Freedom at Issue

Chavez's Post-Referendum Offensive

Photo Credit: Flickr user !Que comunismo!

Hugo Chavez has continued his attacks on his chief television adversary, Globovision, with a personal phone call two weeks ago to the station’s executives warning them to “behave correctly.” Invective against Globovision is nothing new, with Chavez frequently calling for its closure and even labeling its work as “media terrorism.” The station has been a vociferous critic of Chavez and has been accused by the president of trying to thwart the efforts of the elected government and even promoting his assassination. In an address to Latin American diplomats in Washington last April, Andrés Izarra, a former media executive and now Venezuelan government official, likened Globovisión's coverage to Rwandan radio broadcasts that helped provoke genocide in 1994. 

Chavez has recently stepped up his criticism of the channel, matching words with actions. This month, the station was slapped with a US$4.19 million fine for alleged unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the station’s top executive’s home was raided in May by more than 100 Venezuelan police officers accusing him of running a car smuggling ring  (Globovision’s President, Guillermo Zuloaga, co-owns a Toyota dealership). Both investigations were undertaken at the request of pro-Chavez lawmakers. New charges were brought against the station for supposedly breaking the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television (Ley Resorte), a vague law criticized by human rights groups for its potential to hinder media freedoms.

Indeed, the media has been a battleground since Chavez’s election in 1998 and, more acutely, since a brief 2002 coup. RCTV, Venezuela’s oldest television channel, was not allowed to renew its terrestrial broadcast license in 2007 after being accused of supporting the coup against Chavez and the subsequent oil strike that sought to topple the government. The recent campaign against Globovision is also directly linked to the network’s involvement in opposition activities. In the case at hand, Globovision has been accused of giving air-time to opposition organizations including Women for Liberty and Democratic Renewal, without paying the requisite taxes. 

RCTV, Globovision, and two other networks, Televen and Venevision, had openly supported the unseating of Chavez and played key roles in the 2002 coup attempt through media blackouts and selective coverage. Few contest the fact that RCTV and other stations have taken sides, often aggressively, against Chavez, with commentators openly calling for his demise. Pressure on the government by Televen and Venevision eased notably in following years, however, and unsurprisingly, they have been the target of far less official attention.

"I'm happy that the institutions are working, we have to keep moving against impunity. Let them say what they'll say," Chavez is quoted as saying by AFP. Indeed, several weeks before, Chavez ordered the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to “fulfill your obligation” and take action against Globovision in light of their breaking a story on a minor recent earthquake which the government had not yet reported. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in particular, makes clear that Chavez’s notion of “institutions working” apparently does not include the idea of separation of powers.

Such moves against Globovision must be seen in light of a broader effort by the Chavez government to deepen the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” after the February referendum that removed term limits for public officials, thus allowing Chavez to run for a third term in 2012. Chavez terms this new push the “third phase” of the revolution.

Following the election, Michael Shifter, of the US-based think-tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that “[Chavez is] going to be very emboldened. He’s going to move ahead in radical fashion with his revolution.” Shifter’s words were prescient.

Chavez’s efforts to bolster the revolution post-referendum have principally focused on a specific set of issues: 1. Reining in unruly media outlets, especially Globovision; 2. Undermining the power of both private and public sector unions; 3. Continuing with his agenda of nationalization and expropriation of foreign companies operating in Venezuela; 4. Weakening opposition parties; and 5. Accruing powers for the central government at the expense of local governments.

Chavez’s attempts at undermining the power of unions that oppose or contradict his revolutionary vision is not new. In its report, A Decade Under Chavez, Human Rights Watch states,"The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by promoting state interference in union elections, refusing to bargain collectively with established unions, and engaging in favoritism toward pro-government unions. It has also punished workers with job dismissals and blacklisting for legitimate strike activity. And it has supported the creation of alternative labor organizations that undercut the country's labor laws, risk undermining established unions, and leave workers particularly vulnerable to political discrimination."

This judgment was echoed by a Freedom House report from last year, Freedom of Association Under Threat. A bill that was recently introduced in the National Assembly would cripple unions by eliminating collective bargaining and giving powers in regards to labor matters to “worker’s councils,” usually controlled by ruling party members.

Chavez has also continued his plan to nationalize both foreign and domestic companies. In March, Chavez expropriated local operations of US food giant Cargill, accusing the company of avoiding price controls. While the petrochemicals industry has already witnessed substantial intervention, along with steel, cement, electricity and telecommunications, the May announcement that a set of privately owned oil services firms would be taken over marked a new foray into the country’s dominant economic sector.

Chavez has also continued to undermine democratic freedoms through attacks on opposition members and weakening the country’s local leaders. Manuel Rosales, the main opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and recently elected mayor of Venezuela’s second largest city, was recently forced to seek asylum in Peru after being charged with corruption. Other prominent opposition members including former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel have also been placed under investigation on corruption charges. In addition, Chavez has stepped up his offensive against regional governors, who won victories in some important states in last November’s regional and local elections, by pushing a law through the Parliament which would see their powers diminished by regional “vice presidents” subordinate to the President.

With oil prices rising again, opposition members fleeing the country, and media outlets in the crosshairs, it looks as though there is little to slow Chavez’s offensive in the short term. In a recent statement reported by Reuters, Chavez stated to his party stalwarts: "I've said it before and I repeat, we must keep up the offensive, bulldozing the counter-revolution. We can no longer be the idiots we were." If Chavez has made one thing clear during his ten years in power, it’s that when he says he’ll do something, it probably will happen. Such is the personalist nature of 21st century socialism.

Nicaragua's Ortega Brings No Revolution to Women's Rights

Photo Credit: Flickr user svengaarn

In May, the UN Committee against Torture called for Nicaragua to reconsider its absolute ban on abortion. The Committee ruled that the ban, which has been in effect since 2006, infringed on the rights of women and girls by prohibiting abortion in cases in which pregnancy threatened the mother’s life as well as in cases of rape. Moreover, as Amnesty International argues, the ban on abortion violates the right of women not to be subject to “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” The UN Committee against torture is not the first UN body to admonish Nicaragua for this law; as of today, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the UN Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women have all rebuked Nicaragua for its blanket abortion law and have reminded the country of its obligation to uphold human rights.

The persistence of this particular violation of women’s rights should come as no surprise. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's authoritarian tendencies have presented themselves with increasing frequency since the Contra War of the 1980s. In previous posts, we explored the president’s most recent authoritarian behavior, citing Ortega’s vigorous impingements on press freedom, flagrant manipulation of electoral laws, and wanton disregard for the democratic electoral process. On June 11, the Millennium Challenge Corporation directly punished Nicaragua for its deplorable governance trend by canceling the final $60 million of a $175 million aid agreement. In addition, his malign approach to women's rights is nothing new. While Ortega once supported abortion, he displayed his preference for political expediency by changing his position to ally himself with the Catholic Church during the run up to the 2006 presidential election. Most notorious, however, is Ortega's possible involvement in a sexual abuse scandal involving his stepdaughter. While his stepdaughter ultimately withdrew her case from consideration, she has not withdrawn her accusations. In addition to committing the above transgressions, Ortega has more recently trampled on women's rights by ignoring requests to rescind the absolute ban on abortion, aggressively harassing feminist activists, and largely turning a deaf ear to issues such as discrimination.

The fact that the country’s respect for women’s rights has begun to backslide is particularly disheartening considering the lamentable state of gender equality even before Ortega assumed the presidency in 2007. As the Countries at the Crossroads Report on Nicaragua noted, as of 2006 women were inadequately protected against sexual abuse and were not supported by any notable state commitment to reverse rampant discrimination. In cases of abuse, women were frequently referred to civil society organizations for further help after lodging complaints with the national police. Although constitutional safeguards exist, high levels of both discrimination and harassment against women in the workplace have persisted since this time. More recently, the State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report on Nicaragua stated that while laws criminalizing rape and domestic violence exist, the laws against domestic violence were selectively enforced. Both the country’s Special Prosecutor for Women and the national police reported that violence against women increased in 2008. As is the case in other Latin American countries, a strong “machista” culture is firmly ingrained in Nicaraguan society, which fuels and exacerbates the aforementioned problems.

