Freedom at Issue

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

Migration: Another Pressure Point for China's System

The global economic crisis that has resulted in 20 million Chinese migrant workers losing their jobs, in combination with the prominence of last summer’s Beijing Olympics, have resulted in somewhat sustained attention to the issue of freedom of movement in China. While the economy was strong and the dollars pouring in, officials were able to occasionally place on the reform agenda the ancient and cumbersome hukou, a household registration system greatly restricting travel and maintaining a huge rural-urban divide (discussed here in January). The strong demand for Chinese goods also served as an incentive to allow millions of migrants to come to urban centers and work factory jobs. No more.

As of 2008, the hukou system continued to deny Chinese migrants public benefits such as education for children and medical care. The government did introduce temporary household registration for migrant workers, but only a small percentage of workers have been able to obtain it. At the Third Plenum of the 17th Party Congress held on October 12, 2008, it was announced that the “old rural-urban divide” can now give way to “a combined development of urban and rural areas.” Recently, some cities, such as Jiaxing City in Zhejiang, abolished the designation of “agricultural households,” and Yunnan province eliminated the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou. Despite the changes, however, critics note that discrimination against migrants in terms of what types of benefits they receive still exists. The recent creation of 20 million jobless migrant laborers and the current lack of an adequate welfare system serve to highlight this fact.

Members of China’s Uighur Muslim minority have been particularly notable victims of movement restrictions: they have faced oppression for years, and existing travel restrictions became even tighter in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics. During this time, Uighurs were discouraged or in some cases, barred from air travel and access to Beijing was limited. Every year during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan, Uighur passports are confiscated by the Chinese government, forcing Uighurs to join government-run tours to Mecca, rather than traveling there on their own, which is illegal. Today almost no Uighurs have passports, an especially problematic issue for business owners. Similarly, Tibetans face strict limitations on their movement and are required to have travel permits to leave the areas in which they are registered to live. 

Besides increasing travel restrictions, the Beijing Olympics resulted in forced evictions so that new stadiums could be built. A common estimate, noted in this post, put the number at 1.5 million Chinese moved to make way for Olympic construction, though it notes this has occurred over an eight year period leading up to the games. “Undesirables,” migrants and the homeless were also removed from the city in preparation for the Olympics. In addition, the games were used as a pretext to arrest an estimated 1,500 members of China’s Falun Gong movement. Many members were removed from the sites of Olympic venues and sent to labor camps.

It seems clear that as the financial crisis worsens and attention to reform is diverted, hukou will continue to pose a problem in 2009. Many of the millions of Chinese workers who lost their jobs no longer possess the skills to work in the agriculture sector; in some cases, they simply do not want to return to rural life and its low-paying, backbreaking jobs. The clock is ticking for China to comprehensively enact reforms to ensure that migrant laborers in the cities have access to the same benefits as traditional urban dwellers. If not, the millions of unemployed and bitter migrants may pose a dangerous challenge to Chinese authorities. After all, as has been mentioned innumerable times by advocates of greater democracy in China, the rigidity of the country’s political system means there is little in the way of escape valves – among the most important one in a democratic system being elections and a free press. Without these valves, this may be the moment when the system’s internal contradictions are laid bare.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Kongharald

The Dragon's Surprisingly Ambivalent Reform

Thirty years ago, land reforms in China launched the country’s economic rise, initiating a process that enriched urban dwellers at the expense of the rural peasantry. Nowadays China is one of the most unequal countries in the world, and urban-rural divides are at the core of many institutional bottlenecks that hinder the attainment of broad, equitable progress. In fact, land issues encapsulate one of modern China’s major contradictions: while the market is now king in most economic spheres, land is still collectively owned and its usage heavily restricted by the state. Urban land can be traded with very long leases that are, in practical terms, as good as outright ownership (manifold state abuses such as forced dislocation aside), whereas rural land is still owned by village committees that rent small plots to peasants on 30-year leases. Land cannot be mortgaged and selling usage rights or building can be legally problematic. As peasants cannot own land or use it as collateral, credit is all but impossible to obtain and little incentive exists to improve the lots, let alone consolidate them. This creates productive inefficiencies and jeopardizes China’s food security.

