Freedom at Issue

Corruption Aggravates Flailing Ugandan AIDS Fight

Photo Credit: Flickr user heatherlyone

A recent New York Times article examined Uganda’s deteriorating war against AIDS. Major clinics have begun to deny treatment as funds from the U.S. and other international donors have dried up due to both the global economic recession’s impact on donors and frustration with the course of the war against the incurable disease, which now affects 33 million people worldwide. In the face of this fatiguing challenge, major donors such as the United States and Great Britain have shifted their attention to diseases that are more treatable and cheaper to combat, especially child-killers like diarrhea and measles. However, another reason for the freeze on U.S. funding for AIDS in Uganda is the lack of transparency in the distribution of funds. In fact, the U.S. considered increasing Uganda’s funding by $38 million, but decided against it after Ugandan ministers were found to be siphoning off funds received from other donors. Although the ministers were forced to pay back the money, they were not jailed for their crimes. The entire situation is a particularly tragic example of Uganda’s serious corruption problem and its deleterious effects.

Corruption in Uganda is endemic, especially within the public sector, where the line between the official and private interests of government officers is blurred. Several high profile abuse of office cases have surfaced in Uganda in the past few years, many of which involved the theft of public health funds. From 2006-2009, several Ugandan ministers were accused of diverting money donated by global health organizations, prompting an important lender, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, to end two grants. However, the problem is not unique to the public health sector. Ugandan officials have also been implicated in the diversion of funds from the army and the National Social Security Fund. Public corruption is also strongly linked to shoddy procurement practices, which are estimated to cost the government roughly $100 million a year and recently led important donors such as the U.S., the EU, and the World Bank to voice concerns that Uganda’s newly discovered oil reserves will not trickle down to Ugandan citizens but instead be lost to corruption. Furthermore, graft occurs not only at the high levels of government, but extends to local government institutions, where district councils are prone to misusing government money earmarked for rural development and demanding bribes in return for basic services. All of these facets of Uganda’s corruption problem serious harm the country’s development prospects. 

According to the Countries at the Crossroads report on Uganda, the government has made some preliminary attempts to address this problem, largely by reinforcing its institutional anticorruption framework through such measures as the creation of the Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court. The government of President Yoweri Museveni has also for the most part allowed the Inspectorate of Government, the main anticorruption body, to act independently in an energetic recent campaign against corruption, during which it arrested 37 officials and seized public assets that were diverted by officials for their personal use. However, laws governing corruption in Uganda are unevenly enforced, with justice dispensed according to political considerations and thereby failing to challenge a culture in which high-level corruption is generally tolerated. Hence the country’s abysmal performance in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranked Uganda 130 out of 180 countries.

As the current shortage of funding for AIDS demonstrates, the consequences of Uganda’s failure to promote a climate of transparency and accountability are severe. In this case and in others, Uganda’s corruption problem has had a concrete effect on citizens’ lives and well being. Ugandans with AIDS have been turned away from hospitals due to drug shortages, with the attendant ill effects on their personal health but also indirect effects: denied coverage leads to drug sharing among family members and accelerated development of drug-resistant AIDS strains. Given foreign aid’s perennial political unpopularity in many donor nations, recession-induced fiscal retrenchment might well have caused a reduction in funds regardless. However, tales of graft and misdirected funds provide a basis for arguments that such assistance is a “waste” of taxpayer money. Moreover, Uganda’s failure to increase its efforts to combat corruption may lead donors to reconsider a broader range of assistance efforts, including the fight against other diseases as well as other social or economic projects. 

Unfortunately, similar corruption issues were identified in most of the African countries examined in Crossroads’ 2010 edition. While the gravity of these countries’ graft problems varies, comprehensive steps towards uprooting corruption have generally been absent. Indeed, from 2006-2010, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Kenya, and South Africa all registered declines in their Anticorruption and Transparency scores. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe improved their scores slightly, but both remain at extremely low levels. Only Tanzania was singled out as having made notable progress, and even then, it remains highly vulnerable to ongoing graft. Other countries may thus soon find themselves in the same situation as Uganda as donors take pause before disbursing scarce funds to countries with poor transparency and corruption records. The course of the global economy is largely out of the hands of most developing countries, so economic downturns will always carry the risk of donor cutbacks. But states that fail to adequately assure clean government allow donors to more easily rationalize such decisions. Due to the particularly daunting challenge posed by AIDS, funds for treatment could be especially at risk. In the New York Times article cited above, Ambassador Eric Goosby, the U.S. global AIDS coordinator, stated, “I’m worried we’ll be in a ‘Kampala situation’ in other countries soon.” One can only hope that part of the Kampala lesson is that other countries’ domestic effort to encourage corruption-free governance is seen as an essential part of the fight.

Kenya's Simmering Governance Crisis Threatens to Boil Over

Photo Credit: Flickr user ActionPixs (Maruko)

By Thomas Lansner, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs

Professor Thomas Lansner, author of the Kenya report in Countries at the Crossroads 2010, observes that Kenya is currently confronting an outright crisis of governance. He argues that the country's political elite needs to end zero-sum politics in order to resolve the situation before it boils over into a nation-threatening catastrophe.

Kenya’s crisis of governance today threatens not only its peoples’ security and livelihoods, but potentially its continued existence as a state. Like other countries artificially and often arbitrarily created by external powers, its citizens share a constructed identity. Loyalty to such an identity is neither intrinsic nor unbreakable. It must be earned by the legitimacy of ruling institutions. And a notional national identity is even more tenuous if a country’s resources are perceived to be captured and distributed in ways that effectively exclude large portions of the population on the basis of race, religion, language, or ethnicity.

Since achieving independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya’s leaders have intensified ethno-linguistic rivalries over control of scarce resources, particularly land. As I reported in Freedom House’s 2010 Countries at the Crossroads, “The country’s ethnic divisions have been reinforced by successive generations of politicians who have used patronage to build personal and party loyalties based on ethno-regionalism.”

The effects of ethnic and clan-based patronage politics include endemic corruption and pervasive impunity that undermine the legitimacy of governmental institutions by weakening their efficacy and flouting their fairness. In Kenya today, checks and balances that in democratic systems are meant to control the more venal and brutal tendencies of the powerful are almost entirely absent. The judiciary is mostly emasculated. Governmental watchdogs remain toothless even if they raise alarm. The executive is virtually unaccountable for high crimes as well as misdemeanors.

Some hope for positive change in Kenya rises from an often vibrant — if still imperiled — mass media, and a growing network of civil society organizations that transcend ethnic lines and are building citizen pressure for better governance.  But these voices remain mostly ineffective at convincing powerholders to concede to their demands.

Is Kenya is en route to becoming a “failed state”? Lack of resources and capacities inhibit development even in countries with the best-intentioned administrations. If a country that does not or cannot provide security and justice and opportunities for its peoples is defined as failing, then Kenya would join a bevy of other nations, not all of them in the “developing” world, that should be so labeled. Honest efforts by accountable leaders can win citizen trust on which progress, even if gradual, and “nationhood” is built. Yet political infighting in Nairobi is so severe that the coalition cabinet has not even met since early February.

Kenya’s potentially catastrophic failure would be far broader than public dismay at poor performance: it would be active rejection by its citizens of the possibility that the state as constituted will ever serve all its peoples with a reasonable degree of fairness and competency. Absent this faith, other loyalties might prevail, and formally fracture the country among ethno-linguistic groupings that functioned as the precolonial loci of power.

This remains a worst-case scenario, but it is imaginable if Kenya’s leadership across political parties and ethnicities continue to place personal and group privilege ahead of justice. Deeply flawed December 2007 elections, contested largely along ethnic lines, evoked bloody confrontations—often promoted by various politicians—in which at least 1,100 people were killed. There are credible reports that ethnic militias that then nearly launched a civil war while battling mainly with spears, machetes, and bows and arrows are now stockpiling automatic weapons.

As the Countries at the Crossroads Kenya report urges, international pressure and mediation are desperately needed to help properly empower the country’s democratic institutions, and to ensure acceptable elections in 2012. Maintaining politics as a zero-sum competition for ethnic-based spoils, rather than an arena for national compromise, could drive Kenya to a conflagration it will be lucky as a nation to survive, and one that many of its citizens surely will not. Parliament's approval on April 1 of a draft constitution that will now go to a national referendum is an encouraging sign. But Kenya's recent history gives scant hope that the country's leaders will honor its highest laws, or their own most solemn promises.

Nigerian Power Vacuum Highlights Institutional Weakness

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On February 9, Nigeria’s presidential crisis reached its denouement, at least for now, when the National Assembly voted to install Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as acting president. Nigeria has effectively lacked a president since November, when President Umaru Yar’Adua left to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Yar’ Adua’s departure spurred a heated debate over the constitutional provisions regulating the matter, with some arguing that Yar’Adua violated the constitution by failing to hand his power over to the vice president, others (including the majority of the cabinet) countering that the president enjoyed a legal right to carry out his presidential duties abroad, and increasing numbers of Nigerians clamoring for his resignation. In the face of increasing unrest, with citizens taking to the streets with calls of “Umaru Where Are You” and rumors circulating of impending coup attempts, the National Assembly voted to empower Jonathan in the name of “peace, order and good government.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that this ruling will achieve a lasting resolution of the matter, and the current turmoil is not an aberration, but rather a symptom of Nigeria’s unresolved institutional issues.

For one thing, informal understandings play a key role in the stability of the country’s democracy. In this case, contentious ethno-religious issues surrounding the presidency could be exacerbated as the ascendancy of Jonathan, a southern Christian, to the presidency in place of Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, could throw a wrench in the tension-reducing system of alteration of power between members of the two faiths. In addition to the presidency, other institutions remain either frail or politically compromised, limiting the country’s ability to follow good governance practices. Political parties are feeble, with competitive politics rendered extremely difficult by the increasing dominance of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which has been ensured through the manipulation of the state machinery, especially in the fraudulent 2007 elections. In a related vein, the country’s electoral institutions remain underdeveloped; the primary institution in charge of overseeing elections, the Independent Electoral Commission, has been accused of being a tool of the executive branch and implicated in several scandals. Promised electoral reforms geared toward addressing these issues have yet to arrive. In addition, the country’s new anticorruption institutions, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, have handed down few convictions, especially in cases implicating politicians with links to Yar’Adua. Finally, the government security apparatus continues to commit rampant abuses with impunity despite increased civilian control over the security sector.

The dilapidated nature of these institutions is inextricably linked to Nigeria’s political and social problems. Institutional ineffectiveness has paralyzed Nigeria’s response to serious internal challenges, most notably the presence of ethnic and religious tension between Muslims and Christians, which has claimed 13,500 lives since 1999, and the precarious peace in the Niger Delta, where the conflict over oil continues to simmer. Due to the institutional failure to address the root causes of these problems, they have persisted, with positive steps made towards resolution consistently impossible to maintain. Moreover, in some cases, the state’s incapacity to effectively provide basic services, an equitable distribution of resources, and the establishment of the rule of law directly contributed to the creation of the problems in the first place. It becomes a vicious circle: by fueling the most severe crises, institutional weaknesses has stymied efforts to address baseline governance concerns including electoral reform and corruption.