One of the most alarming examples of the government’s deficient attitude towards women’s rights is its belligerent conduct towards women’s rights organizations. Since 2006, the government has aggressively attacked women’s rights advocates. As Human Rights Watch notes, women’s rights organizations protesting the ban on abortion have been investigated and intimidated by the government, which ramped up its campaign against these organizations in 2008. Last year, 9 women’s rights advocates were criminally investigated, while the offices of the organizations they represented were raided due to questionable allegations regarding funding sources. Reporters without Borders also claimed that Sofia Montenegro, the director of the Autonomous Women’s Movement, had been the victim of a government smear campaign. Despite the looming threat of government persecution, women’s organizations have remained dedicated to their quest to revoke the law. In late May of this year, 500 women protested the abortion law outside of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. 

 The excessive harassment of feminist activists and NGOs is part of a larger government campaign against freedom of association. Due to the fact that Nicaraguan women often rely on NGO support in cases of domestic abuse and rape, the government’s quest to suppress the activities of these organizations has especially regrettable consequences.

Ortega’s war against feminist organizations provides additional evidence that the Sandinista revolution’s dedication to social change is extremely subordinate to his desire to accrue and maintain power.  On a superficial level, the Sandinista government has in some ways upheld its commitment to the empowerment of women by launching healthcare, anti-poverty, and literacy programs. A recent article lauded the strides made by the Nicaraguan government to address the country’s pronounced gender inequality through its literacy campaign. Nicaraguan women, who make up somewhere between 15 and 52 percent of the country’s illiterate population, have garnered notable benefits from this program. However, as the article notes, seemingly positive government policies such as this one are being carried out against a backdrop of increased violence against Nicaraguan women and could even be considered a veil for the government’s abusive actions.

Due to the restrictive, oppressive climate being generated by the Ortega regime, any sustained progress on women’s rights seems highly unlikely at this time. Ortega has firmly locked Nicaragua in a downward spiral on governance matters. As Ortega continues to wage war against his adversaries, feminist activists and women’s rights organizations will number among his victims, and the comprehensive change Nicaragua needs will remain far from realization. 

Violence in Peru: The Government's Role

Last Friday a brutal clash occurred between Peruvian police attempting to open up a highway and the hundreds of Amazonian indigenous protesters that had been blocking the road for weeks. At least a dozen police and 9 protesters – though possibly many more – were killed during the protests; Saturday brought the discovery of another dozen dead police who had been held hostage by protesters. The protests, which have mobilized a number of different tribes throughout the vast Peruvian Amazon, are based on a series of decree laws issued by the government in the first half of 2008. The protesters perceive that these laws will violate their ancestral territorial rights by opening their lands to resource exploitation. In addition, they were not consulted – as is necessary under international agreements to which Peru is a party, including International Labor Organization Convention 169 – prior to the enactment of the decrees. Thus, their stance was that the laws must be rescinded entirely. The government refused to cede, arguing that the laws were necessary for Peru’s modernization and that the violence was entirely the fault of the protesters. President Alan Garcia has been particularly aggressive in declaring that the violence was the result of a conspiracy carried out by malign forces, both international and domestic, that who do not wish to see Peru advance.

No proof has been offered for what appear to be these absurd accusations. Moreover, while the government is absolutely correct that the killings of the police are unacceptable and must be investigated and perpetrators held accountable, the government’s own attitudes and actions have been determinant during the course of the conflict. President Garcia’s statements, which repeatedly state that the indigenous are being manipulated by outsiders, treat them like sheep and deny them all agency. The government also seems to lack any context – regardless of the content of these specific decrees, the government should be able to understand why a group of people who have been excluded from policy decisions regarding their ancestral lands for hundreds of years might have justifiable suspicions regarding their future. The protesters have undoubtedly made serious mistakes, but the government’s attitude has represented the worst facets of a state that is prone to Lima-centric political fiddling while the jungle (or mountains, or anywhere else outside the capital) burns. Below is the translation of a column from Tuesday’s La Republica in which the well-known, centrist Peruvian political scientist Martin Tanaka provides some of that context.

The State, Organizer of the Protest

Martin Tanaka, La Republica (Lima), 6/9/09

Social organization in the Amazon, like the country as whole, has been marked in recent years by localism and fragmentation. It could be argued that the broad protest movement throughout the Amazon is the consequence of government action: the adoption of the DL [decree laws] without indigenous consultation created the perception that the indigenous way of life was at risk, triggered the memory of historical grievances and feelings of regional exclusion and distance from the state, and laid the foundations for a conflict in which the general identity and dignity of the Amazon was at stake. It also created a common demand (the repeal of the DL) and a single adversary, the central government, which must be addressed. AIDESEP ended up circumstantially channeling these demands, as it was the organization best positioned to lead the demands of the widely heterogeneous groups.

The demand for the repeal of the decrees is also the creation of the state. Since the protests of September of last year and until very recently the government gave signals that it would repeal the decrees in question (like 1090, which was declared unconstitutional by the [congressional] Constitutional Commission on May 20). It was only in recent weeks that the government took the position of defending the constitutionality of the decrees, and proposed a comprehensive revision of these decrees in the PCM [council of ministers].

Too late: the government created the image of having been “rocking” the indigenous peoples. This led to the radicalization of the protests. The violence unleashed as a result of attempting to clear the Fernando Belaunde roadway is also the creation of the state; many leaders in the area are reserve soldiers, former patrolmen and members of self-defense groups, ex-soldiers from Cenepa [ed.: a reference to the brief 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru]. The existence of these capabilities for mobilization explains why the resistance to police action has been so fierce.

The government’s mishandling of the whole situation can help one to understand the ease with which extremist speeches are propagated, irresponsible leaders are exalted, false information is taken as true (such as the information that speaks of the killing of tens or even hundreds of indigenous people), all of which results in the brutal assassination of policemen. Those who sympathize (and we do sympathize) which the demands of the indigenous population should be the first to say clearly that no protest, no matter how just it may be, that confronts a democratic government, however misguided it may be, justifies the murder of unarmed policemen.

The worst thing is that even today the government’s answer continues to create conditions for more protests and violence. The persecution of indigenous leaders, the talk of manipulation, ignorance, misinformation, and the presence of foreign interests only increase the anger and annoyance of the Amazonians. The president of the republic himself has made frankly irresponsible declarations. A path of relaxation, prudence, and dialogue such as that being promoted by the Ombudsman must be opened.

Photo Credit: Flickr user powless

The Fading Shadow of Brazil's Dictatorship

On April 30, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal abolished the country’s 1967 Press Law after ruling that the law violated constitutional guarantees of free expression. This act, which came into effect during the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1961 and 1985, sought to repress criticism of the dictatorship by setting prison terms of up to 3 years for journalists convicted of defamation crimes. Such crimes were defined in very expansive terms and included “reporting deemed offensive to public morals; reporting that a plaintiff finds damaging to his reputation or offensive to his dignity; reporting that is considered subversive to public and political order; and reporting ‘true’ facts that are considered distorted or provocative.” The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that both during and after the dictatorship, the law was used by businessmen and politicians in thousands of cases to attack critical journalists. As such, the long overdue abolition is a momentous victory for freedom of the press in the country. In addition, it should be viewed as an important accomplishment in the country’s attempt to slowly chip away at the lingering legacies of dictatorship.

