Toward the end of this post a few weeks ago we noted that a new and provocative piece had been published in Foreign Affairs arguing that the much-heralded gains of Venezuela's poor during the Hugo Chavez era were difficult to back up with data. We also linked to a piece by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which has defended Venezuela's economic performance since Chavez assumed office in 1999. Unsurprisingly, the dispute between the two sides has intensified: CEPR's Mark Weisbrot posted an analysis purporting to debunk the Foreign Affairs piece, while Francisco Rodriguez, the author of the article, responded to Weisbrot with a more detailed look at the way he arrived at his conclusions. This debate will likely be one that is seen with greater frequency, especially if the one point on which the two sides are in agreement - that Venezuela has troubling macroeconomic balances that could cause severe pain in the future - remains unaddressed (see this Financial Times article from yesterday on one way the government might start to deal with the currency imbalance).
Leaving aside the very interesting methodological dispute, there are a couple of broader governance-related points to note here. First, one of the problems in the debate is data-related. Venezuela's data have been poor and untimely, making the issue of what sets to use and their relevance more problematic than would otherwise be the case. Although the constitution references citizens' right to information, no systematic transparency and access to information law has been enacted. A lack of transparency, combined with a politicized judicial system and large increases in government spending, will almost inevitably lead to increased corruption, one of Venezuela's other serious governance problems.
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the broader question of where Hugo Chavez's Venezuela fits into the international system, not in terms of geopolitics but in terms of ideology and political economy. The defense of his much-questioned presidency rests on two fundamental tenets. One is increased political participation opportunities for average Venezuelans. Proponents of this view argue that "the appeal of Chávez and 21st-century socialism is as much to do with this being a project of political empowerment as it is one of oil-'rent' distribution." There is little question that Venezuela's previous two-party system was not particularly representative. However, as Venezuela continues to tread a path in which executive branch power grows - or, in the case of the failed constitutional reform, nearly grows - as traditional institutions that can check it wither, the proposition that citizen participation can adequately replace traditional mechanisms of liberal democracy will be tested.
The other fundamental tenet of Chavismo is economic growth and material improvements in people's lives. Some people see Venezuela's significant post-2003 economic growth as a repudiation of neoliberal economics. This is difficult to prove or disprove, given the windfall from the oil boom of the last few years (growth in Argentina is perhaps a more interesting case here, as was recently discussed, and eventually dismissed, in The Economist). Others point to the concrete gains of the poor, both in monetary terms and in increased provision of state services. But the longer Chavez remains in power, the greater the expectations will be, and the less excuse the government will have for continued failures (such as the stratospheric violent crime rate). Murky data and all, one can expect more frequent debates over the empirical results of Chavismo in the coming years.
Photo found at CaracasChronicles