The eruption of violence in the months since Yar’Adua’s departure serves as an extreme example of the link between institutional failure-in this case the failure of the executive institution- and the country’s internal struggles. In the North, sectarian strife claimed more lives on January 19, when armed men, believed to be Christian, attacked the predominantly Muslim population of Kuru Karama, killing 150. The violence then spread to neighboring communities, where additional attacks brought the death toll up to at least 364.While this outbreak of violence was not the direct result of Yar'Adua's absence, the ethno-religious facet of presidential crisis, namely the alteration of power issue, has undoubtedly heightened tensions between the two groups during this time. The violence also illustrates that Muslim-Christian friction could stand to worsen if Yar'Adua cedes the rest of his term to a Christian. Following the attacks, Jonathan promised to immediately investigate the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice, although the halting pace of past investigations raises doubt over the probability of this taking place. This conflict was soon followed by an end to the truce in the Niger Delta. On January 30, Jomo Gbomo, declaring himself the spokesperson for a militant group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), announced the end of the ceasefire in the region, citing a belief that the government would never empower the region’s inhabitants with control over its hydrocarbon resources. The demise of the ceasefire was partly the result of the stalling of the amnesty program on account of Yar’ Adua’s absence.

Until Nigeria’s struggling institutions are empowered with increased capacity and find mechanisms to decrease the perceived zero-sum nature of politics, severe governance deficits will remain. Although no one would expect a country a country with such a short history of elected rule to feature pristine institutions, the lack of progress is disheartening, and a lack of political will has been a contributing factor. Regardless of the cause, the recent saga has crystallized the ongoing challenges, and hopefully will spur the country’s political class to do something about it.

Frelimo secures major victory in Mozambican elections

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Frelimo, the political party that has ruled Mozambique since the country became independent in 1975, scored a victory of unprecedented magnitude in the country’s October 28 presidential election. Frelimo has won every national election since the 1992 peace agreement, this time garnering 75 percent of the vote, in contrast to its main rival, Renamo, which took a mere 16.5 percent. While the victory was unambiguous, it enlarges already instilled fears about growing single party rule in Mozambique. 

With this result, Armando Guebuza, the incumbent president and one of the country’s wealthiest businessmen, surpassed his 2004 triumph over Renamo leader Afonso Dhaklama, when Guebuza gained 63.7 percent of the vote to Dhaklama’s 31.7 percent. According to the New York Times, Frelimo officials anticipated a dramatic victory, with the party spokesman claiming that the Frelimo was “really just competing with ourselves; our aim is to win by a margin greater than in the past.” The opposition party is challenging the election’s legitimacy. Warning of an impending “people’s revolt,” Dhaklama held a session on Thursday to discuss the party’s future and argued that the meeting must decide “whether Renamo will manage to survive as a political force in [Mozambique]; whether democracy will survive, or has ended with the October elections; or whether Renamo, as the force which brought about this democracy will have to launch a demonstration in protest against all that happened on 28 October.”

The history of rivalry between these competing political parties is decades long and marked by brutal violence. From 1975 to 1992, Frelimo and Renamo were the primary two warring armies in one of Africa’s most bloody civil wars (the country’s main north-south road is still adorned with ruined schools and burnt-out health clinics) and they became parties only after 1992. Today, however, what really raises eyebrows in not the competition between the two factions, but the lack thereof. With each additional Frelimo victory, Renamo sinks further; with no viable threat from a third party, only Frelimo is left to fill the vacuum. 

This year’s elections were marred long before Mozambicans went to the polls. In September, the country’s Frelimo-dominated National Election Commission (NEC) announced that because of inadequate paperwork, the newly formed Mozambique Democratic Movement could not compete in most of the country’s voting constituencies. Its creator, Daviz Simango, the mayor of Beira (and the only non-Frelimo mayor in Mozambique), was able to compete as one of three presidential candidates, but the NEC’s decision left MDM only able to win, at most, around a dozen of the 250 seats in parliament. 

While international observers reported no electoral irregularities that would have a significant effect on the results, some flaws were reported. The EU Election Observation Mission noted that officers refused to accept complaints from monitors of the political parties. Renamo is rejecting the results of the elections, accusing Frelimo of stuffing ballots and other acts of electoral fraud. The electoral commission acknowledged that workers at polling stations intentionally marked ballots with ink to invalidate them. And the Mozambican Public Integrity Center and the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa revealed in their analysis that the commission also excluded more than 100,000 ballots. That said, considering the 58.5 percent margin, the irregularities were not nearly enough to change the outcome of the election. Similar observations were made in the country’s 2004 contest, with observers noting ballot-box stuffing, politicization of the NEC, and lack of transparency. Though highly critical of the country’s electoral conduct, the Mozambique Constitutional Council still accepted the election results.

Mozambique is not the only Countries at the Crossroads state in Africa where the prospect of single party rule seems to be looming ever closer. As discussed in an earlier post on this blog, the African National Congress’s overwhelming control of South Africa’s executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. Growing single party rule also affects Tanzania, where state officials favor the ruling party. While all political parties must gain permission from the police to hold rallies, for example, the ruling CCM party appears to hold rallies where and when it pleases, even as opposition parties have trouble securing permission. Moreover, Angola, perhaps the country with a history most similar to that of Mozambique, is a premier exemplar of the perils of single party dominance.

Growing single party rule is not just a threat to democracy on its own terms; rather, it has far reaching consequences for other governance spheres, often exacerbating both grand and petty corruption, unfair campaign finance practices, and inequitable rules on freedom of assembly. Although Frelimo’s victory at the polls is unlikely to be seriously challenged or reversed, the election flaws are not without consequence. Mozambique is the world’s ninth poorest country, with a per capita income of US$770 in 2008, and is highly dependent on foreign aid. The country has drawn in investment and donations as a result of its market-oriented policies and rich mineral resources, and has been seen as a “darling of foreign donors.” But those very donors have expressed disappointment in Frelimo’s electoral behavior.

With Parliament almost entirely under the control of Frelimo, and an entrenched culture of political influence in the judiciary, Guebuza’s actions are likely to be left unchecked by the country’s other political institutions. In the absence of such checks and without any viable challenge at the ballot box, democracy and the foreign aid upon which Mozambique is highly dependent are at risk.

Cultivation of Corruption Among South Africa's Elites

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Criminal proceeding against Jackie Selebi, the South African police commissioner, began in Johannesburg this month. Selebi, whose CV includes positions such as former ambassador to the United Nations and chief of the international crime group Interpol, is on trial for corruption and other serious crimes. In one of the more colorful moments of the trial thus far, Glenn Agliotti, one of the country’s more notorious drug smugglers, testified to picking up the tab for Selebi’s designer clothing. He also bought couture handbags for Mr. Selebi’s wife, and paid the commissioner about $135,000 in cash in exchange for sensitive information.

Agliotti, for his part, is accused of murdering a corrupt mining magnate in a separate trial, and made a deal with the state to testify in exchange for indemnity for his dealings with Selebi. 

South Africa is far from the most corrupt country in the world (it ranked 54th best out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index), yet neither is the anticorruption record of the country’s leaders impeccable. In 2004, Tony Yengeny, the anti-Apartheid activist and former African National Congress (ANC) speaker of parliament, was convicted for taking bribes from a weapons manufacturer. He served four months of a four-year prison sentence. And Jacob Zuma, the current president, was charged with corruption in 2005 and sacked from his position as deputy president, though after years of legal battles all charges were dropped in April 2009. The now-dormant charges against Zuma were related to a multi-billion dollar arms purchase in the 1990s an illustrative case as the awarding of government contracts has been an area of activity plagued by graft accusations.

The ANC’s overwhelming control of the executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. The Parliament has been criticized for failing to sufficiently investigate corruption scandals of members of the executive branch. In addition, political interference hampers the ability of the judiciary to fully combat corruption. The politicization of the judiciary was especially apparent in the corruption prosecution of Zuma and the suspension of Vusi Pikoli as National Director of Public Prosecutions by justice minister Brigitte Mabandla. In the latter case, it became apparent that the suspension was related at least partially to the fact that Pikoli approved an arrest warrant for Selebi.

South Africa’s constitution outlines three institutions meant to combat corruption, but for various reasons, none of them are fully effective. The Office of the Auditor General is responsible for reporting to the National Assembly on the finances of any agency that receives public funding, but suffers countless deficiencies such as a lack of resources and incomplete reporting by agencies. The Public Prosecutor investigates complaints on the part of the public against governmental officials, but its independence has been called into question, especially since the current PP, Leonard Mushwana, is a former ANC MP and has been accused of inhibiting investigations of senior ANC members and the party itself. Finally, while the Independent Electoral Commission regulates the public finances through the Represented Political Parties’ Fund, private contributions are totally unregulated, and parties do not have to reveal the size or sources of their donations. There are a handful of other, smaller agencies in the government that combat corruption, but all have similar limitations.

Furthermore, while South Africa has an independent media, government and especially ANC-affiliated officials have accused investigative journalists of treason or racism. A number of private newspapers and magazines—among them, the Mail & Guardian, the Cape Times, and the Sunday Times—express sharp criticism of the government, to which the ANC has been particularly sensitive. As a result, many private media outlets have been issued gag orders and lawsuits related to investigations into corruption, and the ANC has in some cases even threatened to withdraw advertising. 

As a result, about half of South Africa’s population believes corruption is widespread among government officials and civil servants. This perception is intensified by a heightened awareness of inequality between South Africa’s elites and the population as a whole. While much of South Africa’s society is poor and lacking running water, electricity, and toilets, members of the ruling class flaunt luxurious lifestyles. Haroon Bhroat, an economist at the University of Cape Town, reported that South Africa now harbors “the most unequal society in the world.” According to Bhroat’s calculations, South Africa’s Gini coefficient, which measures the level of income inequality in a given country, is at 0.679 (0 is completely equal, 1 is completely unequal). He warned that the situation could lead to social instability and, indeed, protests comprised of citizens from the lower rungs of society have recently broken out in Johannesburg.

President Zuma says he is committed to rooting out corruption, and in fact he has made some progress in certain fields. A “mood of intolerance” toward corruption is newly noticeable and criminal charges, rather than light wrist slaps, are becoming a more regular punishment for accused officials. He is also trying to make public finances more transparent and to create more barriers between companies that perform work for public bodies and public sector employees, forbidding the latter to seek employment with the former. How effective such measures will be has yet to be determined, and it’s perhaps a bit difficult to believe that Zuma--  whose involvement in one of South Africa’s most serious corruption scandals was thrown on out due to prosecutorial transgressions rather than a determination of innocence-- when he talks about rooting out graft. If the experience of other single party-dominant regimes is any guide, the overwhelming control of the ANC in South African politics, and the sense among aspiring officials that pleasing party elites is the key to professional advancement, will serve as a serious obstacle to effective and sustained reform.

Uganda Riots: Aberration or Prologue?

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On September 10-12th, riots broke out throughout Uganda’s capital city of Kampala between supporters of the King of Buganda (the largest tribal monarchy in Uganda) and police, killing at least 20 and injuring 50. Aside from the long-running, well-chronicled conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, domestic politics have been comparatively peaceful in the twenty-three years of rule by President Yoweri Museveni. Consequently, the death of 20 protesters represents a potentially ominous deviation from recent norms.

