Photo Credit: Flickr user daveblume
On September 10-12th, riots broke out throughout Uganda’s capital city of Kampala between supporters of the King of Buganda (the largest tribal monarchy in Uganda) and police, killing at least 20 and injuring 50. Aside from the long-running, well-chronicled conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, domestic politics have been comparatively peaceful in the twenty-three years of rule by President Yoweri Museveni. Consequently, the death of 20 protesters represents a potentially ominous deviation from recent norms.
Uganda is a multi-ethnic society comprising five ancient kingdoms: Bunyoro, Busoga, Tooro, Ankole, and Buganda. The kingdoms were banned in 1969 under Idi Amin and then restored by Museveni in 1993. The Baganda, residing largely within the Kingdom of Buganda, are the largest ethnic minority within the country at 16.9% of the population. The group is led by a king who, under the present Ugandan constitution, is designated as a cultural leader and prohibited from engaging in state politics. Despite this ban, the current king, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, is a strong political force within the country, especially where the protection of his kingdom and his perks are concerned.
The September riots can be seen as the escalation of the ongoing conflict between Museveni and Buganda over land and sovereignty. The king had planned to attend a youth ceremony on September 12th in Kayunga, a district that has been at the center of Museveni and Mutebi’s quarrels. According to the Baganda, Kayunga is a historical part of their Kingdom; however, the Banyala, an ethnic group within Kayunga, have long sought independence and in the last five years have received strong backing from Museveni. In December 2004, Museveni was invited to the installation of the new Banyala cultural leader. He told the assembled crowd, “I am your President and nobody can oppress you,” referring to Banyala complaints of cultural imposition by Buganda. Museveni has also advocated the creation of smaller chiefdoms within Buganda, which, the king argues, effectively undermines the kingdom’s sovereignty. Museveni has further aggravated Buganda with his aggressively pushed for a controversial land reform law containing amendments which, according to the king, will take decrease the kingdom’s landholdings and revenue.
This underlying tension played a major role in sparking the riots. On September 10th, two days before the king’s scheduled visit, military and police intercepted Bugandan Prime Minister John Baptist Walusimbi, The atmosphere was already politically charged and moreover, the incident was reminiscent of a similar one in July 2008, when three Bugandan officials were arrested and held without charges for five days, in direct violation to their constitutional right to be charged within 48 hours of arrest. Consequently, many Baganda flocked into the street to protest what they perceived as yet another infraction against Buganda by Museveni. As the protest escalated into rioting and looting, police responded with tear gas and rounds of live ammunition. During the rioting, Museveni told members of parliament from Buganda that he had intelligence indicating that Buganda had received funds from Libya to fight against him. Since the riots, the government is increasingly arguing that they were strategically planned, perhaps by outside forces, and that the rioters themselves may have received payment. The government has brought charges of terrorism against at least 29 of the rioters. If convicted they could face the death penalty.
Uganda is set to hold multiparty elections in 2011 for which the opposition parties have already mounted a strong national campaign. Museveni appears intent on running yet again, and appears to be positioning himself for the contest, with marginalization and fragmentation of the opposition a potential part of the strategy. It is a delicate balance for the president: In the 2006 elections, a quarter of Museveni’s votes came from the Baganda. Yet as the post-riots anger demonstrates, Buganda appears poised to shift toward the opposition in 2011, which could hurt the incumbent absent a new source of votes.
Uganda is not a dictatorship, and Museveni faces scrutiny and challenges from the media, judiciary, and legislature. However, only in 2006 did Museveni lift the ban on multiparty politics, and the resulting parties are still in their infancy, which contrasts sharply to the president’s deeply-rooted NRM grouping. Prior to the ban, Ugandan parties were based on religious affiliation and there is a fear that party politics may now be similarly turning to tribal affiliations. Already within the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) there is tension between the Acholi and Langi over the upcoming election of new leadership in October. Similarly, in August 2008, the other major opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, experienced strife surrounding the election of a new secretary. The party leadership split on how to handle regional differences when executive officers rejected the newly elected secretary general because he hailed from Buganda, which would have meant that all key party positions would be occupied by Baganda.
These rifts could have a destabilizing effect on the fragile opposition alliance known as Interparty Cooperation (IPC), which plans to run in the 2011 election. Moreover, the IPC faces the challenge of recruiting Buganda into their united platform which will prove difficult given the historical bad blood between the UPC and the king. The UPC and the king governed post-colonial Uganda together from 1962 to 1966. In 1966, however, Milton Obote, leader of the UPC, turned on the king and ordered a military attack on his palace, which began the exile of the Bugandan Kingdom. It will take a considerable amount of diplomacy to rectify this divide.
Much hangs in the balance as to whether the opposition can effectively mount a united campaign against Museveni. One of his potential strategies to assure their failure is the creation of a sharply divided ethnic terrain in which party compromise is difficult. By shifting the political space along ethnic lines he may be able to break the coalition of political parties and their ability to tap into the political power of Buganda. The incentive for Museveni to broaden his ethno-geographic base is clear, but the method he chooses is important. As his neighbors in Kenya can attest, ethnic politics is a dangerous game. For that reason, the government’s reaction to the recent unrest will be closely watched both within the country and abroad.
