Photo Credit: Flickr user endworld
While Google’s departure from China generated the headlines and international attention, recent months have also witnessed other important developments related to the expansion and institutionalization of internet controls in China. The People’s Republic already has the most sophisticated, multilayered internet control apparatus in the world. In April 2009 Freedom House published a pilot study of digital media freedom in 15 countries. The findings on China highlighted the fact that not only is there pervasive filtering of political and religious content, but also extensive “outsourcing” of censorship to private companies and proactive “guidance” of online discussion by government-paid agents.
Control is not absolute: in particular, one aspect of the internet landscape that contributes positively to free expression is users’ ability to anonymously post comments online. Despite the party-state’s sophisticated content controls, the sheer volume of internet traffic and the speed with which information can spread has created some space for exposés of local government malfeasance and open political discussion. In one case in August 2009, a local newspaper in Shaanxi published a short article about lead poisoning among children caused by pollution from a nearby smelting plant. The popular web portal Netease quickly reposted the story (portals are barred from producing their own content), drawing national attention to the incident. However, in response to this and other incidents where news reflecting poorly on government oversight spread quickly, both central and local authorities have taken steps to boost the effectiveness of internet controls.Looking at developments in recent months, there have been several notable trends regarding the new media environment and regulatory framework:
• Institutionalizing “outsourcing”: In practice, most internet service and mobile phone providers cooperate closely with the authorities to monitor users, censor content, and transmit private communications to security forces upon request. This is either because the providers are state-controlled or because they face license revocation if they do not comply. Nonetheless, as the system is not foolproof (in some cases, due to intentional “negligence” on the part of moderators), the government has taken measures to strengthen provider liability with the force of law. On April 29, the National People’s Congress passed an amendment to the state secrets law requiring internet service providers and operators to work closely with security officials on investigating leaks of “state secrets.” The new amendment states that internet companies must immediately block any leak they encounter and report the violation to state authorities or else face punishment. The amendments did little to clarify the vague and arbitrary process for defining “state secrets,” a term that has been applied to a wide range of content and used to sentence activists to long prison terms without due process.• Increased restrictions on anonymity: For months, information has been circulating that news websites had begun requiring real name registration for users wishing to post comments on articles. On April 30, Wang Chen, head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO, one of the primary bodies overseeing internet controls), verified for the first time that major news and business portals had indeed implemented a new no-anonymous comment rule. He also announced that the authorities intend to extend the practice to other sites including online forums and chat rooms and are currently “exploring an identity authentication system” for such websites. In a similar development, a March 19 article in the Chongqing Evening News reported that the local political-legal committee was preparing to implement a new program that would subject microblogs, cell phone text messages, and some forms of instant messaging to monitoring. The plan would also reportedly require real name registration by users logging into such services. Though the full details and timeline of the plan are not yet clear, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “this is the first time [real name registration] regulations are being applied to microblogs and QQ groups [a form of instant messaging], two of the most popular forms of online communication in China.”
• Creation of another Internet control agency: In mid-April, the Chinese government confirmed that it had created two new entities under the SCIO: Bureau 8, which would regulate foreign news and information outlets doing business in China, and Bureau 9, a new Internet News Coordination Bureau. The latter joins Bureau 5, which until now was the SCIO’s only arm dealing solely with online content. According to the New York Times, the old bureau will continue its work pushing the party line on domestic websites, while the new one will likely devote its efforts to monitoring user-generated content, particularly social networking sites and online forums, which have been harder for the government to control than news sites. An official statement announcing the bureau’s creation described its responsibilities as “’guidance, coordination and other work related to the construction and management of Web culture.’”
• Decentralization of online monitoring and manipulation: In addition to central agencies expanding their capacity to control online content, local governments—often seeking to limit exposure of official malfeasance—have been ramping up their own internet control apparatus. The above-mentioned monitoring plan in Chongqing is to be implemented by local police forces. Meanwhile, as officials realize that they cannot censor everything undesirable that appears on the web, a key element of their internet control strategy in recent years has been to proactively manipulate online discussions using government-paid commentators. These are often termed the “50 Cent Party,” a reference to the small payment received for each progovernment posting. According to David Bandurksi of the China Media Project: “Internet commentators…have now been trained up and used by all sorts of government units at all levels, and they are one of the most open dirty secrets of Internet control in China.” Bandurski goes on to describe how on May 18, several news outlets reported that Guangzhou’s corps of “city inspectors,” a security agency whose officers have been criticized for their sometimes brutal methods of enforcing order, would likely be receiving its own squad of internet commentators. The head of Guangzhou’s City Inspectors Committee, Li Yangui, was quoted as saying that the team’s goal would be to “track and analyze online public opinion, preventing the spread of undesirable information and thereby generating positive guidance of public opinion.” In a similar vein, Lanzhou’s Western Business Post reported in January that the Gansu’s provincial authorities had decided to establish a squad of 650 online progovernment commentators.
These developments raise a number of questions related to governance – how much do these added resources cost? What public services might the funds otherwise be dedicated towards? How many users will be more likely to face retribution for their online writings given fewer possibilities for anonymity? How many items of public interest—from information about tainted food products to environmental disasters to the torture of petitioners or the harmlessness of Falun Gong practitioners—won’t be posted and circulated because potential authors fear repercussions if they must use their real names?The answers to these questions are not easily found. But one governance-related point is certain – the authorities don’t necessarily want users to know about these new restrictions on privacy and free expression. Indeed, as an indication of the opacity surrounding censorship decisions in China, party and government bodies issued censorship directives to restrict comments and circulation of the very news items announcing the above developments.
On April 28, the government reportedly banned the media from “hyping content” referencing the internet-related amendments to the state secrets law and ordered that all such discussions be deleted from forums and news comment spaces. In January, shortly after its publication, the above-mentioned news story from the Western Business Post was quickly “expunged from the Internet.” According to Jonathan Ansfield of the New York Times, the head of the new bureau under the SCIO had participated in meetings with foreign diplomats and Chinese officials for weeks, but public acknowledgment of the structural change came only in early April after the Times queried the government about the new agency.
The officials’ desire to restrict publicity of the expansion of internet controls is not surprising. Beyond the Communist Party’s general tendency towards secrecy, such wariness responds at least in part to past experiences, when notice of new restrictions prompted significant popular backlash and ultimately, forced retraction of controls. One of the most dramatic examples was the Green Dam fiasco last year. In May 2009, the government announced regulations that would require the installation of censorship and surveillance software called Green Dam Youth Escort on all computers sold in China. Activists, lawyers, and ordinary users mobilized quickly to protest the directive. With added pressure from the international business community and human rights groups, the authorities were forced to withdraw the orders in June, though installation reportedly continued in schools and internet cafés.
So what might the future hold? As Qian Gang of the China Media Project explains: “China’s Internet is a chaotic space. There are times when controls are more strict, and other times when controls momentarily relax. Some places in China are controlled more tightly by local party leaders, while others are more open.”“The only true constant is the government’s determination to exercise control.”