Furthermore, the village collective-state-corporation alliance makes the system prone to corruption and clientelism. Illegal, and often violent, land seizures by local officials and developers remain endemic. In numerous instances, farmland is seized for urban expansion and industrialization without sufficient compensation given to farmers, while local officials siphon off profits further fueling resentment. Thus, according to the East Asia Forum “illegal land requisitions take place in the order of tens of thousands a year,” causing an increasing number of peasant protests. In other instances and despite technically being illegal, plot sizes are reallocated among villagers based on family size, even in cases where leases have not expired. Divorced and widowed women are especially vulnerable to these practices.

Because land issues encompass so many of China’s major economic, social, political, institutional and environmental challenges, land reform is urgent. Thus, the Communist Party’s announcement of land reform attracted much media coverage. The reform hinges on two major features: first, to allow peasants to engage in unrestricted trade, purchase, and sale of land-use contracts within regulated markets; and second, to extend those contracts to up to 70 years. Combined with other measures, this is intended to increase income in the countryside. However, the reform is much more modest than the celebrated ‘breakthrough’  language accompanying the agreement implies. The basic principle of ownership will remain unchanged. Village committees, controlled by party  cadres, will still own the land and direct its usage rights. Further, the transfer of usage rights is already allowed legally (with some limitations) and has become a common practice in recent years.

After the initial media hype, quiet enveloped the reforms, suggesting hints of discord within the top echelons of the Communist Party. Opponents of the reform had argued that moving closer to land ownership would solidify Western capitalism and thus undermine the party’s authority, while proponents had stressed that improved property rights could improve rural-urban income disparities, appease social unrest, and stem the waves of peasants migrating to the cities.

But even if the party could agree on enhanced  land rights, this would only be a first step. As the Countries at the Crossroads report stated in 2007, those rights would need to be protected by a more independent legal system that can combat governmental corruption and hold police accountable when they use excessive force. Without a reformed legal system, after all, the principles of stability and predictability that the reform hopes to encourage will not develop. Further, village elections – the only level where Chinese citizens can directly vote for their representatives – would need to be more competitive and less influenced by the Communist Party’s control to secure a fair distribution of the land. Reforming the legal system and improving governmental transparency would not only appease 800 million Chinese farmers, but would help this potentially transformative reform move from word to deed.

Photo Credit: Flickr user rentonr

Taking the Wheel in Nepal, Maoists Face a Rocky Road

Former rebel leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by the nom de guerre Prachanda, was sworn in as Nepal’s prime minister on August 18, confirming his status as the country’s most powerful political leader. While the achievement sealed the victory of his Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in its long struggle with the now-defunct monarchy, it came at the cost of a grueling 1996–2006 insurgency and some 13,000 lives. The new government will have to address the simmering instability and institutional wreckage left in the wake of the conflict, all while managing an uncertain political coalition and coping with urgent problems like food shortages and rising fuel prices.

No Sign of Olympic Truce for Human Rights in China

With the opening of the Beijing Olympics just a month away, the Chinese government has done little to fulfill its promise that the games would usher in human rights improvements. China earned praise only a few weeks ago after the tragic May 12 earthquake disaster led to greater openness in the media and increased activity by civil society groups. Those developments effectively eclipsed a spate of international criticism and Chinese nationalism associated with the travels and travails of the Olympic torch and the ongoing security crackdown in Tibet. However, it has since become clear that the government intends to continue—albeit with new Olympic vigor—its long-standing policy of sanitizing public discourse and using force to muzzle or eliminate sources of potential controversy.

Mugabe’s Bishop Guides Flock with a Truncheon

In his ongoing effort to cow the Zimbabwean electorate ahead of the June 27 presidential runoff vote, President Robert Mugabe has deployed cudgel-wielding security forces and party militias against political activists, trade unionists, journalists, and any other members of society who are suspected of disloyalty to the regime. This campaign has even extended to the country’s Anglican parishioners, as major media outlets have noted. For several weeks, the police and other agents of the state have been invading churches in Harare and beating men, women, and children who attempt to worship in communion with the internationally recognized Anglican hierarchy, headed locally by Bishop Sebastian Bakare. The actions are meant to enforce the authority of Mugabe’s man in the miter, Nolbert Kunonga, who was dismissed as bishop of Harare by the Anglican Church of the Province of Central Africa (CPCA) in late 2007.

