COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Algeria's Election Heralds Continuation of Status Quo

Algeria’s recent presidential elections yielded unsurprising results. On April 9, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika , who has ruled Algeria since 1999, was re-elected to a third term with 90.23% of the national vote. This extremely high margin of victory is undoubtedly inflated. While the participation rate was officially measured at 74.5%, the opposition estimated that roughly 24% of eligible voters participated. According to official tallies, opposition candidate Louisa Hanaoune came in second place with 4.5% of the vote, while none of the other candidates were able to garner more than a few percentage points.

While these results were expected, they are troubling nonetheless. Both the run-up to the election and the balloting itself were decidedly undemocratic. The president’s reelection bid was only made possible after the parliament approved his proposed amendment to the constitutional provision that had previously set a two term limit on the presidency. This amendment essentially determined the outcome of the election in advance. During the presidential campaign, the absence of a viable opposition was striking. This was partially the result of direct government interference in the campaign activities of the opposition. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the development of a competitive party system in Algeria has been hampered by the government’s practice of refusing to award legal status to opposition parties. Without official authorization, parties are generally unable to participate in elections. As a result of this, the presidential election featured opposition candidates with little popular support. These candidates were widely considered to be “token opponents.” Several opposition leaders who were barred from participating attempted to stage a mass boycott as a last-ditch effort to influence the election’s results, but the protests were predictably stifled. Meanwhile, President Bouteflika utilized the resources of the state to exert control over the media and win over supporters on the campaign trail with extensive political handouts.

Apart from the government’s meddling, equally disconcerting is the prevailing environment of political apathy in which the election took place. Among both the general public and the formal opposition, the predominant line of thought seems to be that measurable change is unfeasible. While the opposition’s poor showing was principally the result of unfair government restrictions, a general lack of popular support and mobilization for the opposition was also a factor.

Unfortunately, in the realm of governance, a change of course is exactly what Algeria needs. Although the country must implement substantial reforms before governance can be improved, let alone democratized, Bouteflika failed to include any innovative policy proposals in the campaign. Instead, he repeatedly promised to boost economic growth and protect stability and security – important issues, to be sure, but far from visionary. The president’s health is another complication. Over the past few years, the 72- year-old president has been repeatedly hospitalized, possibly for stomach cancer. On top of all of this, he will likely have to focus much of his attention on the recent surge of terrorist attacks committed by the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. As a result of these factors, chances are slim that further headway will be made on crucial reforms with Bouteflika at the helm.

The details of the presidential elections serve as evidence of the country’s lack of progress in the sphere of accountability and public voice. While the election was generally free of violence, it was rife with fraud. In addition, Bouteflika has consolidated authority in the executive branch, largely through the support of the powerful military establishment. The president himself verified his half-hearted respect for important democratic principles: following the ratification of the constitutional amendment on term limits, he stated that democracy cannot “constitute a single, universal model…a model that must be adhered to and applied at all times and in all places.”

Moreover, Algeria’s level of respect for human rights and the rule of law is complicated by the president’s continuing focus on a particular conception of national reconciliation. As the 2008 Freedom in the World report on Algeria reports, the excessive amnesty laws passed by the government have resulted in an undermining of the justice system. As Human Rights Watch notes, terrorists and militants who committed heinous crimes during the civil conflict of the 1990s, during which 150,000 Algerians died and 6,000 disappeared, have escaped punishment, while groups representing the victims have been ignored and even actively harassed by the government. More recently, Bouteflika has expressed his willingness to pardon Islamic extremists responsible for organizing suicide bombings. In response to this, Amnesty International released a document earlier this year which denounced Bouteflika’s “legacy of impunity.” Due to the fact that reconciliation remained Bouteflika’s top campaign issue, nothing is likely to change in the near future. Relatedly, the state of emergency, which has been in effect for 17 years, gives the government the authority to unjustly imprison journalists and political dissidents, and Bouteflika has shown no inclination towards the revocation of the act.

Finally, the level of transparency in Algeria’s government is lamentable. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption is entrenched in the country. In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 90th out of 180. Despite his early promises to sweep Algeria’s political scene of corrupt officials, Bouteflika has largely turned a blind eye. Backroom dealings, often including cash handouts, were pervasive throughout the election. The separation of politics from business remains moribund, as do efforts to reform the military's role in commercial enterprise.

In essence, the president’s conduct during election season provides no evidence that Algeria’s poor governance record will be rectified. Real change in Algeria will require a changing of the guard. Given the constraints on the opposition, it is questionable how this will come about other than via a decline in Bouteflika’s health, which would create a dangerous vacuum. For now, then, Algerian governance will remain at the mercy of global economic fortunes and the interests of a narrow political class, and dispatches from the country will continue to feature descriptors like “stagnation” and “weak prospects” rather than “reform” and “justice.”

Photo Credit: Flickr user Franck Prevel

1000 Days of Alan Garcia: the Peruvian Take

Wednesday marked the 1000th day of the presidency of Peru's Alan Garcia, and there are various potential perspectives on his presidency. First, it is critical to recall that the first Garcia administration, from 1985 to 1990, is widely regarded as the worst in Peruvian history, an era when the country came perilously close to failed state status. This carried two implications entering the current term. First, it was obvious that Garcia would seek, above all, to maintain macroeconomic stability in order to inoculate himself against the fear that this term would turn out like the previous one. Second, many hoped that he would energetically devote himself to a wide range of reforms in order to assure that the legacy of his second term would serve as his primary political epitaph.

At this point, the latter set of hopes have been largely extinguished. Especially from abroad, Peru's fundamentals looked strong before the crisis hit. GDP growth was enormous, poverty rates fell, and inflation remained contained. Yet the hope that such a favorable economic environment would lead to broader reforms in critical areas, such as the justice system, anticorruption, environmental conflict, and the country's appalling social breaches, have been largely dashed. For a mix of reasons, the Garcia government has stagnated in all these areas and more, with only incremental achievements in most areas where reform is urgently necessary.

