Freedom at Issue

Follow the Money

One of the numerous troubling aspects of grand corruption as practiced in many developing countries is that the stolen loot generally does not add, even inefficiently, to the local economy; rather, it is spirited away to high-security accounts in foreign countries. However, the UN and World Bank announced a new system last week that will attempt to combat corruption in developing nations by returning assets plundered by corrupt leaders to their respective countries. Combined with the safeguards imposed on signatories to the 2005 UN Convention against Corruption, leaders will no longer have the assurance that their pilfered money is safe once it leaves the country.

Previously, the corruption of various leaders and ex-leaders might have been well-known, but the money remained untouchable, with asset freezing the only possible action typically open to successor governments. Once the new system is implemented, however, countries will have the ability – and responsibility – to trace and recover these previously protected funds. While implementation will hit predictable snags from developed countries looking to protect their financial centers and smaller, specialized centers of offshore banking looking to hold on to their share of what has been a growth industry, developed countries might well embrace the free publicity that comes with appearing to altruistically “donate” millions of development dollars once given up as lost – without even having to dip into their own budgets. But it also suggests a free-rider problem, where one or a few banking centers benefit from being the safe haven for millions of plundered dollars after deciding it is more important to protect their financial environment than to help pay for, say, malaria treatment.

What remains to be seen and proved to wary developed nations (or those looking for an excuse not to link up with the new system) is how the system will work in the developing countries, and how, if at all, that money is used to help the people it was originally intended for. Most importantly, given that many of the countries still have major corruption problems, the World Bank’s assurances that the money “will not be stolen twice” sound a bit thin. Nonetheless, such a high-profile effort not only may bring tangible benefits, it also gives succor to investigators and anticorruption crusaders in developing countries. Let’s hope that this initiative receives the broad support it deserves.

In Honor of Alberto Fujimori

In honor of today’s decision by the Chilean Supreme Court to extradite Peru’s former authoritarian ruler Alberto Fujimori back to the country he misruled to face trial on charges of corruption and human rights violations, a few links to documents describing the havoc he wrought on Peruvian society and governance:

The decline of political parties

Corruption and the hollowing of institutions.

Human rights violations.

Overall regime criminality.

Bonus for Spanish readers – the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a tragic, fascinating, and critical read for anyone interested in Peru, the Andes, political violence, insurgency and counterinsurgency, or post-conflict challenges.

The Golden Triangle Loses its Edge

The New York Times reports that opium production in the legendary Golden Triangle, which encompasses parts of Laos, Thailand, and Burma, has declined precipitously, with its share of global opium production falling from 70 percent thirty years ago to 5 percent today. To some degree – in an aspect the story underreports somewhat – this may be due to the fact that Afghan poppy farmers, who can produce four times as much opium from the same acreage, are outcompeting Golden Triangle growers. However, the article notes that an important factor in the fall comes from a somewhat surprising source: China’s growing economic power. Apparently Chinese officials, displeased with rising addiction and needle-transmitted HIV cases, convinced Golden Triangle growers, particularly those in Burma, that it was more in their economic interest to cooperate than to antagonize China. This attitude, combined with several other factors mentioned in the article, was enough to cause the rapid descent in opium production.

The question of whether the rise of China, with its much-remarked upon “insatiable appetite for commodities” and condition-free loans to unsavory governments, will ultimately have a positive effect on the countries it actively engages is hotly debated. However, the issue often turns on whether the benefits of economic development justify the threats to sovereignty and the subsidization of repressive regimes. In this case, however, this trade-off does not currently exist (the Chinese deal with local tribes more than Burmese or other national authorities): in almost in any country other than Burma, it would be a win-win. Because it is Burma, however, the sustainability of the project remains in question. Toward the end of the article, several analysts observe skeptically that absent “investment for better roads, schools and clinics,” the gains may not be lasting. Given that the notorious junta is unlikely to provide these conditions, this is a major caveat. Moreover, were Afghan opium production ever to be restrained, and demand held steady, prices would rise and farmers would be tempted to replant poppies. Ask the Colombians, Peruvians, or Afghans – they’ve seen these cycles before.

Nonetheless, the change in the Golden Triangle will hopefully have a notable demonstration effect. Drug production and distribution is one of the most insidious forces a country can confront as it attempts to establish the rule of law and reduce corruption. Increasing the economic viability of alternative production is slow and difficult, with the result that governments – and particularly militaries – often prefer forced eradication. But if economic incentives can be combined with some coercion to reduce production as drastically as in the Golden Triangle, and if that is followed up with the investment noted in the article, there is hope that the gains might be consolidated. Put like that, and without even mentioning demand, it sounds difficult, because it is. But governments in places like the Andean region, which are bastions of probity and efficiency compared to Burma or Laos, should take heart in the gains and take a deep look at the strategy.

Morocco’s disaffected voters stay at home

Low turnout and allegations of foul play cast a cloud over Morocco’s recent elections. In a surprise victory, the Istiqlal (Independence) party took the most seats, while the favored Justice and Development Party (PJD), which is billed as a pragmatic Islamist group, came in second, failing expectations that it would double its seats in the legislature. Disappointed with defeat, the PJD launched accusations of vote buying, even though the consensus from observers was that the elections were free and fair. In fact, the European Union praised the elections as showing Morocco’s “commitment to political…reforms.”

However, the severely low turnout is a cause for concern. Only 37% of the electorate cast a vote, down from 52% in the 2002 elections, making this the lowest turnout in Morocco’s history.

Analyst Issandr El Amrani believes the elections to have been essentially a non-event, as the political landscape of Morocco has hardly changed and the campaigns run by the parties were almost indistinguishable from each other. Those who did vote chose based on family ties, reputation, or personality rather than party affiliation. In addition, the electoral laws are designed to create a weak legislature: no single party can take a majority. Moreover, since all Moroccans are aware that true decision-making power remains firmly with the king, it is no wonder that turnout was so low. The apathy stems from the feeling that there is no point in voting when nothing is going to change.