China’s Show of Confidence in the Face of Disaster

The humanitarian disaster accompanying the recent earthquake in Sichuan, China has captured the world’s attention, and in the process has shed light on changes to aspects of governance in China that may have far reaching implications. The Chinese government’s response to the crisis represents an improvement over its reaction to crises in the past, such as the 1976 Tangshan earthquake or the SARS outbreak of 2003. This is not surprising, given China’s significant social and economic advances over the last three decades. Part of the reason for the improvement is the dramatic change in the way that the press and NGOs have been allowed to function this time around. However, despite the space that has been seized by the media, for example, the earthquake has also exposed the tangible, deadly effects of corruption in Chinese society. 

The 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report on China highlighted both self-censorship and the use of “prior restraints” to severely restrict news outlets, and indeed, both of these tactics have been used by the Chinese government in an attempt to control the media’s coverage of the earthquake. However, the New York Times reported that overwhelming domestic interest in the earthquake led many Chinese journalists to ignore the instructions of the central government, overwhelming the government’s initial efforts at micromanaging coverage and creating a “blush of independent reporting.” Others have pointed out, however, that despite the more open media environment surrounding the earthquake, the government’s propaganda department has still been actively attempting to control the coverage and has been largely successful in setting the tone of reporting. Chinese journalists have also largely avoided questions surrounding the collapse of schools and its relationship to corruption.   

NGOs and volunteers have also taken an unusually active role in responding to the earthquake, spurred in part by the vigorous and dramatic coverage that it has received. Aided by internet-based tools, small, unregistered citizens’ organizations are essentially functioning as legitimate earthquake relief NGOs; this represents a significant departure for the central government, which is typically wary of independent grassroots organizations that operate beyond its control.  Larger NGOs have stepped in to coordinate relief efforts among volunteers as well. As with the press, this is unlikely a harbinger of a new age of openness, but it is progress.

Despite these developments in press freedom and civil society, the quake has also shed light on problematic features of Chinese governance. The most visible is the pernicious effect of corruption and the government’s difficulties in combating it. As it became clear that a disproportionately large number of the collapsed buildings were schools, questions about school building corruption that have long festered at the local level suddenly became a matter of national and international outrage. Those seeking answers turned angrily on local officials for explanation; notably, national officials have been largely spared from the people’s wrath. This highlights another perennial governance issue in China: the disconnect between the central government and the local level. The national government may well sacrifice some local officials in the name of justice but many citizens are now more aware than ever that the lack of meaningful and effective oversight is a critical shortcoming in Chinese governance.

The Chinese government should be recognized for the small, positive steps it has taken and encouraged to operate with transparency during natural disasters. However, once the immediate effects of this crisis have been dealt with, the Chinese people would be well served by continuing to push the line, demanding information and taking a hard look at the endemic corruption that contributed to the scale of this disaster. The response of the central government to such continued pressure will be far more revealing than the restrained attitude that has been displayed in recent weeks.

Photo Credit: Flickr user eightland

Who Will be Burned by the Dragon's Flames?

The Economist cover last week featured a snarling image of a dragon, accompanied by the phrase “Angry China,” to illustrate the challenges to domestic governance and foreign affairs posed by resurgent Chinese nationalism. Flare-ups of Chinese resentment toward actions and criticisms by foreign states are, of course, nothing new. As a briefer from the Council on Foreign Relations describes, Chinese nationalism is deeply rooted in grievances related to China’s historic relations with the Western world and is inextricably tied to the initial rise of Chinese communism as a movement. There are several important aspects of the issue of Chinese nationalism, not the least of which is its effects on the government’s foreign relations, as well as broader global attitudes toward China’s rise. However, no less important is the relationship of Chinese nationalism to internal governance.

As the CFR analysis, the Economist article, and just about every other piece on Chinese nationalism notes, the outbursts are inseparable from issues connected to internal governance. As the Economist puts it, “the appeal to nationalism is a double-edged sword: while it provides a useful outlet for domestic discontents, it could easily turn on the government itself...popular anger, once roused, can easily switch targets.” A complementary article uses the ecological nightmare of Tai Lake, once a prime tourist attraction, to illustrate the type of governance shortcomings driving the protests that the government tries to channel toward nationalism. Another piece, in the Financial Times, notes that the control of information by the Chinese state is extremely distorting insofar as many young Chinese think the West is conspiring against them because they do not grasp the idea of organic, non-government backed expressions of protests such as the worldwide demands for greater Tibetan rights. Ironically, even as China’s economic integration with the world continues headlong, China's repressive media environment means that many of its citizens are acting on the basis of dire misconceptions about how the rest of the world works.