Uganda is a multi-ethnic society comprising five ancient kingdoms: Bunyoro, Busoga, Tooro, Ankole, and Buganda. The kingdoms were banned in 1969 under Idi Amin and then restored by Museveni in 1993. The Baganda, residing largely within the Kingdom of Buganda, are the largest ethnic minority within the country at 16.9% of the population. The group is led by a king who, under the present Ugandan constitution, is designated as a cultural leader and prohibited from engaging in state politics. Despite this ban, the current king, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, is a strong political force within the country, especially where the protection of his kingdom and his perks are concerned.

The September riots can be seen as the escalation of the ongoing conflict between Museveni and Buganda over land and sovereignty. The king had planned to attend a youth ceremony on September 12th in Kayunga, a district that has been at the center of Museveni and Mutebi’s quarrels. According to the Baganda, Kayunga is a historical part of their Kingdom; however, the Banyala, an ethnic group within Kayunga, have long sought independence and in the last five years have received strong backing from Museveni. In December 2004, Museveni was invited to the installation of the new Banyala cultural leader. He told the assembled crowd, “I am your President and nobody can oppress you,” referring to Banyala complaints of cultural imposition by Buganda. Museveni has also advocated the creation of smaller chiefdoms within Buganda, which, the king argues, effectively undermines the kingdom’s sovereignty. Museveni has further aggravated Buganda with his aggressively pushed for a controversial land reform law containing amendments which, according to the king, will take decrease the kingdom’s landholdings and revenue.

This underlying tension played a major role in sparking the riots. On September 10th, two days before the king’s scheduled visit, military and police intercepted Bugandan Prime Minister John Baptist Walusimbi, The atmosphere was already politically charged and moreover, the incident was reminiscent of a similar one in July 2008, when three Bugandan officials were arrested and held without charges for five days, in direct violation to their constitutional right to be charged within 48 hours of arrest. Consequently, many Baganda flocked into the street to protest what they perceived as yet another infraction against Buganda by Museveni. As the protest escalated into rioting and looting, police responded with tear gas and rounds of live ammunition. During the rioting, Museveni told members of parliament from Buganda that he had intelligence indicating that Buganda had received funds from Libya to fight against him. Since the riots, the government is increasingly arguing that they were strategically planned, perhaps by outside forces, and that the rioters themselves may have received payment. The government has brought charges of terrorism against at least 29 of the rioters. If convicted they could face the death penalty.

Uganda is set to hold multiparty elections in 2011 for which the opposition parties have already mounted a strong national campaign. Museveni appears intent on running yet again, and appears to be positioning himself for the contest, with marginalization and fragmentation of the opposition a potential part of the strategy. It is a delicate balance for the president: In the 2006 elections, a quarter of Museveni’s votes came from the Baganda. Yet as the post-riots anger demonstrates, Buganda appears poised to shift toward the opposition in 2011, which could hurt the incumbent absent a new source of votes.

Uganda is not a dictatorship, and Museveni faces scrutiny and challenges from the media, judiciary, and legislature. However, only in 2006 did Museveni lift the ban on multiparty politics, and the resulting parties are still in their infancy, which contrasts sharply to the president’s deeply-rooted NRM grouping. Prior to the ban, Ugandan parties were based on religious affiliation and there is a fear that party politics may now be similarly turning to tribal affiliations. Already within the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) there is tension between the Acholi and Langi over the upcoming election of new leadership in October. Similarly, in August 2008, the other major opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, experienced strife surrounding the election of a new secretary. The party leadership split on how to handle regional differences when executive officers rejected the newly elected secretary general because he hailed from Buganda, which would have meant that all key party positions would be occupied by Baganda. 

These rifts could have a destabilizing effect on the fragile opposition alliance known as Interparty Cooperation (IPC), which plans to run in the 2011 election. Moreover, the IPC faces the challenge of recruiting Buganda into their united platform which will prove difficult given the historical bad blood between the UPC and the king. The UPC and the king governed post-colonial Uganda together from 1962 to 1966. In 1966, however, Milton Obote, leader of the UPC, turned on the king and ordered a military attack on his palace, which began the exile of the Bugandan Kingdom. It will take a considerable amount of diplomacy to rectify this divide.

Much hangs in the balance as to whether the opposition can effectively mount a united campaign against Museveni. One of his potential strategies to assure their failure is the creation of a sharply divided ethnic terrain in which party compromise is difficult. By shifting the political space along ethnic lines he may be able to break the coalition of political parties and their ability to tap into the political power of Buganda. The incentive for Museveni to broaden his ethno-geographic base is clear, but the method he chooses is important. As his neighbors in Kenya can attest, ethnic politics is a dangerous game. For that reason, the government’s reaction to the recent unrest will be closely watched both within the country and abroad.

Northern Africa's Plodding Progress on Women's Rights

Photo: Women's rights activist speaking at the 2005 International Conference of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association in Cairo, Egypt; Photo Credit: Flickr user cactusbones

Despite the enormously improved legal provisions for women’s rights in Morocco that resulted from the 2004 Moroccan Family Law, the lag time between passage and implementation has disappointed Moroccan women. In a recent article, the Inter Press Service reported that the law has yet to resolve the country’s difficult environment for women’s rights. A July report from the Moroccan Association for Human Rights noted a strong “perseverance of segregation and violence against women,” especially within the family. When Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan visited Morocco in March, she condemned the persistence of violence, stating, “King Mohamed VI’s government must now consolidate…progress by criminalizing violence against women.” Also troubling is the recent finding that the Family Law has resulted in a rise the number of marriages to minor girls, especially in rural areas. Although the 2004 law raised the legal age for marriage from 15 to 18, a loophole states that a judge can grant an exception to this rule. Family court judges received 39,000 requests for marriages to minors in 2007, 68% of which were approved. The law has also failed to curb polygamy, despite the fact that it imposed strict conditions on the practice.

Many women’s rights activists have argued that the law has been loosely enforced due to family judges’ unwillingness to implement a code that stands to fundamentally challenge the traditional patriarchal structure of Morocco’s Muslim society. Indeed, Rabia Naciri, president of the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, claims that “Moroccan politicians have argued that the law is not applied because society is not ready for it.” Thus, the widespread view that Morocco has joined Tunisia as a regional exemplar for women’s rights may be premature. Indeed, the law serves as a case study on how deeply ingrained views about an issue—in this case, women’s subordinate role in society—can result in both the persistence of traditional injustices at home and half-hearted implementation of the laws that attempt change.

That said, it is beyond dispute that the new Family Law has expanded women’s rights and rectified several of the injustices formerly present in the Moroccan legal system. The law secured each woman’s right to self-guardianship, divorce, and child custody, and imposed a set of punishments for sexual harassment. In many cases, the formal enshrinement of these rights has served to empower Moroccan women and compel them to exercise their new rights in courts, or at least to make them aware of their right to do so.

In addition to bringing about change within the country, this law has served as an inspiration and model for the women’s rights movement in other North African countries. Indeed, family law reform was soon carried out in several of Morocco’s neighbors. For example, Algeria amended its family code in 2005, in large part due to the advocacy efforts of women’s rights organizations similar to those functioning in Morocco. Notably, the amendments expanded the rights of Algerian women by allowing them to seek divorce and vastly increased the protections afforded them when undergoing this process. The law grants women custody over children in most cases and requires the ex-husband to provide housing for his ex-wife and children. In addition, the law now allows women to transmit citizenship and nationality to her children and spouse.  Furthermore, Egypt granted women the right to a no-contest divorce in 2005. Finally, in Tunisia, which is widely considered to be one of the most progressive Arab countries where women’s rights are concerned, has also adopted a few additional reforms in recent years. For example, in 2008, a new amendment to the country’s already favorable family code granted divorced women with custody the right to be provided housing. These reforms were carried out for the most part due to the increased advocacy efforts of women’s rights organizations.

Nevertheless, as is the case in Morocco, a resilient current against change remains prominent in spite of the promulgation of these laws. Enforcement remains the most serious problem facing the women’s rights movement in North Africa. In some cases, this is due to the fact that both women and men living in rural regions are unaware of the laws’ existence. In other cases, the law is not implemented due to the resistance of judges. This is largely due to the widespread opinion in Islamic fundamentalist circles that Shariah law, and particularly marriage, is being attacked by the women’s rights movement. As a consequence, measurable change has been difficult to achieve. In Algeria, despite the promulgation of the new housing law, divorced women continue to wind up on the streets, or, if they are provided housing, are often forced to live in slums. Men have found ways to circumvent the laws, while judges have often sided with them in court. This situation is predominantly the result of the persistence of traditional societal values and views on women’s role in society. Although women may theoretically have the right to seek a divorce in these countries, for example, the stigma against it remains strong, which deters women, their husbands, and legal officials from implementing the law. As Leila Rhiwi, the women’s rights coordinator for the Maghreb for the UN Development Fund for Women states, “What we have seen is a change in the law, not a change in society.” 

Furthermore, although recent laws and amendments have advanced women’s rights, further legal reform will be essential in order to fully address the trials and tribulations women in the region continue to face. In all of the cases noted above, family law codes continue to contain discriminatory provisions, while recent reforms have themselves sometimes contained questionable caveats. For example, as the 2009 Freedom in the World Report on Algeria notes, women still suffer from unequal rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Egypt’s 2005 law granting the right to a no-contest divorce also states that women may lose their dowry if they choose to exercise this right. Unfortunately, the resistance to change is not only prevalent on a micro-level, but often plays itself out at the upper echelons of government. While Moroccan King Mohamed VI has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to promote women’s rights, most notably through spearheading the movement to reform the family code, this strong political will is absent in some of the country’s neighbors. Alarmingly, following the passage of the 2005 family code amendments, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika told women’s rights activists, “You have obtained vested rights today. Do not demand more.”

The recent strides to advance women’s rights in Northern Africa through legal reform should certainly be applauded. As Leila Rhiwi notes, “changes in law allow for changes to occur in society.” In all of the above cases, it will take several years to convince the countries’ traditional Muslim societies of the compatibility of women’s rights with Shariah law, and consequently to bring about real change. The Tunisian case is illustrative. Since the 1956 personal status code was promulgated, the country has been engaged in a difficult battle to ensure that women are entitled to equal treatment.  Encouragingly, however, the country’s quest has yielded successful results. In fact, a 2007 World Economic Forum index ranked women’s status in Tunisia as the second highest in the Arab world. Thus, while the road to comprehensive women’s rights reform in Northern Africa will be long, it is not likely to meet a dead end as long as both local and international activists keep the movement on track.

