Freedom at Issue

Indonesian Sex Tape Scandal Reopens Debate on Free Speech

Photo Credit: Flickr user KamalSelle

On June 23, Indonesian pop star Nazril “Ariel” Ilham was arrested for his appearance in two sex tapes that since early June have been distributed rapidly throughout the country via social networking sites and cell phones. He was charged under both the 2008 Anti-Pornography law and the Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which provides for sanctions of up to six years imprisonment for the electronic dissemination of insulting information. In response to the scandal, government officials have expressed their desire to revisit the issue of internet controls. In February of this year, a bill imposing stricter regulations on the internet was introduced, but it was ultimately shelved due to substantial civil society opposition. When commenting on the scandal, Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring of the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party spoke of plans to introduce a filter to block internet users from accessing sites featuring pornography, blasphemy, gambling, and violence. Furthermore, President Susilo Yudhoyono stated, “We have increasingly realized that our nation should not stay naked and be crushed by the information technology frenzy, because there will be many victims.” The House commission in charge of information and defense then ordered the Ministry of Information to resume work on a draft internet content regulation measure. In addition, the government also responded to the incident by sending out teams to set up firewalls in over 2,000 internet cafes, authorizing school officials to search students’ cell phones for the tapes, and beginning to remove online links to the videos. While some Indonesians supported the government’s efforts to protect the morality of the country’s internet users, others expressed fears that freedoms of speech and information were being violated. Meanwhile, Ariel and his girlfriend claim to be the victims of defamation, stating that the tapes were fabricated as a form of character assassination.

The response to the sex tape scandal highlights the presence of strong crosscurrents in Indonesian society and politics when it comes to issues related to freedoms of the press and expression. When social issues are at play, the sparring often pits those who promote the adoption of Sharia law-inspired norms in the country, which is 85 percent Muslim, against those who promote secularism. This tension is playing a part in the current scandal, and Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party have been at the forefront of the calls to impose new censorship regulations in order to protect societal morality. The scandal also sparked nationwide protests by conservative Islamic groups condemning the celebrities’ behavior. The still-lingering legacies of the Suharto dictatorship, which came to an end in 1998, also fuel these tensions and complicate democratic progress, as longstanding law and  undemocratic practices, which often serve the interests of the same political elite that have dominated Indonesian politics for decades, face resistance from reformers and a burgeoning civil society.

The tensions regarding internet freedom are illustrative of similar complications regarding Indonesia’s progress on media freedom in general. It is important to note that Indonesia’s media environment is generally free. Since the end of the dictatorship, the country’s media landscape has become increasingly vibrant. Independent media outlets have grown from 300 to 800 since 1998, and the government has recently passed laws to better protect media freedom, one of which notably removed a provision allowing for punishment for slander against the government. Nevertheless, restrictions remain, especially within the legal environment, which is still marred by frequently employed criminal defamation laws. The government has even expanded the penalties for criminal defamation in recent years, most notably through the 2008 Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which increased prison terms and fines for those who commit defamation online. In addition, the antipornography law provides for journalists, along with ordinary citizens, to be jailed for disseminating pornography, which is vaguely defined as “any means of public communication or demonstration which stimulates sexual arousal and/or infringe public moral.” And although the 2008 Freedom to Access Public Information Law marked an important advance, it sets out a one-year jail term for those who “misuse” information. This legal environment has resulted in infringements on the rights of journalists and ordinary citizens alike. In one extreme case in February, 18-year-old Farah Nur Arafah was convicted of defamation and received a suspended jail sentence for calling a friend a “pig” and a “dog” on Facebook. This follows the 2009 case of Prita Mulyasari, who was jailed after an email message in which she claimed that a hospital had misdiagnosed her mumps was made public, prompting the hospital to sue.

In addition to regulating general media content, the government has acted to restrict reporting on certain contentious issues, most notably the separatist movements in Papua and the southern Molucca islands. For example, a French journalist who was filming a peaceful student protest in Papua was arrested earlier this month for allegedly attempting to portray Indonesia in a negative light by filming an illegal protest. A similar case occurred in 2009, when four Dutch journalists were detained for covering a demonstration held without a permit. Unsurprisingly, domestic residents who voice separatist sentiments face even harsher limits on freedom of expression. A recent Human Rights Watch report on political prisoners in Papua and the Moluccas revealed that over 100 activists are currently imprisoned for peacefully expressing their pro-independence views.

While Indonesia has made great strides towards consolidating democratic practices in the short period of time that has passed since the end of the dictatorship, Indonesia’s leaders must ensure that further improvement on key governance issues does not become a casualty of the political tensions explored above. In addition to the battles over freedom of speech, Indonesia has yet to adequately address such daunting challenges as rampant corruption and weak rule of law, all of which will require enormous time, effort, resources and political will. Democratic transitions always bring a wide array of political issues, some of which inevitably lend themselves to deep culture clashes or even demagoguery. Finding ways to address these political tensions while maintaining pluralism and protecting basic principles will be a long-term project.