One of the keys here is the question of sustainability. As the introduction to the Countries at the Crossroads 2007 report details, China is a welter of contradictions. Maintaining a lid on political ferment even as China continues its integration into the global economy brings new pressures on the government from every direction, presenting an unprecedented challenge. As citizens become more aware of rising inequality within China and the opportunities that are denied them due to arbitrary and capricious governance, pressures for more responsive and effective governance will invariably grow. Nationalism is clearly a tried and true outlet for such pent up pressure in many countries. However, it is generally insufficient. Of the many virtues of greater political openness is that it enables peaceful outlets for citizen frustration – in essence societal safety valves that can ameliorate growing socio-economic unease.

The current governance approach presents clear gaps and is not likely to be sustainable. It is unclear how long China will continue to economically advance absent meaningful political reform. In particular, the massive shortcomings in rule of law, rampant corruption, and the ongoing environmental catastrophe will inevitably have an impact on the ability of the state to keep its citizens politically pacified and could also harm China’s continued attractiveness as an investment destination. However, the images of growing nationalism serve as an important reminder that China’s leaders must look to new ways of addressing the growing expectations of their people.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Jrwooley6

An Opaque Giant Embraces a Secretive Neighbor

The economic, geopolitical, and social implications of China’s prolonged economic expansion have been felt and debated in almost every corner of the globe. Perhaps nowhere, however, has the impact of China’s rise been more dramatic than right in its Southeast Asian backyard. One of the countries most affected is also home to one of the world’s most opaque regimes – Laos. Historically, relations between Laos and Vietnam have been closer than those with China. However, China’s sheer size, massive economic output, and hunger for Laotian natural resources have inevitably resulted in Laos being sucked ever-further into China’s orbit.

Despite having adopted modestly market-oriented economic policies in the 1980s, the Lao government remains an utterly closed system. All decisions are made by highly centralized Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) elites, patronage is the preferred transactional currency, and corruption is endemic. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report acidly notes, “the rule of law is honored more in the breach than the observance.”

In recent years, Chinese production has flooded Laos with new products, while Laotian exports, mostly in the form of raw materials, have surged more than 650 percent just since 2004. Just last week the two countries agreed on a new package of projects at a Greater Mekong Subregion summit. Of particular importance is the pace of infrastructure development, which is a natural realm of cooperation given both countries’ interest in expediting increased land- and river-based trade.

However, the criticisms that often accompany the presence of Chinese investment are present as well. A recent episode involves the granting of a lease for the land encompassing the Vientiane area’s largest wetland to Chinese investors in exchange for the construction of a sports complex. Like all such decisions in Laos, it was the result of largely secret negotiations. However, by Laotian standards, the outcry greeting the pronouncement was significant, or at least notable enough that the government felt obligated to hold a press conference to deny that tens of thousands of Chinese would be moving onto the land or that the wetland would be destroyed. Nonetheless, the mechanisms behind the transaction, the details of the plan, and perhaps most importantly, the impact on the residents currently dwelling near the project, all remain highly uncertain.

This sort of story has become typical within countries doing business with China, especially ones with weak institutions. As the Crossroads report also notes, one of the few semi-exceptions to Laos’ murkiness has been in foreign aid distribution, where demands for a modicum of transparency have in the past been at least partially accepted. The Chinese feel little such compunction; the author of the Crossroads report, Martin Stuart-Fox suggests in a Reuters story that intra-elite rivalry for Chinese kickbacks is probably at the root of the controversy rather than real concern over the decision-making process and its potential impact on the land. In addition, the record of both the Chinese and Laotian governments in issuing compensation to people whose land is seized is very poor.

Perhaps the fact that the government even felt the need to explain its actions represents an example of the very slow movement that is about the most that can currently be expected of the LPRP. At the very least, greater attention will likely be paid to the project’s impact than might be expected in the absence of any debate. The optimistic view is that it will be an opportunity for China and Laos to show that they are responsive to local and international concerns. Given the increasing opprobrium heaped on China’s investment and management style, it would be wise to demonstrate improved willingness to coordinate and engage in dialogue with locals. But given the history and nature of both countries’ ruling regimes, such an outcome would be very surprising indeed.

