COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Future of Bolivian Justice Remains Hazy

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On February 18, Bolivian President Evo Morales appointed 18 interim justices to fill long-vacant posts in the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Judicial Council. These appointments were made possible by the recent passage of the “Ley Corta,” which empowered Morales to fill 20 of 27 total posts in the three judicial bodies until new justices are elected in December 2010. This controversial law has been the subject of a heated debate between its adherents, who argue that the new appointments will strengthen the country’s judicial system by bringing an end to the judicial paralysis created by the vacancies, and its critics, who counter that the law was a political move geared towards increasing government control over the judiciary. On the day the law was passed, opponents wore black to symbolize mourning, with some carrying signs lamenting the death of democracy. While this estimation of the situation may be extreme, Morales’ direct appointment of judicial officers, when viewed alongside the myriad issues already debilitating and complicating the Bolivian justice system, does raise serious questions about the government’s view of justice.

Addressing the severe case backlogs, which number some 13,000 in the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal combined, is undoubtedly crucial. But Morales’ attitude—and that of his Movement towards Socialism (MAS) party more broadly—has led opponents to argue that the government does not respect the very concept of judicial independence. Executive interference in the Bolivian judiciary certainly did not start under the MAS. However, the fights regarding the composition of the judiciary contributed to the creation of the judicial vacuum in the first place, as justices who resigned from their posts in the Constitutional Tribunal in 2007 cited executive harassment as their reason for leaving, and the Supreme Court has also been the forum for political squabbles. Thus the logic becomes somewhat circular: we must appoint judges to fix the backlog that our political disputes helped cause.

 It is worth emphasizing that justice in Bolivia has never been blind. Nonetheless, since coming to power, the MAS has often seemed to be more vigorous about prosecuting opponents rather than supporters. Since Morales’ landslide victory in the December 2009 elections, in which the MAS attained a two-thirds supermajority in the congress, the situation has intensified. Shortly following Morales’ January 2010 inauguration, Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera announced that a priority of the Legislative Assembly would be to continue with the judicial proceedings against former government officials including ex-presidents Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze and Carlos Mesa, former Supreme Court Justice Eddy Fernandez, and ex-magistrate Rosario Canedo, along with a number of government ministers. While some of the cases brought against these officials are undoubtedly merited given Bolivia’s history of corruption, several of the charges are questionable, blurring the line between political disagreement, incompetence, and criminal negligence. What’s more, 59 opposition members currently face charges, including all six of the ex-governors of the departments in the opposition-dominated “Media Luna” region, mostly for corruption or abuse of office. The fact that only one MAS official has been charged along with these opposition members raises concerns over the role that politics has played in these accusations.

This slew of cases against opposition members has been accompanied by legal initiatives with other unclear consequences for justice. In addition to the “Ley Corta,” other laws with troubling provisions include the controversial anticorruption law, which is currently being debated in the legislature. More effective anticorruption efforts in Bolivia would be welcome, but certain provisions – in particular, the issue of what provisions will be retroactive – are extremely controversial. If retroactivity merely signals that corruption crimes that previously would have been dismissed on the basis of statute of limitations are now prosecutable, it is a debatable proposition. If the term means that former officials or citizens can be punished for acts they did not know to be criminal at the time of commission, it is far more problematic. In general, the boldness with which MAS members call for investigations or judgments of people with whom they disagree politically is at times jarring. Finally, the decision to include the election of high judicial authorities in the constitution is controversial in its own right. Very few countries select judges through elections – the US being a massive exception – precisely due to the unavoidable clash between political responsiveness and nonpartisan justice.

Justice for regular citizens is fraught with unresolved questions as well. Although geared towards improving the security of citizens and strengthening law enforcement in the country, the recently proposed changes to the penal code set out in the Fast Law Enforcement Bill also stand to decrease the due process guarantees afforded to alleged criminals. Another issue complicating the country’s justice system includes the problematic process of reconciling community justice with civil law. The new constitution officially endorses the communal justice system, but the question of how the two legal regimes will mesh remains fluid. The recent case of Felix Patzi, a candidate for the governorship of La Paz, Bolivia’s biggest department, is illustrative.  After being arrested for drunk driving on February 4, Patzi was sentenced to make 1,000 bricks under the community justice system. Although Patzi initially withdrew his candidacy at the request of Morales, he later changed his mind, and now argues that his drunk driving charge should not disqualify him from the La Paz race due to the fact that he has already served out his community justice sentence. However, his civil case remains open, leading to controversy over whether or not the communal punishment should suffice. Due to the MAS party’s commendable insistence on using Patzi to set an example regarding behavioral expectations for its candidates and continued unwillingness to allow Patzi to run, he abandoned the MAS.

The MAS envisions its political project as a refoundation of Bolivian society, and citizens have repeatedly endorsed its vision in elections. But justice and politics reside in tension in every country, which is the reason that separation of powers is considered such an essential element of democracy. The MAS has not always abused its power – indeed, Morales’ interim selections were viewed as fairly credible by most observers – but the government’s actions have been controversial in many different spheres related to the rule of law. With such political hegemony as the MAS now possesses inevitably comes temptation to abuse it, especially in conditions of unconsolidated institutions. How these issues are addressed will say a great deal about the MAS’s attitude toward basic democratic tenets more generally.

Evidence of Cambodian Governance Backsliding Accumulates

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In a recent Human Rights Watch press release on Cambodia, Brad Adams, the organization’s Asia Director, commented that “Hun Sen seems intent on reversing the political pluralism that has been created over the past two decades.” Adams’ statement was directly referring to the January 27 conviction of opposition leader Sam Rainsy on charges of fueling racial tensions and destroying demarcation posts on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Rainsy was tried in absentia and sentenced to two years in prison and a fine of 8 million riels (US$2,000). His case is representative of the situation currently faced by most government-critical activists and politicians in the country, as Prime Minister Hun Sen has increasingly clamped down on dissent and strengthened his hold over the country, plunging Cambodia into a governance downslide.

