Photo Credit: Flickr user ..:. ninu .:..
On July 14, the Colombian government rejected the “Ley de Fosas,” a law that would have created the “Bank of Genetic Profiles of the Disappeared.” This database would have collected both genetic information obtained from the exhumed remains of Colombian victims buried in mass graves and the genetic data of family members of the disappeared, in an effort to facilitate the identification process. When justifying its decision, the government cited financial considerations, arguing that the law’s implementation would be unfeasible in light of Colombia’s current macroeconomic situation. Specifically, it noted that the cost of collecting and preserving the genetic data would reach over $91 billion pesos (roughly US$45 million), a significant expenditure given the nation’s current financial constraints. In response, Guillermo Rivera, one of the law’s coauthors, argued that the government was exaggerating the projected cost, noting that the law did not intend to initiate DNA testing in all cases. In addition, he reminded the government of its obligation to do everything possible to identify the victims of the 44-year internal conflict that continues to afflict Colombia today.
Unfortunately, this is one of several recent examples of the government acting intransigently in its attitude toward victims of the internal conflict. The “Ley de Victimas”(Victims’ Law), an initiative that establishes the reparations process for the conflict’s victims, is another. A version passed in the Senate in June 2008 with strong endorsements from both domestic and international human rights groups was extensively modified over the following year. It finally was passed by the Chamber of Representatives on June 16, but in a weakened state that was criticized by Guillermo Rivera, the original bill’s proposer, human rights organizations, and victims alike due to the fact that it discriminated between victims of guerrilla groups and victims of the state. In its modified form, the law allowed victims of guerrilla groups and paramilitaries to apply for compensation through administrative means, but required victims of state security forces to prove that a state official committed a crime acting beyond his authority before being eligible to receive compensation. Due to the slowness and inefficiency of Colombia’s judicial system, the discriminatory ramifications of this particular clause were considered especially pernicious. Although the Chamber and Senate reconciliation committee approved the Senate version, Uribe allies knocked the bill down at the executive branch’s behest in the Senate reconciliation vote on June 18. As with the Ley de Fosas, financial hardship arguments were utilized to justify its actions.
In response to those who criticized its decision, the government announced that it would be willing to draft a new law, along the lines of the Chamber of Representatives bill, that addresses the concerns of the victims while staying within budget guidelines. Nevertheless, the decision to sink the original Senate version was considered an insult by many victims’ rights groups. According to Senator Juan Fernando Cristo, the promoter of the Senate bill, “the Congress prefers to legislate in favor of the perpetrators instead of the victims.” The fact that state agents were implicated in a series of extrajudicial executions in 2008 made the government’s insistence on treating crimes by state agents differently all the more eyebrow-raising.
The government’s obstinacy is especially disheartening considering the fact that the conflict is by no means over. Although urban security has improved tremendously, with the number of homicides and kidnappings related to the armed conflict decreasing substantially as a result of paramilitary demobilization and gains by state security forces, the number of victims continues to mount as additional Colombians suffer arbitrary killings, displacement, and other abuses. According to Amnesty International’s 2009 report, more than 1,515 civilians were killed from June 2007-June 2008, whereas 1,348 were killed in the previous 12-month period. In addition, the organization recently reported that 380,000 people were displaced in Colombia in 2008, which represents a 24% increase from 2007 and makes the number of displaced people in Colombia among the highest in the world. As Marco Pollack, AI’s Americas director, notes, “The Colombian government is lying when it says that violence is part of the past. The reality is very different.” It is clear that the war continues to rage on; in fact, Human Rights Watch has reported that the demobilized paramilitary groups have been replaced with new armed groups.
This all comes in the context of the broader peace process, which, given continued fighting between guerrillas and the state, has centered on paramilitary demobilization. Although the government made an attempt to address this issue by passing the 2005 Justice and Peace Law, which sets out demobilization procedures and offers lighter punishments for full and truthful confessions, and the 2006 amendments to the law that followed a Constitutional Court decision insisting that the law’s treatment of the perpetrators be made more stringent, the justice process has lagged since this time. Paramilitaries have often failed to cooperate, while victims testifying against the defendants have been threatened and killed. Of particular concern is the fact that several of the rights workers who have been harmed are those working on the specific issue of land reform, which is one of the most sensitive elements of the concurrent truth and reparations processes. The level of displacement has resulted in an enormous transfer of land from the rural poor to powerful actors, many of whom are paramilitaries or are linked to them. Determining what land was stolen in this “counter-reform” and returning it to its rightful possessors is one of the most important tests for Colombian justice. Again, unfortunately, progress here has been extremely slow.
Even as the above controversies rage, President Alvaro Uribe has recently visited rural municipalities and personally overseen the distribution of reparations to some victims of non-state actors. The administration takes pride in the security gains it has brought the country and the boost to Colombia’s international reputation. However, it has also made erroneous assertions that Colombia’s internal conflict is a thing of the past, a position that may shine some light on the apparent reluctance to embrace victims’ rights. Instead of demanding a full accounting of the conflict’s atrocities, the administration seems to favor a superficial form of “reconciliation” over “truth,” possibly in order to be able to claim victory and cement both its legacy and the continuity of its policies (regardless of whether Uribe or someone else occupies the presidency next year, which is a different question). However, without full truth and complete reparations, real reconciliation is impossible. An inconsistent stance toward the conflict’s victims is the wrong way to proceed, and may thwart the nation’s progress rather than expedite it. In order for Colombia to have a chance at sustained justice and progress, persecution of illegal armed actors must be accompanied by a demonstration that the government respects the deep grievances underlying the conflict and is willing to address them in full—even if it seems expensive.
