By Natalie J. Kitroeff
Carlos Castresana, the Spanish judge at the helm of the UN International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption in Guatemala (CICIG), resigned from his post on June 7th, striking a major blow to efforts at combating corruption and the growing influence of organized crime in the fragile country. Explaining his sudden decision, Castresana cited unwillingness on the part of the administration of President Alvaro Colom to implement important recommendations made by the CICIG, most recently with regard to the appointment of Conrado Reyes to the position of Attorney General. Castresana has accused Reyes of maintaining close ties with Guatemala’s organized criminals, particularly those involved with narcotrafficking and illegal adoption, and in a press conference following his resignation called on Colom to remove Reyes from his post immediately.
Another proximate cause of Castresana’s resignation appears to be the smear campaign launched against the judge, an effort that intensified in the aftermath of the CICIG’s arrest and prosecution of ex-president Alfonso Portillo on charges of money laundering in January. According to Castresana, powerful groups have tried to publicly discredit his character and cast a shadow on the work of the CICIG, which has begun to chip away at their long-held political dominance through its removal of more than 1,700 police officers connected to organized crime and arrest of 140 corrupt officials over the past three years. While these are only small steps toward dismantling the sophisticated organized crime networks that have penetrated the Guatemalan government, judiciary, and penal system, they represent critical first steps toward confronting the entrenched power of these groups.
The strong link between politics and crime in Guatemala is rooted in legacies of the country’s 36-year civil conflict that ended with the signing of peace accords in 1996. During the conflict, many members of the military erected criminal networks that continue to operate behind the scenes, untouched by institutions that have proven highly vulnerable to corruption and informal influence. The notable presence of former soldiers and army officers in positions of political power, a phenomenon that is in part a result of the justice system’s failure to hold ex-combatants accountable for human rights abuses, further guarantees unfettered access by shadowy figures into positions of political and economic power. With only 2 percent of crimes ever solved in Guatemala, impunity is both a symptom and a cause of the continued involvement of public officials in criminal activities.
Given the lack of deterrence, corruption has unsurprisingly become a structural feature of politics in Guatemala. Despite marginal improvements in the area of anticorruption and transparency since 2006, the Guatemala report in Freedom House’s Countries at the Crossroads 2010 edition reflects the formidable challenges the government still faces if it wants to confront the country’s deeply ingrained culture of corruption. The extradition and arrest of former president Portillo and the resignation of Eduardo Meyer Maldonado from Congress in 2008 represent rare examples of public officials held accountable for the abuse of public office for personal gain, as the embezzlement of government money represents a common source of corruption in the country. Despite these high-profile examples, the effect of widespread corruption and virtual impunity for those involved in illicit dealings has been to corrode national institutions and impede effective democratic governance in Guatemala.
In recognition of the inability of domestic institutions to tackle these pervasive problems, the UN Secretary General and the Guatemalan government agreed to set up an international commission to address corruption in general, and the illegal activities of clandestine security groups in particular. Established in 2007 in spite of resistance on the part of powerful sectors of Guatemalan society, the CICIG represents the country’s best hope of dismantling the organized crime networks that hold Guatemalan institutions hostage. Charged with investigating the operations of clandestine security groups as well as assisting in the prosecution of their members, the commission’s mandate is broad relative to tribunals of its kind in other contexts. As a result of its ability to effect institutional reform and bring individuals involved in organized crime to justice, the CICIG has been touted as a “model worth replicating in other states seeking international assistance to strengthen the rule of law”. Though its enforcement capabilities are limited, and its recommendations have not always been enacted by the Oscar Berger (2004-08) or Colom (2008-) administrations, observers note the positive influence the commission has had in strengthening institutional capacity to implement the rule of law in Guatemala.
Castresana’s resignation is indicative of the challenges that persist for the CICIG – specifically, the lack of political will to institute real reform and the power held by criminal networks intent on undermining the progress the commission has made thus far. There is, however, a silver lining to this otherwise troubling turn of events. In response to Castresana’s plea for the ousting of Reyes, the international community and civil society groups found common cause in applying considerable pressure on the Colom government to comply with the demand. The mobilization of these groups achieved its desired effect, as the Constitutional Court, acting in accordance with its mandate to uphold the rule of law, ruled to dismiss Reyes just three days after Castresana’s resignation in a rare, and therefore impressive, display of institutional responsiveness to Guatemalan citizens. The ability of civic groups to collaborate with each other and with the international community, as well as the responsiveness of the country’s political leadership, are demonstrative of the gains registered in terms of the struggle for accountability and the fight against corruption in Guatemala. It appears, therefore, that this brief period of political crisis has not undermined the credibility of the CICIG—and in fact may have strengthened it by illustrating the ongoing need for its assessments. Indeed, if Guatemalan institutional powers cooperate with the new commissioner, the CICIG may yet continue to bolster the country’s potential to consolidate democratic governance.