Updates Post: Jordan, Tunisia, Mauritania, Honduras, Venezuela

Photo Credit: Flickr user a d a m

On July 15, Jordan’s Upper House of Parliament passed several amendments to the controversial civil society law signed by King Abdullah II in December 2008. While civil society groups had hoped that Jordan would take advantage of this opportunity to address the widespread international and national criticism of the restrictive 2008 laws and adopt some of the revisions recommended by civil society groups, this did not come to pass. The approved amendments fail to revoke the 2008 law’s provisions that grant the executive branch extensive control over the registration and activities of the country’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  NGO registration will continue to depend on an opaque approval process rather than an administrative notification procedure. In addition, executive authorities will retain their ability to monitor NGO activities by directly appointing NGO delegates to General Assembly meetings, controlling some personnel appointments, and reviewing annual activity plans. Furthermore, the new version of the law strictly regulates financing by prohibiting NGOs from receiving foreign funds without approval by the Council of Ministers. Finally, as was the case in the 2008 law, NGOs will be prohibited from pursuing political objectives and carrying out activities that threaten social order.  In response to the House’s decision, civil society groups lamented Jordan’s failure to eliminate excessive government interference in the NGO sector, which is considered by some to be one of the country’s major obstacles to democratic reform. Last July, we blogged on freedom of association in Jordan following the initial introduction of the two draft NGO laws to the Jordanian parliament.  Both the passage of the law last year and the recent failure of the government to ease its clampdown on the sector are unfortunate, considering the country’s continued rhetorical commitment to deepening liberalization.

Tunisia has also witnessed discouraging recent developments. Specifically, the run-up to the October presidential and parliamentary elections has been fraught with violence. In the past few months, opposition members, journalists, and human rights defenders alike have been the victims of physical attacks. Criticism of the government of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who is seeking a fifth term in office, has been met with increased repression by state security officials. Furthermore, the campaign activities of the opposition have been severely restricted. Opposition papers including Al Mawkif, Mouatinoun, and Attarik El Jedid have been repeatedly harassed, which has caused their distribution to be disrupted. This aggressive assault against the opposition is being carried out despite the fact that President Ben Ali‘s victory in the election, along with the dominance of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (RCD) in the parliamentary elections, is basically predetermined. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, there is no real opportunity for rotation of power in the country. This is largely the result of the country’s winner-take-all system, which provides the RCD with strong advantages given the country’s past experience of single-party rule. Last November, we blogged on Tunisia’s poor prospects for reform, especially in the realm of electoral politics, calling attention to the gap between the government’s rhetoric, which supports democracy and human rights, and the reality of Tunisia’s political and social situation, which is characterized by oppressive laws and practices that restrict free expression and generally thwart democratic advancement. Although Ben Ali has continued to employ democratic rhetoric by making promises that the run-up to the election will be open and competitive and followed his words with deeds by working with the National Observatory of Presidential and Legislative Elections to ensure that “neutrality, transparency, and independence” is observed, the credibility of the process remains tenuous at best when observed alongside its offensive against the opposition.

In the nearby nation of Mauritania, the latest developments are more complicated. On July 18, General Muhammad Ould Abdel Aziz, head of the junta that gained power in Mauritania following a military coup in August 2008, won the country’s presidential election. General Abdel Aziz defeated his main opponent, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the former speaker of the parliament who had vehemently opposed the coup, with 53% of the vote. While the holding of elections would normally be considered a positive development, especially in light of Mauritania’s recent history of military rule and political uncertainty, the circumstances surrounding these elections cast doubt upon the degree of democratic advancement they represent. The fact that General Abdel Aziz, who ousted the country’s first-ever democratically elected president from power last year after already being involved in two prior coups, included his name on the election ballot, raised eyebrows. In addition, several of Abdel Aziz’s opponents have called the election a charade. They have specifically claimed that there were too few observers, although international actors such as the African Union, along with several diplomats, have disagreed.  Following last year’s coup, we blogged on the country’s major democratic setback, along with its history of coups and excessive military involvement in the country’s political affairs. At that time, we noted that the Mauritanian military had yet again shown its unwillingness to relinquish its dominant role in the country’s politics, reflecting a longstanding tradition of weak civilian control over the military. General Abdel Aziz’s refusal to bar junta members from competing in the recent elections, and his successful attempt to fill the presidential shoes himself, are yet another example. Also troubling is Abdel Aziz’s governance record over the past year. As the 2009 Freedom in the World report on Mauritania notes, the Abdel Aziz-led junta imposed restrictions on press freedom along with other basic civil rights. Thus, if past record is a good indication of his future performance Mauritania’s prospects for democratic progress will remain questionable.

Finally, in several Latin American countries, press freedom has taken a major hit. The press environment in Honduras and Venezuela has become especially restrictive. In Honduras, television and radio stations were completely shut down immediately following the June 28 military coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya from the presidency. Since this time, a selective news blackout has been continuously imposed, with media regarded as critical of de-facto President Roberto Micheletti’s government being obstructed and censored. Reporters without Borders has reported that the broadcasts of eight radio and TV stations have been periodically interrupted during the past month, oftentimes following coverage of pro-Zelaya material. On the contrary, media outlets supportive of the de-facto government have escaped persecution. Furthermore, local broadcasting of international TV stations including Telesur and CNN has been stopped. In early April, we blogged on Honduran media freedom as part of a post on Central-American government-media relations. At the time, we noted that the Honduran media tended to be quite critical of President Zelaya, which was unusual considering the fact that the country’s political and media elite were historically one and the same. This reflected a more ominous situation than most observers realized at the time. The powerful anti-Zelaya media sector has undoubtedly facilitated the coup-leaders’ agenda, especially in the beginning, when several outlets immediately echoed their statements that a coup had not occurred. In the current political environment, these outlets have come to largely dominate the Honduran media landscape, while the few pro-Zelaya outlets have been forced into silence. This is yet another reason that the government installed by the coup, which has been widely denounced by international bodies including the UN and the OAS, deserves not a sliver of legitimacy when compared to the democratically elected Zelaya government.

In June, we blogged on President Hugo Chavez’s assault on the media, and especially his battle with the rabidly anti-government channel Globovision.  Throughout July, the Venezuelan government continued its campaign against opposition media by shutting down 34 radio stations due to alleged violations, while also opening an additional procedure against Globovision, this time for airing an advertising campaign that used the image of an unclothed, pregnant woman in the name of defending private property. In addition, on August 3, 30 pro-government militants reinforced the offensive against Globovision by storming the organization’s headquarters. This act was apparently a bridge too far: the leader of the militants, well-known activist Lina Ron, was arrested and charged with a number of crimes. However condemnable Ms. Ron’s acts, it bears noting that she has a good reason to feel cognitive dissonance: the fever pitch of anti-Globovision rhetoric expressed by President Chavez and his top allies undoubtedly encouraged supporters like herself, who consider themselves the vanguard of the Bolivarian movement, to carry out such actions. This all comes in the context of the ill-fated draft “media crimes bill” that would have imposed jail sentences for a variety of ambiguous “media offenses.” Much like 2008’s notorious intelligence bill, however, the swift and fierce international outcry by everyone from the UN press rapporteur to pro-Chavez websites caused legislators to bury the legislation. Nonetheless, relations between Chavez and against critical media show no signs of achieving equilibrium anytime soon, and many outlets continue to wait for the next step in what seems to be a permanent offensive. 

The Johnson-Sirleaf Allegations: A Bump in the Road to Liberian Reconstruction?

Photo Credit: Flickr user World Economic Forum

In early July, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, president of Liberia since January 2006 and the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa, was accused of having indirectly given funds to former president Charles Taylor, who is currently on trial for war crimes at The Hague. The allegation from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an independent body established in 2005 to investigate Liberia’s bloody past, has caught the nation and its foreign backers off guard, as Johnson-Sirleaf is seen as the linchpin of the country’s stability. Even more disturbing is the commission’s recommendation that she be banned from holding public office for 30 years. She has previously admitted that she had formal ties with Charles Taylor as they both rose to prominence fighting Samuel Doe’s oppressive regime in the late 1980s. However, she has denied ever being a member of Taylor’s movement and says she regrets her involvement with Taylor. Considering Liberia’s record, the fact that an independent body could arrive at and publicize such a conclusion is cause for celebration. Nevertheless, removing Johnson-Sirleaf from office could deal a serious blow to her administration’s tangible successes in governance and reconstruction, though these have been tempered by consistent setbacks and lingering concerns.

Five years after the end of its brutal 14-year internal conflict, Liberia continues to suffer from a major governance deficit. The biggest challenge is security reform, entailing not just police and military training, but also the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants. There have been steady gains in the latter effort, with over 70,000 combatants disarmed between 1998 and 2002, and over 75 percent applying to join reintegration programs. Provisions for the return of 750,000 displaced civilians were also implemented quickly and efficiently, and both programs have assisted Liberians with job training and recruitment.

Police and military reform has made slower progress. The old military was deactivated in 2003, and responsibility for internal security was transferred to UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia). The task of rebuilding the army fell to the United States, while the UN tackled police training. The U.S.-led military reform project was outsourced to the private contractors DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers, whose culturally insensitive approach has complicated the process. Moreover, funding problems have delayed the vetting and recruitment of new soldiers and reduced training on human rights and civil-military relations. To the U.S. government’s credit, the mission has recently received more attention, and a number of Marine Corps advisers were deployed in January to step up training. And despite the delays, the final results have been generally satisfactory. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, army reform is considered “a provisional success,” given that 2,000 Liberian privates have now been trained.

Meanwhile, UNMIL’s police reforms have suffered from insufficient funding, flawed recruitment, and the lack of momentum associated with operations in which no single nation takes the lead. Today, the Liberian police continue to engage in deplorable and often criminal behavior, and have been generally unable to address the worsening internal security situation. The service is also apparently rife with corruption. As a result, the 13,000-strong UNMIL force has stayed on and even increased its numbers in recent years. The police therefore have little incentive to intensify training, which has been far less thorough than the army’s. The one real success story of the UNMIL effort has been the development of the new Emergency Response Unit as a dependable force.

Some have argued that Johnson-Sirleaf should be more actively involved in the reform process, and on some of the other rule of law issues for which the president is directly responsible, she has failed to make substantial headway. Notably, judicial reform has made little progress, and there have been a number of high-level cases in which the course of justice has been perverted. The country’s most prevalent judicial deficiencies include a paucity of trained legal personnel, a lack of infrastructure, and outdated rules of procedure. Impunity also continues to hamper reform, especially with respect to abuses committed during the internal conflict.

Nevertheless, Johnson-Sirleaf’s record is generally impressive when it comes to other pressing governance concerns. Last year, she laid out a three-year poverty reduction strategy with four pillars: peace and security, governance and the rule of law, infrastructure and basic services, and economic revitalization. While progress has been sluggish on rule of law issues, Johnson-Sirleaf has already made a substantial effort to deliver on her other promises. Indeed, in the 2008 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Liberia moved up six places between 2005 and 2006, placing it at 38th among sub-Saharan countries, with a score of 48.7 out of 100. The area where Liberia’s progress has been the most dramatic is economic development, and here Johnson-Sirleaf, a Harvard-trained economist and former finance minister, has proven instrumental. Recent progress has been fueled by foreign aid and investment, with many companies seeing great opportunities in the nation’s natural resources, which had been neglected during the civil wars. This financial stimulus has driven the rapid development of Liberia’s infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, and facilitated annual economic growth rates of about 8 percent. Johnson-Sirleaf made a campaign pledge to restore electricity to Monrovia by July 26, 2006, and this was accomplished, albeit with significantly less coverage than originally planned. Forest management has emerged as a way to both create jobs and earn export revenues in a transparent and sustainable manner. The president’s “zero-tolerance” approach to combating entrenched corruption has helped to remove an obstacle that had thwarted economic growth and denied Liberian citizens basic services for years. While several high-profile corruption scandals involving top officials have weighed down her efforts, the president successfully oversaw the creation of the country’s first Anti-Corruption Commission, along with the dismissal or arrest of numerous corrupt officials in 2008. On July 10 of this year, she signed a new transparency law aimed at eradicating corruption from the country’s lucrative extractive industries.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work is of exceptional importance to Liberia’s post-conflict reconstruction process. However, the benefits of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s leadership, particularly with respect to development and governance improvements, are also undeniable. In this case, a line may need to be drawn between those who actively facilitated the civil war and those who were caught up in it and naturally took sides. Johnson-Sirleaf seems to belong to the latter group. Before ruling on the commission’s recommendation, the Liberian parliament should fully evaluate the gravity of the matter, and consider both the gains Johnson-Sirleaf has brought to Liberia and the losses that could accrue if she were forced out of the picture.

