Freedom at Issue

Ruling By Law

Photo Credit: Flickr user Iaihiu

What do Liu Xiaobo, Tran Anh Kim, Evgeny Zhovtis, Emin Milli, and Adnan Hajizade have in common?

All are democratic reformers seeking to advance greater democratic accountability in their countries. In 2009, all were on the receiving end of harsh prison sentences—products of contrived and non-transparent legal proceedings—designed to silence them.

The plight of these modern-day dissidents is troubling, given the ruthlessness and unjust nature of their treatment. These cases are even more disturbing, however, because they fit into a broader pattern of “rule by law” visible in findings from Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual analysis of political rights and civil liberties. Influential authoritarian states, including China, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (whose citizens are cited above), as well as other repressive regimes like those in Russia and Iran, in recent years have pursued increasingly illiberal policies that have played a critical role in the global setback to democratic accountability.

The countries at the forefront of this surge of illiberalism are strikingly diverse culturally, geographically, economically, and ideologically. China sets the standard for authoritarian capitalism, with rapid economic growth sustaining single-party rule. Vietnam applies a similar approach. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia are post-Soviet petrostates, where governing cliques divide spoils from oil and gas windfalls. Iran, a clerical authoritarian system, is in the throes of political upheaval where the authorities are resorting to depredations—including mass arrests, show trials and unspeakable violence against its own citizens—few could envision before the country’s rigged elections last June.

But for all of their differences, what these regimes have in common is a priority of maintaining absolute political power. They are systematically fine tuning methods of “rule by law,” rather than rule of law, raising serious questions about the prospects for these countries with ever deepening ties to the international economy to create accountable, rules-based systems.

Consider the cases of the dissidents:

On December 25, Liu Xiaobo, a respected literary figure and human rights activist, was convicted of “inciting subversion of state power” and sentenced to 11 years in prison.  Liu had been held in secret by the Chinese authorities since December 8, 2008, for helping write Charter 08, a document advocating for democratic rights and the rule of law. His lawyers were given less than two weeks to prepare their defense. His trial, closed to the public, lasted two hours.

On December 28, Tran Anh Kim, a former army officer who pushed for democratic reforms, was convicted in Vietnam of “subversion.” He was sentenced to five and a half years in prison following a court hearing that began in the morning and was over by the same afternoon. Kim’s is the first in a series of prosecutions of pro-democracy and human-rights activists, including prominent human-rights lawyer Le Cong Dinh, who was charged with subversion in December and could face the death penalty for allegedly attempting to undermine the state by supporting democratic freedoms.

In Kazakhstan, leading human rights activist Evgeny Zhovtis was sentenced to four years in prison for vehicular manslaughter on September 3 in a legal proceeding fraught with irregularities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), among other international organizations expressing doubts about the case, raised concerns about “numerous violations of Zhovtis’ right to a fair trial.”

And in what the outgoing head of the OSCE’s media freedom arm Miklos Haraszti described as a set-up in Azerbaijan, video bloggers Emin Milli, 30, and Adnan Hajizade, 26, in November received jail sentences of two-and-a-half and two years, respectively, for “hooliganism” following an altercation in a restaurant that occurred in July. The charges undoubtedly stem from an online video satirizing Azerbaijan’s government the bloggers posted shortly before their arrest.

So why are these cases important?  While it may be tempting to view the dissidents’ treatment in isolation, it has wider implications for advancing democratic accountability.  In these authoritarian settings their fate is intertwined with citizens’ broader aspirations for reform. By silencing them, the regimes are sending a clear message to others who might agitate for more systematic political change.

This pattern of abuse is also of a piece with broader institutional crackdowns on democratic accountability.  China’s leadership for example is building a 21st century, market-based censorship model that includes a multilayered system of internet monitoring and filtering and also targeting human rights lawyers.  Last July the authorities shut down the respected Open Constitution Initiative, a group of public interest lawyers known for defending the victims of China’s tainted milk scandal.

More ominously, emboldened authoritarian regimes are not checking illiberal behavior at their borders but are increasingly inclined to project it outward.