But don't take this blog's word for it. Below the fold is a translation of a report giving a critique of the first 1000 days from the perspective of Peru.21, one the country's more centrist newspapers. While not shy about criticizing the administration, it is the type of media outlet that could have been won over had Garcia decided to govern as he said he would during his campaign (i.e., as a center-leftist) rather as he actually as (largely from the right).

Chinese Assistance: A New Model or a Short-term Fix?

 

In January 2006, China released a major foreign policy document outlining its involvement with African countries. The document described both the much-criticized principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the “one China policy,” whereby African countries must have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This step was a culmination of years of mutual aid and trust building, the two most important elements of which were the initiation of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China’s cancellation of $1.3 billion worth of debt three years later. These diplomatic maneuvers and gestures have been coupled with a massive increase in trade and aid. Trade has increased four-fold in the last four years – China has replaced the UK to become Africa’s third largest trade partner – and if Beijing’s promises to double aid between 2008 and 2009 come to pass China will give fully one-third the amount of the US. These facets of Chinese policy in Africa paint a picture of an emerging economic behemoth willing to grant, lend, or invest large sums regardless of the beneficiary as long as there is a business or geopolitical opportunity. Thus, for the international good governance and democracy promotion movement, the greatest concern is to what degree this shift will result in the protection and preservation of autocratic regimes.

That African countries – autocratic and democratic alike – are snatching up Chinese loans and business deals should not come as a surprise. Until recently, Africa had been almost exclusively dependent upon the West for financial assistance. Western aid, however, almost always came with strings attached. Donors usually demanded that the provision of aid to African countries be conditional upon the adoption of economic reforms, respect for human rights standards, and progressive democratization. Now China has appeared, offering the same supply of goods and capital without the attendant loss of sovereignty. However, there is a time-horizon problem: what’s good for politicians’ short-term needs may indeed benefit the country, but also may carry costs over the longer term. Thus, the new Sino-African relationship should not be viewed as a question of whether or not Africa gains or loses, but whether the initial gains are worth the potential governance costs in the medium- to long-term.

Sudan is the country where China’s influence is most obviously pernicious. Khartoum has been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the State Department since 1993, and by the millennium the EU and US had cut ties with the regime. Then, China came to the rescue. Sino-Sudanese relations picked up when Beijing began to pump money into exploiting Sudan’s oil reserves. China’s financial assistance made it far easier for Sudan to maintain production levels adequate to fund the government’s activities – including most notoriously the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur – without having to bow to Western conditions.

Zimbabwe offers a strikingly similar example of China upholding a regime economically, politically, and militarily that might otherwise have collapsed due to international pressure and catastrophic internal policies. President Mugabe has made deliberate efforts to “turn East” in an effort to escape pressure for democratic reform. China has provided some export credits and soft loans, possibly tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and in exchange for certain mining concessions. Most importantly, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to the country, including the delivery of military aircraft and other vehicles, while scuttling Anglo-American/French attempts to impose harsher restrictions in the UN Security Council.

China can be accused of scuttling western efforts at inducing reform and promoting corruption in other African countries as well. In 2004, the international community was pressing Angola to improve the transparency of its oil sector and to make other reforms as a prerequisite for any talks concerning extending credit. Then, China offered a $2 billion loan with the expected result that Luanda largely shelved reform efforts.

Likewise, China has a committed interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt and has completed a lucrative deal in which Beijing receives vital raw materials for its manufacturing sector and in return builds for Kinshasa necessary transportation infrastructure and even some hospitals. Nevertheless, concerns over the effective management of this deal within the DRC’s corrupt economic environment have frequently been raised.

China's relations with Mozambique date back to the Cold War, when Beijing backed the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO party. Interest dropped afterwards, but suddenly reappeared in recent years. Trade stood at a mere US$70 million in 2004, but tripled in two years. Beijing has coupled this increase in trade with writing off debt and the elimination of tariffs on a number of exports. This financial relationship is expected to soar as Chinese firms are tempted to relocate to Mozambique, with its cheap labor force proximity to raw materials.

In Zambia, hopes had been raised by the substantial resources China had been devoting to transportation and communication infrastructure. Locals praised a multi-dimensional initiative that nominally envisaged Africa as an ally and not a colony, as “a growing market and possibly a source over the long run for food, manufacturing, and industrial goods.” However, the abysmal pay and working conditions in Chinese-operated mines became an election issue championed by Michael Sata in 2006. In reaction, Beijing declared that new investment had been put on hold pending the result of the elections. Had Sata come close to victory in the presidential elections, Beijing might well have shown the limitations on sovereignty its assistance carries. In addition, the focus on physical infrastructure has been welcomed by many, but the procurement prescriptions and general lack of coordination with local actors has been criticized for reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Such tied aid through Chinese companies also makes it difficult to scrutinize the aid flows to check against corruption or to uphold environmental standards, exacerbating the accountability concerns.

The future of Chinese involvement is possibly more promising than the present, as there are signs that Beijing’s policy might fall more in line with American and European efforts in the future. Most importantly, the financial hazards of conducting business with regimes that are unaccountable and un-transparent will unavoidably come to the fore as China becomes more deeply tied to African economies. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, China is already becoming aware of these risks as it suffers the effects of the global economic slow-down. In the short run, however, this realization could bring about decidedly unfortunate consequences. As China becomes more cautious when choosing the countries and sectors in which it will invest, the development prospects of several African countries that have become highly dependent on Chinese assistance will undoubtedly suffer. The example of the Congo is illustrative: as prices have fallen, the $9 billion dollar copper deal between the DRC and China has become shaky. As a result, the Congo may be left in the lurch. Should this be the case, the negative consequences for the country’s development prospects will be even more pronounced due to the fact that China failed to make its aid conditional upon the adoption of reforms aimed at boosting sustainability.