Brazil’s military dictatorship left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics and society. The brutal military regime not only passed repressive laws like the one above, but also committed extensive human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and large-scale arbitrary detention during its campaign to suppress a communist guerrilla movement. According to official government tallies, roughly 400 people were killed, 160 were disappeared, and hundreds of others were tortured during the dictatorship. Moreover, Brazil lags far behind its neighbors in its attempts to confront the shrouded events of its military past and unveil the details of the regime’s activities to Brazilian citizens. In 1979, the Brazilian government passed an amnesty law that protected military and public officials and political dissidents from prosecution for crimes committed during the dictatorship. As a result, no one has been prosecuted for human rights offenses committed during the period. In addition, Brazil has not convened a truth commission, nor has the country given a full account of the military regime’s activities, although it did publish a 500 page report on disappearances in 2007. 

The remaining legacies of the dictatorship have had important consequences for governance. Most obviously, laws such as the Press Law have continued to restrict Brazilian civil liberties in the 25 years since the country’s transition to democratic rule. However, the country’s failure to fully address the misdeeds of the dictatorship has had other damaging results. While the military has argued that Brazil’s pacted transition was a reasonable price to pay in order to bring about a peaceful transition to civilian rule, others have argued that allowing the military to maintain their power and escape punishment has hampered the country’s process of democratic consolidation. Most notably, rule of law has suffered. Indeed, one of Brazil’s most troubled governance issues is the ineptitude and corruption of the justice system, which has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.  Unfortunately, rather than using fair, unbiased human rights trials to build confidence in the justice system (as recently done in Peru, Argentina, and others), the government’s treatment of past crimes has reinforced the culture of
impunity. 

Thus, directly confronting the events of the military dictatorship is crucial to the attainment of a truly democratic future for the country. Fortunately, Brazil’s recent repeal of the Press Law has been accompanied by other steps towards confronting the past. Recently, federal prosecutors have requested that investigations against several individuals suspected of committing human rights violations be carried out. In October 2008, a Sao Paulo civil court found a military colonel civilly responsible for human rights violations committed while serving as director of an intelligence agency. In addition, last week, Brazil launched a website containing information about the events that occurred in the country between 1964 and 1985. The site includes official documents from the dictatorship that are part of the national archives. At its launch, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva acknowledged the link between national reconciliation and the country’s democratic well-being when he proclaimed “We are doing Brazilian democracy a service when we unveil some of the mysteries that persist about our past.” Finally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal is preparing to review the 1979 Amnesty Law in the face of several pending cases that challenge the law’s legitimacy. Among these cases, the court will consider the Brazilian Bar Association’s assertion that the current interpretation of the law erroneously provides for the protection of state agents from prosecution in all cases when in reality, it should not shield them from prosecution for crimes such as torture.

Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts may be ramped up in the future. On April 8, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that amnesties and statutes of limitations should not be applied to crimes against humanity that were committed during Brazil’s dictatorship. This is the first international decision to be made regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil during this era. While the decision is not binding, concerns over international legitimacy and approval may compel Brazil to become more open to a reinterpretation of the amnesty law.

Brazil should be lauded for breaking out of its decades-long resignation to allowing several of the debilitating legacies of the dictatorship to persist.  Nevertheless, the country still has a long road ahead. It has yet to fully open military and police archives to the public, and the active prosecution of human rights offenders is a long way off even if the court rules against the current interpretation of the amnesty law. Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation of this law is a very polemical issue. The Brazilian military, which staunchly opposes all efforts to reinterpret the amnesty law, is an extremely powerful and influential institution. Furthermore, while Lula has taken measures to disclose more information about the military dictatorship to the public, his solicitor general’s office has officially opposed challenges to the law. In recent years Brazil has sought to pose as both a leader and model for developing countries. Confronting the past while strengthening democracy and justice can only improve the country’s standing and add further momentum to a South American success story.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Samory Santos

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Bolivarian Commitment to Indigenous Rights

On April 14th, the Bolivian Congress passed an electoral law that guarantees the holding of both general elections and departmental and regional referendums on autonomy this December. The law was only approved after prolonged debate and deadlock between the governing Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party and the opposition. In this case, indigenous issues were a major point of contention. While the MAS proposed that 14 seats in the lower house of the Legislature be reserved for representatives from indigenous districts, the opposition insisted that this would lead to the overrepresentation of indigenous areas. The MAS eventually compromised by decreasing its requested number of indigenous seats to 11 and then to 8, but the opposition remained intransigent. In the end, 7 seats were allotted to indigenous representatives. In response, two of Bolivia’s most powerful indigenous organizations, the Lowland Indigenous Confederation (CIDOB) and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Kollasuyu (CONAMAQ), expressed their outrage at the MAS’ perceived betrayal.

This rift between the MAS and Bolivia’s indigenous movements is superficially surprising, considering President Evo Morales’ traditionally unwavering commitment to indigenous rights. Morales, himself an Aymara Indian, has largely centered his administration around the mission of reversing the centuries of exploitation suffered by the indigenous majority. For several of the region’s other “Bolivarian” presidents, this theme has also constituted an important focus. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has pledged to eradicate the remnants of imperialism, rectify the deplorable situation of the country’s relatively small indigenous population, and incorporate the communitarian tradition of indigenous peoples into his socialist agenda. In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa has made similar promises.

Nevertheless, the rhetoric of these leaders has not always matched the reality of the situation. In several instances, indigenous groups in all three countries have been disappointed as promises and formal protections have yielded tenuous results.

In Bolivia, there is no arguing the fact that the rights of the indigenous peoples, who make up as much as 55% of the country’s population, have been vastly expanded with Morales at the helm of government. In January of this year, Bolivians approved a new constitution that, in addition to officially recognizing and protecting the cultural and social rights of Bolivia’s 36 indigenous communities, provides for the actual participation of Bolivia’s indigenous people in the country’s political life. Morales considered this constitution to be a “re-founding” of Bolivia which restored the indigenous majority to their rightful place at the heart of the country’s political and social fabric. 

As a result of these advances, Bolivia’s indigenous people are undoubtedly more included than ever before. However, the government’s commitment to indigenous rights may not be absolute. The Morales administration’s minor regression in this area is best illustrated by the aforementioned electoral law. Before the negotiations on the law had even begun, the MAS had already alienated the country’s indigenous movements by requesting 14 seats rather than the 18 seats proposed by CIDOB and CONAMAQ. These organizations claimed that the MAS ignored the new constitutional provisions that provide for the active participation of indigenous people in the country’s legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. They also highlighted the lack of indigenous representation in the presidential cabinet. Roman Loayza, one of the founders of the MAS, who has announced a run against Morales in the upcoming presidential election, broke with the party over this issue, arguing that the upper echelons of the government are dominated by converted neoliberals and leftists rather than those who are truly representative of Bolivia’s plurinational state. After the electoral law passed, indigenous groups declared their intent to reconsider their backing of the MAS government. In response to the indignation expressed by these groups, the government made some initial overtures. Early last week, the MAS announced its desire to set up a meeting with the leaders of the CIDOB to explain the reasoning behind its final decision to agree on 7 indigenous seats. Regardless of the outcome of this meeting, however, the mutual trust between the two groups has been at least temporarily shaken.

In Venezuela, the situation of indigenous rights is also rather precarious. Due to the fact that Venezuela’s indigenous peoples only constitute around 1.4% of the country’s population, the government’s emphasis on indigenous issues is not as intense as in Bolivia. However, Chavez has repeatedly expressed his commitment to address the long-standing discrimination against indigenous peoples and even renamed Columbus Day the “Day of Indigenous Resistance.” This commitment was institutionalized in the constitution of 1999, a document that not only includes a formal recognition of the language and cultural rights of the indigenous population, but also declares the state’s responsibility to institute social programs for the benefit of the indigenous and to demarcate indigenous lands. Furthermore, it guarantees indigenous groups representation in the National Assembly.

