anti-Corruption Commission. In 2007, the problem continued unchecked. According to a report commissioned by the president, a lack of oversight mechanisms and a general culture of corruption in government ministries enabled thousands of dollars to be diverted from their intended recipients.

 Despite all of this, however, TI’s Barometer reported that 64% of respondents in Sierra Leone considered their government’s efforts in the fight against corruption be effective. Although an alarmingly high prevalence of petty bribery is reported in the Barometer, out of all of the Sub-Saharan African countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone’s citizens were the most content with their government’s performance in this area. This is most likely due to the initial efforts that President Ernest Koroma, who came to office after winning the democratic election run-off in September 2007, has made to develop a comprehensive approach to the daunting issue. In 2007, Koroma made battling corruption his top priority and immediately moved to examine the roots of the corruption problem by commissioning the report noted above. Furthermore, in September of last year, Komora enacted an anti-corruption law. The law moves to address high-level corruption by requiring all public officials to declare their assets and broadening the Anti-Corruption Commission’s powers to eradicate graft and protect whistle-blowers. Since the law was passed, the Commission has ramped up its investigations into graft allegations. As is shown by the high approval rating reported by TI, Komora’s accomplishments in the fight against corruption are noteworthy. Nevertheless, the entrenched nature of bribery and thievery in the public sector, along with the presence of other complications created by both the legacies of the civil war and the current economic crisis, will make it extremely difficult for Komora to achieve substantial progress on the issue.

While corruption is not quite as endemic in Uganda, which has somewhat more stable institutions, it is still an onerous governance problem. In the 2009 Barometer, Ugandan respondents named the judiciary as the most corrupt institution, with the civil service coming in at a close second. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report on Uganda argues, one of the main reasons that the environment for corruption remains favorable is that President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for over 20 years, has never made any dedicated effort to curb corruption within the public sector. Over the course of his reign, he has shown great reluctance to prosecute government officials accused of corruption and has even directly thwarted the efforts of the inspector-general of government, Uganda’s most powerful anti-corruption agency. Furthermore, the 2008 Freedom in the World report added that Uganda lacked the resources to enforce the legislative measures that exist to combat corruption. As a result of these factors, the corruption problem worsened over the past few years, as evidenced by both the country’s slip in TI’s Corruption Perception Index and the results of a Ugandan Bureau of Statistics Survey.

Recently, however, Museveni’s rhetoric has been teeming with declarations of war against corruption. Most notably, on his June 3 State of the Nation Address, Museveni claimed that the war against corruption was the only war remaining in the country, stating that his government has “zero tolerance for corruption.” In addition, the government has made some new efforts to uproot corruption. For example, in May, the Ugandan parliament passed an Anti-Corruption bill that addresses public sector corruption by expanding the investigative powers of the Inspector General and creating punishments for public officials who fail to explain the source of their wealth. In addition, the parliament tabled a Whistleblower’s Bill.  These developments are potentially promising, but the same lack of resources that has always debilitated anti-corruption efforts will remain. Furthermore, if Museveni’s past approach towards corruption is any indication of his future stance towards the issue, the chances that corruption will be aggressively tackled while he remains at the helm of government are slim.

In both Sierra Leone and Uganda, corruption constitutes a fundamental, pernicious governance concern. Unfortunately, neither country has extremely auspicious prospects of stamping out the problem in the short term. While Sierra Leone’s president may have the will to address the issue, the existence of sizeable constraints – notably a severe lack of resources – will seriously complicate his efforts.  In Uganda, a lack of presidential will, and to a lesser extent resource shortages, could stand to impede the country’s war against corruption. Nevertheless, hope for the future is not lost. While the current forecast may be dreary, the recent adoption of new legislative measures in both countries could pave the way for a more effective approach to the issue under more amenable future circumstances.

