On June 30, Human Rights Watch urged Ethiopia to amend its proposed Anti-Terrorism Law. According to HRW, the draft counterterrorism law would create myriad possibilities for human rights violations. Specifically, the law includes both an extremely broad definition of terrorism and a multitude of pernicious provisions regulating the state’s response to “acts of terrorism.” If passed, the law will provide police with the right to search and arrest individuals without judicial oversight and to detain suspects for months without charge. What’s more, this law is being proposed at a time when Ethiopia is already being extensively criticized by the international human rights community for committing offenses including harassment, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention of political activists and independent journalists. As the country’s human rights climate appears increasingly uncertain, the state of the country’s judicial system will become a critical issue. At this venture, it is important to investigate the health of the legal system that dissidents, “terrorists,” and ordinary citizens alike rely upon for justice.
Ethiopia is one of the oldest and largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is unique in that it largely escaped the 19th-century European race to annex territory on the continent. However, it remains an extremely poor and rural country, with over 80 percent of the population living off subsistence farming. A Marxist-Leninist military junta called the Derg overthrew the emperor in 1974, and was likewise overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as the Soviet Union withdrew financial aid from its allies in Africa. Four years later, a constitution had been agreed upon and Ethiopia’s first multiparty elections occurred. It was then that the incumbent prime minister, Meles Zenawi came to power pledging reform and decentralization.
There were a number of largely uncoordinated though vigorous reform efforts during the 1990s. However, the pace quickened dramatically in 2005 with the implementation of the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP), encompassing civil service reform, district level decentralization, and tax and justice reform. The Justice System Reform Programme (JSRP) in particular has drawn considerable attention. The Ethiopian legal system is complicated due to the country’s federal nature: each of the nine regional states has its own legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, in addition to the national government. Although the successes of the various judicial reform initiatives have been somewhat limited, the strong political support behind the programme – recognised as vital for eventual success – has not lagged.
Some of the main hurdles to judicial reform arise from the issues associated with the end of communism and the post-1995 restructuring. One long-term characteristic of the nation that impedes deeper systemic attempts at reform is previous monarchical and communist regimes’ centralized government authority and the current subjugation of the federal judiciary to the executive, which has maintained a weak judicial branch with insufficient capability of exercising independent action in order to avoid challenges to Zenawi’s government.
One of the most immediate post-revolution issues affecting the Ethiopian judicial system was the total loss of experienced legal personnel who fled when the Derg were overthrown. This in turn resulted in a severe lack of staff in every district, and also forced the government to lower the requirements for posts across the sector. The ramifications of this exodus of talented personnel continue to plague Ethiopia’s judicial system today, especially at the lower levels. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report on Ethiopia explains, judges at the local level are still generally uneducated and oftentimes unacquainted with Ethiopian laws. In addition, the as-yet-incomplete process of decentralization (the inter-ethnic relations angle of which was examined in a previous blog post) continues to complicate matters, partly owing to a lack of communication between the higher and lower courts that has created a situation in which many local officials believe themselves to be unaccountable to higher powers.
There are a number of further issues that require attention. The most prominent is judicial independence. As the 2007 Crossroads report noted, the president draws up the lists of judicial appointees for parliament to (theoretically) scrutinise, which is problematic in as executive-dominant environment as Ethiopia’s; worse yet, the government often interferes in trials by threatening judges, especially when high-profile defendants are involved. Both of these measures limit independent judicial decisions, a situation most prominently criticised by Teshale Aberra, a former president of the Oromo Supreme Court who fled to the UK in 2006. The following year Human Rights Watch reinforced her condemnation of the system. In addition, defense lawyers are attacked for representing unfavourable clients.
The prospects for judicial reform are not entirely bleak. Ethiopia has made progress and has secured a solid core of devoted donor partners. As the 2007 Crossroads Report explains, the general culture of impunity has slightly improved as a result of the JSRP. For example, in 2007, several former members of the deposed Marxist-Leninist regime including Mengistu Haile Mariam, the most prominent officer of the Derg, were accused of crimes against humanity and genocide committed during the Red Terror of the 1970s (though it is important to note that few prosecutions of EPRDF members have occurred, despite ample evidence of human rights and other abuses). In addition, courts in states such as Oromia have also increased their efficiency in the past few years by reducing backlogs and delays and implementing a judicial training program. At least some of the reforms have enduring significance for the broader region, with the Kenyan Chief Justice visiting Ethiopia last year to learn about the JSRP, specifically its ICT modernization.
Merely incremental progress, marked by occasional missteps, is inevitable considering the very low starting point. If the Zenawi government maintains the impetus of its reforms, change will be evident over time. Nevertheless, human rights abuses such as the ones listed above can hardly coexist with an effective and just legal system. In the end, there is no question that real change will require political will and a willingness to yield some measure of control, factors that have been in small supply recently.