China is pursuing its censorship ambitions internationally, in democratic and authoritarian settings alike, seeking to repress voices critical of the Chinese government at conferences, in academic settings and in news media. China’s internet control methods, at the vanguard of new media subversion, are drawn on by other authoritarian regimes. Kazakhstan, ranked Not Free in Freedom in the World, has just taken over the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In the end, the treatment of these dissidents is not simply directed at the individuals involved, but clearly signals these regimes’ allergy to democratic governance and rule of law.

Leaders, Governance, and Approval in Latin America

On December 11, Latinobarometro released the findings of its most recent poll of public opinion in Latin America. As the annual Economist article summarizing the findings details, the survey’s overarching findings are optimistic, especially where support for democracy is concerned. In fact, authors report that “despite the [Honduran] coup d’etat and despite the 2009 [economic] crisis, Latin America is more democratic after the 2009 crisis, is more tolerant, is happier….The reforms that have taken place in the region are beginning to bear fruit, as this strengthening of democracy in spite of the crisis is a positive symptom.” That said, not all Latin Americans are content with their country’s political and economic climate. Government approval ratings in the region range between 25 and 85 percent. Of the countries included in the Countries at the Crossroads survey, the governments of presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Mauricio Funes of Salvador, and Alvaro Uribe of Colombia receive the highest approval ratings with scores of 84, 83, and 72 percent, respectively. On the low end of the spectrum, the governments of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina, Alan Garcia of Peru, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua receive the worst approval ratings, with scores of 25, 26, and 37, percent respectively.  These wide-ranging scores provide an opportunity to look at some factors separating the more contented democracy situations from the shakier ones, particularly in reference to their governance record.

In Brazil, the sky-high 85 percent approval rating received by Lula’s government is most directly linked to his successful economic policies, which have fostered economic growth while simultaneously improving income distribution and poverty levels. The rating is also linked to his adept management of the economic crisis. According to Latinobarometro data, only 22 percent of Brazilians considered the economic situation to be bad, 18 points lower than the regional average, and 75 percent of Brazilians approved of the way Lula was managing the economic crisis. Social programs such as bolsa familia have convinced Brazilians that Lula governs for the good of the people: 42 percent of Brazilians polled in the survey believe that the government rules for the good of all Brazilians rather than an elite minority, giving Brazil the 6th highest score in this category. That said, Brazilians are not entirely content with all of Lula’s governance practices. 34 percent of Brazilians reported personally experiencing corruption in the last year, the highest percentage in the region. And Brazilians remain conscious of certain problematic social realities: 26 percent said they had been the victim of discrimination, the second highest figure in the region.

In El Salvador, the Funes administration receives an 83 percent approval rating largely due to the fact that it is still enjoying a post-election “honeymoon period.” Funes’ March 2009 election victory represents the left’s first triumph in the country and the first alternation of power following 20 years of rule by the right-wing ARENA party. As such, his presidency symbolizes change, and Salvadorans still hope that he will fulfill campaign promises to alleviate poverty and combat corruption. Furthermore, Funes has already made some demonstrable efforts to push this agenda forward. For example, he announced the Anti-Crisis Plan, which set out steps to address the economic crisis and increase public services to citizens. These positive preliminary steps are reflected in the survey reponses. 62 percent of Salvadorans approve of the way Funes is managing the crisis, and 44 percent of Salvadorans are satisfied with the economy, the second highest percentage in the entire region. In terms of good governance practices, Salvadorans are most impressed with the government’s anticorruption efforts; 49 percent of Salvadorans believe that the government has progressed in its anticorruption efforts, 10 points above the regional average. Whether these numbers can be sustained in the post-honeymoon period remains to be seen, of course.