As Rainsy’s case highlights, the undermining of the rule of law in has become increasingly prevalent in Cambodia. Rainsy’s unfair trial exemplifies the political perversion of the Cambodian justice system, which continues to be manipulated by Cambodia’s high-level officials. Rainsy has been the frequent target of politically motivated charges since the 1990s, with government officials engaging in repeated attempts to jail the opposition leader. Unfortunately, he is not alone. As most judges and prosecutors are members of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, Hun Sen and other high-level government figures have been able to use the court system to target opposition leaders, activists, and journalists with defamation suits. The government’s use of the judiciary as a political tool has become even more flagrant of late, with at least ten government critics being sued for criminal defamation in 2009, including two additional opposition parliamentarians, a Sam Rainsy Party youth activist, and four journalists. In addition to lacking independence, the Cambodian judiciary is also plagued by corruption, an issue that gained international awareness when a kickback scheme was uncovered within the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal in 2007.

Another particularly troubling rule of law issue relates to property rights, specifically the escalating issue of forced evictions and land confiscations. According to Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia’s epic of forced evictions of the urban poor and confiscation of farmers’ land in the countryside reached crisis proportions in 2009.” Land grabs have become increasingly common in recent years, a practice that is made possible by a convoluted land-titling system that has favored the wealthy elites, leaving 80 percent of citizens in rural areas without title deeds. The weak legal regime, combined with the ability of powerful officials and businessmen to manipulate the system, has left ordinary Cambodians without an avenue to protect their rights or receive adequate compensation in cases of eviction. High real estate prices and new development projects in both rural and urban areas have been especially to blame for this problem in the past years.

Most alarmingly, the security forces charged with carrying out evictions frequently engage in excessive force against civilians, who are rarely informed of evictions in advance. For example, in January 2009, 250 police hired by the company 7NG, which claimed ownership of the land, evicted 152 families from the Dey Kraham community, using tear gas to disperse the crowd. Furthermore, villagers and activists who protest against the unjust confiscation of land are often arrested and even shot, as was the case with four Che Kreng villagers in one March 2009 clash with the police. More than 60 people are imprisoned or awaiting trial for charges related to land conflicts, an indication that ordinary citizens who rebel against the government’s policies have not escaped the crackdown experienced by the formal opposition. Activists working on human rights and land and trade union issues, along with opposition journalists, have been especially subject to harassment, attacks, and even killings, and crimes are often committed by the security forces. In 2008, the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association investigated the murders of 40 Cambodians, six of them political activists, by security force members. 

In yet another egregious example, a recent Human Rights Watch report chronicles the abuses endured by drug users who are sent to “rehabilitation centers.” According to the report, drug users detained in the center are beaten, raped, subjected to forced labor, and tortured rather than provided with effective treatment for their addictions. Many of the detainees end up in the center after being arbitrarily arrested in mass police round-ups of prostitutes, homeless people, the mentally-ill, and drug-users alike, and are often left in the dark as to the charges against them. In response to allegations regarding these abuses, the government has occasionally recognized these practices, although it normally justifies them as a necessary part of drug rehabilitation.

Cambodia’s governance backsliding is especially distressing due to the generous amount of funding the country receives from international donors. International assistance makes up over half of Cambodia’s annual budget. Most of Cambodia’s major development partners, which include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, the European Commission, and the United States, among others, have invested in a variety of projects geared towards advancing judicial reform, addressing past abuses (most notably through the UN-funded Khmer Rouge tribunal), instituting training programs on human rights issues, addressing health issues such as HIV/AIDS, and fostering economic development. However, these donors have had minimal success in ensuring that the government takes its international human rights commitments seriously. This is partly due to the fact that although investors will occasionally issue formal criticisms of the Cambodian government and urge reform, the aid keeps coming. Their limited achievements in this realm, and the recent backsliding on any progress made in the past, are also at least partly the result of China’s high levels of investment in the country, which has largely been funneled towards infrastructure development. As we discussed in a previous post, China’s assistance is not conditioned on the adoption of reforms, and thus increased Chinese assistance has afforded the Cambodian government a greater ability to turn its back on good governance efforts with lesser financial consequences, and to use China’s ever-mounting assistance as a bargaining chip when dealing with other donors.

Nigerian Power Vacuum Highlights Institutional Weakness

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On February 9, Nigeria’s presidential crisis reached its denouement, at least for now, when the National Assembly voted to install Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as acting president. Nigeria has effectively lacked a president since November, when President Umaru Yar’Adua left to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Yar’ Adua’s departure spurred a heated debate over the constitutional provisions regulating the matter, with some arguing that Yar’Adua violated the constitution by failing to hand his power over to the vice president, others (including the majority of the cabinet) countering that the president enjoyed a legal right to carry out his presidential duties abroad, and increasing numbers of Nigerians clamoring for his resignation. In the face of increasing unrest, with citizens taking to the streets with calls of “Umaru Where Are You” and rumors circulating of impending coup attempts, the National Assembly voted to empower Jonathan in the name of “peace, order and good government.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that this ruling will achieve a lasting resolution of the matter, and the current turmoil is not an aberration, but rather a symptom of Nigeria’s unresolved institutional issues.

For one thing, informal understandings play a key role in the stability of the country’s democracy. In this case, contentious ethno-religious issues surrounding the presidency could be exacerbated as the ascendancy of Jonathan, a southern Christian, to the presidency in place of Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, could throw a wrench in the tension-reducing system of alteration of power between members of the two faiths. In addition to the presidency, other institutions remain either frail or politically compromised, limiting the country’s ability to follow good governance practices. Political parties are feeble, with competitive politics rendered extremely difficult by the increasing dominance of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which has been ensured through the manipulation of the state machinery, especially in the fraudulent 2007 elections. In a related vein, the country’s electoral institutions remain underdeveloped; the primary institution in charge of overseeing elections, the Independent Electoral Commission, has been accused of being a tool of the executive branch and implicated in several scandals. Promised electoral reforms geared toward addressing these issues have yet to arrive. In addition, the country’s new anticorruption institutions, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, have handed down few convictions, especially in cases implicating politicians with links to Yar’Adua. Finally, the government security apparatus continues to commit rampant abuses with impunity despite increased civilian control over the security sector.

The dilapidated nature of these institutions is inextricably linked to Nigeria’s political and social problems. Institutional ineffectiveness has paralyzed Nigeria’s response to serious internal challenges, most notably the presence of ethnic and religious tension between Muslims and Christians, which has claimed 13,500 lives since 1999, and the precarious peace in the Niger Delta, where the conflict over oil continues to simmer. Due to the institutional failure to address the root causes of these problems, they have persisted, with positive steps made towards resolution consistently impossible to maintain. Moreover, in some cases, the state’s incapacity to effectively provide basic services, an equitable distribution of resources, and the establishment of the rule of law directly contributed to the creation of the problems in the first place. It becomes a vicious circle: by fueling the most severe crises, institutional weaknesses has stymied efforts to address baseline governance concerns including electoral reform and corruption.