Perhaps China will become less of an inhibitor of governance reforms in the future. Although it will certainly not emerge at the forefront of demands for democracy and human rights, it may also not be as likely to actively undermine the development of good governance practices. Unfortunately, however, China may continue to frustrate governance efforts in a more indirect way. Specifically, the Chinese economic model, the ill-defined “Beijing Consensus”, could be used by African countries to provide an excuse for authoritarianism. Due to China’s remarkable economic achievements, the Beijing Consensus is often touted as an effective formula for growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, the strict adoption of the Chinese model, which includes an initial focus on economic reform which is later followed by political and cultural change, would signify an actual regression in the level of democratic reform in most African countries, rather than merely a slower pace of democratization.  The fact that China’s economic reforms were carried out in an environment of political repression is oftentimes ignored by those championing the model. Turning towards the Chinese model is based in part on the perceived failure of the “Washington consensus,” but also is closely related to resentment about the role of developed countries in Africa. Nonetheless, as many of these states are already learning, replacing the “imperialist” model with a seemingly less paternalistic one may not be the panacea that many leaders and citizens are hoping for.

Photo credit: Flickr user Pan-African News Wire Photo File

Ethiopia Seals the Lid on Ethnic Rights

Recently, the Ethiopian government scoffed at Genocide Watch’s request that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees investigate human rights violations in the country. Genocide Watch primarily voiced its concern over the government’s involvement in atrocities committed against members of the Anuak ethnic group in 2005. The organization has concluded that the crimes committed against this group fit the definition of genocide. The Ethiopian government, in response, called the allegations “unfounded, fabricated lies.”

This turn of events is indicative of the increasingly adverse human rights situation in the country. The government’s general level of respect for civil liberties has been spiraling downward. More particularly, the rights of several of Ethiopia’s myriad ethnic groups have been jeopardized. The deplorable state of affairs has been brought about by both the government’s active undermining of minority protections and its failure to respond to allegations of human rights violations.

Ethiopia is populated by at least 80 different ethnic groups. The Oromo people, who make up 40-45% of the population, are the largest group, followed by the Amhara, who make up 25% of the population. The country’s political scene has traditionally been dominated by the Amhara people. More recently, however, the Tigray group has become the most powerful political entity. The Tigray, who make up  less than 10% of Ethiopia’s population, exert their influence through the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a party which constitutes the nucleus of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPRDF). Other important groups include the Oromo and Somali groups, who have traditionally been the targets of extensive persecution.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the EPRDF government made a concerted effort to respect ethnic rights in the country at the outset of its rule. When it came to power in 1991, the EPRDF nominally responded to the injustices suffered by the majority of the country’s ethnic communities. In the constitution drafted in 1995, the EPRDF government granted increased regional autonomy to various groups by creating a federal system based upon ethnic lines. It also incorporated these ethnic groups into the government by including their respective parties within the ruling coalition. In addition, the government made seemingly positive strides toward adopting good governance practices on such pressing issues as poverty and food insecurity.

Unfortunately, the positive trend towards respecting ethnic rights soon stalled out and then reversed itself. The government squeezed out all parties but the TPLF and its allies from the ruling coalition. In addition, violence and discrimination against ethnic groups resumed. While the human rights situation was unfortunate, the Ethiopian government seemed to remain committed to adopting reforms aimed at economic and political development well into this decade.

Nevertheless, by the 2005 elections, the hopes that technocratic governance improvements might be accompanied by further democratization had been dashed. During the run-up to the elections, the Ethiopian government became engaged in a campaign to intimidate and restrict the activities of opposition members. This political targeting was partially ethnic in nature. The All Ethiopian Unity Party, the main political party of the Amhara people, comprises an influential component of the country’s main opposition movement. The opposition, which is made up of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy and the United Ethiopian democratic Forces, campaigned for greater power and respect for the country’s different ethnic groups. Throughout this period, members of the opposition were harassed, arrested, and killed.

Persecution of this sort has continued into the present. A report released by the UN committee responsible for implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination reported that government agents including military officials and police officers had committed crimes against minority groups including the Anuak and the Oromo. Human Rights Watch has made similar claims. Most notably, it alleged that Ethiopian security forces have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against ethnic Somalis residing in the Ogaden region. According to HRW, the most intense persecution took place in 2007, when Ethiopian troops tortured and raped innocent Somali civilians. In addition, HRW has echoed Genocide Watch’s accusation that heinous crimes were committed against the Anuak communities in the Gambella region from 2003-2005. In addition to these more extreme examples, the Minority Rights Group International has reported that the level of representation of minority groups at the government level remains unsatisfactory.

Due to its ever clearer involvement in the persecution of minority groups, the government’s response to this situation has been extremely lackluster. The Ethiopian government has failed to investigate allegations of discrimination and crimes; indeed, official government policy with regards to human rights abuses consists almost exclusively of denying all charges or turning a deaf ear. The fact that the country has refused to grant the requests of several international human rights organizations to investigate the situation on the ground has only lent credence to the allegations. In some cases, the Ethiopian government has felt compelled to counter the aforementioned NGO reports. For example, the government urged the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission to publish a report on the situation in the Ogaden region.Unfortunately, however, this commission is by no means an independent entity. As the 2007 Crossroads report maintains, it is largely a government tool and is given little actual authority to respond to violations. That being the case, the report’s finding that no human rights violations were committed in the region is both unsurprising and extremely suspect. This general failure to address the human rights crisis has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.

Given this situation, the onus of responding to and raising the alarm about the steady stream of violations has largely fallen on human rights organizations operating both within and outside of Ethiopia. However, the government has recently taken steps to control the activities of NGOs. On January 6, the Ethiopian parliament passed new regulations it claims are necessary in order to provide a favorable legal framework and environment for NGOs in the country. Nevertheless, the new law will bring decidedly negative consequences for ethnic rights, not to mention its freedom of association and assembly implications. The law labels as “foreign” any organization that receives over 10% of its funding from outside of Ethiopia. Most alarmingly, it goes on to prohibit these “foreign” NGOs from engaging in human rights and governance work. As a recent Human Rights Watch report notes, this law will be especially damaging due to the fact that there are very few organizations that engage in human rights work in Ethiopia and even fewer that will be able to qualify as “domestic” under the new law. Tragically, this law’s implementation may effectively stifle Ethiopia’s few remaining ethnic rights watchdogs.