Note: This is an update of an entry that was initially posted at 11:27 AM.

Dawn in the Horn?Judicial Reform in Ethiopia

On June 30, Human Rights Watch urged Ethiopia to amend its proposed Anti-Terrorism Law.  According to HRW, the draft counterterrorism law would create myriad possibilities for human rights violations. Specifically, the law includes both an extremely broad definition of terrorism and a multitude of pernicious provisions regulating the state’s response to “acts of terrorism.” If passed, the law will provide police with the right to search and arrest individuals without judicial oversight and to detain suspects for months without charge. What’s more, this law is being proposed at a time when Ethiopia is already being extensively criticized by the international human rights community for committing offenses including harassment, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention of political activists and independent journalists. As the country’s human rights climate appears increasingly uncertain, the state of the country’s judicial system will become a critical issue. At this venture, it is important to investigate the health of the legal system that dissidents, “terrorists,” and ordinary citizens alike rely upon for justice.

Ethiopia is one of the oldest and largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is unique in that it largely escaped the 19th-century European race to annex territory on the continent. However, it remains an extremely poor and rural country, with over 80 percent of the population living off subsistence farming. A Marxist-Leninist military junta called the Derg overthrew the emperor in 1974, and was likewise overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as the Soviet Union withdrew financial aid from its allies in Africa. Four years later, a constitution had been agreed upon and Ethiopia’s first multiparty elections occurred. It was then that the incumbent prime minister, Meles Zenawi came to power pledging reform and decentralization.

There were a number of largely uncoordinated though vigorous reform efforts during the 1990s. However, the pace quickened dramatically in 2005 with the implementation of the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP), encompassing civil service reform, district level decentralization, and tax and justice reform. The Justice System Reform Programme (JSRP) in particular has drawn considerable attention. The Ethiopian legal system is complicated due to the country’s federal nature: each of the nine regional states has its own legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, in addition to the national government. Although the successes of the various judicial reform initiatives have been somewhat limited, the strong political support behind the programme – recognised as vital for eventual success – has not lagged.

Some of the main hurdles to judicial reform arise from the issues associated with the end of communism and the post-1995 restructuring. One long-term characteristic of the nation that impedes deeper systemic attempts at reform is previous monarchical and communist regimes’ centralized government authority and the current subjugation of the federal judiciary to the executive, which has maintained a weak judicial branch with insufficient capability of exercising independent action in order to avoid challenges to Zenawi’s government.

One of the most immediate post-revolution issues affecting the Ethiopian judicial system was the total loss of experienced legal personnel who fled when the Derg were overthrown. This in turn resulted in a severe lack of staff in every district, and also forced the government to lower the requirements for posts across the sector. The ramifications of this exodus of talented personnel continue to plague Ethiopia’s judicial system today, especially at the lower levels. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report on Ethiopia explains, judges at the local level are still generally uneducated and oftentimes unacquainted with Ethiopian laws. In addition, the as-yet-incomplete process of decentralization (the inter-ethnic relations angle of which was examined in a previous blog post) continues to complicate matters, partly owing to a lack of communication between the higher and lower courts that has created a situation in which many local officials believe themselves to be unaccountable to higher powers.

There are a number of further issues that require attention. The most prominent is judicial independence. As the 2007 Crossroads report noted, the president draws up the lists of judicial appointees for parliament to (theoretically) scrutinise, which is problematic in as executive-dominant environment as Ethiopia’s; worse yet, the government often interferes in trials by threatening judges, especially when high-profile defendants are involved. Both of these measures limit independent judicial decisions, a situation most prominently criticised by Teshale Aberra, a former president of the Oromo Supreme Court who fled to the UK in 2006. The following year Human Rights Watch reinforced her condemnation of the system. In addition, defense lawyers are attacked for representing unfavourable clients.

The prospects for judicial reform are not entirely bleak. Ethiopia has made progress and has secured a solid core of devoted donor partners. As the 2007 Crossroads Report explains, the general culture of impunity has slightly improved as a result of the JSRP. For example, in 2007, several former members of the deposed Marxist-Leninist regime including Mengistu Haile Mariam, the most prominent officer of the Derg, were accused of crimes against humanity and genocide committed during the Red Terror of the 1970s (though it is important to note that few prosecutions of EPRDF members have occurred, despite ample evidence of human rights and other abuses). In addition, courts in states such as Oromia have also increased their efficiency in the past few years by reducing backlogs and delays and implementing a judicial training program.  At least some of the reforms have enduring significance for the broader region, with the Kenyan Chief Justice visiting Ethiopia last year to learn about the JSRP, specifically its ICT modernization.

Merely incremental progress, marked by occasional missteps, is inevitable considering the very low starting point.  If the Zenawi government maintains the impetus of its reforms, change will be evident over time. Nevertheless, human rights abuses such as the ones listed above can hardly coexist with an effective and just legal system. In the end, there is no question that real change will require political will and a willingness to yield some measure of control, factors that have been in small supply recently.

Shadows Over the Horn: Press Freedom in Eritrea

Eritrea remains the only country in Africa not to have a single private news agency.  In a surprisingly frank and lengthy recent interview with Sweden’s Tv4, Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afewerki, attacked independent journalists in his country “as funded by the CIA.”  President Afewerki brushed off questions about jailed journalist Dawit Isaak, an Eritrean with Swedish nationality, stating that Sweden has “no right” to raise the issue. The President said that Sweden’s demands for more accountability surrounding the case was “part of a larger campaign waged by the CIA against Eritrea.” Regarding the case of Isaak, President Afewerki, obviously annoyed by the interviewer’s insistence, said “I don’t even care, I don’t even know what he is doing. He did a big mistake and he is accountable for what he did and I don’t waste time knowing what he is doing.” As for a free and fair trial, Afewerki replied, “We will not release him nor take him to trial. We know how to deal with him and others like him.”

Indeed, Eritrea has dealt with journalists in some of the most harsh and brutal ways of any nation in recent years. Starting in 2001, all independent media was closed and journalists were targeted in a widespread campaign to suppress freedom of expression and, more particularly, criticism of the ruling party, which was deemed “harmful to national security.” Afewerki, a former guerilla commander who helped secure his country’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has become Africa’s largest jailer of journalists and fourth largest worldwide after China, Cuba, and Burma. Though estimates are difficult given government secrecy and repression, Reporters without Borders has reported that there were at least 17 journalists imprisoned in Eritrea at the start of 2009. In addition, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, several journalists have died in custody since the 2001 crackdown. Moreover, countless others have fled the country into Sudan.

One of the latest journalists to be imprisoned is Daniel Kibrom, a journalist employed by Eritrea’s state-owned Eri TV. Kibrom has been held since October 2006 in a prison camp in the south of the country, where he is serving a sentence of five years of forced labor for trying to cross the border into Ethiopia, according to a report by Reporters Without Borders. According to a former prison guard who escaped Eritrea, Kibrom is likely working on a farm or quarry owned by a party elite or Afewerki ally.

In another incident in February 2009, Eritrean authorities ordered a raid on the premises of Radio Bana, a small station in the heart of the capital that puts out educational programs under the sponsorship of the education ministry. Its entire staff of around 50 journalists were arrested and taken without explanation.  Some of the staff were released, but several remain in custody.

Eritrea was also put on Reporters without Borders’ Internet Enemies list due to the government’s insistence on blocking foreign news websites and blogs critical of the regime and its monitoring of internet cafes with armed guards. Moreover, attacks on press freedom are only one of a series of worrying trends in Eritrea. In its report State Repression and Indefinite Discrimination in Eritrea, Human Rights Watch outlines appalling human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, abysmal detention conditions, forced labor, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship. During the Tv4 interview Afewerki stated, “We will not have elections at any time like the European model. We have our own ways of allowing participation. [Elections] are not an option.” Questioning the democratic bona fides of Europe and North America, Afewerki said bluntly, “Democracy is a way of cheating people.”

Tv4’s interview with Afewerki revealed the deep-seated paranoia in which the Eritrean government operates, particularly through its sense of betrayal towards the West, which has favored Ethiopia as a strategic regional partner, and through its own antipathy towards Ethiopia, against which it fought a decades-long war of independence. In its 2007 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that “the government continued to raise the specter of Ethiopian aggression to justify its absolute control over the media.” Moreover, in 2007, Bush administration officials called Eritrea a “state-sponsor of terror,” further isolating the regime and making it suspicious of Western motives.

Though often overlooked, Eritrea has become one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Basic rights and freedoms are flouted as opposition members and members of the press are jailed or pushed into exile.  In November 2009, Eritrea will be compelled to explain its poor human rights record to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its Universal Periodic Review. One of the most important foci for the review should be Eritrea’s obligations under article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed and ratified. The review will give activists and concerned countries another opportunity to speak out against human rights violations in Eritrea and make the names of journalists imprisoned there be heard. Those names include: Mattewos Habteab, Temesgen Gebreyesus, Dawit Isaak, Isaac Abraham, Girmay Abraham, Dimtsi Hafash, Mulubrhan Habtegebriel, Meles Negusse, Fessehaye "Joshua" Yohannes (presumed dead), Dawit Habtemichael, Yusuf Mohamed Ali, Medhanie Haile, Temesgen Ghebreyesus, Emanuel Asrat, Said Abdulkader and Tura Kubaba.

PEN American Center has actively fought for the rights of many of the above mentioned journalists with a letter writing campaign found here.

Greed and Graft Grow in Sub-Saharan Africa

According to Transparency International’s recently released 2009 Global Corruption Barometer, corruption continues to wreak havoc on Sub-Saharan Africa’s governance record. Notably, of the 9 sub-Saharan countries examined in the report, Crossroads countries including Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, numbered among the states most afflicted by petty bribery. In all of these countries, over 23% of respondents reported paying a bribe within the last year. Furthermore, in line with this finding, respondents in most of the countries named the civil service as one of the most corrupt sectors, with the majority labeling it the single most corrupt institution. On a slightly more positive note, in most of the Crossroads countries examined, citizens remain relatively confident in their governments’ anti-corruption efforts. In sub-Saharan Africa, 64% of respondents were satisfied with their governments’ anti-corruption programs. Unfortunately, as the New York Times reports, the political will to combat corruption in these countries is swiftly fading. In addition, the positive public perceptions pale in comparison to the generally bleak picture of rampant regional corruption painted by the report.

