
When President Umaru Yar’Adua came to power a year and a half ago in Nigeria, a country with 140m people speaking some 250 languages, he detailed a seven-point agenda (energy, security, wealth creation, education, land reform, mass transit, and the execution the Niger Delta plan) to propel development via good governance. Topping President Yar’Adua’s agenda was achieving progress in the Niger Delta Region, where 23 percent of Nigerians reside and where instability reigns, with frequent inter-ethnic clashes over the allocation of oil wealth and resources. The Delta has always been a source of conflict: since initial oil deposits were founded in 1956, residents have been paid pittances, lost their lands, and suffered environmental degradation. Though there have been a few encouraging signs of incremental decreases in tensions, the complexity of the problem means that there is still little hope of an imminent resolution.
Nigeria is the world’s eighth largest exporter of oil – a commodity that accounts for a majority of the government’s revenue – yet the Niger Delta that produces it is the least-developed area of the country and has seen little economic development in its 50 years of oil production. It is estimated that less than 5 percent of federal oil revenue is returned to Rivers State, which partly explains the region’s lack of infrastructure, potable water, good schools, and communication facilities, among other necessary citizen services. Moreover this inability to harness the area’s natural wealth has fueled the resentment that turned the issue violent within ten years of the initiation of oil production. Now, violent gangs flourish amid high unemployment caused by bad governance as well as damage to traditional livelihoods, such as fishing, by oil drilling. As a 2008 Human Rights Watch report entitled The Politics of War argues, the prevalence of violence, which is endemic to the Rivers State, fuels a vicious circle of mismanagement and corruption: “Ironically, the young men attracted into well funded gang activity because of poverty and unemployment are helping to fuel the same problems responsible for their lack of opportunities in the first place.”
Historically, the Delta has been fragile and fragmented, with the famous three-year Biafran civil war that started in 1967 only its most notorious episode. In 2008, terror and lawlessness by militants is rampant in Rivers State, with kidnappings, often of oil workers, a habitual practice used to generate income. Human Rights Watch’s 2008 report notes that in the first 10 weeks of 2008, armed gangs kidnapped more than a dozen people for ransom. Allegations have also surfaced that political kingmakers have used government funds to sponsor criminal gangs to do their dirty work. It is widely acknowledged that the criminal gangs operating in the Delta are partners in power, patronage, and impunity with the ruling politicians. To add insult to injury and to greatly exacerbate circumstances, IRIN/Plus News, in discussing the relationship between unemployment and rising HIV/AIDS in the region, reports that “rape is prevalent: these militants do anything they like, and when there is conflict, the military move in, and they too will commit rape.” Dr C. Okeh, who chairs the State Action Committee on HIV/AIDS (SACA) notes that since Rivers State is dotted with oil and gas activities, and commercial sex workers follow the camps and we are finding a rising [HIV] prevalence in rural farming and fishing communities."
Not that the rest of Nigeria is a governance model. Freedom in the World 2008 ranks Nigeria as Partly Free and notes that it “received a downward trend arrow due to the 2007 national elections that international and domestic observers judged to be extremely flawed.” Therefore, it is not surprising that many Nigerians are lamenting that their soft-spoken president is failing to execute many of his inaugural promises. So far under President Yar’Adua, corruption reforms appear to be backsliding, especially since the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an anticorruption body, has lost its credibility following the sacking of its head Nuhu Ribadu, who had won international praise for dealing with governmental corruption. Coupled with this, civil strife has worsened in the Delta region as an “oil war” has been declared by militants. To address the new wave of violence in the Rivers State and the lack of civil liberties enjoyed by citizens and minority groups, on September 11, 2008, President Yar’Adua announced the creation of a cabinet position dedicated exclusively to the Delta. The move sharply divided pundits, with the main militant coalition, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), opposed. The MEND is undeniably a key voice in the dispute. However, the Economist argues that while MEND portrays itself as political organization that is fighting for the allocation and redistribution of oil resources, it is more of an “umbrella organization for several armed groups, which it sometimes pays in cash or guns to launch attacks. This franchise approach has so far been successful.” In the past three years the group has orchestrated attacks across the Niger Delta that have reduced the country’s oil output by a fifth.
The new Niger Delta Ministry is seen by many as just “another bureaucracy”, a moribund ministry, rather than a new intermediary between the Niger Delta and the Federal government. This new ministry bears a notable resemblance to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which was created in 2000 to relieve poverty in the region but has been hamstrung by corruption, insufficient funds, and poor management. In 2007, some 38 infrastructure projects were terminated by the NDDC. However, while some leaders have called for greater federalism in Rivers State in order to enable the “full components of resources control and devolution of power,” others welcomed the new ministry as a signal of commitment from President Yar’Adua to his seven-point agenda. In any event, the announcement of this new ministry united several armed gangs, which led to attacks on pipelines and the killing of innocent citizens, plunging the region into the worst violence in several years.
However, efforts to reach resolution remain active – and always will, given the critical importance of maintaining Nigeria’s oil production. Perhaps some light at the end of the tunnel actually comes from failed negotiations between the Ogoni region and the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) this past June, as reported on by the International Crisis Group. While the negotiations hit a standstill, the progress that was achieved shows that a non-violent approach could engender success in regaining the rights of local groups. The withdrawal of SPDC for the Delta region, according to the ICG, paves the way for President Yar’Adua’s government to demonstrate greater goodwill and sensitivity to ethnic minority groups of Rivers State. ICG further concludes that the peaceful transition in Ogoni can persuade other armed militant groups to disarm and deactivate the Delta insurgency. Like other seemingly intractable conflicts, then, achieving an accord with one group could unlock the door to a wider set of agreements. Only time will tell if the new ministry will promote peace. However, as oil prices spiral downward and lawlessness continues to enshroud the Niger Delta region, minority populations continue to suffer all the familiar repercussions of unending conflict.
Photo Credit: Flickr user ISN Security Watch