Coverage of last week’s Turkish presidential election concentrated on the milestone of electing an Islamist, and of the ability of the AK Party of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to use snap elections to overcome the objections of both the military and secular establishment and emerge with a strengthened mandate. The lack of a coup (so far) is being seen as a sign that democracy really is possible under a governing party with a mild Islamist bent. Skeptics continue to watch, worriedly, to see whether or not the military really will permit this perceived encroachment on the precious legacy of the Republic’s founder, Kemal Ataturk.
The last time an openly religious party was elected was in 1997; on that occasion, the military proceeded to force out the democratically elected government in favor of one it deemed less threatening. Though the military claims to act as the protector of secularism in Turkish democracy, its recent grumbles bring into question the accountability of the military as an institution to a civilian government, and the extent to which an unelected body influences political liberties and rights. Gul’s elections as president, despite express discouragement by the military will be a test for the depth of democracy in the country: will a popularly elected and publicly accountable government will be allowed to stay in office, as is the right of the Turkish people under Turkey’s Constitution?
Despite Gul’s promises to reach out to all Turks, the opportunities created by this event have gone largely unnoticed, with the risks from both the Islamists and the military more frequently highlighted. Turkey’s AK Party has the unique opportunity to prove, both to the Middle East and to the world, that Islam need not equate to fanaticism or authoritarianism and that Islam really can be compatible with democracy in the long run. The AK needs to convince the military, and through them the broader secular class, that it will protect the cherished principle of secularism, without forgetting the base that elected them. Gul and Erdogan can’t ignore Islamic issues, such as the contentious headscarf ban, but both have built their reputations and staked their legitimacy on non-religious issues that don’t threaten either constituency, such as steering the country to substantial economic growth and political progress. Gul and Erdogan have the unique opportunity, as pointed out in an opinion piece by Hussain Haqqani in the International Herald Tribune, “to define secularism in the Muslim world as a political system ensuring separation of theology and state rather than as an anti-religious ideology.”
President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan have a narrow path to tread. It remains to be seen whether or not the military will allow them the chance to demonstrate that they can use religion as a moral and personal compass for their decisions (as is expected of Presidents in the U.S.) without alienating secular Turks already feeling besieged by the dominance of an overtly religious party. If both men’s past records are any indication, and they remain true to the paths of the past few years, Turkey has the opportunity to become the showcase for a successful, modern democracy in the Near East.