Bolivia is fast approaching an August 10 recall referendum in which the continued tenure of President Evo Morales and all nine of the departmental prefects (similar to US state governors) will be put to the test. As usual, the country is full of sound and fury, with various prefects oscillating back and forth between resistance to and participation in the referendum. It now appears as though all or nearly all of the prefects will participate in the balloting. What is less clear is what the results will mean for the country’s political stalemate.
Last month the International Crisis Group put out a report on Bolivia arguing that the government needed to show greater initiative in dealing with the issue of autonomy, which is one of several serious political obstacles to the approval of a new constitution. A note from the Andean Information Network, however, took issue with the way the ICG framed the political conflict, noting that asking the government for significant concessions while putting the opposition’s foremost demand at the top of the priorities list was less than helpful. The broader problem, however, is that the brinksmanship and maneuvering in the country and the breakdown in institutions renders any successful negotiations very difficult to even undertake, let alone succeed.
As the Democracy Center notes in a piece that discusses the breakdown in Bolivia and nicely summarizes a list of the most pressing issues, President Morales’ government appears to be reaping what it helped sow while in opposition: namely, a lack of respect for the law and a belief that shows of force on the streets are the most effective way to assert one’s claims. It is much easier to use this method to get in the way of change than push it forward, as the government already knew and the opposition has enthusiastically discovered.
As for the recall referendum, the two questions are what will happen and how much it will matter. The first question – along with a brief summary of the unorthodox rules – is addressed in two blog posts here and here. Basically, there appears to be a fairly high chance that Evo will receive support within a few points one way or the other of the 53.7% percent he got in 2005, with a small probability toward the downside. Several of the most powerful prefects are also likely to prevail, while a few will probably fall. The one thing most observers appear to agree on is that the referendum won't do much to change the political panorama in Bolivia. Positive movement depends on the ability of the two highly intransigent sides to find common ground. The government believes that its 2005 election victory provided a mandate for deep, lasting structural changes. The problem is that its mishandling of the constitutional drafting process (detailed in the ICG report) has dented its legitimacy. The opposition, as the Democracy Center piece notes, has played a skillful game of switching from demand to demand, but its legitimacy with government supporters is damaged by twenty five years of governmental mismanagement (as well as, to some degree, an association with several hundred years of oppressive elite-dominated rule).
What is the way out? Some observers, like the head of the UNDP in Bolivia, seem to think that incremental steps like agreeing on nominations for various electoral organs and the currently inquorate Constitutional Tribunal are the answer. The ICG believes that direct negotiations are necessary, probably with an intensive guiding hand from outside mediators. The Democracy Center thinks that the opposition will simply try to stall until Morales’s term runs out – possibly one of the most dangerous strategies of all. Perhaps the best outcome would be one in which both sides emerge from the referendum feeling strengthened, with both President Morales and several of the important lowlands prefects winning easily. While this could of course lead to further intransigence, perhaps it will provide space for the two sides to negotiate without looking “weak.” For now, all that can be hoped for is a peaceful run-up to referendum day and quiet encouragement from influential actors (read: the US and OAS for the opposition, and Europeans and Hugo Chavez for the government) for the two sides to show restraint.
Photo Credit: Flickr user olmovich
