
After a prolonged period in which it appeared that anything, including civil war, was possible in Bolivia, the government and the opposition have reached agreement on the text of the draft constitution and the process by which it will be voted on by Bolivia’s citizens. On the surface, it looks like both sides can boast significant achievements. For the government, the fundamental priority has always been to get the new charter, with its expansive view of citizen rights, approved and implemented. The opposition, meanwhile, can point to strong gains regarding the question of regional autonomy, as well as a pledge by Evo Morales not to stay in office beyond 2014. If the agreement holds, it will mark a rather dramatic turnaround from just one month ago, when the prospect of sustained bloodshed seemed all too plausible.
The basic story about the agreement is covered in the Miami Herald; for a story that received significant amounts of attention when things were going badly, the international press have shown little interest in the more positive denouement: neither the Economist nor the BBC has a story up, and both The New York Times and the Washington Post give only cursory mentions. In any event, as usual, strong Bolivia analysis is provided by blogger MABB, political scientist Miguel Centellas, and the Democracy Center. For Spanish-readers, a version of the updated charter can be found here, usefully left in “track changes” mode so that the areas where changes were focused are clear. In brief, the most ambitious portions of the 411-article document, those that call for extensive and detailed protections of everything from the environment to workers rights to indigenous cultural rights, were left largely unchanged. Alterations focused on the nuts-and-bolts portions of the document, in particular the sections dealing with regional and local autonomy and the functioning of both the legislative and judicial branches.
Some changes were obviously welcome, like the switch from an absolute to a two-thirds congressional majority for future constitutional amendments. Others may come to be regretted, such as the popular election of high court judges. The motivation behind that change is understandable – Bolivia’s judicial system has been paralyzed by an inability to agree on high court nominees – but in a weakly institutionalized and highly politicized context, where popular election by no means guarantees legitimicy, such a system could easily lead to even greater political fights in the future.
There are, of course, many interesting questions about what will happen next. Will the “media luna” (half moon) states of the lowland east accept the autonomy formula incorporated into the constitution? Early signs hint that persuasion will be difficult. Indeed, one of the interesting underlying currents throughout the last three years in Bolivia has been the shift in the center of resistance to the Morales administration from opposition congressmembers to the regional prefects. Could the negotiations over the constitution, which were conducted by those previously marginalized congressmembers, mark an effort to regain influence? It will be interesting to watch how the intra-regional dynamics play out. The prefects, whose recalcitrance and obstructionism know very few bounds, have to some degree had the rug swept out from under their feet. Given the over 65 percent support that President Morales received in the August recall referendum, when polarization was at its peak, it is very unlikely that a draft constitution with a big “compromise” stamp on it will not receive broad support when the vote occurs.
Of course, passing the new charter is only the first step. Implementation will be difficult, given the very real shifts in power structures it will herald. The use of street pressure is as decisive – if not more so – as ever in Bolivia. Getting the new-look institutions able to function long enough to begin the process of consolidation before the next crisis brings Bolivians to the streets will be a challenge. So will taking the vast array of newly consecrated rights from word to deed rapidly enough to keep disillusion and cynicism from setting in.
The de-institutionalized reality of Bolivian politics was no secret even before the events of the last year, but the turmoil since last November was especially damaging to Bolivia as a coherent polity. One critical factor going forward will be political leadership. For President Morales, now that his most highly desired achievement is within view, will he act magnanimously? Will the opposition prefects seek to join the compromise, seek to maximize power by fighting over the reins of local leadership, or continue to refuse to even acknowledge Bolivia’s new political realities? Bolivia is by no means out of the woods yet, but this week’s events are the most encouraging signs in quite some time.
Photo Credit: Flickr user vocesbolivianas