Photo Credit: Flickr user M*rten

Violence in Peru: The Government's Role

Last Friday a brutal clash occurred between Peruvian police attempting to open up a highway and the hundreds of Amazonian indigenous protesters that had been blocking the road for weeks. At least a dozen police and 9 protesters – though possibly many more – were killed during the protests; Saturday brought the discovery of another dozen dead police who had been held hostage by protesters. The protests, which have mobilized a number of different tribes throughout the vast Peruvian Amazon, are based on a series of decree laws issued by the government in the first half of 2008. The protesters perceive that these laws will violate their ancestral territorial rights by opening their lands to resource exploitation. In addition, they were not consulted – as is necessary under international agreements to which Peru is a party, including International Labor Organization Convention 169 – prior to the enactment of the decrees. Thus, their stance was that the laws must be rescinded entirely. The government refused to cede, arguing that the laws were necessary for Peru’s modernization and that the violence was entirely the fault of the protesters. President Alan Garcia has been particularly aggressive in declaring that the violence was the result of a conspiracy carried out by malign forces, both international and domestic, that who do not wish to see Peru advance.

No proof has been offered for what appear to be these absurd accusations. Moreover, while the government is absolutely correct that the killings of the police are unacceptable and must be investigated and perpetrators held accountable, the government’s own attitudes and actions have been determinant during the course of the conflict. President Garcia’s statements, which repeatedly state that the indigenous are being manipulated by outsiders, treat them like sheep and deny them all agency. The government also seems to lack any context – regardless of the content of these specific decrees, the government should be able to understand why a group of people who have been excluded from policy decisions regarding their ancestral lands for hundreds of years might have justifiable suspicions regarding their future. The protesters have undoubtedly made serious mistakes, but the government’s attitude has represented the worst facets of a state that is prone to Lima-centric political fiddling while the jungle (or mountains, or anywhere else outside the capital) burns. Below is the translation of a column from Tuesday’s La Republica in which the well-known, centrist Peruvian political scientist Martin Tanaka provides some of that context.

The State, Organizer of the Protest

Martin Tanaka, La Republica (Lima), 6/9/09

Social organization in the Amazon, like the country as whole, has been marked in recent years by localism and fragmentation. It could be argued that the broad protest movement throughout the Amazon is the consequence of government action: the adoption of the DL [decree laws] without indigenous consultation created the perception that the indigenous way of life was at risk, triggered the memory of historical grievances and feelings of regional exclusion and distance from the state, and laid the foundations for a conflict in which the general identity and dignity of the Amazon was at stake. It also created a common demand (the repeal of the DL) and a single adversary, the central government, which must be addressed. AIDESEP ended up circumstantially channeling these demands, as it was the organization best positioned to lead the demands of the widely heterogeneous groups.

The demand for the repeal of the decrees is also the creation of the state. Since the protests of September of last year and until very recently the government gave signals that it would repeal the decrees in question (like 1090, which was declared unconstitutional by the [congressional] Constitutional Commission on May 20). It was only in recent weeks that the government took the position of defending the constitutionality of the decrees, and proposed a comprehensive revision of these decrees in the PCM [council of ministers].

Too late: the government created the image of having been “rocking” the indigenous peoples. This led to the radicalization of the protests. The violence unleashed as a result of attempting to clear the Fernando Belaunde roadway is also the creation of the state; many leaders in the area are reserve soldiers, former patrolmen and members of self-defense groups, ex-soldiers from Cenepa [ed.: a reference to the brief 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru]. The existence of these capabilities for mobilization explains why the resistance to police action has been so fierce.

The government’s mishandling of the whole situation can help one to understand the ease with which extremist speeches are propagated, irresponsible leaders are exalted, false information is taken as true (such as the information that speaks of the killing of tens or even hundreds of indigenous people), all of which results in the brutal assassination of policemen. Those who sympathize (and we do sympathize) which the demands of the indigenous population should be the first to say clearly that no protest, no matter how just it may be, that confronts a democratic government, however misguided it may be, justifies the murder of unarmed policemen.

The worst thing is that even today the government’s answer continues to create conditions for more protests and violence. The persecution of indigenous leaders, the talk of manipulation, ignorance, misinformation, and the presence of foreign interests only increase the anger and annoyance of the Amazonians. The president of the republic himself has made frankly irresponsible declarations. A path of relaxation, prudence, and dialogue such as that being promoted by the Ombudsman must be opened.