Of the Crossroads countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone and Uganda are in particularly dire straits. Alarmingly, 62% of respondents in Sierra Leone and 55% of respondents in Uganda reported paying a bribe in the last year. Along with Cameroon and Liberia, they were the only countries included in the survey to reach the 50% mark. These new findings, in combination with their rankings of 158 and 126, respectively, in Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, place Sierra Leone and Uganda among the most corrupt countries in the world. Their dismal performance in the recent Barometer report merits a closer examination of corruption in these two countries, along with the prospects for an amelioration of the problem in the future.

In Sierra Leone, pervasive corruption affects all levels and sectors of society. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption largely drove the collapse of the state before war was launched against the Revolutionary United Front in 1991, and the lingering legacies of the extensive patronage networks and general mismanagement that plagued the country until the end of the war in 2002 continue to hamper reform efforts. Petty corruption remains unhindered due to extensive bureaucratic red tape, a phenomenon that illuminates the country’s poor performance in the Barometer’s bribery category. Furthermore, the report explains that as of 2006, state efforts were extremely lackluster, in part due to both the inability of the auditor general to filter her reports through the various government ministries and the failure of the attorney general to prosecute cases reported by the Anti-Corruption Commission. In 2007, the problem continued unchecked. According to a report commissioned by the president, a lack of oversight mechanisms and a general culture of corruption in government ministries enabled thousands of dollars to be diverted from their intended recipients.

 Despite all of this, however, TI’s Barometer reported that 64% of respondents in Sierra Leone considered their government’s efforts in the fight against corruption be effective. Although an alarmingly high prevalence of petty bribery is reported in the Barometer, out of all of the Sub-Saharan African countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone’s citizens were the most content with their government’s performance in this area. This is most likely due to the initial efforts that President Ernest Koroma, who came to office after winning the democratic election run-off in September 2007, has made to develop a comprehensive approach to the daunting issue. In 2007, Koroma made battling corruption his top priority and immediately moved to examine the roots of the corruption problem by commissioning the report noted above. Furthermore, in September of last year, Komora enacted an anti-corruption law. The law moves to address high-level corruption by requiring all public officials to declare their assets and broadening the Anti-Corruption Commission’s powers to eradicate graft and protect whistle-blowers. Since the law was passed, the Commission has ramped up its investigations into graft allegations. As is shown by the high approval rating reported by TI, Komora’s accomplishments in the fight against corruption are noteworthy. Nevertheless, the entrenched nature of bribery and thievery in the public sector, along with the presence of other complications created by both the legacies of the civil war and the current economic crisis, will make it extremely difficult for Komora to achieve substantial progress on the issue.

While corruption is not quite as endemic in Uganda, which has somewhat more stable institutions, it is still an onerous governance problem. In the 2009 Barometer, Ugandan respondents named the judiciary as the most corrupt institution, with the civil service coming in at a close second. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report on Uganda argues, one of the main reasons that the environment for corruption remains favorable is that President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for over 20 years, has never made any dedicated effort to curb corruption within the public sector. Over the course of his reign, he has shown great reluctance to prosecute government officials accused of corruption and has even directly thwarted the efforts of the inspector-general of government, Uganda’s most powerful anti-corruption agency. Furthermore, the 2008 Freedom in the World report added that Uganda lacked the resources to enforce the legislative measures that exist to combat corruption. As a result of these factors, the corruption problem worsened over the past few years, as evidenced by both the country’s slip in TI’s Corruption Perception Index and the results of a Ugandan Bureau of Statistics Survey.

Recently, however, Museveni’s rhetoric has been teeming with declarations of war against corruption. Most notably, on his June 3 State of the Nation Address, Museveni claimed that the war against corruption was the only war remaining in the country, stating that his government has “zero tolerance for corruption.” In addition, the government has made some new efforts to uproot corruption. For example, in May, the Ugandan parliament passed an Anti-Corruption bill that addresses public sector corruption by expanding the investigative powers of the Inspector General and creating punishments for public officials who fail to explain the source of their wealth. In addition, the parliament tabled a Whistleblower’s Bill.  These developments are potentially promising, but the same lack of resources that has always debilitated anti-corruption efforts will remain. Furthermore, if Museveni’s past approach towards corruption is any indication of his future stance towards the issue, the chances that corruption will be aggressively tackled while he remains at the helm of government are slim.

In both Sierra Leone and Uganda, corruption constitutes a fundamental, pernicious governance concern. Unfortunately, neither country has extremely auspicious prospects of stamping out the problem in the short term. While Sierra Leone’s president may have the will to address the issue, the existence of sizeable constraints – notably a severe lack of resources – will seriously complicate his efforts.  In Uganda, a lack of presidential will, and to a lesser extent resource shortages, could stand to impede the country’s war against corruption. Nevertheless, hope for the future is not lost. While the current forecast may be dreary, the recent adoption of new legislative measures in both countries could pave the way for a more effective approach to the issue under more amenable future circumstances.

Photo Credit: Flickr user M*rten

Nigeria's Stumbling Electoral Reform

Nigeria is the definition of a struggling democracy. While all of the country’s institutions are in need of extensive reform, the state of the country’s electoral process – the sine qua non in a democracy – is particularly deplorable. The necessity of election reform first became a high-priority issue in Nigeria following the country’s 2007 elections. According to the Freedom in the World report on Nigeria, these elections were the worst of the few free contests Nigeria has conducted since the end of military rule. The 2007 presidential, state, and legislative elections were characterized by both widespread violence and irregularities including fraud, vote buying, vote-rigging, and ballot-stuffing. Following the balloting, the winner, Umaru Yar’Adua of the PDP, acknowledged in his inaugural address that the elections that brought him to power were deeply flawed. He then pledged to reform the ailing electoral process during his tenure as president.

Nevertheless, recent events have cast light on the persistence of Nigeria’s electoral woes. On April 25, re-run elections in the Ido-Osi local government of Ekiti State were closely followed by local and international observers who hoped to see that progress had been made since 2007. The controversy and intrigue surrounding these elections, however, illustrates that Nigeria’s electoral process is still in dire straits. This week, 31 Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) officials faced interrogation regarding their involvement in the N250 million (US$1.7 million) bribery scandal. These officials, who presided over the re-run election, have been accused of receiving 250 million Nairas from one of Nigeria’s political parties. John Onaji, the presiding officer at the elections, blew the whistle on the scandal after another INEC official involved allegedly failed to share the money. This newest twist in the saga of Nigeria’s electoral mishaps occurred after the INEC had been forced to delay the Ekiti elections due to security concerns over gang-related violence that had probable connections to Nigeria’s political parties. An additional difficulty was created when Ayoka Adebayo, Ekiti’s Residential Electoral Commissioner, resigned due to an unwillingness to participate in a process that went “against her conscience,” but then returned to her seat after conferring with the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). After the election, the INEC delayed its release of the results for several days before declaring the PDP candidate the winner. Nigeria’s Action Congress (AC) party has, however, disputed the results.

While these most recent events provide substantive evidence that little headway has been made, this does not mean that the president has turned a deaf ear to the issue. After his election, Yar’Adua succumbed to popular pressure and convened an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) under the leadership of Justice Muhammad Uwais. Chief among the recommendations was that the INEC be made actually independent – currently, the president appoints all members of the commission. The ERC urged the government to establish three new bodies: an Electoral Offences Commission, a Constituency Delimitation Commission, and a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission, to relieve the INEC of some of its duties.

In response, the government has followed some of the ERC’s recommendations. On March 11, the federal government released a white paper stating that it would implement some of the report’s recommendations. It agreed that funding for the INEC should be guaranteed and independent of the executive. In addition, the INEC was given responsibility for state elections, replacing the troubled state election committees. Most importantly, it instituted a secret ballot system. INEC’s Chairman, Maurice Iwu, praised these reforms but, in an eyebrow-raising statement, also stated his support for “the power of the president to appoint the chairman of INEC.” Of course, this is hardly surprising, considering that he was appointed by the party in power. Nonetheless, on April 30, the president submitted 7 bills addressing election reform issues to the National Assembly. In these bills, the president proposed the removal of both the INEC’s control over the party registration process and its supervisory powers over parties. He has also proposed the creation of a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC) to assume these duties in place of the INEC, along with an Electoral Offences Commission. As of today, the government has accepted 73 out of 83 recommendations made by the ERC.

While the president’s reform efforts seem quite extensive, however, he has unfortunately remained intransigent on one of the most crucial reform issues. On May 12, the president reiterated his strong belief that the power to appoint the chairman of the INEC belongs to the president. He argued that transferring this power to the judicial branch would violate the separation of powers. The president’s continued control over the INEC, however, means that the president will retain his power to unfairly influence elections in favor of his party. The widespread victories achieved by the PDP both during and after the 2007 elections have been attributed, at least in part, to the use of the state machinery to manipulate the electoral process. With the newly proposed electoral reforms reducing the powers and responsibilities of the INEC, this phenomenon may become slightly less problematic in the future. Nevertheless, the bills contain provisions which would protect the president’s control over the new electoral bodies. For example, one of the bills states that the governing board of the new PPRRC is to be appointed and directed by the president. As such, not much stands to change.

Not surprisingly, the government’s tentative steps towards reform have not been widely embraced by Nigerians. Following the president’s initial drafting of an electoral reform bill in March, a coalition of opposition parties cried foul and urged the people to take to the streets and defend their voting rights by force. Alhaji Bashir Tofa, a former candidate, used some of the most inflammatory language, saying: “Civil society and labour must mobilise and organise to resist the insult and affront.” Sam Aluko, a famed economist, has “called on Nigerians to defend their votes with guns.” Since the president sent the new bills to the Legislative Assembly, opposition has been slightly less fierce. However, the events of the Ekiti re-run election reinvigorated the movement. On May 14, civil society groups began to plan a nationwide rally in support of a bill requiring the implementation of all of the reforms recommended by the ERC, rather than just the set approved by Yar’Adua.

Yar’Adua’s recent efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral process could be a small step in the right direction. In addition, the interrogation of the INEC officials involved in the recent scandal may serve as evidence that the culture of impunity surrounding electoral fraud is being slowly ameliorated. However, these changes will not be enough to expunge Nigeria’s undemocratic political culture and revamp Nigeria’s electoral process. Events such as the botched Ekiti re-run elections have made Nigerians increasingly suspicious and skeptical of their country’s political process in general and the INEC in particular. Nigerians have come to believe that the outcomes of elections are determined by political thugs rather than the will of the people. In order to bring credibility to the most critical element in any democracy, far-reaching reform is necessary. The perception wrought by the 2007 elections means that partial reform will not suffice. Without change from the ground up, civilian apathy (at best) and violent political unrest at worst will continue to cast a shadow over the Nigerial electoral landscape.

Photo Credit: Flickr user usnico

Chinese Assistance: A New Model or a Short-term Fix?

