Violence continues to flare up in and around Sana’a, Yemen’s capital—and President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government is backpedaling on its commitments to better governance. The pressures of an ongoing civil war and shortages in food and water have led Saleh and the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) to substitute the rule of force for the rule of law. Despite advances like a promised liberalization of broadcast media and the recent election of governors by an apparently free popular vote, accountability, public voice, and civil liberties are waning in Yemen. The Saleh government has proven unable to manage popular demands through transparent democratic governance.
Since June 2004, the Yemeni government has fought a brutal campaign in the northern district of Sa’ada against an army of Zaidi (moderate Shi’a) rebels led by Abdul-Malik al-Huthi. A ceasefire negotiated in Doha brought a year of relative quiet from June 2007 up to this April, but the conflict is now resurgent after the government refused to withdraw or release captured rebels, maintaining a blockade on the region. The latest fighting was touched off by the assassination of Sa’ada MP Saleh Daghsan on April 18 and a rebel ambush of a military leader on May 16.
The Saleh government has fought its campaign not just in the hilly north, but also in the press and in the courts. Two weeks ago, as the rebels were poised to battle in the streets of Sana’a, and as exiled MP Yahya al-Huthi—rebel leader Abdul-Malik al-Huthi’s half brother—held negotiations in Berlin with the Saleh government, state news agency Saba Net reported that the military had ‘liquidated’ the rebels and informed Reuters that al-Huthi had been injured in combat. The rebel leader disagreed in a recent tape. This week, the Yemeni military forced a Huthi retreat. But the manner in which objective information has been suppressed by the government suggest less-than-transparent intentions toward managing the conflict.
Several other areas raise serious concerns. First, accountability is on the decline. In February 2007, the Sa’ada district was declared a closed military sector and civilian communications were restricted, barring access to aid agencies and journalists. Information on the wellbeing of civilians in Sa’ada is now scarce. Moreover, the Yemeni government is seeking to crush the rebellion without addressing Huthi grievances. A Huthi delegate to the Yemen peace negotiations was detained in late April without explanation, and Yahya al-Huthi, also involved in the negotiations from abroad, was stripped of parliamentary immunity this weekend at the government’s request. Freedom House recommended in the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report that Yemeni officials be stripped of immunity, but not selectively, and not for political reasons.
Second, the Saleh administration has continued to restrict free expression in the press. Journalists have increasingly come under attack for breaching the silence imposed on the closed Sa’ada sector. Abdel Karim al-Khaiwani was jailed, charged with sedition and conspiracy, and sentenced to six years of forced labor after he was caught with images of the conflict and statements from rebels. Socialist Party general secretary and Journalists’ Syndicate head Mohammed al-Maqalih was imprisoned for “attacking and defaming the judicial system” after he laughed at Khaiwani’s trial. The courts have resisted efforts by several officials and nine MPs to release al-Maqalih, in a show of weak accountability to elected representatives and the press. State coercion of the media, cited in the 2006 Crossroads survey as a central impediment to democratic governance in Yemen, continues to obscure popular and official sentiment there.
Last, as the al-Khaiwani case illustrates, civil liberties and the rule of law are not established. The Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights reported this May that last December 370 people were in detention without justification; many had been tortured. Secrecy and interrogation without lawyers are standard operating procedure in Yemen. In December, the Supreme Court heard the case of Walid Haykel, who was charged with murder and sentenced to death at age fifteen. Walid’s family alleged that he was tortured and that he was not of age to be sentenced to death. The court rejected medical evidence of his age, calling it ‘speculative’—many Yemenis are not registered at birth—and ruled again for execution. Suspects are guilty until proven innocent, and the government has not established sufficient institutions to meet the law with evidence.
No matter the levels of coercion and force applied, separatist tensions may flare up in Yemen’s volatile north and south for years; good governance is the only permanent fix. Yemen’s government is under pressure to meet the demands of an impoverished and repressed population. Several recommendations from the 2006 Crossroads survey merit reiteration. First, Saleh should revisit his 2005 plans to revise the 1990 Law for Press and Publications, respecting the spirit of his government’s discussions with the Journalists’ Syndicate. He should also encourage the Ministry of Information’s plans to liberalize Yemeni broadcast media and begin the process of dissolving this antiquated ministry. Second, it is time to further limit the power of the executive branch over the judiciary, to revisit penal laws and build appropriate institutions for enforcement, and to retrain state security officials in the proper discharge of their duties. The Saleh government should accept that it cannot control all public information, and that the best way to govern Yemen is openly—and democratically.
Photo Credit: Flickr user localsurfer
