Photo credit: Flickr user Ratchaprasong
Thai prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has established several new commissions to investigate the violence that occurred during the April-May “red shirt” protests and propose institutional reforms to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. The National Reform Committee (NRC), the Assembly for National Reform, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have are charged with making concrete recommendations for reform within three years. The government’s recognition of the need for institutional reform is promising, though the process of meeting that need will only start when the newly-formed groups provide recommendations for ways that Thai institutions can better mediate political turmoil.
Thailand underwent a period of liberal political development between 1992 and 2006, including the passage of a 1997 constitution that established a set of institutions designed to cut abuses of power and decrease the prominent role of wealth in electoral politics. From 2001 to 2006, however, the government was under the leadership of PM Thaksin Shinawatra, a wealth communications tycoon from the north of the country. Thaksin enjoyed widespread support among rural and traditionally disenfranchised communities because of his social programs and efforts to redistribute wealth. Predictably, however, elites worried (with good reason) that Thaksin’s populist approach was a threat to their traditionally privileged role in Thai politics. Following significant political upheaval and a torrent of accusations of corruption against Thaksin, a military grouping calling itself the Council for National Security overthrew Thaksin’s administration in September 2006 and a complicated period of political maneuvering ensued that included a new constitution, elections that brought Thaksin supporters temporarily back to power, a “judicial coup,” and the eventual formation of a government headed by anti-Thaksin PM Abhisit. (For a detailed discussion of this period, see the 2010 Freedom in the World report.)
The most recent rash of violence occurred in the spring of 2010, when antigovernment protesters, the red shirts, stormed the capital and occupied Bangkok’s central business district. The red shirts demanded that the government dissolve parliament and schedule new elections. Government security forces slowly forced the protesters out, but more than 80 people died and more than 1,300 were wounded in the process, with the cause of the deaths and injuries remaining disputed. General elections are tentatively scheduled for November 2010.
Emergency rule is still in effect for Bangkok and nine other provinces, but the government appears to be in the initial phases of the formidable task of institutional reform. On July 15, Abhisit established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is charged with investigating the violence of April and May. Leaving the matters of culpability and punishment to the judicial system, the group is focusing on three goals: investigating what exactly happened on the ground during the violence, formulating plans to heal the physical and emotional damage of that period, and identifying ways to prevent similar violence in the future. The group is hoping to incorporate significant public participation through its website and other outreach measures.
Former PM Anand Panyarachun is leading the National Reform Committee (NRC), a 20-member panel that is discussing issues of concern related to the economy, resources, human rights, opportunities, and bargaining power. The Committee has the daunting task of identifying potential reforms on issues including urban and rural debt, labor wages, equitable farming contracts, and the social welfare system. Land reform will be a central focus, and one that the committee will share with the Assembly for National Reform. Led by social critic Prawase Wasi, this group has a similarly broad and ambitious purview, including aims to promote fair business practices, strengthen communities, reform the bureaucracy, and restructure the economic, education, media, and justice sectors. The assembly is particularly concerned with lessening social inequality and will make recommendations to the government for ways in which tax measures and land reform can achieve that goal.
Given the tumult of the past decade, much of Thailand’s political future relies on the ability of these government committees not only to identify the root causes of the divisions that have given way to violence, but also to outline clear and feasible reforms that will create an institutional framework that Thais from all backgrounds can trust to protect their interests. Analysts have demonstrated that the conflicts are far more complex than simple rich versus poor or urban versus rural dichotomies, and in fact demonstrate widespread anxiety over rapidly changing power dynamics—notably including the role of the monarchy in Thai politics and society—and degrees of access to the political system. Many of Thaksin’s past and current supporters, for example, have traditionally been marginalized from elite politics. Regardless of the corruption and mismanagement that characterized the Thaksin administration, that era does appear to have awakened many people to the inherent benefits of access to the political system.
A key question yet to be answered is if the red shirts themselves will support these efforts. Initial reports suggest that building support will be an uphill battle, as critics expressed incredulity that the government’s efforts at national reconciliation were sincere or sufficient. Following Anand’s appointment to lead the NRC, red shirt leader Jatuporn Prompan said, “He should reform himself first. When he was prime minister, he did many terrible things to the country and he stood opposed to the people.” Some parties under the red shirt umbrella have expressed dissatisfaction that people who have openly opposed the red shirts occupy key positions in the government’s reconciliation plan. Given the red shirts’ central role in Thai politics, their support for reconciliation efforts is crucial. In addition, the experience of other countries show that both truth and reconciliation commissions and other attempts at far-reaching, consensus-driven reforms only are effective when the groups are perceived as credible by a broad range of domestic constituencies.
The issues at the core of the recent violence remain salient and will keep Thailand in a volatile state regardless of the precise timing and outcome of elections. Thailand is at a point where multiple political constituencies (with differences in wealth, class, regional and cultural background, and level of access to the political system) are deeply engaged in the political process. Simply put, electoral politics alone cannot mediate these tensions—independent institutions must be in place to ensure that the transition to a more equitable system proceeds fairly, regardless of who is elected. Absent serious reforms carried out with transparency and sensitivity, Thailand’s politics are likely to remain a tinderbox for the indefinite future.