Photo of Chinese construction in Laos by Flickr user fredalix

Weekly Governance Links: Updates Edition

Many of the posts on this blog are related to structural conditions that are painfully resistant to rapid change, while others relate to fast-moving events. Here are some links to provide updates on issues addressed in prior posts.

All the way back in August we discussed the Chinese government's continued manipulation of foreign media correspondents, despite pledges to allow greater freedom of movement in the run-up to the Olympics. The tragic recent events in Tibet have revealed quite clearly both the degree of control over foreigner reporters and the breathtakingly brazen manipulation of the local press.

A post in September described the political difficulties facing Turkey, the underlying cause of which was continued tension between the ascendent AK Party and the old-line secular elites. That fight continues, with the current focal point a constitutional challenge that could result in closure of the AK. The battle is described here, with an update as of earlier this week in this Turkish newspaper article.

In November we wondered whether, even with a strong record of economic growth, good governance would not prove to be the primary drag on Russian progress in the medium- to long-term. It is too soon to tell what will happen under new president Dmitry Medvedev, but in a lengthy interview this week with the Financial Times he spoke in detail about governance issues, focusing particularly on the rule of law. FT writers also contributed with an analytical description in the article found here.

The fascinating but worrying situation in Bolivia has been the subject of several posts, including this one describing a period in November when tension levels appeared to rising dramatically. The situation has since gone in cycles of rising and falling tension, with the current moment a high point. A good description of the situation can be found in this Democracy Center post, while an IPS article goes into greater detail on the confrontation between the government and soy producers, who are generally aligned with the opposition. Finally, another article gives an interesting broader overview of the situation from a perspective that is socialist but not as dogmatic or naive as much of the international left's coverage of Bolivia.

In early January we offered an update to the post-election cataclysm in Kenya, a situation which seemed to have been resolved last month with the help of Kofi Annan. However, the New York Times notes that while a power-sharing agreement was reached, the government and the opposition remain deadlocked over the details, a dangerous situation considering how on edge the country remains.

Also in January we discussed the often ignored problem of prison policy in developing countries, where grotesquely inhumane and counterproductive conditions remain all too common. Venezuela, which had over 400 deaths in 2007 among a prison population of just 20,000, is a particularly egregious offender in this regard. However, this article talks about ways in which the government is finally demonstrating some signs of a reformist impulse on prison conditions.

Prior to the Pakistani parliamentary elections in February we offered some thoughts on how things might turn out for President Musharraf. The answer, of course, was "very badly." However, the strong performance of secular moderates has offered hopeful signs, analyzed in a particularly interesting New York Review of Books article as well as in the New York Times.

Another February post offered analysis of the manifold failures of the public health system in post-Soviet countries. Soon after, an article in the Washington Post took a close look at one individual case of a hospital in Russia whose problems tied into many of the themes mentioned in the blog post.

Finally, a post earlier this month gave an overview of the state of play in Iran as parliamentary elections were imminent. See two articles (one, two) from the Economist describing the fairly predictable and dreary outcome.

This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land

With the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing fast approaching, the People’s Republic of China continues to turn heads as it unveils modern architectural wonders constructed for the games. However, behind the splashy designs lie the human consequences of the blistering pace of infrastructure development – the nearly 1.5 million Chinese citizens displaced by construction connected with the Games of the 24th Olympiad. Western media outlets are paying close attention to the plight of the displaced as tensions over China’s unclear property laws simmer both in urban centers and the rural hinterlands. Increasingly sensitive to its international image in advance of the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government – which received a poor score of 2.67 out of 7 for its protection of property rights in the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report – has cracked down, resulting in increased criticism regarding public ownership of all land in the Middle Kingdom.

A new property law adopted in 2007 was hailed by the Economist as a “breakthrough” and offered new legal protections, predominantly for urban “landowners” (70-year lessees) within the rapidly emerging Chinese middle class anxiously seeking protection for their assets. The article notes that the very passage of such a law is an indication that “the party is showing itself somewhat more responsive to public opinion than it was in the past.” This latest property law, however, stops well short of a revolution in Chinese land ownership rights. Indeed, recent episodes in the run-up to the Olympics have underscored the ever-present threat of expropriation in a nation where the state owns all of the land. At the root of the issue is the fact that, as in many developing countries, a massive gap still exists between Chinese property rights in theory and in practice, with images of forced evictions starkly contrasting the Chinese government’s stated aims of “protecting private ownership” and “promoting social harmony.”

