


On April 14th, the Bolivian Congress passed an electoral law that guarantees the holding of both general elections and departmental and regional referendums on autonomy this December. The law was only approved after prolonged debate and deadlock between the governing Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party and the opposition. In this case, indigenous issues were a major point of contention. While the MAS proposed that 14 seats in the lower house of the Legislature be reserved for representatives from indigenous districts, the opposition insisted that this would lead to the overrepresentation of indigenous areas. The MAS eventually compromised by decreasing its requested number of indigenous seats to 11 and then to 8, but the opposition remained intransigent. In the end, 7 seats were allotted to indigenous representatives. In response, two of Bolivia’s most powerful indigenous organizations, the Lowland Indigenous Confederation (CIDOB) and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Kollasuyu (CONAMAQ), expressed their outrage at the MAS’ perceived betrayal.
This rift between the MAS and Bolivia’s indigenous movements is superficially surprising, considering President Evo Morales’ traditionally unwavering commitment to indigenous rights. Morales, himself an Aymara Indian, has largely centered his administration around the mission of reversing the centuries of exploitation suffered by the indigenous majority. For several of the region’s other “Bolivarian” presidents, this theme has also constituted an important focus. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has pledged to eradicate the remnants of imperialism, rectify the deplorable situation of the country’s relatively small indigenous population, and incorporate the communitarian tradition of indigenous peoples into his socialist agenda. In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa has made similar promises.
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of these leaders has not always matched the reality of the situation. In several instances, indigenous groups in all three countries have been disappointed as promises and formal protections have yielded tenuous results.
In Bolivia, there is no arguing the fact that the rights of the indigenous peoples, who make up as much as 55% of the country’s population, have been vastly expanded with Morales at the helm of government. In January of this year, Bolivians approved a new constitution that, in addition to officially recognizing and protecting the cultural and social rights of Bolivia’s 36 indigenous communities, provides for the actual participation of Bolivia’s indigenous people in the country’s political life. Morales considered this constitution to be a “re-founding” of Bolivia which restored the indigenous majority to their rightful place at the heart of the country’s political and social fabric.
As a result of these advances, Bolivia’s indigenous people are undoubtedly more included than ever before. However, the government’s commitment to indigenous rights may not be absolute. The Morales administration’s minor regression in this area is best illustrated by the aforementioned electoral law. Before the negotiations on the law had even begun, the MAS had already alienated the country’s indigenous movements by requesting 14 seats rather than the 18 seats proposed by CIDOB and CONAMAQ. These organizations claimed that the MAS ignored the new constitutional provisions that provide for the active participation of indigenous people in the country’s legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. They also highlighted the lack of indigenous representation in the presidential cabinet. Roman Loayza, one of the founders of the MAS, who has announced a run against Morales in the upcoming presidential election, broke with the party over this issue, arguing that the upper echelons of the government are dominated by converted neoliberals and leftists rather than those who are truly representative of Bolivia’s plurinational state. After the electoral law passed, indigenous groups declared their intent to reconsider their backing of the MAS government. In response to the indignation expressed by these groups, the government made some initial overtures. Early last week, the MAS announced its desire to set up a meeting with the leaders of the CIDOB to explain the reasoning behind its final decision to agree on 7 indigenous seats. Regardless of the outcome of this meeting, however, the mutual trust between the two groups has been at least temporarily shaken.
In Venezuela, the situation of indigenous rights is also rather precarious. Due to the fact that Venezuela’s indigenous peoples only constitute around 1.4% of the country’s population, the government’s emphasis on indigenous issues is not as intense as in Bolivia. However, Chavez has repeatedly expressed his commitment to address the long-standing discrimination against indigenous peoples and even renamed Columbus Day the “Day of Indigenous Resistance.” This commitment was institutionalized in the constitution of 1999, a document that not only includes a formal recognition of the language and cultural rights of the indigenous population, but also declares the state’s responsibility to institute social programs for the benefit of the indigenous and to demarcate indigenous lands. Furthermore, it guarantees indigenous groups representation in the National Assembly.
The efforts made by Venezuela to address the plight of the indigenous through constitutional reform are notable. However, the rights enjoyed by Venezuela’s indigenous population have not been universally upheld. Indigenous peoples have frequently protested the government’s slow-paced land demarcation process. Exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories is an example of especially flagrant abuse, and indigenous groups including the Wayuu, Yukpa, and Bari have repeatedly fought against coal, gold, and diamond mining in their territories. In many of these cases, Chavez has responded with promises and actions geared at directly addressing their grievances. However, as with most elements in Chavez’s Venezuela, implementation has lagged rhetoric. For example, the government halted plans for new coal mining in the state of Zulia after indigenous groups voiced disapproval through a series of protests. Nevertheless, Chavez later announced that the state-owned corporation Corpozulia would acquire the majority of coal mining projects in the state, which led indigenous groups to speculate that coal mining – along with its attendant abuses – would simply continue under new management.
Finally, in Ecuador, indigenous rights have also been controversial. During his first campaign for the presidency in 2006, Rafael Correa pledged to respond to the injustices faced by the 20% of the population comprised of indigenous groups. Moreover, the constitution approved in September 2008 recognizes the rights of indigenous people to their own cultural traditions and territories, while protecting them against racism. It also grants them a certain level of autonomy over their territorial administrative districts.
Nevertheless, the constitution has not proved satisfactory to some indigenous groups, and Correa’s approach to indigenous rights has been questionable. During the drafting of the constitution, for example, Correa expressed his disapproval of the concept of plurinationality. In addition, the issue of indigenous territories and resources has been particularly polemical. A new mining law passed in January of this year was met with widespread condemnation among indigenous peoples, who fear the negative consequences that metal mining will have on their territories and natural wealth. After the law was passed, the powerful Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) presented a lawsuit against President Correa to the Constitutional Court. The CONAIE argues that the law, which attempts to regulate large-scale extractive mining, violates indigenous rights to water, nature, and to prior consultation in matters involving indigenous lands.
As the above cases show, the Bolivarian emphasis on indigenous rights sometimes exists more in theory than in practice. It is important to emphasize that the mere visibility and inclusion of indigenous issues represents a colossal transformation in countries where indigenous peoples have been banished from the political and social sphere for centuries. Nevertheless, in several instances, the Bolivarian presidents have also demonstrated their willingness to relegate their commitments to indigenous rights to the back-burner in favor of political expediency. To a large degree, this is merely inevitable compromise. However, given indigenous groups’ historically grounded suspicion that they will eventually be marginalized, successful policy requires a comprehensive, dedicated approach to the issue rather than the current coupling of piecemeal advancements with contradictory regressions.
Photo Credit: Flickr user fguzmanj2001