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20 Years After Tiananmen, a Different Form of Undermining Democracy

Freedom House has just released a new report, Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, describing the efforts of authoritarian states including China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to sustain their autocratic models and even advance alternatives to democracy in other countries. The report explores how these leading authoritarian regimes are threatening democratic development by promoting repressive policies and manipulating and distorting democratic discourse. Their efforts to redefine – and ultimately empty out – the concept of democracy have not only been pursued within their borders, but have also been exported abroad.

Among the tools that these regimes have used to further their interests internationally, the promotion of “win-win” economic arrangements and “no-strings-attached aid” stand out. In April, we addressed this issue in a blog post about China’s aid policy towards Africa in particular. At the time, we discussed the dangers of championing China’s unique development model, along with the pernicious effects that China’s offers of unconditional aid can have for governance. Because Beijing’s foreign assistance isn’t conditioned on the adoption of reforms and a general respect for human rights, it opens the door for corruption and neglect of the rule of law. Undermining Democracy includes a more comprehensive analysis of China’s foreign assistance efforts, along with those of other authoritarian regimes, analyzing the modern strategies and methods used to project authoritarian influence.

As Undermining Democracy explains, China’s is systematically developing its own brand of “soft power.”  After becoming aware of the necessity of increasing its clout in an increasingly interdependent international system, China began to ramp up efforts to promote its own model of political and economic development in its international relations. Due to China’s impressive economic development, the model is often touted as a superior alternative to Western prescriptions.

As it happens, Undermining Democracy has been released on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. An article in the Financial Times last week traced China’s political trajectory since the crackdown, explaining how China’s Communist Party weathered both extensive criticism and countless predictions of its demise to propel its country to a leading role in the world sphere. As it notes, Chinese officials have ceased to adopt an outwardly apologetic stance towards their more repressive political policies, instead becoming increasingly confident in their model’s superiority over its Western counterpart. Most importantly, it argues that China’s remarkable ability to persevere and prosper can be attributed to its willingness to adapt and modernize. In other words, whereas mere repression might not have been enough to counteract the pre- and post-Tiananmen calls for change, China has survived and flourished due to its policy of economic opening. While these reforms have boosted growth and ameliorated some citizen complaints, more fundamental reforms of accountability and transparency have been absent.

China’s economic success has created a major dilemma for advocates of good governance. This success has obvious appeal as a formula for economic prosperity for struggling developing countries.  Nevertheless, there are some important points to consider. First, by championing the undemocratic Chinese model, the benefits in terms of basic ethics and justice of democratic rule in comparison to China’s oppressive political regime are ignored. The coercive nature of China’s political regime cannot be underemphasized. China is a highly repressive state, which is evidenced by the regime’s dismal human rights record. China has, every year, by far the highest number of executions of any country and has consistently and arbitrarily applied state power to restrict basic freedoms including freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

Secondly, it is important to realize that the Chinese model of adaptation is not the norm. As the Financial Times article notes, China was successfully able to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes and to become aware of the need to “adapt and change or atrophy and die.” If any lessons are to be learned from the past, however, China’s adaption method is the exception: authoritarians are often drawn to the repressive part of the model while ignoring the technocratic, adaptive element. Some but certainly not all developing countries will be able to follow China’s trajectory. For example, in the past few months, Hugo Chavez has frequently praised the comparative advantages of the Chinese model over the Washington Consensus at the same time that he has ramped up his efforts to curb trade union autonomy and freedom of the press in the country.  In addition, Kremlin officials have frequently evoked the Chinese success story to justify Russia’s autocratic policies. In addition to providing these leaders with validation for their despotic ventures, the opportunities the model provides for corrupt practices are extensive, as is evidenced by China’s ranking of 72 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Moreover, it is not just the model in conceptual terms that is a threat to the democratic order, but also China’s means of promoting it. Most notably, China has sought to facilitate the model’s advancement by offering “win-win” economic arrangements to foreign countries and coupling its aid provision with a promise of “non-interference” in domestic affairs. Apart from the African countries listed in our previous post, China has provided unconditional assistance to numerous Latin American countries and several Asian countries, most notably Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, many of which have questionable or downright execrable human rights records. As we noted in our previous post, the negative consequences of providing unconditional aid are a real threat to democratic governance.  As Undermining Democracy argues, these arrangements also threaten democratic development on a greater scale. By framing these new economic relationships in “win-win” terms, China seeks to tarnish the legitimacy of the Western development model, and more particularly the traditional Western requirement that aid be conditional upon reform and respect for human rights standards.

