Bangladesh’s current government is an interim regime installed by the military in a January 2007 coup. The government was supposed to direct the country away from its entrenched politics based on patronage and personality to a cleaner, more democratic form of governance. The primary goal was to create an alternative to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, and the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina. The two parties, bitter rivals, have long dominated Bangladeshi politics: Zia was prime minister from 1991-1996 and 2001-2006, and Hasina was prime minister from 1996-2001. They are known as the two “begums” – Muslim women of high rank – and each of their administrations was characterized by rampant corruption and a cult of personality centered on the respective leader. Since the coup, the army has tried to push the begums aside, jailing them and splitting their parties. However, by calling elections that will likely include both begums, the military has implicitly admitted that its mission has been less than successful.
As this blog discussed in June, out-of-control corruption provided the justification for the coup, and the caretaker government has engaged in a crackdown on crooked politicians and their associates. Bangladesh’s Transparency International rankings tell the story of why such action was initially popular: it was reckoned the world's most corrupt nation from 2001-2005. While the relative shortcomings have eased a bit, the organization says corruption is still endemic, and petty corruption has increased despite the anti-graft drive.
Why did a coup premised on restoring the rule of law end up losing its way? There appear to be several reasons. In the year following the coup it became apparent that the military and its allies’ arrest strategy was focused primarily on consolidating control over national politics. Thus the government’s Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) focused on ending high-profile impunity, while insufficiently tackling the systemic patronage that affects the wider citizenry. In addition, the anticorruption drive has crumbled due to sloppy legal work and a lack of expertise. Investigators were not properly trained in anticorruption laws, and many cases have been thrown out because legal procedures were not followed.
Moreover, the military may have underestimated the contradiction between its intention to transition back to democracy and its goal of crushing the begums. While both were arrested and charged with a number of corruption-related crimes, the legal processes stalled and their loyal followers showed little ability to abandon them and formulate newer and more progressive parties. Pressure brought by rising food and commodity prices have also resulted in lower support for the interim regime and increased its desire to hand over the government.
On August 4, municipal elections were held, the first balloting since the coup. The elections were tightly controlled, but they were fair and resulted in a clear outcome – a decisive victory for Hasina’s Awami League. The fact that some of those elected ran campaigns while in jail on corruption charges signals that party loyalties still trump a vague desire for reformed politics.
The government has also announced that parliamentary elections will be held on December 18 and rural upazilla (sub-district) elections on December 24 and 28. On a positive note, the election commission has purged 12 million duplicate, deceased, and fake names from voter roles. Emergency rules in place since the coup banning public gatherings are supposed to be relaxed or suspended during the upcoming campaign.
Unfortunately, anyone likely to take power will come from the BNP or Awami League – and the country will probably be led once again by Zia or Hasina. Cognizant of the power and popularity of the parties – and the potential perceived illegitimacy of elections held without them – the government appears to have pulled back on its anti-corruption drive. On September 11, the government freed Zia on bail. She still faces charges, but those are not likely to move forward. Earlier, the government released Zia's elder son, Tarique Rahman, who had been jailed in March 2007. Rahman was a public symbol of corruption and violence during his mother's rule, and was facing many charges. As for Hasina, who still faces extortion charges, this week a Bangladeshi court refused to grant her bail. Hasina was released in June to go the US to receive medical care, and is supposed to return home to prepare for the December elections. The Awami League has demanded that she be given full freedom by the government, and the party threatens to boycott the elections otherwise. Meanwhile, some factions of the BNP, including Zia herself, have threatened to boycott if additional people arrested for corruption are not released. Both of these threats are grave: if either the Awami League or the BNP boycotts the election, democratic legitimacy will suffer and the process could even turn violent.
Thus, the outlook for improved governance generally, and corruption specifically, is not good. Many Bangladeshis whose expectations were raised by the anticorruption activities are now extremely frustrated by the continuing corruption. There are also signs that the army will not completely retreat from the national political scene. The government has asserted that a banned Islamist militant group, the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, has issued threats, and the home ministry has warned of declining law and order.
Whatever the exact sequence of next steps, the military’s vision of a reformed state remains unfulfilled. It was folly on the armed forces' part to think that it could sweep out the old order. It will be interesting to see if any of the positive advances, including the electoral purge and many of the corruption arrests, remain in place under a new civilian government. Nonetheless, it appears that Bangladesh is at risk of entering the same old cycles of polarization and patronage.