The eruption of violence in the months since Yar’Adua’s departure serves as an extreme example of the link between institutional failure-in this case the failure of the executive institution- and the country’s internal struggles. In the North, sectarian strife claimed more lives on January 19, when armed men, believed to be Christian, attacked the predominantly Muslim population of Kuru Karama, killing 150. The violence then spread to neighboring communities, where additional attacks brought the death toll up to at least 364.While this outbreak of violence was not the direct result of Yar'Adua's absence, the ethno-religious facet of presidential crisis, namely the alteration of power issue, has undoubtedly heightened tensions between the two groups during this time. The violence also illustrates that Muslim-Christian friction could stand to worsen if Yar'Adua cedes the rest of his term to a Christian. Following the attacks, Jonathan promised to immediately investigate the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice, although the halting pace of past investigations raises doubt over the probability of this taking place. This conflict was soon followed by an end to the truce in the Niger Delta. On January 30, Jomo Gbomo, declaring himself the spokesperson for a militant group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), announced the end of the ceasefire in the region, citing a belief that the government would never empower the region’s inhabitants with control over its hydrocarbon resources. The demise of the ceasefire was partly the result of the stalling of the amnesty program on account of Yar’ Adua’s absence.

Until Nigeria’s struggling institutions are empowered with increased capacity and find mechanisms to decrease the perceived zero-sum nature of politics, severe governance deficits will remain. Although no one would expect a country a country with such a short history of elected rule to feature pristine institutions, the lack of progress is disheartening, and a lack of political will has been a contributing factor. Regardless of the cause, the recent saga has crystallized the ongoing challenges, and hopefully will spur the country’s political class to do something about it.

Cultivation of Corruption Among South Africa's Elites

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Criminal proceeding against Jackie Selebi, the South African police commissioner, began in Johannesburg this month. Selebi, whose CV includes positions such as former ambassador to the United Nations and chief of the international crime group Interpol, is on trial for corruption and other serious crimes. In one of the more colorful moments of the trial thus far, Glenn Agliotti, one of the country’s more notorious drug smugglers, testified to picking up the tab for Selebi’s designer clothing. He also bought couture handbags for Mr. Selebi’s wife, and paid the commissioner about $135,000 in cash in exchange for sensitive information.

Agliotti, for his part, is accused of murdering a corrupt mining magnate in a separate trial, and made a deal with the state to testify in exchange for indemnity for his dealings with Selebi. 

South Africa is far from the most corrupt country in the world (it ranked 54th best out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index), yet neither is the anticorruption record of the country’s leaders impeccable. In 2004, Tony Yengeny, the anti-Apartheid activist and former African National Congress (ANC) speaker of parliament, was convicted for taking bribes from a weapons manufacturer. He served four months of a four-year prison sentence. And Jacob Zuma, the current president, was charged with corruption in 2005 and sacked from his position as deputy president, though after years of legal battles all charges were dropped in April 2009. The now-dormant charges against Zuma were related to a multi-billion dollar arms purchase in the 1990s an illustrative case as the awarding of government contracts has been an area of activity plagued by graft accusations.

The ANC’s overwhelming control of the executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. The Parliament has been criticized for failing to sufficiently investigate corruption scandals of members of the executive branch. In addition, political interference hampers the ability of the judiciary to fully combat corruption. The politicization of the judiciary was especially apparent in the corruption prosecution of Zuma and the suspension of Vusi Pikoli as National Director of Public Prosecutions by justice minister Brigitte Mabandla. In the latter case, it became apparent that the suspension was related at least partially to the fact that Pikoli approved an arrest warrant for Selebi.

South Africa’s constitution outlines three institutions meant to combat corruption, but for various reasons, none of them are fully effective. The Office of the Auditor General is responsible for reporting to the National Assembly on the finances of any agency that receives public funding, but suffers countless deficiencies such as a lack of resources and incomplete reporting by agencies. The Public Prosecutor investigates complaints on the part of the public against governmental officials, but its independence has been called into question, especially since the current PP, Leonard Mushwana, is a former ANC MP and has been accused of inhibiting investigations of senior ANC members and the party itself. Finally, while the Independent Electoral Commission regulates the public finances through the Represented Political Parties’ Fund, private contributions are totally unregulated, and parties do not have to reveal the size or sources of their donations. There are a handful of other, smaller agencies in the government that combat corruption, but all have similar limitations.

Furthermore, while South Africa has an independent media, government and especially ANC-affiliated officials have accused investigative journalists of treason or racism. A number of private newspapers and magazines—among them, the Mail & Guardian, the Cape Times, and the Sunday Times—express sharp criticism of the government, to which the ANC has been particularly sensitive. As a result, many private media outlets have been issued gag orders and lawsuits related to investigations into corruption, and the ANC has in some cases even threatened to withdraw advertising. 

As a result, about half of South Africa’s population believes corruption is widespread among government officials and civil servants. This perception is intensified by a heightened awareness of inequality between South Africa’s elites and the population as a whole. While much of South Africa’s society is poor and lacking running water, electricity, and toilets, members of the ruling class flaunt luxurious lifestyles. Haroon Bhroat, an economist at the University of Cape Town, reported that South Africa now harbors “the most unequal society in the world.” According to Bhroat’s calculations, South Africa’s Gini coefficient, which measures the level of income inequality in a given country, is at 0.679 (0 is completely equal, 1 is completely unequal). He warned that the situation could lead to social instability and, indeed, protests comprised of citizens from the lower rungs of society have recently broken out in Johannesburg.

President Zuma says he is committed to rooting out corruption, and in fact he has made some progress in certain fields. A “mood of intolerance” toward corruption is newly noticeable and criminal charges, rather than light wrist slaps, are becoming a more regular punishment for accused officials. He is also trying to make public finances more transparent and to create more barriers between companies that perform work for public bodies and public sector employees, forbidding the latter to seek employment with the former. How effective such measures will be has yet to be determined, and it’s perhaps a bit difficult to believe that Zuma--  whose involvement in one of South Africa’s most serious corruption scandals was thrown on out due to prosecutorial transgressions rather than a determination of innocence-- when he talks about rooting out graft. If the experience of other single party-dominant regimes is any guide, the overwhelming control of the ANC in South African politics, and the sense among aspiring officials that pleasing party elites is the key to professional advancement, will serve as a serious obstacle to effective and sustained reform.