The efforts made by Venezuela to address the plight of the indigenous through constitutional reform are notable. However, the rights enjoyed by Venezuela’s indigenous population have not been universally upheld. Indigenous peoples have frequently protested the government’s slow-paced land demarcation process.  Exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories is an example of especially flagrant abuse, and indigenous groups including the Wayuu, Yukpa, and Bari have repeatedly fought against coal, gold, and diamond mining in their territories. In many of these cases, Chavez has responded with promises and actions geared at directly addressing their grievances. However, as with most elements in Chavez’s Venezuela, implementation has lagged rhetoric. For example, the government halted plans for new coal mining in the state of Zulia after indigenous groups voiced disapproval through a series of protests. Nevertheless, Chavez later announced that the state-owned corporation Corpozulia would acquire the majority of coal mining projects in the state, which led indigenous groups to speculate that coal mining – along with its attendant abuses – would simply continue under new management.

Finally, in Ecuador, indigenous rights have also been controversial. During his first campaign for the presidency in 2006, Rafael Correa pledged to respond to the injustices faced by the 20% of the population comprised of indigenous groups. Moreover, the constitution approved in September 2008 recognizes the rights of indigenous people to their own cultural traditions and territories, while protecting them against racism. It also grants them a certain level of autonomy over their territorial administrative districts. 

Nevertheless, the constitution has not proved satisfactory to some indigenous groups, and Correa’s approach to indigenous rights has been questionable. During the drafting of the constitution, for example, Correa expressed his disapproval of the concept of plurinationality. In addition, the issue of indigenous territories and resources has been particularly polemical. A new mining law passed in January of this year was met with widespread condemnation among indigenous peoples, who fear the negative consequences that metal mining will have on their territories and natural wealth. After the law was passed, the powerful Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) presented a lawsuit against President Correa to the Constitutional Court. The CONAIE argues that the law, which attempts to regulate large-scale extractive mining, violates indigenous rights to water, nature, and to prior consultation in matters involving indigenous lands.

As the above cases show, the Bolivarian emphasis on indigenous rights sometimes exists more in theory than in practice. It is important to emphasize that the mere visibility and inclusion of indigenous issues represents a colossal transformation in countries where indigenous peoples have been banished from the political and social sphere for centuries. Nevertheless, in several instances, the Bolivarian presidents have also demonstrated their willingness to relegate their commitments to indigenous rights to the back-burner in favor of political expediency. To a large degree, this is merely inevitable compromise. However, given indigenous groups’ historically grounded suspicion that they will eventually be marginalized, successful policy requires a comprehensive, dedicated approach to the issue rather than the current coupling of piecemeal advancements with contradictory regressions.

Photo Credit: Flickr user fguzmanj2001

1000 Days of Alan Garcia: the Peruvian Take

Wednesday marked the 1000th day of the presidency of Peru's Alan Garcia, and there are various potential perspectives on his presidency. First, it is critical to recall that the first Garcia administration, from 1985 to 1990, is widely regarded as the worst in Peruvian history, an era when the country came perilously close to failed state status. This carried two implications entering the current term. First, it was obvious that Garcia would seek, above all, to maintain macroeconomic stability in order to inoculate himself against the fear that this term would turn out like the previous one. Second, many hoped that he would energetically devote himself to a wide range of reforms in order to assure that the legacy of his second term would serve as his primary political epitaph.

At this point, the latter set of hopes have been largely extinguished. Especially from abroad, Peru's fundamentals looked strong before the crisis hit. GDP growth was enormous, poverty rates fell, and inflation remained contained. Yet the hope that such a favorable economic environment would lead to broader reforms in critical areas, such as the justice system, anticorruption, environmental conflict, and the country's appalling social breaches, have been largely dashed. For a mix of reasons, the Garcia government has stagnated in all these areas and more, with only incremental achievements in most areas where reform is urgently necessary.

But don't take this blog's word for it. Below the fold is a translation of a report giving a critique of the first 1000 days from the perspective of Peru.21, one the country's more centrist newspapers. While not shy about criticizing the administration, it is the type of media outlet that could have been won over had Garcia decided to govern as he said he would during his campaign (i.e., as a center-leftist) rather as he actually as (largely from the right).

Spotlight on Central American Government-Media Relations

Picture taken from Freedom of the Press 2008 map. Yellow indicates "Partly Free," with green indicating "Free."

A recent article in the New York Times Magazine highlighted the mounting conflict between the government of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and the country’s media outlets. The article traces the evolution of Carlos Fernando Chamorro, a prominent independent journalist who comes from one of Nicaragua’s most influential families. Chamorro currently runs a weekly newspaper and an investigative magazine program, both of which have caused quite a stir in the country due to their coverage of such polemical issues as corruption, cronyism, and election fraud. As a result, Chamorro has been a major target in the government’s campaign to curb critical reporting.

This clash between the government and the media represents yet another twist in media-government relations in Nicaragua. Before the country’s precarious democratic transition in 1990, both the right-wing and left-wing authoritarian regimes were able to convert the media sector into their own personal propaganda machines. In fact, Chamorro himself was directly involved in the highly politicized media system of Nicaragua’s past. During the 1980s, he ran Barricada, “the official organ of the Sandinista Front.” This newspaper existed solely to serve the Sandinista cause. Interestingly enough, his mother and other family members ran La Prensa, the main opposition newspaper at this time. La Prensa, however, was repeatedly shut down, censored, and silenced by the Sandinistas – just as it had been by the preceding Somoza dictatorship.

Despite the current government’s efforts to curb press freedom, critical journalism is still thriving in Nicaragua, with Chamorro and his family members at the helm. In contrast to past times, the Nicaraguan government now finds itself engaged in a struggle with a redoubtable media sector rather than an easily malleable force. This has made the government’s efforts to buy off or restrict the media increasingly difficult.

Similar situations obtain in several other Central American countries. Indeed, the one-time cozy relationship between the government and media sectors has largely collapsed throughout the region. In Honduras, the battle between the government and a powerful media sector has become especially intense. Recently, President Manuel Zelaya has faced a growing onslaught of criticism from the media, which is largely dominated by his opponents. This is unfamiliar territory for the country, as Honduras’ political and media elite have traditionally been one and the same. The media, while quite powerful, has normally promoted the interests of the president. Today, media ownership in Honduras is still concentrated in the hands of three moguls who have been at the forefront of the country’s politics for years:  Jorge Canahuati, Jaime Rosenthal, and former President Carlos Flores. However, media outlets no longer serve the president. Instead, they almost exclusively criticize him. While the media elite belong to the same Liberal party as President Zelaya, their opposition to the president has been on the rise due to the perceived threat his policies pose to the livelihood of the business sector. Zelaya has become increasingly frustrated and flustered by this situation. He has frequently pointed his finger at these media elite, calling them "powerful economic groups motivated by self-interest to exploit political and social problems to provide grist for their mills." As the 2008 Freedom of the Press report on Honduras notes, tensions reached a pinnacle when Zelaya required that radio and television stations include a series of 10 interviews with public officials in order to counteract what he perceived to be a strong bias against him.

While not as extreme, the situation in Guatemala has some parallels to the Honduran case. The Guatemalan media is also in the ownership of those in opposition to the president. As the 2008 Freedom of the Press report on Guatemala indicates, the sector is dominated by a small group of businessmen with conservative leanings. Prensa Libre dominates the newspaper market, while Mexican entrepreneur Angel Gonzalez controls all of the country’s television stations. As such, center-left President Alvaro Colom by no means faces acquiescent and affable media forces. At the same time, government repression is not nearly as prominent a threat to media freedom as is the violence and disorder characterizing Guatemalan society. Many journalists have been attacked and threatened in recent years, including one who was killed by an arrow fired by a crossbow. As in Mexico, criminals associated with the drug trade are largely blamed for this phenomenon, and widespread self-censorship has been the predictable result.