Chinese officials vehemently deny any wrongdoing in relocating people in advance of the games, adding that individuals have been adequately compensated by the state for the inconvenience. But the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), a Geneva-based NGO advocating for property rights, is not convinced, naming the Beijing Municipality and the Beijing Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (BOCOG) its Housing Rights Violator of 2007. Government compensation is hardly far-reaching, with many individuals fully excluded from receiving any remuneration. COHRE observed that “the process of demolition and eviction is characterized by arbitrariness and lack of due process.”

In spite of efforts by the government to limit discussion, China’s broader human rights record will inevitably be under the microscope during the games. Commenting directly on the recent Chunlin case, President Bush pledged to raise human rights concerns during the Olympics with President Hu Jintao and push for greater freedoms for Chinese citizens. Trying to appear accommodating, China has also stated in recent days that it would be amenable to reopening a pre-existing but stalled set of discussions regarding its rights record.

Property rights issues were again thrust into the foreground this past week as the trial of a land rights activist in China garnered international attention. Yang Chunlin, 52, faces charges of “subverting the power of the state,” as the laid-off factory worker was imprisoned after collecting 10,000 signatures on a petition entitled “We Want Human Rights, not the Olympics.” Chunlin had spent recent years helping farmers in the northeast province of Heiliongjiang receive remuneration for property seized by local officials. Through its recent actions, the Chinese government is sending a clear signal that the screws will be tightened in the coming months to prevent land rights activists from creating a stir in conjunction with the Olympics.

While property disputes are becoming increasingly common in China, the controversy has not been limited to urban areas. Indeed, the land rights issue is acute in the Chinese countryside, where millions of peasant farmers are subject to arbitrary land seizures by local officials without adequate compensation. The uneven application of the property law is creating an additional disparity between urban and rural dwellers beyond the income gap, as the latter lack sufficient economic and political clout to pressure the Chinese state. However, as the Financial Times observes, Chinese peasants are growing increasingly restive, with thousands of rural farmers whose land has been seized protesting every month. While not a new occurrence, land rights demonstrations are now becoming increasingly organized. Some farmers across the country now utilize modern communications technology to coordinate their protest actions, thereby amplifying the attenuated voice of the victims whose land has been seized. 

Although their outlook varies greatly from that of urban “landowners,” the underlying source of discontent for the rural peasantry is fundamentally the same: the absence of adequate property rights and protection against land grabs. All indications point toward increasing tensions in the Chinese system of land tenure, as both segments of society continue to pressure the state for more rights.

Photo Credit: Flickr user tashu1

Weekly Governance Links: China

As usual, there is no shortage of recent reports dealing with governance in China. Indeed, the enormous rise in attention as to how China is governed is one of the underrated virtues of China’s economic rise. The reasons for this go beyond the scale of economic growth or the country’s massive population (India is almost as big and receives significantly less international coverage of its government). While the pace of growth remains the primary factor, there are at least two other critical elements driving interest in Beijing’s actions. The first is China as threat. Leaving aside international security issues, the two forms of this brand of coverage have to do with fears about China’s economic impact on the rest of the world (they’re stealing our jobs! is the crudest expression of this) and, more and more, China’s impact on the global environment. The second factor driving the interest is more abstract: curiosity about how a system that, to Western eyes, is epically contradictory (repressive Maoist politics, semi-capitalist economics) manages to function. What follows are some links to articles and reports that describe and evaluate the huge task of maintaining political power and (relative) social harmony in China.

To dispense with modesty for a moment, an indispensable starting point for understanding China’s inner workings is Thomas Gold’s China chapter in the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, which directly addresses the theme of contradictions in the current Chinese governance model.

Regarding more specific issues, Chinese repression of the press is always a popular topic, due largely to the Chinese government’s aggressiveness against reporters. The 2008 Beijing Olympics have provided the occasion for many awareness campaigns about conditions in China. The Committee to Protect Journalists provides background on the press freedom environment, as does Human Rights Watch, as part of a broader Olympics-linked campaign. Reporters Without Borders deals with the specific issue of internet censorship, while the Washington Post describes a class on “Marxist Journalism” which is, depending on one’s interpretation, either another form of ensuring submission to government standards or a clever way of attracting government funds to train Chinese journalists.