Castresana Resigns, the Fight Against Corruption in Guatemala Intensifies

By Natalie J. Kitroeff

Carlos Castresana, the Spanish judge at the helm of the UN International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption in Guatemala (CICIG), resigned from his post on June 7th, striking a major blow to efforts at combating corruption and the growing influence of organized crime in the fragile country. Explaining his sudden decision, Castresana cited unwillingness on the part of the administration of President Alvaro Colom to implement important recommendations made by the CICIG, most recently with regard to the appointment of Conrado Reyes to the position of Attorney General. Castresana has accused Reyes of maintaining close ties with Guatemala’s organized criminals, particularly those involved with narcotrafficking and illegal adoption, and in a press conference following his resignation called on Colom to remove Reyes from his post immediately.

Another proximate cause of Castresana’s resignation appears to be the smear campaign launched against the judge, an effort that intensified in the aftermath of the CICIG’s arrest and prosecution of ex-president Alfonso Portillo on charges of money laundering in January. According to Castresana, powerful groups have tried to publicly discredit his character and cast a shadow on the work of the CICIG, which has begun to chip away at their long-held political dominance through its removal of more than 1,700 police officers connected to organized crime and arrest of 140 corrupt officials over the past three years. While these are only small steps toward dismantling the sophisticated organized crime networks that have penetrated the Guatemalan government, judiciary, and penal system, they represent critical first steps toward confronting the entrenched power of these groups.

The strong link between politics and crime in Guatemala is rooted in legacies of the country’s 36-year civil conflict that ended with the signing of peace accords in 1996. During the conflict, many members of the military erected criminal networks that continue to operate behind the scenes, untouched by institutions that have proven highly vulnerable to corruption and informal influence. The notable presence of former soldiers and army officers in positions of political power, a phenomenon that is in part a result of the justice system’s failure to hold ex-combatants accountable for human rights abuses, further guarantees unfettered access by shadowy figures into positions of political and economic power. With only 2 percent of crimes ever solved in Guatemala, impunity is both a symptom and a cause of the continued involvement of public officials in criminal activities.

Given the lack of deterrence, corruption has unsurprisingly become a structural feature of politics in Guatemala. Despite marginal improvements in the area of anticorruption and transparency since 2006, the Guatemala report in Freedom House’s Countries at the Crossroads 2010 edition reflects the formidable challenges the government still faces if it wants to confront the country’s deeply ingrained culture of corruption. The extradition and arrest of former president Portillo and the resignation of Eduardo Meyer Maldonado from Congress in 2008 represent rare examples of public officials held accountable for the abuse of public office for personal gain, as the embezzlement of government money represents a common source of corruption in the country. Despite these high-profile examples, the effect of widespread corruption and virtual impunity for those involved in illicit dealings has been to corrode national institutions and impede effective democratic governance in Guatemala.

In recognition of the inability of domestic institutions to tackle these pervasive problems, the UN Secretary General and the Guatemalan government agreed to set up an international commission to address corruption in general, and the illegal activities of clandestine security groups in particular.  Established in 2007 in spite of resistance on the part of powerful sectors of Guatemalan society, the CICIG represents the country’s best hope of dismantling the organized crime networks that hold Guatemalan institutions hostage. Charged with investigating the operations of clandestine security groups as well as assisting in the prosecution of their members, the commission’s mandate is broad relative to tribunals of its kind in other contexts. As a result of its ability to effect institutional reform and bring individuals involved in organized crime to justice, the CICIG has been touted as a “model worth replicating in other states seeking international assistance to strengthen the rule of law”. Though its enforcement capabilities are limited, and its recommendations have not always been enacted by the Oscar Berger (2004-08) or Colom (2008-) administrations, observers note the positive influence the commission has had in strengthening institutional capacity to implement the rule of law in Guatemala.

Castresana’s resignation is indicative of the challenges that persist for the CICIG – specifically, the lack of political will to institute real reform and the power held by criminal networks intent on undermining the progress the commission has made thus far. There is, however, a silver lining to this otherwise troubling turn of events. In response to Castresana’s plea for the ousting of Reyes, the international community and civil society groups found common cause in applying considerable pressure on the Colom government to comply with the demand. The mobilization of these groups achieved its desired effect, as the Constitutional Court, acting in accordance with its mandate to uphold the rule of law, ruled to dismiss Reyes just three days after Castresana’s resignation in a rare, and therefore impressive, display of institutional responsiveness to Guatemalan citizens. The ability of civic groups to collaborate with each other and with the international community, as well as the responsiveness of the country’s political leadership, are demonstrative of the gains registered in terms of the struggle for accountability and the fight against corruption in Guatemala. It appears, therefore, that this brief period of political crisis has not undermined the credibility of the CICIG—and in fact may have strengthened it by illustrating the ongoing need for its assessments. Indeed, if Guatemalan institutional powers cooperate with the new commissioner, the CICIG may yet continue to bolster the country’s potential to consolidate democratic governance.