Finally, it seems plausible that the situation in El Salvador will soon come to resemble that of its neighbors. If the bitter media war that dominated the 2009 election is any indication of the future trajectory of Salvadoran politics, then a major clash between President-elect Mauricio Funes and the media is likely imminent. As is the case in Honduras, the ruling elite and the media powers have traditionally reinforced each other in El Salvador. El Salvador’s biggest media powers are for the most part owned by staunchly conservative businessmen who are predominantly concerned with the country’s financial interests. The strong alliance that was forged between the conservative ARENA party, the business sector, and the media during the years of the right-wing dictatorship has yet to be shaken. During the run-up to this March’s presidential election, the power of this relationship was evidenced by the anti-Funes bias present in most of the country’s newspapers and television programs.  As such, it is reasonable to conclude that Funes will be forced to reckon with a media sector that is just as powerful as it is hostile. Of course, Funes was himself a prominent journalist, and thus may have an advantage in handling media relations. His trick will be to ensure that he personally remains the face of the government in the press, rather than more radical elements of the FMLN party he leads.

The consequences that this turn of events will have for governance issues are varied. On the one hand, the strength of the opposition media has served as a bulwark against authoritarianism. This is especially the case in Nicaragua and Honduras. In both countries, pseudo-leftist presidents have recently ramped up their efforts to directly wield control over the press and stifle criticism emanating from the opposition. Both Presidents Ortega and Zelaya have allegedly attempted to mold the media into a more government-friendly sector by denying government-paid programming and advertising to newspapers and television programs that cast them in an unfavorable light. Powerful media outlets in both countries, however, have thus far been able to weather the storm. As such, freedom of the press has been upheld to a certain degree. Regional democratic norms also help: every government in the region wants to maintain at least superficial democratic credentials, so the type of blatant repression seen in other parts of the world is unlikely (though far from impossible, and the Chamorro case comes close).

Nevertheless, the inherent nature of the media structure in almost of these countries is hardly conducive to good governance. As explained above, the strongly politicized media sectors in these countries are controlled by oligarchies made up of businessmen who do not always espouse the interests and opinions of the majority of the population. With the exception of perhaps Nicaragua, there is for the most part a paucity of independent journalism in the region. Oftentimes, the viewpoints of the other side – which at present happens in some cases to be the ruling party – are hardly represented. As was the case in El Salvador’s presidential election, the result of this media bias could be an exaggerated targeting that is in some ways akin to the campaigns waged by the dictators of a previous generation. In this scenario of thin, politicized media, the conflict between the government and the compromised press sectors can hardly be considered a healthy manifestation of freedom of the press.

Will the Rule of Law Apply to All Bolivians?

On March 7, a mob of Bolivians occupied the home of Victor Hugo Cardenas, an indigenous politician who served as vice president under former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. The group, which justified the action as an expropriation based on a provision of the new constitution requiring that land holdings serve a social function, also acted roughly with Cardenas’ wife and children. The mob explicitly stated that they specifically targeted Cardenas due to his opposition to the new constitution. The responses of government officials to this seizure have been contradictory and unclear thus far. High-level officials including Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and Deputy Interior Minister Marcos Farfan, however, have implied or stated outright their support for the action. Unfortunately, the incident is but one in a series of occurrences that have observers – even those sympathetic to the Morales administration – scratching their heads regarding the government’s relationship with the rule of law.

In the Cardenas case, indigenous Bolivians determined that the provision on land holdings gave them the green light to apply indigenous communal justice. While it is certainly important to protect the rights of the traditionally exploited indigenous majority, it is very much in the Bolivian government’s own interest that a line be drawn between community justice and mob rule. As a previous post explains, numerous lynchings have been carried out in the name of communal justice. This is in large a product of the lack of an effective state-run judicial system in the countryside, and is by no means unique to Bolivia. While the government has consistently ruled that lynchings cannot be considered a permissible form of communal justice, the will to investigate and punish perpetrators has been lacking, thereby providing ammunition to opposition members who argue that under MAS rule the less progressive elements of community justice will be extended throughout the country.

Another complaint concerns the lack of respect for basic judicial procedures and protections. Since last fall, the situation has been especially troubling. The most egregious violation of habeas corpus transpired during and after the infamous Pando Massacre of September 11, when the government was justifiably preoccupied with apprehending both material and intellectual perpetrators. In the days after the incident, police forces arrested 14 participants in the conflict without showing a court order and used violence both during the initial arrest and the resulting confinement.  In February, months after the massacre, several additional Pando residents were questionably detained. In an ironic twist, the tactics bear an uncanny resemblance to administration those used in the past by anti-drug units against coca growers –many of whom now staff the administration.

Bolivia’s respect for the principle of equality before the law has also been suspect. Since Morales’ election, opposition members have been targeted on a consistent basis. This has frequently played itself out at the upper echelons of Bolivia’s government. Investigations have been initiated into the conduct of several of Bolivia’s former presidents.  Some of the accusations made by Morales and the MAS are plausible (the case against former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada is probably the best example). In several cases, however, allegations have seemed shaky at best and politically motivated at worst. The investigation into former President Eduardo Rodriguez’s involvement in the destruction of Bolivian anti-aircraft missiles in 2006 is illustrative.  While the details of the mysterious transfer of 28 missiles to the United States for destruction are still hazy, Morales immediately called for the indictment of Rodriguez, a well-regarded former head of the judiciary with center-right leanings, on charges of treason.

In addition to former presidents, members of the high courts have been frequently beleaguered when they have protected the rights of opposition members instead of bowing to the wishes of the MAS.  For example, when the Supreme Court ruled that the arrest of Governor Leopoldo Fernandez and others in connection with the Pando massacre was illegal, the government responded by initiating an investigation of two of the Court’s Justices for aiding a fugitive. More recently, the MAS has moved to investigate Justice Eddy Fernandez, the current head of the judiciary, for delaying judicial proceedings in the cases against opposition members including former Minister of Health Tonchy Marinkovic and former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.

In response, the opposition has accused the MAS of undermining the justice system. They certainly have a strong case: as there is currently no quorum in the Constitutional Tribunal, the country’s highest legal authority, the court has been inactive during a period in which numerous pressing constitutional questions have arisen. The Supreme Court also is just one vacancy away from being inquorate; in the case of neither court has the government shown any interest in appointing replacements. The unstated goal is likely to be delay until justices can be elected, as provided for in the new constitution. However, the willingness to allow such prolonged institutional paralysis seems to symbolize the Morales administration’s highly ambivalent attitude toward separation of powers and the rule of law.

The chaos currently shaking the foundations of Bolivia’s rule of law is largely rooted in the inability or unwillingness of President Evo Morales and the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party to work within the confines of the country’s political system. In the early 2000s, the MAS was created to challenge a preexisting institutional framework which perpetuated the exclusion of the indigenous majority. Resistance and opposition are at the very core of the party. Thus the generous interpretation of the crisis is that Morales, the embodiment of this social movement, has yet to break free from his confrontational cocalero mentality in favor of a more accommodating approach. The less generous take – offered daily by the opposition – is that the MAS is simply an authoritarian movement. Either way, the result is the persistence of sharp divisions between MAS supporters and Bolivians residing in the opposition stronghold known as the Media Luna.