Other contemporary authoritarian regimes have used foreign assistance of one sort or another to exert influence. Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, for instance, have used their oil wealth to court developing nations, leading them to ignore governance reform.  While these active efforts are providing new competition to reform-based assistance, the authoritarians’ approach is not perfect. As Undermining Democracy notes, China’s increasingly powerful position – and even more so the other states – has its own inherent flaws. The global economic crisis, along with other factors, could hamper its efforts to propel the new model; alternatively, discontent at home could herald a loosening of the authoritarian reins. In any case, 20 years after Tiananmen, the Chinese authorities have modernized their authoritarianism and, for the time being at least, offer a serious challenge to the notion that economic growth in China would inevitably lead to political liberalization and sounder governance. 

Thailand's Military: A Constant Amongst Turmoil

Shortly after political unrest rocked Thailand yet again in April, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva quietly transferred several senior military officers who were classmates of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at the Armed Forces Preparatory School to inactive posts. The general public has interpreted the government’s actions as a thinly veiled attempt to eradicate Thaksin’s remaining allies from the country’s political scene. This military reshuffle should come as no surprise, considering the skepticism that has arisen surrounding the military’s response to the April protests. While the military ultimately played an instrumental role in quelling the political violence that shook the nation for three weeks, their loyalty to the government was questioned at various times. These most recent events highlight one of Thailand’s most persistent and troubling rule of law issues: the continued lack of civilian control over the security sector and debilitating impact of this phenomenon on reform efforts.

Thailand’s most recent political chaos erupted when the red-shirted supporters of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a movement that is spearheaded by the self-exiled Thaksin, charged the resort where an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting was to be held, assailed Abhisit’s offices, home, and car, and seized control of a large area in Bangkok’s government district, clashing with adherents of the pro-Abhisit People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) at various points along the way. As the New York Times explains, the fact that Thaksin’s supporters were able to overrun security forces at the easily-protected location of the Asean summit, among other places, raised questions about the military’s allegiance to the Abhisit government. In addition, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul has accused Thaksin's military allies of carrying out an assassination attempt against him on April 17. It has been rumored that Thaksin still has several loyal allies within the military, and the accusations and peculiarities noted above fueled widespread rumors of a possible Thaksin-orchestrated military coup throughout the protests. It is important to note that the security forces eventually contained the violence by surrounding the main protest camp. In response to this, however, UDD protestors accused the military forces of discriminating against them in favor of the PAD, pointing out the fact that military forces failed to use emergency powers to put an end to the PAD’s occupation of Bangkok’s airport last year, which was seemingly a greater security threat. In any case, these events demonstrate that the subordination of the military forces to civilian rule remains subject to constant questioning, while the professional, politically impartial nature of the military is extremely suspect.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report explains, the Thai military and police forces have played an influential and oftentimes deplorable role in the country’s political history. The military has traditionally assumed the role of veto player in Thai politics. Due to the power wielded by Thailand’s military institution, the success of any political regime has been largely determined by military judgment; in short, military approval has translated into political success while disapproval has led to failure, oftentimes in the form of a military-led overthrow. The military’s instrumental role in this process is largely tied to its strong relationship with Thailand’s monarchy. Over the course of Thailand’s history, the two institutions have oftentimes worked together to guide or force Thailand’s political trajectory in their desired direction. From 1932-1992, the military played a direct role in the country’s political process by staging numerous coups, and the security forces retained a prominent position during the rule of Thaksin, with whom they were strongly allied. During his reign, Thaksin, a former police officer, awarded his cronies with key security posts in order to consolidate his control over the security sector and the country. Later on, however, members of the military directly interfered in Thailand’s democratic process yet again by carrying out a coup against Thaksin and installing a former army commander as prime minister. After ruling the country for 15 months following the coup, the military returned to the barracks, although it has continued to play a central role in Thai politics from outside. In fact, Abhisit was propelled to his current position as prime minister in part due to the military’s support.