 

In January 2006, China released a major foreign policy document outlining its involvement with African countries. The document described both the much-criticized principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the “one China policy,” whereby African countries must have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This step was a culmination of years of mutual aid and trust building, the two most important elements of which were the initiation of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China’s cancellation of $1.3 billion worth of debt three years later. These diplomatic maneuvers and gestures have been coupled with a massive increase in trade and aid. Trade has increased four-fold in the last four years – China has replaced the UK to become Africa’s third largest trade partner – and if Beijing’s promises to double aid between 2008 and 2009 come to pass China will give fully one-third the amount of the US. These facets of Chinese policy in Africa paint a picture of an emerging economic behemoth willing to grant, lend, or invest large sums regardless of the beneficiary as long as there is a business or geopolitical opportunity. Thus, for the international good governance and democracy promotion movement, the greatest concern is to what degree this shift will result in the protection and preservation of autocratic regimes.

That African countries – autocratic and democratic alike – are snatching up Chinese loans and business deals should not come as a surprise. Until recently, Africa had been almost exclusively dependent upon the West for financial assistance. Western aid, however, almost always came with strings attached. Donors usually demanded that the provision of aid to African countries be conditional upon the adoption of economic reforms, respect for human rights standards, and progressive democratization. Now China has appeared, offering the same supply of goods and capital without the attendant loss of sovereignty. However, there is a time-horizon problem: what’s good for politicians’ short-term needs may indeed benefit the country, but also may carry costs over the longer term. Thus, the new Sino-African relationship should not be viewed as a question of whether or not Africa gains or loses, but whether the initial gains are worth the potential governance costs in the medium- to long-term.

Sudan is the country where China’s influence is most obviously pernicious. Khartoum has been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the State Department since 1993, and by the millennium the EU and US had cut ties with the regime. Then, China came to the rescue. Sino-Sudanese relations picked up when Beijing began to pump money into exploiting Sudan’s oil reserves. China’s financial assistance made it far easier for Sudan to maintain production levels adequate to fund the government’s activities – including most notoriously the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur – without having to bow to Western conditions.

Zimbabwe offers a strikingly similar example of China upholding a regime economically, politically, and militarily that might otherwise have collapsed due to international pressure and catastrophic internal policies. President Mugabe has made deliberate efforts to “turn East” in an effort to escape pressure for democratic reform. China has provided some export credits and soft loans, possibly tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and in exchange for certain mining concessions. Most importantly, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to the country, including the delivery of military aircraft and other vehicles, while scuttling Anglo-American/French attempts to impose harsher restrictions in the UN Security Council.

China can be accused of scuttling western efforts at inducing reform and promoting corruption in other African countries as well. In 2004, the international community was pressing Angola to improve the transparency of its oil sector and to make other reforms as a prerequisite for any talks concerning extending credit. Then, China offered a $2 billion loan with the expected result that Luanda largely shelved reform efforts.

Likewise, China has a committed interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt and has completed a lucrative deal in which Beijing receives vital raw materials for its manufacturing sector and in return builds for Kinshasa necessary transportation infrastructure and even some hospitals. Nevertheless, concerns over the effective management of this deal within the DRC’s corrupt economic environment have frequently been raised.

China's relations with Mozambique date back to the Cold War, when Beijing backed the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO party. Interest dropped afterwards, but suddenly reappeared in recent years. Trade stood at a mere US$70 million in 2004, but tripled in two years. Beijing has coupled this increase in trade with writing off debt and the elimination of tariffs on a number of exports. This financial relationship is expected to soar as Chinese firms are tempted to relocate to Mozambique, with its cheap labor force proximity to raw materials.

In Zambia, hopes had been raised by the substantial resources China had been devoting to transportation and communication infrastructure. Locals praised a multi-dimensional initiative that nominally envisaged Africa as an ally and not a colony, as “a growing market and possibly a source over the long run for food, manufacturing, and industrial goods.” However, the abysmal pay and working conditions in Chinese-operated mines became an election issue championed by Michael Sata in 2006. In reaction, Beijing declared that new investment had been put on hold pending the result of the elections. Had Sata come close to victory in the presidential elections, Beijing might well have shown the limitations on sovereignty its assistance carries. In addition, the focus on physical infrastructure has been welcomed by many, but the procurement prescriptions and general lack of coordination with local actors has been criticized for reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Such tied aid through Chinese companies also makes it difficult to scrutinize the aid flows to check against corruption or to uphold environmental standards, exacerbating the accountability concerns.

The future of Chinese involvement is possibly more promising than the present, as there are signs that Beijing’s policy might fall more in line with American and European efforts in the future. Most importantly, the financial hazards of conducting business with regimes that are unaccountable and un-transparent will unavoidably come to the fore as China becomes more deeply tied to African economies. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, China is already becoming aware of these risks as it suffers the effects of the global economic slow-down. In the short run, however, this realization could bring about decidedly unfortunate consequences. As China becomes more cautious when choosing the countries and sectors in which it will invest, the development prospects of several African countries that have become highly dependent on Chinese assistance will undoubtedly suffer. The example of the Congo is illustrative: as prices have fallen, the $9 billion dollar copper deal between the DRC and China has become shaky. As a result, the Congo may be left in the lurch. Should this be the case, the negative consequences for the country’s development prospects will be even more pronounced due to the fact that China failed to make its aid conditional upon the adoption of reforms aimed at boosting sustainability.

Perhaps China will become less of an inhibitor of governance reforms in the future. Although it will certainly not emerge at the forefront of demands for democracy and human rights, it may also not be as likely to actively undermine the development of good governance practices. Unfortunately, however, China may continue to frustrate governance efforts in a more indirect way. Specifically, the Chinese economic model, the ill-defined “Beijing Consensus”, could be used by African countries to provide an excuse for authoritarianism. Due to China’s remarkable economic achievements, the Beijing Consensus is often touted as an effective formula for growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, the strict adoption of the Chinese model, which includes an initial focus on economic reform which is later followed by political and cultural change, would signify an actual regression in the level of democratic reform in most African countries, rather than merely a slower pace of democratization.  The fact that China’s economic reforms were carried out in an environment of political repression is oftentimes ignored by those championing the model. Turning towards the Chinese model is based in part on the perceived failure of the “Washington consensus,” but also is closely related to resentment about the role of developed countries in Africa. Nonetheless, as many of these states are already learning, replacing the “imperialist” model with a seemingly less paternalistic one may not be the panacea that many leaders and citizens are hoping for.

Photo credit: Flickr user Pan-African News Wire Photo File

Ethiopia Seals the Lid on Ethnic Rights

Recently, the Ethiopian government scoffed at Genocide Watch’s request that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees investigate human rights violations in the country. Genocide Watch primarily voiced its concern over the government’s involvement in atrocities committed against members of the Anuak ethnic group in 2005. The organization has concluded that the crimes committed against this group fit the definition of genocide. The Ethiopian government, in response, called the allegations “unfounded, fabricated lies.”

This turn of events is indicative of the increasingly adverse human rights situation in the country. The government’s general level of respect for civil liberties has been spiraling downward. More particularly, the rights of several of Ethiopia’s myriad ethnic groups have been jeopardized. The deplorable state of affairs has been brought about by both the government’s active undermining of minority protections and its failure to respond to allegations of human rights violations.

Ethiopia is populated by at least 80 different ethnic groups. The Oromo people, who make up 40-45% of the population, are the largest group, followed by the Amhara, who make up 25% of the population. The country’s political scene has traditionally been dominated by the Amhara people. More recently, however, the Tigray group has become the most powerful political entity. The Tigray, who make up  less than 10% of Ethiopia’s population, exert their influence through the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a party which constitutes the nucleus of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPRDF). Other important groups include the Oromo and Somali groups, who have traditionally been the targets of extensive persecution.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the EPRDF government made a concerted effort to respect ethnic rights in the country at the outset of its rule. When it came to power in 1991, the EPRDF nominally responded to the injustices suffered by the majority of the country’s ethnic communities. In the constitution drafted in 1995, the EPRDF government granted increased regional autonomy to various groups by creating a federal system based upon ethnic lines. It also incorporated these ethnic groups into the government by including their respective parties within the ruling coalition. In addition, the government made seemingly positive strides toward adopting good governance practices on such pressing issues as poverty and food insecurity.

Unfortunately, the positive trend towards respecting ethnic rights soon stalled out and then reversed itself. The government squeezed out all parties but the TPLF and its allies from the ruling coalition. In addition, violence and discrimination against ethnic groups resumed. While the human rights situation was unfortunate, the Ethiopian government seemed to remain committed to adopting reforms aimed at economic and political development well into this decade.

Nevertheless, by the 2005 elections, the hopes that technocratic governance improvements might be accompanied by further democratization had been dashed. During the run-up to the elections, the Ethiopian government became engaged in a campaign to intimidate and restrict the activities of opposition members. This political targeting was partially ethnic in nature. The All Ethiopian Unity Party, the main political party of the Amhara people, comprises an influential component of the country’s main opposition movement. The opposition, which is made up of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy and the United Ethiopian democratic Forces, campaigned for greater power and respect for the country’s different ethnic groups. Throughout this period, members of the opposition were harassed, arrested, and killed.

Persecution of this sort has continued into the present. A report released by the UN committee responsible for implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination reported that government agents including military officials and police officers had committed crimes against minority groups including the Anuak and the Oromo. Human Rights Watch has made similar claims. Most notably, it alleged that Ethiopian security forces have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against ethnic Somalis residing in the Ogaden region. According to HRW, the most intense persecution took place in 2007, when Ethiopian troops tortured and raped innocent Somali civilians. In addition, HRW has echoed Genocide Watch’s accusation that heinous crimes were committed against the Anuak communities in the Gambella region from 2003-2005. In addition to these more extreme examples, the Minority Rights Group International has reported that the level of representation of minority groups at the government level remains unsatisfactory.

Due to its ever clearer involvement in the persecution of minority groups, the government’s response to this situation has been extremely lackluster. The Ethiopian government has failed to investigate allegations of discrimination and crimes; indeed, official government policy with regards to human rights abuses consists almost exclusively of denying all charges or turning a deaf ear. The fact that the country has refused to grant the requests of several international human rights organizations to investigate the situation on the ground has only lent credence to the allegations. In some cases, the Ethiopian government has felt compelled to counter the aforementioned NGO reports. For example, the government urged the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission to publish a report on the situation in the Ogaden region.Unfortunately, however, this commission is by no means an independent entity. As the 2007 Crossroads report maintains, it is largely a government tool and is given little actual authority to respond to violations. That being the case, the report’s finding that no human rights violations were committed in the region is both unsurprising and extremely suspect. This general failure to address the human rights crisis has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.

Given this situation, the onus of responding to and raising the alarm about the steady stream of violations has largely fallen on human rights organizations operating both within and outside of Ethiopia. However, the government has recently taken steps to control the activities of NGOs. On January 6, the Ethiopian parliament passed new regulations it claims are necessary in order to provide a favorable legal framework and environment for NGOs in the country. Nevertheless, the new law will bring decidedly negative consequences for ethnic rights, not to mention its freedom of association and assembly implications. The law labels as “foreign” any organization that receives over 10% of its funding from outside of Ethiopia. Most alarmingly, it goes on to prohibit these “foreign” NGOs from engaging in human rights and governance work. As a recent Human Rights Watch report notes, this law will be especially damaging due to the fact that there are very few organizations that engage in human rights work in Ethiopia and even fewer that will be able to qualify as “domestic” under the new law. Tragically, this law’s implementation may effectively stifle Ethiopia’s few remaining ethnic rights watchdogs.