Corruption-Fighters in Indonesia Feel Pushback

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Indonesian President began his second five-year term on Tuesday, following a resounding electoral victory in July. His success at the polls has been attributed in part to his tough stance on corruption—not an easy challenge to confront in a country rife with graft. However, in recent weeks efforts to provide greater transparency, which are considered indispensable to provide more tools to corruption-fighters, have faced significant resistance from the country’s parliament.

At the end of September, Indonesia’s parliament diluted the powers of the country’s special Corrupt Crimes Court and the independent Corruption Eradication Commission (known as the KPK), arguing that their powers were too far-reaching. The KPK can conduct wiretaps without a warrant, while the Court is known to hand down harsher sentences than Indonesia’s regular judiciary. But advocates of the institutions claimed that the impact of the highly-effective Court and KPK will decline if constraints are imposed and that any backtracking will raise red flags among investors.

In the end, much to the dismay and resistance of President Yudhoyono, parliament managed to weaken both institutions. Although intervention by the president prevented the dissolution of the KPK’s right to prosecute and tap telephones, the bill passed by parliament allows for the Court to staff a majority of its judges from the regular justice system. Previously, a majority of the judges had to come from outside of the government—including practicing lawyers, academics, and retired prosecutors, among others. As career judges do not tend to have impeccable reputations in corruption cases in Indonesia, such a requirement was seen to allow the court more independence.

The weakening of the KPK and the Corrupt Crimes Court was not the only blow to Indonesia’s anticorruption efforts last month. On September 15, Indonesian police named two of the four deputy chairmen of the KPK as suspects in a bribery case. The facts of the crime are a bit dubious (according to the Economist, one of the suspects was in Peru when he allegedly took a bribe in Jakarta), but nevertheless the two have been formally accused of abuse of power and taking bribes. To top off the anticorruption campaign’s woes, the well-respected head of the KPK went on trial in early October for allegedly masterminding the drive-by shooting of Nasrudin Zulkarnaen, the state-owned pharmaceuticals company director, in what appears to be a love triangle-turned-deadly.   

Finally, the president’s new cabinet—expected to lack experience to carry out substantial economic overhaul—raises doubts among analysts that necessary institutional reforms to combat corruption will take place in the near future.

Combating graft is always a frustrating endeavor, let alone in one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and resistance to such efforts is nothing new.  Corruption is endemic to the expansive web of Indonesian bureaucracy as a result of Suharto’s 32-year-long presidency, a kleptocracy marked by brutality and cronyism. Following his death in 1998, corruption was so entrenched in the Indonesian bureaucratic apparatus that bribes were an expected part of nearly all citizen interactions with the state. Despite efforts to reduce opportunities for corruption, such practices have not been sufficiently abated. Note that petty corruption can be combated much more effectively through technocratic reforms than grand corruption, which inevitably hinges on political will.The KPK was created in 2003 to investigate large-scale corruption, defined as official misconduct that cost the state more than US$85,000. Its success at first was highly mixed and it was criticized for failing to convict prosecutors and police. According to Freedom in the World, a 2008 survey revealed that while the KPK is considered highly credible relative to other Indonesian government institutions, almost three-fourths of those polled thought the Commission had not created enough of a “culture of shame” to prevent state officials from engaging in corruption.

However, in more recent years, the Commission has been lauded for its progress, albeit modest, in rooting out corruption and improving Indonesia’s image. According to the New York Times, since 2003 the commission has achieved a 100 percent conviction rate in 86 cases of bribery and graft brought to trial. In 2008, specifically, a string of high-level prosecutions helped solidify the legitimacy of the Commission and fostered an increased fear of prosecution within Indonesia’s political institutions. That October, the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia was slapped with a five-year sentence for embezzling US$10.3 million in central bank funds. Though critics claimed that such a sentence was not harsh enough to serve as an effective deterrent, generally speaking it was seen as a step in the right direction.

Efforts to combat corruption have been made on a more macro level as well. Direct elections at the local level, held since 2005, have helped to reduce patronage. A number of local initiatives, for example, have reduced the likelihood of bribery by simplifying the process of obtaining business permits and making secondary school applications an online process. Such efforts bumped up Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index; in 2007, Indonesia was ranked 143rd of 180 countries (with 180 being Somalia, the most corrupt), while in 2008, it moved up to 126th place.

That said, 126th place is still not an enviable place to be. Corruption is still rampant in all branches of government on both the local and national level and impunity is pervasive. Moreover, with the recent pushback by Parliament, it appears that the reform project is at risk of backsliding.

Few countries have managed to successfully wage the battle against corruption without setbacks. However, given the fight’s centrality to the future of Indonesia’s institutions and the country’s ability to sustain economic growth, President Yudhoyono should certainly consider spending some of his hard-earned political capital to ensure that Indonesia’s reputation as a country on the right trajectory remains intact.           

Heavy Hitters Face Hardcore Challenges in Haiti

 Photo Credit: Flickr users World Economic Forum and M-J Milloy

On August 11, Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, named Dr. Paul Farmer as his deputy. These posts were recently created by the UN in an effort to more effectively promote economic development in the turmoil-racked country. In recent years, both Clinton and Farmer have demonstrated their dedication to aiding Haiti, the Western Hemisphere’s poorest nation. As president, Clinton sent the U.S. military into Haiti in 1994 in order to return democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his post, subsequently turning the operation over to a UN force. While this effort was not successful in the long-run, Clinton remained committed to assisting the nation through other means, in large part through his foundation’s work to combat HIV/AIDS and support recovery efforts after 2008’s destructive hurricanes. Paul Farmer, the co-founder of Partners in Health, an international nonprofit that provides health care services to the Haitian poor and carries out research and advocacy work, has received international acclaim for the work he has done to provide free medical treatment and promote social justice in Haiti throughout the past 3 decades.