Thus far, Morales has proved reluctant to adapt himself and his party to the formal workings of government under both constitutions old and new. He has been loath to negotiate with or appease the opposition in any way. At the government level, conflict and debate within the congress have been quite heated. In some cases, Morales has even threatened to bypass Congress in order to implement his agenda. For example, before the new constitution was approved, Morales declared his intention to implement the document’s new provisions through the use of decrees if the Congress should prove uncooperative. At other times, the MAS has utilized the cerco to exert pressure on the Congress.  More specifically, the bases of the MAS have surrounded the Congress in order to impel members to vote in favor of such measures as the Constitutional referendum proposal. In the most extreme cases, the MAS rank and file blocked opposition members from entering the building. To be fair, however, the opposition has often been just as disobliging and hostile throughout these deliberations. Nonetheless, the use of coercive tactics, aside from its essential ethical and legal shortcomings, can easily become an irresistable temptation that creates a downward spiral.

The administration seems to have adopted a “we must destroy the institutions in order to save them” stance. The rule of law in Bolivia cannot begin to be protected and enhanced unless President Morales and the MAS send clearer signals that they embrace the concept. An unwillingness to demonstrate magnanimity even at notably strong moments, may even be counterproductive, insofar as it contributes to further polarization and gives the opposition the opportunity to adopt a mantle of democratic righteousness. Despite the violence, judicial inefficiency, and general disorder that has gripped the nation in recent times, Bolivia’s problems are not unresolvable. The compromise on the draft constitution, despite its less than ideal conditions (see above), proved that common ground is possible. For any country with aspirations of progress, however, some things are nonnegotiable. Until Bolivia decides that the rule of law is a priority, the prospects of sustained success will remain cloudy at best.

Photo credit: Flickr user germeister

Colombia's Uribe and the Shadow of Reelection

In late January, El Colombiano, Medellin’s daily newspaper, purported to have received confirmation from a government minister that President Alvaro Uribe would not seek reelection in 2010. While this would be a welcome development in a country increasingly uneasy about the uncertainty and confusion surrounding Uribe’s possible reelection bid, the chances that the president and his supporters would abandon their efforts at this stage seems unlikely.

The contentious issue of Uribe’s reelection has been the omnipresent backdrop to the country’s political scene for the past year. Throughout this time, Uribe has evaded making any formal announcement regarding his intentions. In Colombia, reelection has been fodder for intense debate with respect to both the constitutionality and legality of such an endeavor, as well as the practical consequences that reelection would effect on the functioning of the country’s political apparatus.

As it stands today, the constitution prohibits Uribe from seeking a third term. While constitutional barriers did not stop Uribe from successfully seeking reelection in 2006, he now has to reckon with the Constitutional Court ruling from his previous bid, which states that, in order to assure that the balance of powers created by the Constitution is preserved, a president may only seek reelection once.

Uribe’s reelection first became a definite possibility in early 2008, when his supporters organized a committee to promote a referendum on a prospective 2010 reelection and collected 5 million signatures from the Colombian populace. A referendum proposal on a constitutional amendment permitting Uribe to run in 2010 was submitted to the Colombian Congress later in the year. This proposal, however, was defeated by the House after a debate on the specific language used in the referendum proposal to discuss the issue of reelection. Instead, in December, the House approved a referendum on an amendment permitting reelection in 2014. At this time, the measure was sent to the Senate, where deliberations are still in progress. As part of the Senate debate, Uribe’s supporters will put forward an amendment to the proposal which would clarify that the reelection bid applies to 2010.  If the referendum is passed by the Senate, it will then require the approval of both the Electoral Council and Constitutional Court before it can be scheduled.

This entire process has felt rather disingenuous. Uribe claims that his only interest is in the maintenance of his “democratic security” policy, but most Colombian observers have long been convinced that he longs for another term. Throughout the last few months, intrigue and irregularities have tarnished the inner workings of Colombia’s democracy. They have also led to unwelcome comparisons with Uribe’s nemesis, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who recently achieved success in his own bid to end reelection limits altogether.

Aside from the general distraction caused by the time spent reading smoke signals, a certain amount of government bullying may have been responsible for the House’s decision on the referendum. According to leading newsweekly Semana, the measure “was approved by the House of Representatives after a mini coup d’état by the government in the congress at the stroke of midnight- and via some irregular extra sessions.” According to Senator Juan Fernando Cristo, by decreeing that extra sessions take place while Congress was in session rather than in recess, Uribe was essentially sending the message that “nobody is leaving until you vote on this.” It was also reported that all six government ministers presided over the vote, while advisors guarded the doors to ensure that no votes were lost. 

What’s more, limit-pushing of a similar sort may taint Colombian politics in the future. The Electoral Council and the Constitutional Court may well object to the referendum due to both the procedural irregularities and strict rules which prohibit constitutional revisions that do not respond to a previous error in interpretation. A scandal regarding referendum financing is also at issue. Specifically, the foundation responsible for funding the referendum has refused to disclose information on its contributors. Semana predicts that the government will attempt to fill the Constitutional Court’s vacant seats with supporters of Uribe in order to ensure that the measure passes despite these irregularities, while a highly optimistic (from the Uribista perspective) article in leading daily El Tiempo suggests that the government feels confident that the Court will not strike down a referendum that has both the necessary signatures and the approval of congress.

The reelection issue, and the murkiness that has surrounded it, has already had a decidedly negative impact in terms of governance. As noted above, the level of transparency surrounding the matter has been insufficient. In addition, the fate of many other potential candidates hangs in the balance. As Semana notes, qualified and viable candidates for the presidency have been unable or unwilling to begin campaigning while Uribe’s candidacy remains questionable. Ironically, potential Uribista candidates are the ones most directly affected by this uncertainty. According to Colombia Reports, those few Uribistas who have decided to vote against Uribe’s reelection and organize their own campaigns have been targeted by the government. 

Should the attempt to reelect Uribe prove successful, the consequences will be even more unfavorable. The country’s healthy rotation of power is at stake. A 2010 Uribe reelection would mean 12 years of uninterrupted presidential rule in a country in which the executive is invested with expansive powers in comparison with the other branches of government. The upshot of such a development could be that, if Uribe is reelected, the precarious balance of power in the country will be debilitated. More specifically, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 includes provisions which protect public institutions from overbearing presidential control by ensuring that important public appointments do not coincide with presidential terms. By the end of a third term, however, Uribe will have appointed all or a substantial portion of the members of some of the country’s key institutions, including the Constitutional Court, the State Council, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and the National Bank, all of which stand to be increasingly dominated by Uribe and his followers. This has led both Colombians and outsiders to warn against a turn towards caudillismo in the country.

However, Uribe confronts significant obstacles in several regards. There is some (though decreasing) probability that the referendum proposal will be defeated by one of the institutional bodies. The language regarding 2010 vs. 2014 will need to be reconciled. For reasons stated above, the Electoral Council or the Constitutional Court may find fault with the proposal for a referendum on 2010, if not on 2014. In addition, even if the proposal for a referendum is passed, it is by no means certain that the Colombian people will vote in favor of a constitutional amendment. While Uribe has enjoyed incredibly high popularity, the level of support for his reelection has recently declined to around 50%.

Nevertheless, even if the proposal for a referendum is defeated, reelection could be made possible through a direct constitutional reform. In this scenario, Uribe supporters would look to the Congress to endorse his reelection bid. Reelection by this route, however, is still difficult to attain due to the fact that the constitutional reform would need to be passed twice by both houses of Congress. Given that it is already well into 2009, the clock is ticking. In the meantime, those concerned with Colombia’s potential turn for the worse can only adopt a “wait and see” approach. Colombia’s institutions have long been admired within the region, and their durability is particularly notable considering the country’s tumultuous history and the distinct institutional deficit in most neighboring countries. Whatever happens with the reelection issue, the president and his followers would be well-served by keeping in mind that those institutions are far more important than any one man.