As the domestic environment becomes more repressive, the role of international actors will become critical. While they may be unable to investigate violations on the ground, it will remain the responsibility of international human rights organizations to raise awareness about the crisis in Ethiopia and to continue petitioning international organizations such as the UN to respond to the issue. NGOs must continue to lobby world powers including the United States and the EU to speak out against Ethiopia’s abuses and provide support to human rights defenders within the country. Due to the fact that Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign assistance to combat such daunting challenges as rampant poverty, food shortages, and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, international pressure of this sort could bear more fruit than pressure on regimes that are already more internationally isolated.

Photo Credit: Flickr user aheavens

A Tale of Two Southeast Asian States

A recent article in the Economist dubbed Indonesia “South-East Asia’s only fully functioning democracy.” Considering the great strides the country has made towards democratic consolidation since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, this accolade is for the most part well-deserved. In fact, Indonesia is the only South-East Asian country to receive the “free” distinction in the Freedom in the World survey. The country’s reformasi, or reform movement, has given rise to an increasingly open political system characterized by respect for basic civil and political liberties. Indonesia’s democracy is certainly not beyond reproach. As the Economist notes, corruption continues to be prevalent, while the electoral process tends to be overcomplicated, chaotic, and at times overtly undemocratic. Nevertheless, the country’s political climate does boast a robust, competitive party system and a strong degree of pluralism – as befits such an ethnically and geographically diverse land – which has been regularly exemplified during the run-up to the country’s April 9 parliamentary elections and July 8 presidential elections.
The Economist described the campaign for Indonesia’s parliamentary election as a “carnival of democratic competition.” Over the past few months, candidates from a multitude of parties hit the campaign trail with a flurry of rallies featuring both political speeches and singing and dancing. There are currently 38 national parties registered in Indonesia. The assimilation of Islamist parties into this system, and more particularly their willingness to compromise and join forces with secular parties, is quite remarkable considering Indonesia’s past problems with Islamic extremism. During this election season, these parties were able to freely campaign without any restrictions on their activity by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The Election Day proceedings also demonstrated how far Indonesia’s electoral institutions have come. On April 9, 100 million Indonesians headed to the polls. While all of the votes have not yet been tallied, it looks likely that Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party will win the most seats with roughly 20% of the national vote. Polls show that the parties of the Suharto era, the Golkar Party and the Democratic Party of Struggle, have both sustained a substantial decrease in popularity. In addition, several of the smaller Muslim parties took a hit. Regrettably, 5 were killed in Papua, a province in which a separatist movement remains strong. Nevertheless, this outbreak pales in comparison to the bloodshed that once dominated Indonesia’s political scene.

When Indonesia is compared to other Southeast Asian countries, its relative superiority in terms of accountability and public voice is obvious. Thailand’s recent political history has been plagued by military rule and mounting instability, which reached a peak in recent days with the failure of an ASEAN summit and significant violence in Bangkok caused by anti-government protesters. The situation in the Philippines is equally troubling. Supposed coup attempts against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have abounded, while recent elections have been extremely violent. Generally, Malaysia can also be lumped with these troubled countries. Nevertheless, recent developments in this country serve as an indication that at least one of Indonesia’s neighbors may be taking baby steps towards a more democratic future.

In comparison to Indonesia, the political state of affairs in Malaysia is primitive. The corrupt, authoritarian United Malays National Organization (UNMO) party has ruled the country since 1957. In late March, the UMNO selected Najib Razak, a party insider who has been accused of the brutal murder of a Mongolian woman, to succeed Abdullah Badawi as Malaysia’s next prime minister. The UMNO and its coalition, the National Front, have wielded complete authority over the country’s political system despite the fact that a multiparty system formally exists. Throughout UMNO’s reign, opposition activities have been repeatedly restricted. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, campaign periods are extremely short, and with strong control of the media by the government. During the run-up to both the March 2008 parliamentary election and the by-elections that followed, the government’s interference in the campaign activities of the opposition was as bold as ever. At the end of this March, for example, police broke up an opposition rally by seizing DVDs and detaining an opposition leader. They also fired tear gas into a crowd while opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was giving a speech. Harassment of Anwar is no surprise; the repeated charges against the opposition’s most popular leader have epitomized UMNO’s style of frontal combat style politics.

That said, there are signs that the UMNO’s monopoly over Malaysia’s political scene may be waning. In comparison with previously, pluralism is at a new high in the country. Recently, the strength of the opposition, as well as its participation in mainstream politics, has steadily mounted. The opposition is made up of a coalition of three parties: the Malay-dominated Parti Keadilan, the Chinese Democratic Action Party, and the Islamic Pan Malaysian Islamic Party. As a previous post explains, the UMNO lost their two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections of 2008. In this election, the opposition achieved victories in 5 of 13 Malaysian states. They have subsequently lost seats in two by-elections. The most recent loss took place on April 7, when UMNO lost a state parliament seat. In addition, the opposition won another seat in the national parliament in Perak.

Surprisingly, under the newly elected prime minister, the government itself has made some preliminary efforts to respect, or at least not directly smother, the country’s burgeoning competitive party system. For example, Prime Minister Najib lifted the three-month ban on Harakah and Suara Keadlin, two opposition newspapers. However, on the whole, Najib's initial performance has left observers unimpressed.

It is obvious that the current situation in Malaysia leaves much to be desired.  It will still take a sizeable effort to effectively challenge or even to significantly influence the agenda of the entrenched UMNO party. Nevertheless, healthy pluralism has a higher chance than ever before of becoming firmly established in the country. Interestingly enough, Malaysia’s level of true pluralism could one day overshadow that of its neighbor should this prove to be the case. While the number of parties represented in Indonesia’s system is impressive, the diversity of interests and ideas espoused by these parties is not. As both the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report and The Economist note, most of Indonesia’s parties share strikingly similar platforms. The candidates’ policy proposals and opinions on key issues are fairly comparable. Unfortunately, their plans for the future are also equally vague. This dearth of ideological competition may soon contribute to a standstill in Indonesia’s path towards governance reform. 