Rule of law and the almost incomprehensibly opaque Chinese legal system is also frequently analyzed. Despite the hierarchical nature of the Chinese Communist party, rules are bendable even at the highest levels, and as one continues down toward the local level the rules achieve ever-increasing arbitrariness. For a comprehensive view, see this report from the NGO Human Rights in China. Meanwhile, a Council on Foreign Relations op-ed describes the politics of why achieving the rule of law poses such a dilemma for the Chinese Communist party. For the Chinese perspective, an audio file is linked to this CSIS event, where a member of People’s Supreme Court describes reform efforts. Finally, a China-centric legal blog, focused on business but with discussion of many other subjects.

One symptom of a weak rule of law is, of course, corruption, a problem that has become increasingly unbridled in China. A Carnegie Endowment report provides an estimate of the staggering costs. The Chinese government, perhaps finally spurred to action by the report’s harsh conclusions, established an anticorruption website – which promptly crashed.

Workers rights are yet another controversial topic in China, with conditions in many factories, mines, and sweatshops famously inhumane, which ought to be of particular embarrassment in a communist workers’ paradise. The Economist has two recent articles describing efforts to mildly reform workers’ rights, while also adjusting holidays – with the effect of further diminishing one of the valued symbols of socialism.

Finally, as mentioned above, environmental degradation has become a critical issue for Chinese governance, and one that is increasingly a driver of social unrest. The New York Times has been running a monster series of articles about the costs of environmental growth, while the Washington Monthly chips in with an article that asks the key question: is effective environmental stewardship even possible in such a closed political system? Indeed, that question can be applied to most of the above issues. China aspires to great things, but its outsized population creates outsized problems. The possibility of achieving what are viewed as absolutely necessary reforms while retaining iron-fisted political control remains very much in question.

Picture found at The Economist

Millennium Challenge Account Decision

On December 12, the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Board of Directors announced countries selected as eligible for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), multi-billion dollar assistance program established to target development funds to countries that rule justly, invest in their own citizens, and foster economic freedom. Malawi was the sole country added to the group eligible to apply for an MCA compact.  Mauritania was selected to participate in a threshold program.

A press release put out by the MCC explains their selection decisions.

A range of countries are already participating in the program and were reselected by the MCC’s Board as eligible for 2008 fiscal year compact funding. These countries are:  Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Jordan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, and Vanuatu.

Meanwhile, on the subject of influential foreign assistance, a front page article in the Financial Times looks at a World Bank effort to work with the Chinese government on aid programs to Africa.

The piece by Richard McGregor notes that

Multilateral lenders including the African Development Bank have been trying to persuade the Chinese to raise standards of transparency in their lending, amid concerns that a fresh build-up of loans could destabilize economies only recently relieved of long-standing debt.

China’s thirst for energy resources is deeply intertwined with its evolving use of soft power through investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

China has so far closely aligned its development assistance to Africa with its quest for resources on the continent to fuel its booming economy.

For a deeper look at this subject, a book by Joshua Kurlantzick – “Charm Offensive” – provides insight to how China is exerting its influence in the contemporary context.

Weekly Governance Links: (mostly negative) Asia Edition

The ever-invaluable International Crisis Group has issued a new report (free registration required) on southern Thailand, where a poorly-understood insurgency has been raging for several years. The report focuses on the government’s strategy of combating the insurgents through the use of “poorly trained, loosely supervised militias in a volatile conflict in which civilians are the main victims.”

Bhutan may have improved its Crossroads scores significantly but it still has some pressing human rights issues, mostly involving the ethnic Nepalis known as Lhotshampa. Human Rights Watch reports on the problem of discrimination against ethnic Nepali children.

A few weeks ago we posted an item regarding the corruption conviction of former Philippine President Joseph Estrada. We remarked that although it represented a success, it did not necessarily herald a sea change in Philippine anticorruption efforts. Sadly, even this one victory was short-lived – on October 25 Estrada received a pardon from President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Also related to corruption, the Jakarta Post notes that the pace of Indonesian anticorruption efforts seems to have slowed in recent months.

China recently completed its 17th Communist Party Congress, which is always the subject of detailed speculation regarding the party’s inner workings and internecine battles. The Council on Foreign Relations provides background on the workings of the CCP, while the New York Times analyzes the congress’s aftermath.

In Bangladesh, a high-profile committee called to action by the caretaker government recommends an overhaul of relations between different levels of government.