As the domestic environment becomes more repressive, the role of international actors will become critical. While they may be unable to investigate violations on the ground, it will remain the responsibility of international human rights organizations to raise awareness about the crisis in Ethiopia and to continue petitioning international organizations such as the UN to respond to the issue. NGOs must continue to lobby world powers including the United States and the EU to speak out against Ethiopia’s abuses and provide support to human rights defenders within the country. Due to the fact that Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign assistance to combat such daunting challenges as rampant poverty, food shortages, and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, international pressure of this sort could bear more fruit than pressure on regimes that are already more internationally isolated.

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Returning Hutus are Another Test for Rwandan Justice

In January the Rwandan government took the dramatic step of sending troops to the DRC to aid their former foes’ suppression of the Hutu-comprised Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The short strategic incursion – already finishing – has had a ripple-effect in the country. Not only was their three-way mission successful in targeting the FDLR, but recently, with renewed vigor, Congolese-UN forces have launched further military operations against the Rwandan Hutus.

Besides bringing clear political and economic benefits to the DRC, the amplified fighting is increasing the rate of Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda. Many of these are forced: the Congolese government has deported nearly 3,000 Hutus – rebels and civilians alike – in the last month. Others are leaving simply because they no longer have a place in the DRC, encouraged by the low-intensity but sustained human rights abuses committed by the Congolese soldiers. The Rwandan government is very actively encouraging the return of Hutus so that it may continue to forge a “post-tribal” Rwandan nation; indeed, it is only now, when the survivors of both sides of the Rwandan genocide have returned, that one can truly learn what the social cost of 1994 and its aftermath has been.

The stories of the returnees are very interesting, and hold a glimpse into what is to come. Hitherto many had been dissuaded from returning by rebel Hutu leaders who told them that the Tutsis in Rwanda would surely kill or imprison them; instead, what has come from the state is a massive education and socialization drive to create ‘Rwandans’ with none of the other classifications that led to the 1994 slaughter. The first step in this process is a stint in one of a series of camps where the returnees at taught how to be citizens of their new nation. Subsequently, they are told to live in mixed villages: Hutus and Tutsis side-by-side. This top-heavy integration process has had limited success in inducing reform, even though some initiatives, such as police officers receiving training in community relations to make them impartial, have been undertaken.

However, the legal system in particular has confounded the government’s efforts to maintain power and build a nationalism-based state while simultaneously suitably punishing those responsible for Rwanda’s notorious recent history. The major issue is the Gacaca court system. This is a community-based tribunal arrangement that was reformulated in 2004 with great power to punish people involved in Rwanda’s civil war. While the courts handed down hundreds of thousands of sentences in a period far faster than the ordinary court system could ever hope to achieve, they are rife with government manipulation, corruption, preferential treatment, and the tolerance of torture. Furthermore, to maintain their hold on power, the Tutsi-led state has effectively silenced evidence given of their own massacres: there have been no prosecutions to date against Rwandan Patriotic Front personnel – now the country’s governing party – and this lack of judicial impartiality is severely hampering efforts at fostering unity. As a result, Amnesty International has specifically called for countries not to extradite people accused of war-crimes currently detained in their countries, stating that they should rather begin the proper legal process themselves.

Many of the Hutus now returning are in a particularly weak position. Their very flight may be viewed as evidence of culpability, even though some portion of those who fled did so due to fear of unjust persecution. Meanwhile, few will be able to muster the resources necessary to defend themselves – or bribe court officials, as so many others have done. With the Gacaca courts scheduled to finish by the summer, treatment of these returning Hutus will serve as one of the final legacies of the system. The debate over whether justice has been achieved – and more broadly, over how much credit President Paul Kagame’s government deserves for reconstruction, given its weak record on democracy – will long rage in Rwanda. In this light, it will be well worth keeping an eye on what happens to these long-exiled returnees. Their fate may well symbolize the success of the reconciliation enterprise more generally.

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New Cabinet Dynamics and Same OId Trouble in Zimbabwe

The last two weeks have provided much analytical fodder for Zimbabwe’s many outside observers. On Wednesday, 11 February, MDC party and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister, the culmination of a drawn-out power-sharing accord process that began last July. But two days later, the MDC’s nominee for deputy minister of agriculture, Roy Bennett, was imprisoned on charges including supporting terrorism, a move that many perceive as an attempt to scuttle the power-sharing agreement.

The prime minister’s oath was administered by President Robert Mugabe, who has dominated the political, social, and economic life of Zimbabwe’s thirteen million citizens since 1980. Tsvangirai earned a plurality of votes in the first round of the 2008 presidential election, but not enough to win outright. Realizing that he would lose the run-off, Mugabe initiated a reign of terror against MDC supporters, and later claimed to have won 86% of the second-round vote in June. It took the international community three months of intense pressure – including sanctions against Zimbabwe and the freezing of administration members’ accounts abroad – to force Mugabe to accept a power sharing agreement whereby Tsvangirai would become prime minister and appoint a number of cabinet ministers. Even then, negotiations between Mugabe’s party, ZANU-PF, and the MDC came essentially to a stand-still while ZANU-PF refused to relinquish any meaningful cabinet positions. Further international pressure was required to make ZANU-PF relinquish fifteen cabinet posts.

Bennett has been charged with “illegal possession of arms for the purposes of committing banditry, insurgency, and terrorism,” for which he could face a life sentence. The charges are related to the discovery of an arms cache in the home of Peter Michael Hitschmann in 2006, and the government maintains that the two men were conspiring together. Bennett, like many MDC supporters, has been detained and tortured repeatedly by Zimbabwean security forces. He also spent eight months in prison in 2004 for assaulting the former justice minister during a debate in parliament. Mugabe’s choice of target is unsurprising: his traditional bogeymen and scapegoats are white land-owners like Bennett. Tsvangirai has suggested that the move may be a deliberate attempt by ZANU-PF to scuttle the deal, theorizing that some party members are fearful of being prosecuted for human rights violations committed during Mugabe’s long tyranny. The fact that Mugabe celebrated his 85th birthday on Saturday contributes to a sense of unease about the future among his supporters. The apparent seizure of scores of white-owned farms in the last few days might well be related to fears that ZANU-PF members better take full advantage of their untrammeled power while they still can.

The major question is what the MDC will be able to actually do with the power it has wrested from ZANU-PF. The home affairs post is the most meaningful concession that MDC was allowed: it is the ministry that controls the police force. Zimbabwe’s police, like every other part of its government, are deeply corrupt and form a key part of Mugabe’s powerful patronage network. The head of the police force even stated prior to the run-off that he would not allow the opposition to take over. Moreover, the military and the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and national security remain entirely under Mugabe’s control, leaving him with the bulk of real power.

In terms of governance, the MDC’s appointment of Tendai Biti as minister of finance is a good sign for a country where half the population requires food aid and the currency has been devalued to utter worthlessness in recent years. London’s Daily Telegraph calls Biti “a top lawyer widely regarded as incorruptible and one of the MDC's leading lights.” But more disappointment could await: the real power to make economic policy and support the currency has been arrogated to the discredited governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, who has been reappointed for another five years.

Outside of the controversy surrounding his arrest, Roy Bennett is a potentially interesting candidate for deputy minister of agriculture. Zimbabwean agriculture is in desperate need of help. The government began seizing farm land from whites – including Mr. Bennett’s – in 2000 and redistributing it to war veterans and supporters of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The results were catastrophic: output fell dramatically, and with it, Zimbabwe’s GDP and living standards.

Bennett’s is not the only appointment to a very, very difficult position. MDC also chose the ministers of health and public services. The lack of public services in Zimbabwe is an enormous problem, given the staggering rates of lethal disease. Three thousand people have died from cholera in Zimbabwe in the past few months in an outbreak which Mugabe alternately called imaginary, under control, and an attempt by the imperial forces of England to re-colonize Zimbabwe. In addition, more than 2.5 million people in Zimbabwe are infected with HIV. In this light, ZANU-PF’s power-sharing agreement has an air of dumping the consequences of decades of corruption on the shoulders of the MDC.

MDC did manage to collect a few cabinet positions that could become meaningful. It is surprising that an increasingly despotic regime would surrender control of the Ministry for Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, although Mugabe’s control of the military could easily make the rule of law irrelevant at any moment. MDC also gained control of the Information Ministry, which has censored – even violently suppressed – opposition voices. Another astounding gain for MDC is the Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Corruption. Graft and patronage are the linchpins of ZANU-PF’s strength, and it is surprising that they would give MDC a weapon to attack them. One powerful ministry that it makes sense, however, for Mugabe to relinquish is that of economic development, where an MDC member will have far more credibility with the foreign donors Zimbabwe is totally reliant upon.

The degree of change represented by the swearing-in of Morgan Tsvangirai, in a nation that has suffered terribly under the rule of an aging despot, is hard to overstate. Even though it seems like MDC’s cabinet ministers inherit more catastrophes than positions with real potential, it is nonetheless an improvement from a government dominated entirely by a single party. Given Mugabe’s age, ZANU-PF’s utter ossification, and Zimbabwe’s near collapse, there is little question that change will eventually come. What comes next, however, gives reason for fear as well. For Zimbabwe’s citizens to have any hope, the MDC has no choice but to prove it is actually capable of governing; the alternative is too depressing to contemplate.

Conflict in the Niger Delta Simmers on and Flares Up

When President Umaru Yar’Adua came to power a year and a half ago in Nigeria, a country with 140m people speaking some 250 languages, he detailed a seven-point agenda (energy, security, wealth creation, education, land reform, mass transit, and the execution the Niger Delta plan) to propel development via good governance. Topping President Yar’Adua’s agenda was achieving progress in the Niger Delta Region, where 23 percent of Nigerians reside and where instability reigns, with frequent inter-ethnic clashes over the allocation of oil wealth and resources. The Delta has always been a source of conflict: since initial oil deposits were founded in 1956, residents have been paid pittances, lost their lands, and suffered environmental degradation. Though there have been a few encouraging signs of incremental decreases in tensions, the complexity of the problem means that there is still little hope of an imminent resolution.

Now Comes the Hard Part in Mozambique

Considering Mozambique’s background, which includes centuries of colonialism followed by a civil war, the country’s transformation into a democracy has been quite successful. Since the end of the conflict, the country has delighted its (tiny) audience: the World Bank has praised it as figuring among the region’s top business reformers, real GDP has grown by an impressive annual average of 8% since the end of armed conflict in 1992, inflation has stabilized at around 10% per year, and enthusiastic donors have poured billions of dollars in foreign aid into the country. However, this economic progress has only slowly translated into improvements in governance and civil liberties. While Mozambique is peaceful and stable by African standards, its democracy remains immature and its institutions weak.

Zimbabwe and Kenya - Power-Sharing, or Reckonings Postponed?

Following their well-publicized post-electoral meltdowns, Zimbabwe and Kenya are working through tricky governance issues involving power-sharing among multiple, mutually suspicious political parties. These situations are important to monitor as sub-Saharan Africa has all too rarely seen harmonious transitions even when the handover of power is straightforward, let alone when it involves powerful personalities and deep grievances. Ideally, these nations will succeed in peacefully distributing authority among the stakeholders, but the fragility of the processes is severe.