Conversely, the ideas represented in Malaysia’s party system are more diverse than ever before. The interests, beliefs, and political ideologies of the majority of Malaysia’s inhabitants have finally entered the political scene. Most notably, the concerns of traditionally marginalized non-Malays, including the Chinese and smaller indigenous populations, have become part of political discourse. Opposition parties have also come forward with an abundance of ideas about how to address the problems currently debilitating Malaysian politics and society. Thus far, conflict has been the norm in Malaysia’s system. Nevertheless, if the opposition continues to increase its influence just as the negative effects of the global economic slowdown reach Malaysia’s shores, this exchange of ideas may become crucial. Malaysia certainly has a long road ahead. Nevertheless, for the first time in 50 years, there is a chance that it may one day join Indonesia as one of the region’s democratic exemplars.

Photo Credit: Flickr user 12th St. David

Argentina's Permanently Polymorphous Peronists

In late March, Argentina’s Congress approved President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s proposal to change the date of the country’s congressional elections from October 25 to June 28. The president has stated that moving up the date will allow Argentines to avoid the unnecessary obstacles, political drama, and partisanship that normally accompany elections and instead focus more immediately on the economic crisis at hand. The opposition claims otherwise. More specifically, they have identified this move as a thinly veiled attempt to consolidate power before the economic distress and general discontent now gripping the country cause the bottom to fall out of the Kirchner regime.

Regardless of her true motives, the final outcome of the president’s actions could have far-reaching consequences. Congressional candidates will lose four months of valuable campaign time as a result of the ruling, which will decrease the chances of a significant opposition victory. This comes at a time when opposition to the president has been steadily mounting.  Recent polls reveal that less than 30% of Argentines approve of the president’s policies. The president has been engaged in a heated battle with Argentina’s agricultural sector ever since she attempted to increase export taxes on farm products in March of 2008. This struggle, along with growing inflation and the general economic slow-down, have served to decrease her popularity.

If the date change brings about a favorable result for the president, Mrs. Kirchner and her allies at the congressional level may be able retain their hold over Argentine politics for quite some while. As the New York Times explains, the upcoming congressional elections are important because they will serve as a referendum of sorts on Fernandez de Kirchner’s presidency. These elections will strongly influence her party’s decision regarding her nomination for the 2011 presidential elections.

Where governance is concerned, this turn of events is disconcerting. Most notably, as a result of the date change, the pluralism and competition deficit could take yet another hit in a country that has largely been dominated by a sole party, the Peronist party, since the end of the 1940s. One of the more interesting twists to this story, however, is that the most powerful opposition members belong to the same umbrella party as the president: the Peronist Party. In fact, Peronist congressmen Felipe Sola and Francisco de Narvaez have expressed their desire to unite the Peronist party against the president.

 It is this overweening Peronist dominance that may be the biggest threat to good governance in the country.  Argentines frequently express their disapproval of the Peronist party and its stronghold over the country. Most recently, political analysts have pointed to the passionate public response to the death of former President Raul Alfonsin, a member of the Radical Civic Union party who presided over Argentina’s democratic transition in 1983, as evidence of the public’s weariness of unsatisfactory Peronist leaders and their role in bringing about the debilitation of their country’s democratic institutions.

Nevertheless, a truly viable alternative to Peronism does not exist in the country. Argentina’s traditional opposition movement is predominantly made up of two parties: the Radical Civic Union and the Civic Coalition. While these parties made greater strides in the last few months to present a stronger challenge to the president in the run-up to the congressional elections, the date change has presented a serious obstacle.  The death of former President Alfonsin has certainly increased the publicity and popularity of the Radical Civic Union in recent days. Nevertheless, considering the fact that their efforts at mobilization are severely hampered by the dissimilarity of their members (the rank and file of these parties is made up of conservatives, socialists, and Peronist defectors alike), the probability that these non-Peronists could effectively join together to challenge the president is slim.

In reality, the opposition members with the best chance of challenging the president are Peronists themselves. The Peronist party is made up of several diverse factions.  While Mrs. Kirchner and her supporters belong to the center-left Victory Front, several influential party members adhere to the older Peronist tradition, while others have more conservative leanings. The dissident Peronists who make up the opposition have expressed concern over the instability wrought by the interventionist policies of the president.  The ranks of these dissenting Peronists, the majority of whom are concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires, have swelled recently as lawmakers have abandoned the president’s particular sect, which is popularly known as “Kirchnerism” or “K.” Since the president’s proposal to move up the election date was passed, Sola and Narvaez, the leaders of this new opposition movement, have ramped up their efforts to destabilize the Kirchner regime by publicly condemning the president’s policies and holding meetings with party bosses in Buenos Aires. Narvaez heads the list of the candidates for the Buenos Aires province, while Sola holds the second position. Interestingly enough, their main opponent in this race will likely be President Fernandez de Kirchner’s husband, former President Nestor Kirchner.  In addition to these influential congressmen, Vice President Julio Cobos, who joined the Kirchner faction after a long-standing affiliation with the Radical Civic Union, has also evidenced his strong disapproval of Mrs. Kirchner’s actions through both actions and words. While the date change has the same negative effect on this group as it does on the traditional opposition parties, the Peronists have far more resources at their disposal in their fight against the president and her allies.

As a result of this state of affairs, Argentina finds itself in a lose-lose situation. If Mrs. Kirchner and her allies survive the elections without any substantial losses, the atrophied state of the country’s democratic institutions will remain the same. Argentina’s hyper-presidentialist system has only been exacerbated during the reign of the Kirchners. During his term, Nestor Kirchner passed several reforms which strengthened the executive branch. In 2007, Mrs. Kirchner inherited this elevated power, which she has at times exercised in an almost autocratic manner.