With these two heavyweights now serving at the forefront of Haiti’s international advisory team, it is possible that the country might have a greater chance at combating its monumental economic, political, and environmental troubles. Both Clinton and Farmer bring impressive skills and a strong sense of optimism to the table. In fact, Clinton has stated, “I think Haiti, notwithstanding the total destruction of four storms last year, has the best chance to escape its dark history in the 35 years I've been going there …What I want to do is help the Haitian people take control of their own destiny." Nevertheless, Clinton and Farmer have their work cut out for them. The most dire and pressing issue facing Haiti is the nation’s soaring poverty level, which is complicated by a severe food shortage and deteriorating health conditions, along with the destruction left in the wake of last year’s storms. Over 80% of Haitians live in poverty, with the unemployment rate hovering around a shocking 90%. As the island is highly dependent on imports, the 2008 global food crisis hit it especially hard and sparked intense protests. The health of Haiti’s poor is deplorable; the country’s child mortality rates are sky-high, and 6% of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS. These problems are exacerbated and complicated by the government’s poor governance record. Haiti suffers from an extreme lack of services, unsurprising given the country’s political instability, ailing rule of law, and rampant corruption. While the country has recently made some governance improvements that will facilitate Clinton’s and Farmer’s efforts to drive development, colossal challenges remain.

In a March 2009 report, the International Crisis Group stressed that a major focal point of the Haitian government must be electoral and institutional reform efforts. Since its independence, Haiti’s political history has been dominated by instability including foreign intervention, military coups, flawed elections, and multiple authoritarian interludes. Most recently, the 2004 re-ouster of President Aristide split Haiti and left it with no functioning political institutions. Nevertheless, the country has made some strides toward institutional rebuilding in the past few years. In 2006, Haiti elected Rene Preval, who has received international acclaim for his attempts to address unemployment and poverty during a previous term, to the presidency in a free and fair contest that was lauded as “a step toward political stability” and subsequently restored an elected parliament. However, yet another political crisis shook Haiti when Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis was ousted from his post by a Senate vote in the midst of last April’s deadly food protests; the post remained vacant until September, when Michele Pierre-Louis was approved. Furthermore, congressional elections originally scheduled for December 2007 were postponed until this year, which resulted in Senate inactivity as the body was frequently inquorate. The country’s persistent state of institutional instability has effectively stymied any progress on the development of anti-poverty and healthcare programs, along with the effective use of foreign assistance. In fact, it has led most international donors to filter money through NGOs rather than the government – the lack of accountability within the country’s civil society sector notwithstanding.

The absence of effective rule of law in the country is equally troubling. As an ICG report explains, “The state is able to guarantee neither the security of its citizens nor the rights of defendants.” More specifically, lawlessness and crime have reigned supreme since the collapse of the police force following the events of 2004. Gangs have gained control of large areas and committed kidnappings, murders, and other violent crimes against helpless citizens. Unfortunately, these crimes are largely met with impunity due to the dysfunctional state of the country’s judicial system.  Nevertheless, according to the UN, the security situation has been moderately ameliorated. Crime rates are down following efforts by the Haitian police, with the assistance of UN forces, to dismantle the gangs and reinstate control over gang territories. In addition, the UN forces have succeeded in increasing the number of police from 5,000 in 2005 to 9,000 today. Nevertheless, as another ICG report argues, much remains to be done in order to consolidate effective security sector reform.  The report claims that the police force requires further professionalization and that the vetting and training process must become more transparent in order to address concerns regarding personnel guilty of human rights violations and corruption. Human Rights Watch corroborated this, arguing that kidnappings and other crimes persist at an alarming rate while both police lawlessness and a lack of justice continue unchecked. As such, the internal security crisis continues to undermine domestic and international efforts to implement anti-poverty and hurricane recovery efforts and attract foreign direct investment.

Finally, endemic corruption continues to be an especially pernicious problem. In its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Haiti 177 out of 180 countries, with only Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia in worse condition. Preval has made some efforts to eradicate corruption by requiring the disclosure of top government officials’ assets and purging corrupt police officers from the force, but the entrenched, pervasive nature of the problem will require a more systematic approach.

There is no denying the fact that Haiti and its new UN envoys have a long road ahead of them. The country continues to face substantial challenges in all realms of governance and as a result, sustainable progress on economic development issues will be slow. That said, Haiti’s institutions have been rebuilt since the post-2004 nadir and political stability and internal security have improved mildly. In addition, as the new UN appointments, recent U.S. trade legislation offering Haiti duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets, and international pledges of additional aid demonstrate, the international community, especially the United States, may have finally become more committed to encouraging development in the country. While UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s statement that “Haiti stands a better chance than almost any emerging economy…to prosper” may be somewhat hyperbolic, that he said it all symbolizes an important change in expectations for the country.

Can Incremental Change Turn the Tide in Tumultous Pakistan?

Photo Credit: Flickr user U.S. Department of State

In July and August, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, announced two high-profile reform initiatives to improve governance: an electronic governance program and a wide-ranging reform of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The E-governance initiative envisages the computerization of government services from voting to the viewing of land records, thereby increasing the ease and frequency of people’s interaction with the state and promoting transparency and reliability. The reform of the FATA is a far more ambitious project as those regions have previously had a centralized regime with political activity banned, a system reminiscent of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Zardari plans to bring the population of the territory into the mainstream political system by allowing them to join and vote for parties and ending particularly hard-edged tribal measures such as detention without trial and communal punishment.

These are indeed significant strides, but it is debatable whether Zardari, with limited experience in public service and political capital stemming mainly from his status as the widower of the assassinated Benazir Bhutto, will be able to successfully implement such ambitious changes. Expectations were low at the onset of his presidency. Even though Zardari publicly expressed his commitment to gradual democratization during and after his presidential campaign, he is widely believed to have forsaken the Charter of Democracy, which was the outcome of a May 2006 meeting between Bhutto and her long-time political rival, Nawaz Sharif. In that meeting, they established common ground against the Pervez Musharraf-led military junta, including rescinding the power of the president and ending the executive appointment of judges. Zardari has officially signed on to this agreement, but has taken no steps to implement it. One of the primary issues is Article 58(2)(b): allowing for the dissolution of the National Assembly and sacking of the prime minister by the president. Zardari has deemed the internal security situation too serious for this and other powers of the president to be stripped and fears that restoring the judiciary would undermine his rule. Another hallmark of the military’s rule that has stayed fully implemented are the oaths of loyalty extracted from judges, a controversial step initiated by Musharraf in 2007. Furthermore, Zardari’s mindset brings him into frequent conflict with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, who is unenthusiastic about Zardari’s policies and appointment of friends with no political experience into important positions.