In many ways, the military’s perennial independence from the government can be easily understood. Thailand has been plagued by political instability for years. Since 2006, the country has been ruled by four different prime ministers, one of whom was a former military commander and two of whom were forced from office for violating provisions of the Constitution.  As such, for the military, allegiance to any of these short-lived, unsteady governments has proved to be both unnecessary and imprudent.  Regardless of this fact, however, the military’s power and politicization has had decidedly negative consequences for governance. First, in addition to wreaking havoc on the electoral process, it has constituted a major impediment to the implementation of much-needed political reforms. As the 2008 Freedom in the World Report notes, it has often been quite difficult for civilian leaders to enact reforms that in any way affect the military’s privileged position and to address some of the remaining repressive laws that were set in place during the recent period of military rule. In other cases, military-fueled unrest has been responsible for foiling plans for reform.  For example, since Abhisit’s election in December of 2008, his reform agenda, which is rooted in the modification of the largely undemocratic constitution, has been rendered impossible to implement by turmoil that has been at least partly exacerbated by Thaksin’s manipulation of the security sector. As the Economist explains, Thaksin counted on several members of the security forces, who for the most part belong to the same classes as the UDD protestors and have demonstrated their partiality towards Thaksin in the past, to abandon Abhisit during the protest.

Secondly, military power has also blocked Abhisit, along with other past prime ministers, from addressing the numerous allegations accusing members of the security forces of committing human rights abuses. Abhisit is in many ways dependent upon the military due to the institution’s political role. Without the military’s support, Abhisit’s position as prime minister would likely become untenable. Thus, appeasing the military is essential. Unfortunately, this situation has seriously negative consequences for rule of law. Over the years, the power of the security forces has provided its members with immunity from judicial prosecution, which has allowed them to commit flagrant human rights violations without punishment. One of the military’s most brutal campaigns was carried out during Thaksin’s 2003 war on drugs. As Human Rights Watch reports, security forces committed an extraordinarily large number of arbitrary killings during this war. In addition, as Amnesty International reports, the military has committed human rights violations including torture throughout the counter-insurgency campaign it has carried out since 2004. Unfortunately, these abuses continue today. The State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report revealed that there were several allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrest being committed by security forces, especially during counter- insurgency efforts. Most recently, security forces have been accused of beating refugees from a minority Muslim group in Myanmar and subsequently casting them out to sea without supplies. While the government has investigated some of these instances, members of the security forces have not been prosecuted for their actions thus far. While Abhisit has promised to address this culture of impunity surrounding military abuses, it is extremely unlikely that he will risk upsetting the military members upon whose support his position depends.

Thus, the lamentable lack of civilian control over the military has had numerous and varied negative effects on governance. Unfortunately, until the current political crisis between anti- and pro-Thaksin factions is resolved, the chances of consolidating civilian control and depoliticizing the military are slim to none. While Thailand’s political situation remains unstable, the military will continue to defy civilian power and exert its influence in myriad ways. As an upshot, the military will retain its ability to commit abuses with impunity.

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Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

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The Fading Shadow of Brazil's Dictatorship

On April 30, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal abolished the country’s 1967 Press Law after ruling that the law violated constitutional guarantees of free expression. This act, which came into effect during the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1961 and 1985, sought to repress criticism of the dictatorship by setting prison terms of up to 3 years for journalists convicted of defamation crimes. Such crimes were defined in very expansive terms and included “reporting deemed offensive to public morals; reporting that a plaintiff finds damaging to his reputation or offensive to his dignity; reporting that is considered subversive to public and political order; and reporting ‘true’ facts that are considered distorted or provocative.” The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that both during and after the dictatorship, the law was used by businessmen and politicians in thousands of cases to attack critical journalists. As such, the long overdue abolition is a momentous victory for freedom of the press in the country. In addition, it should be viewed as an important accomplishment in the country’s attempt to slowly chip away at the lingering legacies of dictatorship.