Unfortunately, a successful “opposition” challenge may not bring about any more favorable results. Should Sola and Narvaez successfully oust the Victory Front from their dominant position in the Congress, Peronism will still reign supreme. While the date change has thrown a wrench in the works, a victory for these opposition Peronists is not out of the question. Some have argued that the president’s move could backfire by highlighting both her insecurity and the dismal reality of the economic crisis at hand. In addition, as the alliance between Sola, Narvaez, and conservative Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri of the Pro party shows, the dissident Peronists seem willing to seek support for their efforts outside of the Peronist bloc. 

While an opposition victory may slow or stem further consolidation of Kirchner power, it is not likely to solve Argentina’s governance problems.  While the dissident Peronists have proposed some new policy changes, the undemocratic, machine-style characteristics of Peronist rule will undoubtedly remain in place. This clientelistic organization, which consolidates support throughout the country by allocating highly sought after state resources in a largely corrupt process, is the manifestation of a political culture in need of serious renewal, and the outcome and timing of the upcoming elections won’t change that.

Photo Credit: Flickr user !que comunismo!

The SSSC: Syria's Rule of Law Black Hole

The Syrian court system recently came into the limelight with a detailed report issued by Human Rights Watch focused specifically on the notorious Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), which prompted a re-examination of Syria by a number of European newspapers such as the Guardian. The primary shift inducing this re-examination is the latest “thaw” in relations between Syria and the western world, and the fear that the power of foreigners to alter Syria’s internal conduct remains uncertain but is likely quite limited. Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, has received a number of very high-profile visitors, including John Kerry, Nicolas Sarkozy, and various EU foreign ministers, yet he continues to judge that due to realpolitik considerations Syria’s external relations will remain the focus of diplomatic engagement. Thus can Bashar continue to defy calls for domestic liberalization, be it political, economic, or social.

The HRW report maintains that the court, which was founded during the state of emergency declared in 1963 and is the lead instrument in Syria’s persecution efforts, continues to incapacitate the rule of law in Syria. More specifically, the SSSC is utilized as political tool to suppress the opposition and political minorities through the use of unjust trials.Coupled with Syria’s emergency decrees, the SSSC is authorized to take any civilian into its military-style system, where any rights the defendant may theoretically have had quickly disappear. The court is exempt from Syria’s rules of criminal procedure. Furthermore, SSSC decisions cannot be appealed to any higher judicial body – a requirement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Syria became a signatory in 1969. Due to the fact that the SSSC was created as an exceptional court, it is accountable solely to the Minister of the Interior.

The frightening amount of power delegated to the court has had serious ramifications for the rule of law. Where the SSSC is concerned, respect for the equality before the law simply does not exist. In fact, the SSSC has been utilized almost exclusively to attack and punish political opponents through the exercise of arbitrary justice. First and foremost, the SSSC has been used to target ‘Islamists,’ but recently the state has set its sights on political activists, including journalists and bloggers. In doing so, the state has ardently attacked freedom of expression in the country.

Persecution of political and human rights activist by the state broadly falls into four classifications: Article 278 is evoked when acts and/or speeches (supposedly) expose Syria to aggressive acts; Article 285 is cited when people (supposedly) weaken national sentiment; Article 286 is evoked for (supposedly) spreading false information that in turn weakens national sentiment; and Article 307 is used for inciting strife between various domestic groups.

Of the recent arrests, the highest profile were those of twelve pro-democracy activists detained last year for having taken part in an anti-government coalition. Habib Saleh received three years for ‘weakening national sentiment’ under Article 285 and ‘broadcasting false or exaggerated news which could affect the morale of the country’ – Article 286. The evidence used against him was a number of internet articles on domestic political issues. Mohammed Amin al-Shawa and nine other men were arrested by military intelligence in August, and five months later, still in military custody, al-Shawa died from torture.

Even the scope of arrests has widened. In the last year even mildly insulting the state, president, or government officials in private conversations, with no political involvement from any party, warrants three year jail sentences.

For the Kurds – 9% of the population – the situation is even direr. The Kurds have been frequently attacked through the SSSC and the greater justice system. The state does not even pretend to serve their needs, and the Kurds’ persecution is conducted on various levels. According to the Human Rights Watch report, the SSSC frequently convicts Kurdish citizens on charges of undertaking “acts, speeches, writings or other means to cut-off part of Syrian land to join it to another country.” Several Kurds have received this sentence after protesting in favor of expanding the rights awarded by the Syrian government to the traditionally marginalized and repressed Kurdish population. This conduct is particularly extreme considering that Syria’s Kurds do not partake in the fierce Islamism the state considers its greatest internal security threat. Both of the most recent Kurdish victims in the state’s judicial system, Hassam Hussein and Mustafa Jum’ah, were arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression and association; neither are bellicose advocates of violent secession – the Syrian state’s primary fear from its Kurdish community. They are merely members of the Kurdish political party: however, as the ruling Ba’ath party is the sole party allowed to operate in Syria, all others are classified as illegal organizations.

Due to the fact that the SSSC exists mainly to carry out these political purges, due process guarantees are foreign concepts within its walls. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report on Syria explains, legal assistance is often denied to those citizens tried in the security courts. According to the Human Rights Watch report, defendants are often detained for months before being informed of the charges against them. In addition, both during and after their trials, defendants are rarely given the opportunity to consult with their lawyers. The experience of the twelve democracy activists mentioned above serves as evidence of this conduct. According to Amnesty International, the twelve were detained without trial and tortured into signing false confessions, while their lawyers were denied access to the accused and vital information was withheld.