In addition to adopting this undedicated approach to democratic reform, Zardari has implemented several policies with distinctly authoritarian features. For example, he recently passed the Cyber Crimes Act, under which jokes that insult the political leadership electronically can be traced and the people responsible prosecuted. Furthermore, Zardari’s decision to authorize the use of force against protestors demonstrating in favor of the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to his post earlier this year also raised eyebrows.

If there is one area where Zardari’s influence is more positive, it is his view of Pakistan’s security situation. Zardari is not immersed in the military’s security culture, which has centered on India as Pakistan’s primary adversary to such a degree that tolerance and even cooperation with militant groups has been notoriously common. Zardari, whether out of conviction or in response to international admonitions, has shown greater signs than did Musharraf of understanding that the primary threat to the government may in fact come from within and internal militants must be confronted. However, it has yet to be seen whether his viewpoint will be translated into effective action; while the Pakistani security forces have made some strides in reclaiming the Swat valley from militants and putting pressure on radical forces in South Waziristan, the prospects of improving governance enough to make these gains sustainable remains uncertain at best.

To make matters worse for the population, the economy has come close to complete collapse since 2008, with the agricultural sector – which provides employment for 44% of the workforce – taking especially severe hits in the last two decades due to economic modernization as well as crop failure in 2007-2008. Combined with the political instability that has ravaged the country this decade, both GDP and the nation’s exports have fallen significantly. Though this is not entirely Zardari’s fault, there has been a marked absence of plans for agricultural reform or the building of infrastructure, and many segments of the population, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas, are slowly falling back upon remittances sent by family working abroad to live. According to Minister of Finance Shaukat Tarin, this lack of planning is largely the result of bureaucratic mismanagement. More specifically, Shaukat argues that “there’s no performance management…no merit, a lot of nepotism.”

This economic decline has only been exacerbated by rampant corruption. Two examples in particular of companies being stripped of their assets are the crashes of Pakistan Steel and Pakistan International Airlines, both great domestic successes whose resources were whittled away. The downfall of these two companies was largely brought about by the corrupt practices of the government cronies who made up their upper management. For firms with looser government ties, corruption, and more particularly graft, is an equally destructive problem. A recent World Bank report found that “Corruption…is largely associated with the business-government interface…it is common for firms in Pakistan to pay informal payments to government officials to get things done.” The report noted that 57% of Pakistani firms consider corruption to be a severe constraint. Unfortunately, Zardari has not made a dedicated effort to tackle this destructive governance scourge since taking office. Under Zardari’s tenure, investigation into corruption allegations, especially those stemming from Musharraf’s reign, has been negligible. Alarmingly, both foreign assistance and internal funding for social welfare programs have also been lost to corruption. A recent Foreign Policy article reported that U.S. aid has enriched officials in the Pakistani army and intelligence service, whose influence in the country has enabled them to form their own powerful patronage networks, rather than contributing to the building of a stronger civilian government with greater control over these institutions. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International ranked Pakistan a dismal 134 out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perception Index.

As the above shows, Zardari has yet to take the steps necessary to achieve qualitative government improvements. As such, while the passage of new governance reforms is in itself encouraging, the chances that the E-governance initiative and the FATA reforms will be fully carried out, let alone bring about real change, is questionable. Zardari’s dubious degree of dedication, along with his understandable preoccupation with the country’s worsening security situation, suggests that these initiatives may well join others on the long list of Pakistan’s stalled reform efforts.

The Johnson-Sirleaf Allegations: A Bump in the Road to Liberian Reconstruction?

Photo Credit: Flickr user World Economic Forum

In early July, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, president of Liberia since January 2006 and the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa, was accused of having indirectly given funds to former president Charles Taylor, who is currently on trial for war crimes at The Hague. The allegation from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an independent body established in 2005 to investigate Liberia’s bloody past, has caught the nation and its foreign backers off guard, as Johnson-Sirleaf is seen as the linchpin of the country’s stability. Even more disturbing is the commission’s recommendation that she be banned from holding public office for 30 years. She has previously admitted that she had formal ties with Charles Taylor as they both rose to prominence fighting Samuel Doe’s oppressive regime in the late 1980s. However, she has denied ever being a member of Taylor’s movement and says she regrets her involvement with Taylor. Considering Liberia’s record, the fact that an independent body could arrive at and publicize such a conclusion is cause for celebration. Nevertheless, removing Johnson-Sirleaf from office could deal a serious blow to her administration’s tangible successes in governance and reconstruction, though these have been tempered by consistent setbacks and lingering concerns.

Five years after the end of its brutal 14-year internal conflict, Liberia continues to suffer from a major governance deficit. The biggest challenge is security reform, entailing not just police and military training, but also the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants. There have been steady gains in the latter effort, with over 70,000 combatants disarmed between 1998 and 2002, and over 75 percent applying to join reintegration programs. Provisions for the return of 750,000 displaced civilians were also implemented quickly and efficiently, and both programs have assisted Liberians with job training and recruitment.

Police and military reform has made slower progress. The old military was deactivated in 2003, and responsibility for internal security was transferred to UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia). The task of rebuilding the army fell to the United States, while the UN tackled police training. The U.S.-led military reform project was outsourced to the private contractors DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers, whose culturally insensitive approach has complicated the process. Moreover, funding problems have delayed the vetting and recruitment of new soldiers and reduced training on human rights and civil-military relations. To the U.S. government’s credit, the mission has recently received more attention, and a number of Marine Corps advisers were deployed in January to step up training. And despite the delays, the final results have been generally satisfactory. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, army reform is considered “a provisional success,” given that 2,000 Liberian privates have now been trained.

Meanwhile, UNMIL’s police reforms have suffered from insufficient funding, flawed recruitment, and the lack of momentum associated with operations in which no single nation takes the lead. Today, the Liberian police continue to engage in deplorable and often criminal behavior, and have been generally unable to address the worsening internal security situation. The service is also apparently rife with corruption. As a result, the 13,000-strong UNMIL force has stayed on and even increased its numbers in recent years. The police therefore have little incentive to intensify training, which has been far less thorough than the army’s. The one real success story of the UNMIL effort has been the development of the new Emergency Response Unit as a dependable force.

Some have argued that Johnson-Sirleaf should be more actively involved in the reform process, and on some of the other rule of law issues for which the president is directly responsible, she has failed to make substantial headway. Notably, judicial reform has made little progress, and there have been a number of high-level cases in which the course of justice has been perverted. The country’s most prevalent judicial deficiencies include a paucity of trained legal personnel, a lack of infrastructure, and outdated rules of procedure. Impunity also continues to hamper reform, especially with respect to abuses committed during the internal conflict.