Brazil’s military dictatorship left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics and society. The brutal military regime not only passed repressive laws like the one above, but also committed extensive human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and large-scale arbitrary detention during its campaign to suppress a communist guerrilla movement. According to official government tallies, roughly 400 people were killed, 160 were disappeared, and hundreds of others were tortured during the dictatorship. Moreover, Brazil lags far behind its neighbors in its attempts to confront the shrouded events of its military past and unveil the details of the regime’s activities to Brazilian citizens. In 1979, the Brazilian government passed an amnesty law that protected military and public officials and political dissidents from prosecution for crimes committed during the dictatorship. As a result, no one has been prosecuted for human rights offenses committed during the period. In addition, Brazil has not convened a truth commission, nor has the country given a full account of the military regime’s activities, although it did publish a 500 page report on disappearances in 2007. 

The remaining legacies of the dictatorship have had important consequences for governance. Most obviously, laws such as the Press Law have continued to restrict Brazilian civil liberties in the 25 years since the country’s transition to democratic rule. However, the country’s failure to fully address the misdeeds of the dictatorship has had other damaging results. While the military has argued that Brazil’s pacted transition was a reasonable price to pay in order to bring about a peaceful transition to civilian rule, others have argued that allowing the military to maintain their power and escape punishment has hampered the country’s process of democratic consolidation. Most notably, rule of law has suffered. Indeed, one of Brazil’s most troubled governance issues is the ineptitude and corruption of the justice system, which has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.  Unfortunately, rather than using fair, unbiased human rights trials to build confidence in the justice system (as recently done in Peru, Argentina, and others), the government’s treatment of past crimes has reinforced the culture of
impunity. 

Thus, directly confronting the events of the military dictatorship is crucial to the attainment of a truly democratic future for the country. Fortunately, Brazil’s recent repeal of the Press Law has been accompanied by other steps towards confronting the past. Recently, federal prosecutors have requested that investigations against several individuals suspected of committing human rights violations be carried out. In October 2008, a Sao Paulo civil court found a military colonel civilly responsible for human rights violations committed while serving as director of an intelligence agency. In addition, last week, Brazil launched a website containing information about the events that occurred in the country between 1964 and 1985. The site includes official documents from the dictatorship that are part of the national archives. At its launch, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva acknowledged the link between national reconciliation and the country’s democratic well-being when he proclaimed “We are doing Brazilian democracy a service when we unveil some of the mysteries that persist about our past.” Finally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal is preparing to review the 1979 Amnesty Law in the face of several pending cases that challenge the law’s legitimacy. Among these cases, the court will consider the Brazilian Bar Association’s assertion that the current interpretation of the law erroneously provides for the protection of state agents from prosecution in all cases when in reality, it should not shield them from prosecution for crimes such as torture.

Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts may be ramped up in the future. On April 8, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that amnesties and statutes of limitations should not be applied to crimes against humanity that were committed during Brazil’s dictatorship. This is the first international decision to be made regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil during this era. While the decision is not binding, concerns over international legitimacy and approval may compel Brazil to become more open to a reinterpretation of the amnesty law.

Brazil should be lauded for breaking out of its decades-long resignation to allowing several of the debilitating legacies of the dictatorship to persist.  Nevertheless, the country still has a long road ahead. It has yet to fully open military and police archives to the public, and the active prosecution of human rights offenders is a long way off even if the court rules against the current interpretation of the amnesty law. Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation of this law is a very polemical issue. The Brazilian military, which staunchly opposes all efforts to reinterpret the amnesty law, is an extremely powerful and influential institution. Furthermore, while Lula has taken measures to disclose more information about the military dictatorship to the public, his solicitor general’s office has officially opposed challenges to the law. In recent years Brazil has sought to pose as both a leader and model for developing countries. Confronting the past while strengthening democracy and justice can only improve the country’s standing and add further momentum to a South American success story.

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