In Colombia, the Uribe government’s still-lofty approval rating hinges on security achievements. As noted in a previous blog post, Uribe has chalked up some notable successes in his campaign against the FARC, overseen the demobilization of thousands of paramilitaries, and attempted to set a justice and peace process in motion, all of which combined to help bring the homicide rate down to 33 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008, the lowest rate in 30 years. That said, security advancements have been less impressive of late. Advances against the FARC have been slower (the most shocking example being the recent kidnapping and killing of Governor Luis Francisco Cuellar), the justice and peace process has lagged, and urban crime has risen, all of which have caused the government’s approval rating to slip from 75 percent to 72 percent in Latinobarometro’s survey. Nevertheless, Colombians are content with some other governance practices. Notably, 48 percent of Colombians believe that the government has made headway in its anticorruption efforts. That said, two terms of Uribe, along with the looming possibility of a third reelection bid, may have possibly diminished Colombians’ belief in the possibility of positive electoral change, as evidenced by the fact that only 57 percent of Colombians believe that their vote has the power to make things different in the future and only 26 percent consider their elections to be clean.

On the other end of the spectrum, the most obvious reasons that Nicaragua’s Ortega government receives a low 37 percent approval rating are related to the president’s highly polarizing (and to many observers, increasingly authoritarian) tendencies and the fact that he was never that popular to begin with – only 38 percent of Nicaraguans cast their vote for him in 2006. Ortega has shown little indication of believing in pluralism. As noted in a previous post, the government has targeted civil society groups, attacked critical media, and manipulated electoral laws in order to strengthen his grip over the country. Nicaraguans generally consider Ortega to be a leader who rules for his own good rather than the good of the people. Indeed, only 26 percent of Nicaraguans believe that the government rules for the good of all rather than a select few, and only 13 percent consider Nicaragua to be a strong democracy.  In addition, Nicaraguans do not see that Ortega has taken any real steps towards addressing any of the country’s main governance problems. For example, only 31 percent believe that the government has made progress in its battle against corruption. 15 percent of the population, second only to Honduras, think that Nicaragua will never be a developed country, while Nicaraguans responded most pessimistically of all on a scale of how far they see their children as advancing economically.

The 26 percent approval rating received by the Garcia government in Peru is largely linked to the persistent socioeconomic problems that lead Peruvian presidents to usually suffer low approval ratings. While Garcia has represented Peru as a country making great economic strides, pointing to the country’s improved economic performance in recent years, average Peruvians remain discontented. The Latinobarometro data reveals that only 10 percent of Peruvians believe that the distribution of wealth in their country is just. More broadly, average Peruvians believe that they are being left out of both economic progress and political life and decision making in their country. Only 15 percent of Peruvians believe that the Garcia government rules for the good of all rather than for the good of the powerful elite, and only 9 percent of Peruvians view their country as a strong democracy. The country also perceives the highest levels of discrimination in the region, evidence of the deep social disconnects between different groups of citizens within the country.

Finally, the bleak 25 percent approval rating received by Argentina’s Fernandez de Kirchner regime results from an amalgam of factors related to both economic mismanagement and poor governance practices. Under her watch, inflation has soared and the economy has slowed. 57 percent of Argentines believe that the economic situation is bad, and only 8 percent of Argentines are satisfied with the economy, the lowest percentage in the region. Where governance practices are concerned, Argentines perceive Fernandez de Kirchner’s handling of the country’s corruption problem to be especially lackluster. Only 13 percent of Argentine’s believe that the government is making progress in its fight against corruption, easily the lowest score received by any country in the survey, and a remarkably low 7 percent believe that the country’s powerful operate for the good of all.

There is no specific takeaway from these numbers, which are dependent on a variety of factors specific to different countries. The Funes phenomenon points to the power of change as a catalyst for optimism, while Lula and Uribe can both point to concrete achievements that have resulted in increased stability – economically, in Brazil’s case, and in security, for Colombia. It is notable that perceptions in both of the latter two coincide strongly with international perceptions, while one of the other supposed success stories in international coverage, Garcia’s Peru, lags far behind in the survey findings. This speaks to the risk of portraying GDP growth as a proxy for “progress.” Moreover, all three of the laggards described above, Peru, Nicaragua, and Argentina, have witnessed tumultuous political events—including, in all three, presidents formally prosecuted for corruption—in recent years. The damage this has done to trust in the political class will likely take both significant time and an overhaul of the current political elites to change.