Nevertheless, Johnson-Sirleaf’s record is generally impressive when it comes to other pressing governance concerns. Last year, she laid out a three-year poverty reduction strategy with four pillars: peace and security, governance and the rule of law, infrastructure and basic services, and economic revitalization. While progress has been sluggish on rule of law issues, Johnson-Sirleaf has already made a substantial effort to deliver on her other promises. Indeed, in the 2008 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Liberia moved up six places between 2005 and 2006, placing it at 38th among sub-Saharan countries, with a score of 48.7 out of 100. The area where Liberia’s progress has been the most dramatic is economic development, and here Johnson-Sirleaf, a Harvard-trained economist and former finance minister, has proven instrumental. Recent progress has been fueled by foreign aid and investment, with many companies seeing great opportunities in the nation’s natural resources, which had been neglected during the civil wars. This financial stimulus has driven the rapid development of Liberia’s infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, and facilitated annual economic growth rates of about 8 percent. Johnson-Sirleaf made a campaign pledge to restore electricity to Monrovia by July 26, 2006, and this was accomplished, albeit with significantly less coverage than originally planned. Forest management has emerged as a way to both create jobs and earn export revenues in a transparent and sustainable manner. The president’s “zero-tolerance” approach to combating entrenched corruption has helped to remove an obstacle that had thwarted economic growth and denied Liberian citizens basic services for years. While several high-profile corruption scandals involving top officials have weighed down her efforts, the president successfully oversaw the creation of the country’s first Anti-Corruption Commission, along with the dismissal or arrest of numerous corrupt officials in 2008. On July 10 of this year, she signed a new transparency law aimed at eradicating corruption from the country’s lucrative extractive industries.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work is of exceptional importance to Liberia’s post-conflict reconstruction process. However, the benefits of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s leadership, particularly with respect to development and governance improvements, are also undeniable. In this case, a line may need to be drawn between those who actively facilitated the civil war and those who were caught up in it and naturally took sides. Johnson-Sirleaf seems to belong to the latter group. Before ruling on the commission’s recommendation, the Liberian parliament should fully evaluate the gravity of the matter, and consider both the gains Johnson-Sirleaf has brought to Liberia and the losses that could accrue if she were forced out of the picture.

Note: This is an update of an entry that was initially posted at 11:27 AM.

Can a Concert Kill Cambodian Corruption?

Photo: Billboard depicting the official symbol of the Cambodian Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption's 1 Million Signatures Campaign; Photo Credit: Flickr user chrislang

On May 30, Cambodian nongovernmental organizations including Pact Cambodia and members of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption joined together to put on the “Clean Hands Concert,” an event that was geared towards raising awareness of the country’s grave corruption problem. Roughly 50,000 people attended the event, an enormous turnout for such an event.  The concert took place on the 1 year anniversary of the 1 Million Signatures Campaign, a movement that was geared towards garnering support and political will for the passage of an anticorruption law. In the opening speech, U.S. Ambassador Carol Rodley claimed that corruption was a major impediment to economic growth in the country. She argued that corruption costs Cambodia up to $500 million per year in lost revenue. In response, the Cambodian government vehemently denied these claims.  Hor Nambora, the Cambodian ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated that Rodley had joined forces with such anticorruption agencies as Global Witness, “which continually engages in virulent and malicious campaigns against the Royal Government of Cambodia.”

Both the concert’s high turn-out and the government’s harsh rhetorical response to the concert speak volumes about the immense magnitude of Cambodia’s corruption problem. The 2006 Countries at the Crossroads Report on Cambodia echoes Ambassador Rodley’s recent claim, noting that roughly 10% of Cambodia’s GDP is lost to corruption. The report explains that the possibilities for graft are endless in the country’s “cumbersome, politicized, and unregulated” bureaucracy. In addition, it notes that corruption permeates all of Cambodia’s institutions, especially the judiciary. Over the past few years, the scourge of corruption has continued unchecked. In a recent report, Global Witness argues that Cambodia is run by a kleptocratic elite that clandestinely and corruptly allocates rights to oil, gas, and mineral exploitation. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International also ranked Cambodia  a dismal 166th out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, in Transparency’s 2009 Corruption Barometer, fully 47% of Cambodian respondents reported paying a bribe in the last 12 months.

Despite the clearly negative consequences created by the problem, the administration of Prime Minister Hun Sen has been extremely recalcitrant on the issue of anticorruption measures. Sen, a former Khmer Rouge and key leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) who became Prime Minister after staging a coup in 1997, has not succeeded in passing any notable anticorruption legislation. The long-awaited Anticorruption Law, which was first drafted in 1994, has remained in the hands of the Council of Ministers since 2006. Although the Coalition against Corruption presented the government with a petition signed by more than 1 million citizens requesting the enforcement of the anticorruption law, little further progress has been made on the matter. While several Cambodian parties responded to the group’s request, the ruling CPP remained entirely silent. As a result, there are still no functioning independent anticorruption bodies. In addition, even if this law is eventually passed, it presently falls short of international standards.

While an effective response to Cambodian corruption lags, several developments have at least served to bring increased domestic and international attention to the issue. The signature campaign and the concert underscore the strength of the country’s anticorruption civil society movement, along with the high level of domestic support for anticorruption measures. In addition, a high-profile judicial corruption case has increased international awareness of the pervasive corruption plaguing the country’s judicial system. The UN is currently investigating charges that Cambodian personnel employed by the UN-backed Khmer Rouge Tribunal, were forced to pay kickbacks in order to obtain and retain their positions. While this case certainly made the problem more apparent to international actors, it also highlighted the immensely graft-ridden nature of Cambodian government and society.

Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging the problem and working with both the domestic and international civil society movement to combat corruption, the Cambodian government has assumed the defensive. Since the Clean Hands Concert, the government has frequently claimed that anticorruption organizations are united in a struggle to undermine the Cambodian government with false and disparaging remarks. On June 6, popular comedian Chy Koy characterized anticorruption NGOs as “money hungry fabricators of non-existent corruption” when he appeared on the CPP-owned television station. This NGO-related conspiracy theory is one of many contrived by the Cambodian government of late. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the government allows these NGOs to operate relatively freely, and in this case to organize a high-profile concert aimed at chiding the government for its inaction on corruption, provides some evidence that the environment in Cambodia is not entirely repressive.   