Photo Credit: Flickr user A Look Askance

Mexico's Calderon, in His Own Words

A new feature on the Crossroads blog will feature translations of governance-related articles from their original foreign language sources. The following translation provides excerpts of a long interview with Mexican president Felipe Calderon published last week by Mexico City’s El Universal newspaper. The interview was conducted by Jorge Zepeda Patterson, El Universal’s editorial director and formerly a very incisive weekly columnist for the paper.

From a governance perspective, several things stand out in the interview. First of all, Zepeda’s questions are very well-targeted and hit on real points of weakness within the Mexican government, including human rights issues, corruption, institutional stagnation, and the question of how political will can be translated into concrete achievements.

Calderon’s answers are of variable quality. He deserves credit for his forthrightness about the scale of the crime problem as well as his dual acknowledgments that institutional reconstruction is necessary and that previous administrations – including that of his National Action Party colleague, Vicente Fox – were overly lax in their attitude toward drug traffickers. However, some of his other answers are suboptimal from a human rights and governance perspective. For instance, while even the most idealistic activist understands that isolated incidents of abuse are inevitable in a conflict on the scale of Mexico’s war against the cartels, Calderon is overly mild in discussing the issue, and in fact comes close to adopting a “to make an omelet, you have to break a few eggs” attitude. This is unfortunate: Mexico continues to suffer from severe deficits in human rights, and in 2008 the military received hundreds of complaints from civilians about its actions. Signals matter, and it would have been far more encouraging for the president to firmly state that human rights abuses are unacceptable and will be investigated.

Indeed, this gets at the most significant missing concept in the interview: impunity. One of the key drivers of Mexico’s rule of law problems is the fact that criminals are hardly ever punished for their crimes. Likewise with corruption, which is why Zepeda does well to bring up the embarrassing fact that no major political figure has been convicted of corruption since 1999, a reality that no Mexican would attribute to a newfound zeal for probity among public officials. Calderon’s statement that new institutions are needed is welcome, but it would have been even better had he explicitly noted the obvious thread running between crime, human rights abuses, and corruption: impunity.

The excerpts are long, so the rest can be found below the fold.

Corruption: A Heavy Cross for Paraguay's Lugo to Bear

On January 12th, Martin Ocampos Paez, the director of Paraguay's Hugua Nandu FM community radio station, was assassinated at his home in the city of Concepcion. The crime raised a red flag for activists concerned with Paraguay's ongoing battle with large-scale corruption, not to mention those monitoring press freedom. More specifically, members of Paraguay's journalists union have speculated that Paez's death was linked to comments he had made regarding ties between high-level Paraguayan politicians and illegal drug trafficking.

This tragic event takes place at a time when the Paraguay is supposedly engaged in a fierce battle against the endemic corruption that has eternally characterized its political scene. Last April 13, Fernando Lugo, a left-leaning former Catholic bishop, successfully challenged the long-dominant Colorado Party and won the country's presidential election. Throughout his campaign he made promises to combat the corruption and social inequality which had become embedded in Paraguayan politics and society during 61 years of uninterrupted Colorado Party rule. Indeed, in his inaugural address (Spanish link), Lugo proclaimed that “today, the exclusive, secretive Paraguay notorious for its corruption ends. Today, the history of a Paraguay whose authorities and citizens will be unconditional begins.”

For the majority of Paraguayans, Lugo’s victory represented the end of a dark (or at least gray) period in their country’s political history. Six months into his presidency, however, it is important to analyze the strides (or lack thereof) that Lugo has made towards the fulfillment of these difficult promises. The task that Lugo took upon his shoulders is colossal. In Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Paraguay received a score of 2.4 out of 10 and a rank of 138 out of 180 countries. In the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, Paraguay was awarded a score of just 3.33 out of 7 in the “Anticorruption and Transparency” category; in the “Rule of Law” category, the country’s score was no better at 3.32. One of the biggest problems emphasized in the report is the incompetent, non-independent nature of the country’s judicial system. Given the politicization of the Supreme Court and most prosecutors' offices, investigations into the corrupt dealings of public officials are rare. In an encouraging interview with Transparency International, Lugo made an attempt to more specifically characterize Paraguay’s corruption problem. He identified the misappropriation of public funds, especially for personal enrichment, and the socially ingrained institution of the bribe as the most prevalent manifestations of the issue, along with old-fashioned clientelism and patronage.

Unsurprisingly, given the short time period, not much in the way of measurable progress has been made toward eliminating this systemic corruption. This is not to say that Lugo has completely ignored the issue. Thus far, he has attempted to combat corruption in both the National Administration of Navigation and Ports and the bodies responsible for operating the hydroelectric stations at Itaipu. In addition, the efforts of finance minister Dionisio Borda, who has been a key figure in the fight against corruption since even before Lugo's election, are laudable. Since August, Borda has initiated an overhaul of Paraguay's finance and customs ministries. Nevertheless, for the most part, Lugo’s initial promises have been only been followed up by more promises. Since his election, Lugo has vowed to create a National Anti-corruption Ministry and has also expressed his desire to institute controls within each government department. He has also vowed to address the lack of judicial independence in the country through constitutional reform. These things, however, require the sorts of political negotiations that a relative neophyte like Lugo may take time to learn, especially given his coalition's lack of a congressional majority.

Unfortunately, however, the grace period Paraguayans have thus far allowed Lugo to make good on his promises seems to be nearing its end. Recently, an ever-growing number of Paraguayans have expressed their displeasure at Lugo’s inaction. For example, activist Martin Almada alleged that the same government officials who have been in power since the dictatorship continue to rule the country. Furthermore, in a recent poll (Spanish link) by Paraguay’s Institute for Communication and Art, just 37% of Paraguayan respondents declared their belief that Lugo would be unable to decrease corruption. In another poll, 33.4% of the respondents revealed their conviction that Lugo has not fulfilled his campaign promises, while 30% expressed their opinion that Lugo has not named suitable candidates to important government posts. In the meantime, the arrival of the global economic crisis means that the president may find himself spending time originally intended for institutional reform instead devoted to putting out fires on the economic front.

The prospects for an effective resolution of this problem seem uncertain at best. Despite the rumblings of popular discontent, time is still on Lugo’s side. Nevertheless, in many ways, Lugo’s hands are tied. While he may have won the presidency, the Colorado Party, the veritable embodiment of the country’s corruption problem, retains control of both Congress and the judiciary. Considering that a systemic overhaul reaching into all corners of Paraguayan government will be necessary in order to truly bring about an end to country’s culture of corruption, the strength of the opposition poses a serious problem. As it stands today, even if Lugo remains dedicated to his current crusade against corruption, he may potentially be destined to win a few battles while losing the war.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Fernando Lugo APC

THE LEADER FOR LIFE, CONTINUED

In March of this year, we posted on the subject of presidential succession (The Leader for Life), noting the absence of a meaningful rotation of power in a number of strategically important countries and its negative impact on democratic governance.  Among other things, these countries exhibit exceedingly high levels of corruption. A chart detailing time in office for leaders in 20 states indicated that none of these politically managed systems could perform better than 105 (out of 179 countries examined) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Egypt came in at 105; the next best were Yemen and Iran at 131.

Since that time, several critical countries have made news by virtue of their leaderships’ determined effort to extend their term in office.

In Zimbabwe, discredited President Robert Mugabe said on December 19 that he would “never surrender”.  To emphasize the point, Mugabe added that “Zimbabwe is mine”.  Meanwhile, his beleaguered and impoverished country is suffering from a growing list of severe problems, including an outbreak of cholera that has killed hundreds of people. A BBC video clip explains in horrifying detail the devastating price cholera is exacting on ordinary Zimbabweans.