The negative consequences that this dismal situation poses for governance are endless. As long as the SSSC lords over Syria’s judicial system, the rule of law will persist in its weak, debilitated state. Political dissidents, ethnic minorities, and ordinary citizens will continue to be held prisoner to a dangerous, compromised system which is dominated by powerful political puppet-masters. As both the Human Rights Watch and the Countries at the Crossroad reports argue, the only effective and permanent solution to the crisis of justice which has plagued Syria in recent years is the dissolution of the SSSC through the revocation of the state of emergency. While this is certainly a tall order, increased international pressure could go a long way towards getting the ball rolling. This will require patient engagement, but also the willingness to move beyond basic realpolitik concerns and challenge the totality of Syrian misconduct, including inside its own borders.

Photo credit: Flickr user madmonk

Spotlight on Central American Government-Media Relations

Picture taken from Freedom of the Press 2008 map. Yellow indicates "Partly Free," with green indicating "Free."

A recent article in the New York Times Magazine highlighted the mounting conflict between the government of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and the country’s media outlets. The article traces the evolution of Carlos Fernando Chamorro, a prominent independent journalist who comes from one of Nicaragua’s most influential families. Chamorro currently runs a weekly newspaper and an investigative magazine program, both of which have caused quite a stir in the country due to their coverage of such polemical issues as corruption, cronyism, and election fraud. As a result, Chamorro has been a major target in the government’s campaign to curb critical reporting.

This clash between the government and the media represents yet another twist in media-government relations in Nicaragua. Before the country’s precarious democratic transition in 1990, both the right-wing and left-wing authoritarian regimes were able to convert the media sector into their own personal propaganda machines. In fact, Chamorro himself was directly involved in the highly politicized media system of Nicaragua’s past. During the 1980s, he ran Barricada, “the official organ of the Sandinista Front.” This newspaper existed solely to serve the Sandinista cause. Interestingly enough, his mother and other family members ran La Prensa, the main opposition newspaper at this time. La Prensa, however, was repeatedly shut down, censored, and silenced by the Sandinistas – just as it had been by the preceding Somoza dictatorship.

Despite the current government’s efforts to curb press freedom, critical journalism is still thriving in Nicaragua, with Chamorro and his family members at the helm. In contrast to past times, the Nicaraguan government now finds itself engaged in a struggle with a redoubtable media sector rather than an easily malleable force. This has made the government’s efforts to buy off or restrict the media increasingly difficult.

Similar situations obtain in several other Central American countries. Indeed, the one-time cozy relationship between the government and media sectors has largely collapsed throughout the region. In Honduras, the battle between the government and a powerful media sector has become especially intense. Recently, President Manuel Zelaya has faced a growing onslaught of criticism from the media, which is largely dominated by his opponents. This is unfamiliar territory for the country, as Honduras’ political and media elite have traditionally been one and the same. The media, while quite powerful, has normally promoted the interests of the president. Today, media ownership in Honduras is still concentrated in the hands of three moguls who have been at the forefront of the country’s politics for years:  Jorge Canahuati, Jaime Rosenthal, and former President Carlos Flores. However, media outlets no longer serve the president. Instead, they almost exclusively criticize him. While the media elite belong to the same Liberal party as President Zelaya, their opposition to the president has been on the rise due to the perceived threat his policies pose to the livelihood of the business sector. Zelaya has become increasingly frustrated and flustered by this situation. He has frequently pointed his finger at these media elite, calling them "powerful economic groups motivated by self-interest to exploit political and social problems to provide grist for their mills." As the 2008 Freedom of the Press report on Honduras notes, tensions reached a pinnacle when Zelaya required that radio and television stations include a series of 10 interviews with public officials in order to counteract what he perceived to be a strong bias against him.

While not as extreme, the situation in Guatemala has some parallels to the Honduran case. The Guatemalan media is also in the ownership of those in opposition to the president. As the 2008 Freedom of the Press report on Guatemala indicates, the sector is dominated by a small group of businessmen with conservative leanings. Prensa Libre dominates the newspaper market, while Mexican entrepreneur Angel Gonzalez controls all of the country’s television stations. As such, center-left President Alvaro Colom by no means faces acquiescent and affable media forces. At the same time, government repression is not nearly as prominent a threat to media freedom as is the violence and disorder characterizing Guatemalan society. Many journalists have been attacked and threatened in recent years, including one who was killed by an arrow fired by a crossbow. As in Mexico, criminals associated with the drug trade are largely blamed for this phenomenon, and widespread self-censorship has been the predictable result.

Finally, it seems plausible that the situation in El Salvador will soon come to resemble that of its neighbors. If the bitter media war that dominated the 2009 election is any indication of the future trajectory of Salvadoran politics, then a major clash between President-elect Mauricio Funes and the media is likely imminent. As is the case in Honduras, the ruling elite and the media powers have traditionally reinforced each other in El Salvador. El Salvador’s biggest media powers are for the most part owned by staunchly conservative businessmen who are predominantly concerned with the country’s financial interests. The strong alliance that was forged between the conservative ARENA party, the business sector, and the media during the years of the right-wing dictatorship has yet to be shaken. During the run-up to this March’s presidential election, the power of this relationship was evidenced by the anti-Funes bias present in most of the country’s newspapers and television programs.  As such, it is reasonable to conclude that Funes will be forced to reckon with a media sector that is just as powerful as it is hostile. Of course, Funes was himself a prominent journalist, and thus may have an advantage in handling media relations. His trick will be to ensure that he personally remains the face of the government in the press, rather than more radical elements of the FMLN party he leads.

The consequences that this turn of events will have for governance issues are varied. On the one hand, the strength of the opposition media has served as a bulwark against authoritarianism. This is especially the case in Nicaragua and Honduras. In both countries, pseudo-leftist presidents have recently ramped up their efforts to directly wield control over the press and stifle criticism emanating from the opposition. Both Presidents Ortega and Zelaya have allegedly attempted to mold the media into a more government-friendly sector by denying government-paid programming and advertising to newspapers and television programs that cast them in an unfavorable light. Powerful media outlets in both countries, however, have thus far been able to weather the storm. As such, freedom of the press has been upheld to a certain degree. Regional democratic norms also help: every government in the region wants to maintain at least superficial democratic credentials, so the type of blatant repression seen in other parts of the world is unlikely (though far from impossible, and the Chamorro case comes close).

