In January 2006, China released a major foreign policy document outlining its involvement with African countries. The document described both the much-criticized principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the “one China policy,” whereby African countries must have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This step was a culmination of years of mutual aid and trust building, the two most important elements of which were the initiation of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China’s cancellation of $1.3 billion worth of debt three years later. These diplomatic maneuvers and gestures have been coupled with a massive increase in trade and aid. Trade has increased four-fold in the last four years – China has replaced the UK to become Africa’s third largest trade partner – and if Beijing’s promises to double aid between 2008 and 2009 come to pass China will give fully one-third the amount of the US. These facets of Chinese policy in Africa paint a picture of an emerging economic behemoth willing to grant, lend, or invest large sums regardless of the beneficiary as long as there is a business or geopolitical opportunity. Thus, for the international good governance and democracy promotion movement, the greatest concern is to what degree this shift will result in the protection and preservation of autocratic regimes.
That African countries – autocratic and democratic alike – are snatching up Chinese loans and business deals should not come as a surprise. Until recently, Africa had been almost exclusively dependent upon the West for financial assistance. Western aid, however, almost always came with strings attached. Donors usually demanded that the provision of aid to African countries be conditional upon the adoption of economic reforms, respect for human rights standards, and progressive democratization. Now China has appeared, offering the same supply of goods and capital without the attendant loss of sovereignty. However, there is a time-horizon problem: what’s good for politicians’ short-term needs may indeed benefit the country, but also may carry costs over the longer term. Thus, the new Sino-African relationship should not be viewed as a question of whether or not Africa gains or loses, but whether the initial gains are worth the potential governance costs in the medium- to long-term.
Sudan is the country where China’s influence is most obviously pernicious. Khartoum has been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the State Department since 1993, and by the millennium the EU and US had cut ties with the regime. Then, China came to the rescue. Sino-Sudanese relations picked up when Beijing began to pump money into exploiting Sudan’s oil reserves. China’s financial assistance made it far easier for Sudan to maintain production levels adequate to fund the government’s activities – including most notoriously the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur – without having to bow to Western conditions.
Zimbabwe offers a strikingly similar example of China upholding a regime economically, politically, and militarily that might otherwise have collapsed due to international pressure and catastrophic internal policies. President Mugabe has made deliberate efforts to “turn East” in an effort to escape pressure for democratic reform. China has provided some export credits and soft loans, possibly tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and in exchange for certain mining concessions. Most importantly, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to the country, including the delivery of military aircraft and other vehicles, while scuttling Anglo-American/French attempts to impose harsher restrictions in the UN Security Council.
China can be accused of scuttling western efforts at inducing reform and promoting corruption in other African countries as well. In 2004, the international community was pressing Angola to improve the transparency of its oil sector and to make other reforms as a prerequisite for any talks concerning extending credit. Then, China offered a $2 billion loan with the expected result that Luanda largely shelved reform efforts.
Likewise, China has a committed interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt and has completed a lucrative deal in which Beijing receives vital raw materials for its manufacturing sector and in return builds for Kinshasa necessary transportation infrastructure and even some hospitals. Nevertheless, concerns over the effective management of this deal within the DRC’s corrupt economic environment have frequently been raised.
China's relations with Mozambique date back to the Cold War, when Beijing backed the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO party. Interest dropped afterwards, but suddenly reappeared in recent years. Trade stood at a mere US$70 million in 2004, but tripled in two years. Beijing has coupled this increase in trade with writing off debt and the elimination of tariffs on a number of exports. This financial relationship is expected to soar as Chinese firms are tempted to relocate to Mozambique, with its cheap labor force proximity to raw materials.
In Zambia, hopes had been raised by the substantial resources China had been devoting to transportation and communication infrastructure. Locals praised a multi-dimensional initiative that nominally envisaged Africa as an ally and not a colony, as “a growing market and possibly a source over the long run for food, manufacturing, and industrial goods.” However, the abysmal pay and working conditions in Chinese-operated mines became an election issue championed by Michael Sata in 2006. In reaction, Beijing declared that new investment had been put on hold pending the result of the elections. Had Sata come close to victory in the presidential elections, Beijing might well have shown the limitations on sovereignty its assistance carries. In addition, the focus on physical infrastructure has been welcomed by many, but the procurement prescriptions and general lack of coordination with local actors has been criticized for reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Such tied aid through Chinese companies also makes it difficult to scrutinize the aid flows to check against corruption or to uphold environmental standards, exacerbating the accountability concerns.
The future of Chinese involvement is possibly more promising than the present, as there are signs that Beijing’s policy might fall more in line with American and European efforts in the future. Most importantly, the financial hazards of conducting business with regimes that are unaccountable and un-transparent will unavoidably come to the fore as China becomes more deeply tied to African economies. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, China is already becoming aware of these risks as it suffers the effects of the global economic slow-down. In the short run, however, this realization could bring about decidedly unfortunate consequences. As China becomes more cautious when choosing the countries and sectors in which it will invest, the development prospects of several African countries that have become highly dependent on Chinese assistance will undoubtedly suffer. The example of the Congo is illustrative: as prices have fallen, the $9 billion dollar copper deal between the DRC and China has become shaky. As a result, the Congo may be left in the lurch. Should this be the case, the negative consequences for the country’s development prospects will be even more pronounced due to the fact that China failed to make its aid conditional upon the adoption of reforms aimed at boosting sustainability.
Perhaps China will become less of an inhibitor of governance reforms in the future. Although it will certainly not emerge at the forefront of demands for democracy and human rights, it may also not be as likely to actively undermine the development of good governance practices. Unfortunately, however, China may continue to frustrate governance efforts in a more indirect way. Specifically, the Chinese economic model, the ill-defined “Beijing Consensus”, could be used by African countries to provide an excuse for authoritarianism. Due to China’s remarkable economic achievements, the Beijing Consensus is often touted as an effective formula for growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, the strict adoption of the Chinese model, which includes an initial focus on economic reform which is later followed by political and cultural change, would signify an actual regression in the level of democratic reform in most African countries, rather than merely a slower pace of democratization. The fact that China’s economic reforms were carried out in an environment of political repression is oftentimes ignored by those championing the model. Turning towards the Chinese model is based in part on the perceived failure of the “Washington consensus,” but also is closely related to resentment about the role of developed countries in Africa. Nonetheless, as many of these states are already learning, replacing the “imperialist” model with a seemingly less paternalistic one may not be the panacea that many leaders and citizens are hoping for.
Photo credit: Flickr user Pan-African News Wire Photo File