The election is best interpreted as a vote of no-confidence in political parties and a protest in favor of constitutional reform. If the king pays attention to this message, the election could mark a turning point in Moroccan politics and perhaps lead to more power being shared with democratically elected officials. However, some argue that the election actually marks a setback in democratization insofar as it crystallized the fact that all the legislature can do is keep their fingers crossed that the king will implement more reforms.

The recognition that elections are no longer enough has become consolidated. As a result, Morocco’s youth have turned away from the ballot box and are now setting up blogs to voice their political views. These sites are still in their infancy, so it is yet to be seen if the blogging culture that is already popular in other Arab states such as Egypt will arrive and have an impact in Morocco. The next year will be a test of how committed to democratic reform the king actually is, as well as where the disaffected electorate will turn if his promises of reform turn out to be empty.

Catching a Big Fish, Ignoring the Rest of the School

Former Filipino president Joseph Estrada was convicted and sentenced to life last week after being found guilty of corruption following a six-year trial. Estrada was originally accused of diverting funds of up to 4bn pesos (US$84 million), receiving payoffs, and holding a bank account in a false name. The court hearing was televised live as Estrada was convicted on two out of four counts of corruption.

Estrada’s reaction to the verdict was that the verdict was the result was a politically motivated conspiracy, and he complained that his trial occurred in a “Kangaroo Court.” Among his opponents, the verdict is being hailed as a success for anticorruption efforts as well as a demonstration that high profile officials can be prosecuted and sentenced regardless of their status. There are elements of truth on both sides. In isolation, this victory is a success; however, reactions from Filipino bloggers emphasize that the conviction of one big fish is not enough and is, rather, just another example of the sporadic nature of the reforms taking place. At the moment there is no strategy to the government’s anticorruption efforts; indeed, they are often criticized as being misdirected and petty. Moreover, it is widely considered that the current administration’s hand is also in the cookie jar. The Estrada trial’s result could lead to complacency within the government at a time when more consistent and comprehensive anticorruption efforts are needed. Unless intensified efforts materialize and more solid institutions are constructed, Estrada’s trial and conviction will probably come to be viewed as just another piecemeal attempt from a government that has yet to show real spine in the fight against corruption.

Tunisian Censorship Goes International

Human rights lawyer and activist Ayachi Hammami is claiming that the Tunisian government is behind a recent arson attack at his office in Tunis. Hammami, an outspoken critic of the Tunisian government, was due to present a report on the independence of the judiciary to the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network at a seminar in Paris on September 9. According to the group, the attack has rendered him unable to continue his research, as the fire destroyed his computer.

This is not the first time the government has been accused of interfering with Tunisians who are traveling abroad to speak out: the previous week, Mohamed Abbou, another human rights lawyer, was forbidden to travel to London to be interviewed by Al-Jazeera.

These events highlight a worrying development in the attitude of the Tunisian government towards criticism published abroad. It is already known that Tunisia stifles dissent within its borders, but now it is attempting to avoid unwanted attention from the international community by preventing information about human rights abuses from ever reaching their ears.

Click here to read the Reporters without Borders report on the incident.

Turkey in the Spotlight

Coverage of last week’s Turkish presidential election concentrated on the milestone of electing an Islamist, and of the ability of the AK Party of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to use snap elections to overcome the objections of both the military and secular establishment and emerge with a strengthened mandate. The lack of a coup (so far) is being seen as a sign that democracy really is possible under a governing party with a mild Islamist bent. Skeptics continue to watch, worriedly, to see whether or not the military really will permit this perceived encroachment on the precious legacy of the Republic’s founder, Kemal Ataturk.

The last time an openly religious party was elected was in 1997; on that occasion, the military proceeded to force out the democratically elected government in favor of one it deemed less threatening. Though the military claims to act as the protector of secularism in Turkish democracy, its recent grumbles bring into question the accountability of the military as an institution to a civilian government, and the extent to which an unelected body influences political liberties and rights. Gul’s elections as president, despite express discouragement by the military will be a test for the depth of democracy in the country: will a popularly elected and publicly accountable government will be allowed to stay in office, as is the right of the Turkish people under Turkey’s Constitution?

Despite Gul’s promises to reach out to all Turks, the opportunities created by this event have gone largely unnoticed, with the risks from both the Islamists and the military more frequently highlighted. Turkey’s AK Party has the unique opportunity to prove, both to the Middle East and to the world, that Islam need not equate to fanaticism or authoritarianism and that Islam really can be compatible with democracy in the long run. The AK needs to convince the military, and through them the broader secular class, that it will protect the cherished principle of secularism, without forgetting the base that elected them. Gul and Erdogan can’t ignore Islamic issues, such as the contentious headscarf ban, but both have built their reputations and staked their legitimacy on non-religious issues that don’t threaten either constituency, such as steering the country to substantial economic growth and political progress. Gul and Erdogan have the unique opportunity, as pointed out in an opinion piece by Hussain Haqqani in the International Herald Tribune, “to define secularism in the Muslim world as a political system ensuring separation of theology and state rather than as an anti-religious ideology.”

President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan have a narrow path to tread. It remains to be seen whether or not the military will allow them the chance to demonstrate that they can use religion as a moral and personal compass for their decisions (as is expected of Presidents in the U.S.) without alienating secular Turks already feeling besieged by the dominance of an overtly religious party. If both men’s past records are any indication, and they remain true to the paths of the past few years, Turkey has the opportunity to become the showcase for a successful, modern democracy in the Near East.