Unfortunately, however, the government's tolerance for civil society and criticism seems to be waning. In September of 2008, Sen exclaimed that "Cambodia has been a heaven for NGOs for too long...the NGOs are out of control...". At the same time,he called for the revival of a restrictive NGO law.  In addition, the government's verbal attacks on anti-corruption NGOs are being carried out alongside agreater campaign against government criticism. For example, the government has used criminal defamation laws to intimidate and imprison activists, union leaders, and journalists alike.  In this inauspicious climate, it seems unlikely that the Cambodia will engage in a dialogue with the government-critical anticorruption movement. The fight against graft officially remains a high-priority government issue for the 2008-2013 mandate. Nevertheless, the government’s past reluctance and present state of denial seem to spell further delays, and even setbacks, in the effort to rid Cambodia of this governance scourge.

Chavez's Post-Referendum Offensive

Photo Credit: Flickr user !Que comunismo!

Hugo Chavez has continued his attacks on his chief television adversary, Globovision, with a personal phone call two weeks ago to the station’s executives warning them to “behave correctly.” Invective against Globovision is nothing new, with Chavez frequently calling for its closure and even labeling its work as “media terrorism.” The station has been a vociferous critic of Chavez and has been accused by the president of trying to thwart the efforts of the elected government and even promoting his assassination. In an address to Latin American diplomats in Washington last April, Andrés Izarra, a former media executive and now Venezuelan government official, likened Globovisión's coverage to Rwandan radio broadcasts that helped provoke genocide in 1994. 

Chavez has recently stepped up his criticism of the channel, matching words with actions. This month, the station was slapped with a US$4.19 million fine for alleged unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the station’s top executive’s home was raided in May by more than 100 Venezuelan police officers accusing him of running a car smuggling ring  (Globovision’s President, Guillermo Zuloaga, co-owns a Toyota dealership). Both investigations were undertaken at the request of pro-Chavez lawmakers. New charges were brought against the station for supposedly breaking the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television (Ley Resorte), a vague law criticized by human rights groups for its potential to hinder media freedoms.

Indeed, the media has been a battleground since Chavez’s election in 1998 and, more acutely, since a brief 2002 coup. RCTV, Venezuela’s oldest television channel, was not allowed to renew its terrestrial broadcast license in 2007 after being accused of supporting the coup against Chavez and the subsequent oil strike that sought to topple the government. The recent campaign against Globovision is also directly linked to the network’s involvement in opposition activities. In the case at hand, Globovision has been accused of giving air-time to opposition organizations including Women for Liberty and Democratic Renewal, without paying the requisite taxes. 

RCTV, Globovision, and two other networks, Televen and Venevision, had openly supported the unseating of Chavez and played key roles in the 2002 coup attempt through media blackouts and selective coverage. Few contest the fact that RCTV and other stations have taken sides, often aggressively, against Chavez, with commentators openly calling for his demise. Pressure on the government by Televen and Venevision eased notably in following years, however, and unsurprisingly, they have been the target of far less official attention.

"I'm happy that the institutions are working, we have to keep moving against impunity. Let them say what they'll say," Chavez is quoted as saying by AFP. Indeed, several weeks before, Chavez ordered the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to “fulfill your obligation” and take action against Globovision in light of their breaking a story on a minor recent earthquake which the government had not yet reported. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in particular, makes clear that Chavez’s notion of “institutions working” apparently does not include the idea of separation of powers.

Such moves against Globovision must be seen in light of a broader effort by the Chavez government to deepen the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” after the February referendum that removed term limits for public officials, thus allowing Chavez to run for a third term in 2012. Chavez terms this new push the “third phase” of the revolution.

Following the election, Michael Shifter, of the US-based think-tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that “[Chavez is] going to be very emboldened. He’s going to move ahead in radical fashion with his revolution.” Shifter’s words were prescient.

Chavez’s efforts to bolster the revolution post-referendum have principally focused on a specific set of issues: 1. Reining in unruly media outlets, especially Globovision; 2. Undermining the power of both private and public sector unions; 3. Continuing with his agenda of nationalization and expropriation of foreign companies operating in Venezuela; 4. Weakening opposition parties; and 5. Accruing powers for the central government at the expense of local governments.

Chavez’s attempts at undermining the power of unions that oppose or contradict his revolutionary vision is not new. In its report, A Decade Under Chavez, Human Rights Watch states,"The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by promoting state interference in union elections, refusing to bargain collectively with established unions, and engaging in favoritism toward pro-government unions. It has also punished workers with job dismissals and blacklisting for legitimate strike activity. And it has supported the creation of alternative labor organizations that undercut the country's labor laws, risk undermining established unions, and leave workers particularly vulnerable to political discrimination."

This judgment was echoed by a Freedom House report from last year, Freedom of Association Under Threat. A bill that was recently introduced in the National Assembly would cripple unions by eliminating collective bargaining and giving powers in regards to labor matters to “worker’s councils,” usually controlled by ruling party members.

Chavez has also continued his plan to nationalize both foreign and domestic companies. In March, Chavez expropriated local operations of US food giant Cargill, accusing the company of avoiding price controls. While the petrochemicals industry has already witnessed substantial intervention, along with steel, cement, electricity and telecommunications, the May announcement that a set of privately owned oil services firms would be taken over marked a new foray into the country’s dominant economic sector.

Chavez has also continued to undermine democratic freedoms through attacks on opposition members and weakening the country’s local leaders. Manuel Rosales, the main opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and recently elected mayor of Venezuela’s second largest city, was recently forced to seek asylum in Peru after being charged with corruption. Other prominent opposition members including former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel have also been placed under investigation on corruption charges. In addition, Chavez has stepped up his offensive against regional governors, who won victories in some important states in last November’s regional and local elections, by pushing a law through the Parliament which would see their powers diminished by regional “vice presidents” subordinate to the President.

With oil prices rising again, opposition members fleeing the country, and media outlets in the crosshairs, it looks as though there is little to slow Chavez’s offensive in the short term. In a recent statement reported by Reuters, Chavez stated to his party stalwarts: "I've said it before and I repeat, we must keep up the offensive, bulldozing the counter-revolution. We can no longer be the idiots we were." If Chavez has made one thing clear during his ten years in power, it’s that when he says he’ll do something, it probably will happen. Such is the personalist nature of 21st century socialism.