In Russia, CNN reported that the country’s upper house of parliament on December 22 approved an extension of the presidential term from four years to six, a step that could presage former President Vladimir Putin’s return to the nation's top office. Putin now serves as prime minister but is viewed by many as the country’s paramount leader.  The speedy move to amend the constitution comes at a time when low energy prices are putting increasing pressure on the Russian leadership’s ability to maintain the social and economic model that has been forged under Putin.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is also working diligently to remove institutional checks on his power.  On December 22, Chavez suggested that a referendum could be held on February 15, 2009 that would among other measures lift term limits. A December 2007 referendum that included a host of measures that would have removed checks on presidential power was narrowly defeated. Like Russia’s leadership, Chavez confronts a rapidly shifting and less predictable political landscape, as the energy resources that have been integral to his power dwindle.

A December 19 Washington Post editorial observes that while democracy advocates might welcome a vote of this sort in Venezuela, it carries real risks because:

"elections in Venezuela are no longer free and fair. Mr. Chavez has turned national television into a state propaganda outlet, and the Miami Herald reported [on December 14] that the government spent tens of millions of dollars to buy votes in the recent state and local elections. The state election authority, which is controlled by Mr. Chavez's loyalists, delayed the announcement of his defeat in last year's referendum; reliable sources say the president conceded only after he was told by military commanders that they would not put down protests against a falsified result. The official results, showing the margin of Mr. Chavez's loss, have not been released".

Unlike the Russian petrostate, where opposition has tended to be muted, in Venezuela opposing voices still make themselves heard.

Peru's Search for Truth and Justice Faces Another Test

Among the principal actors in Peru’s long fight against subversive groups between 1980 and 2000 were the security forces, both police and military. While much of their effort was laudable, it is undeniable that the conflict, which killed over 69,000 people, included grave human rights violations, including massacres, disappearances, rape, and torture, at times committed by agents of the state. Dealing with the conflict’s legacy has long been a thorny issue in Peru. Now a new chapter has opened with the efforts of several lawmakers to promote new amnesty or pardon laws that could lead to the search for justice being subsumed by politics and procedural questions in a way that seriously obscures the truth about the responsibility of state agents for serious human rights violations.

In 2003 Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission – considered a model of its kind – presented evidence of atrocities to the relevant judicial authorities. However, the cases have proceeded at a very slow pace, with few convictions and many cases stuck in the preliminary investigation phase. Meanwhile, an influential sector of Peruvian society, including some politicians, journalists, elements of the Catholic Church, and armed forces members, have been claiming in ever-louder voices that the processes represent persecution of the security forces – a form of vengeance by closet subversives who wish to defeat in court the soldiers who won the war.

Considering the tiny number of police and soldiers implicated in human rights violation relative to the overall size of the security force sector, the idea of a generalized persecution is implausible. Those favoring amnesty or pardon have one legitimate complaint: like many Peruvian legal cases, the processes have been very slow. However, as both domestic and international human rights groups constantly point out, the primary cause of the delays is the failure of the very armed forces to deliver the necessary information for the cases to move forward. If they are truly interested in rapid resolution of the cases, an end to stonewalling on information requests is clearly the place to begin.

There are two projects in the congress, both sponsored by members of the ruling APRA party. One would provide amnesty to members of the security forces, and is aimed specifically at those who participated in the liberation of hostages at the Japanese Embassy in 1996, an operation that may have led to extrajudicial killings of many of the hostage-takers. This project is unlikely to prosper as it blatantly violates Peru’s international commitments: under the Inter-American system, crimes against humanity are not subject to amnesty. In addition, the bill’s sponsor was somewhat discredited when he claimed that over 100 ex-soldiers were facing charges, when in reality only 4 notoriously brutal and/or corrupt cronies of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori are under scrutiny.

The other project, promoted by one of APRA’s most powerful parliamentarians, Mercedes Cabanillas, would establish a pardons commission to evaluate which ex-security force members are being prosecuted on the basis of weak evidence and should therefore have the charges against them dismissed. The logic is that a number of people convicted of being subversives received pardons in the early 2000s. However, a significant number of the thousands who were convicted were undeniably innocent and had been convicted by hooded judges in kangaroo courts. There is no evidence that the processes ex-soldiers currently face are being held under remotely similar anti-defendant conditions.

If this process goes through and a large number of pardons are eventually issued, it will represent a severe setback for human rights, the rule of law, and the fight against impunity in Peru. It will also almost inevitably engender a major fight between human rights groups and the government, both within Peru and in the Inter-American system. Most ironically, many representatives of the soldiers and police under investigation don’t even want to be pardoned or amnestied: they want to prove their innocence in court. This has raised suspicions that the whole point is to benefit high level political operatives who are potentially implicated in human rights cases. The best way to allay such suspicions will be to make sure that whatever bill, if any, that eventually passes puts justice and the armed conflict’s victims ahead of politics and expediency.

Photo Credit: Flickr user moonbird

Crossroads Spotlight: Guyana

Guyana, hailed as the land of the many waters, six peoples, the mighty Essequibo River, and the majestic Kaieteur Waterfalls, is the only English-speaking country in South America. It has an estimated population of around 800,000. Unfortunately, Guyana is best known for the Jonestown massacre, the authoritarian rule of Linden Forbes Burnham, and its status as a highly indebted poor country (HIPC). However, on October 5, 1992 Guyana held historic free and fair elections, which were supposed to end a long era of corrupt electoral arrangements and the prolonged disembowelment of the legitimacy of the country’s political institutions. Sixteen years later, lingering questions remain about whether or not the promises of democracy have been brought to the Guyanese people.

Guatemala Seeks Answers in a Larger Army

With no end in sight to the lawlessness plaguing Guatemala, the government has unveiled a plan to increase the army from 15,500 to 25,000 soldiers by 2010 in order to combat criminality. Given that the military is blamed for most of the killings during Guatemala’s civil war, which lasted from 1960-1996, this is a somewhat controversial proposition. However, many Guatemalans are so upset by rampant crime that they accept the need for the army’s growth and its internal deployment.

Crossroads Dispatch – Notes from the Field: Peru

In the spirit of last week’s post on Colombia, what follows are observations by Crossroads staff regarding governance in Peru. While not in a state of internal conflict like its neighbor Colombia, Peru also exhibits serious shortcomings in a number of the spheres of governance analyzed in Countries at the Crossroads. As in Colombia, the nation is headed by a charismatic, media-comfortable, US-and-market friendly president; unlike Alvaro Uribe, however, Peru’s Alan Garcia has had little success in translating rapid economic growth into high approval ratings.

Crossroads Dispatch – Notes from the Field: Colombia

Countries at the Crossroads staff recently visited Colombia, a nation featuring the Western Hemisphere’s longest-running and perhaps most complicated internal conflict. Security gains and economic growth in recent years have improved the situation of many Colombians and resulted in an astronomic approval rating for President Alvaro Uribe. Yet in terms of governance there remain serious unresolved issues in nearly all the spheres of governance analyzed in Countries at the Crossroads. While not all the Crossroads categories were investigated in-depth during this visit, meetings with a range of civil society actors permitted observations regarding a number of key aspects of governance. Note that because the term governance by definition emphasizes state behavior, the focus here is on government actions.

GDP Growth Brings Little Love to Peru's Garcia

Last night Peruvian president Alan Garcia gave the annual independence day address, which is similar to the State of the Nation speech in the USA. Given Peru’s robust economic growth and status as a darling of international business, one might have assumed that the speech would adopt a valedictory tone. However, for a variety of reasons Garcia has less to celebrate than first meets the eye.

The Ones the Bolivarian Revolution Left Behind

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez declared the other day that Venezuela’s prisons need an overhaul. A case of the Bolivarian government seeing a developing problem and reacting to it? Hardly. At the least, there is certainly nothing proactive about the idea that the country’s prison system requires attention. Venezuelan prisons have been a human rights disaster for many years, and a serious and sustained government response is long overdue.