Nevertheless, the inherent nature of the media structure in almost of these countries is hardly conducive to good governance. As explained above, the strongly politicized media sectors in these countries are controlled by oligarchies made up of businessmen who do not always espouse the interests and opinions of the majority of the population. With the exception of perhaps Nicaragua, there is for the most part a paucity of independent journalism in the region. Oftentimes, the viewpoints of the other side – which at present happens in some cases to be the ruling party – are hardly represented. As was the case in El Salvador’s presidential election, the result of this media bias could be an exaggerated targeting that is in some ways akin to the campaigns waged by the dictators of a previous generation. In this scenario of thin, politicized media, the conflict between the government and the compromised press sectors can hardly be considered a healthy manifestation of freedom of the press.

Turkey's Slow Road Toward EU Rights Standards

In March, Turkey’s state-run Islamic body announced that it would translate the Koran into Kurdish. Kurds, who comprise at least 12 million of Turkey’s 70 million people, are not a recognized minority in the country. Officially, they are not distinct from the Turkish majority, and expressions of cultural uniqueness are banned. They are discriminated against economically, subject to violence, and may even be jailed for using their language in large groups or on paper. The Koran translation step is thus a positive step, but a small one compared with the changes that will be necessary to bring Kurdish rights to acceptable levels.

Since Turkey began EU accession talks began ten years ago, the EU has published convergence requirements that Turkey must meet, and thus far the country has demonstrated at least some efforts to comply. The requirements include measures for the equality and economic inclusion of Kurds, the defense and education of women, drastically reduced persecution and abuse of the press, and significant reductions in violence perpetrated by the security forces. A look at these issues reveals that in each case the reform record is mixed.

On the first issue, although Kurds and other minorities are still not recognized by the government, the government has created a Kurdish-language channel on state television, along with other programming in languages spoken by unrecognized minorities. Establishing a TV network or enabling the translation of religious texts in Kurdish can be done with a wave of a pen from Ankara. Dismantling systemic de facto and de jure discriminations against Kurds cannot. In the early 1920s, as Turkey took the place of the Ottoman Empire, the principal of national unity was the dominating concern, and no linguistic or cultural differentiation was permitted between the country’s Muslim populations. Since then the government has echoed Brazil’s stance: “What racism? There are no races – we are all the same.” In Turkey, a strongly complicating factor has been the existence of a terrorist separatist movement, the PKK, which has been at war with the government for decades. The group’s activity has provided the government with a rationale for its discrimination. In the name of unity, use of the Kurdish language in official communications or political speeches can result in imprisonment, as can public or printed expressions of support – or even sympathy – for the PKK.

Excessive violence and lengthy prison terms are routine facets of Kurdish affairs in Turkey. In December, a journalist was sentenced to fifteen months in prison for writing that the PKK should not be considered a terrorist organization. While this may be morally objectionable – and groups as diverse as NATO and Human Rights Watch feel the same about the PKK – doing so makes for a questionable criminal offense. Also that month, a court decided that making pro-PKK speeches was functionally equivalent to membership, and convicted an MP of being part of a terrorist organization, for which he will serve ten years in prison. Even more shocking was the government’s violent response to last year’s illegal Kurdish New Year celebrations, which left three people dead and others severely beaten. As remains all too typical of police brutality in Turkey, no investigation was ever carried out. The law also permits children as young as 15 to be tried as adults, and in 2006-2007 almost 200 children under 18 were convicted. Despite the efforts of Ankara’s EU accession ministry, the government’s encouragement and condoning of abuses remains well-documented.

With respect to women’s rights, the European Commission’s enlargement commissioner praised a new women’s rights bill, but said it had yet to be implemented in any meaningful way. Women’s rights in Turkey have been subject to similar lip-service improvements, although conditions have improved somewhat. The EC concedes that the legal framework for protecting women’s rights represents real progress. Ankara has had difficulty convincing the rest of the country to follow the law, however. Especially in poorer, rural, religious areas tradition has tended to triumph over law. The ban on “honor killings” – where a woman or girl is killed by her brother or father to cleanse the family after she has been raped or has refused to marry – has resulted in a dramatic increase in so-called suicides, which run from family coercion to murder concealed with the help of local authorities. This is not to say that no progress at all has been made – the existence of these laws is certainly an improvement over their absence, and the gender gap in education has narrowed to 2.3%. Nonetheless, the country has far to travel by both EU and international human rights standards.

As far as media freedom, violence and politically-motivated charges and detentions against journalists and civilians actually increased markedly in 2008. In December, Turkey opened the negotiation chapter with the EU on “information society and media.” This has always been a sensitive topic in Turkey, whose laws on insulting Turkey, Turkishness, the government, or Ataturk have been used to imprison and intimidate countless journalists, authors, and other public figures. According to BIA Media Monitoring, International PEN, and Reporters Without Borders, 2008 saw a marked increase in censorship and charges against writers. The sincerity of Turkey’s commitment to European standards of freedom of speech is thus particularly questionable. Even more disturbing is a fine of nearly $500 million levied by the government on Dogan Media. It is hard not to connect the penalty to Prime Minister Erdogan’s months of verbal attacks on the company, which published detailed accusations of corruption against the PM and his AK party.

As many analysts have noted, Turkey’s hopes of joining the EU anytime in the medium-term seem rather implausible for reasons unrelated to internal rights, including the status of Turkish-controlled Cyprus and the fear of admitting a majority-Muslim state to the EU. However, the Turkish government would certainly help its cause, while at the same time moving toward compliance with international human rights treaties to which it is a party, by continuing the reform process. Some of the aforementioned progress in Ankara is unprecedented – the government has never before guaranteed women’s rights or promoted use of the Kurdish language. Yet they remain superficial. Thus, those concerned with tolerance and pluralism in Turkey must hope that where ethical-moral calls for change have failed, geopolitical interest will be successful.