Freedom at Issue

Corruption-Fighters in Indonesia Feel Pushback

Photo credit: Flickr user London Summit

Indonesian President began his second five-year term on Tuesday, following a resounding electoral victory in July. His success at the polls has been attributed in part to his tough stance on corruption—not an easy challenge to confront in a country rife with graft. However, in recent weeks efforts to provide greater transparency, which are considered indispensable to provide more tools to corruption-fighters, have faced significant resistance from the country’s parliament.

At the end of September, Indonesia’s parliament diluted the powers of the country’s special Corrupt Crimes Court and the independent Corruption Eradication Commission (known as the KPK), arguing that their powers were too far-reaching. The KPK can conduct wiretaps without a warrant, while the Court is known to hand down harsher sentences than Indonesia’s regular judiciary. But advocates of the institutions claimed that the impact of the highly-effective Court and KPK will decline if constraints are imposed and that any backtracking will raise red flags among investors.

In the end, much to the dismay and resistance of President Yudhoyono, parliament managed to weaken both institutions. Although intervention by the president prevented the dissolution of the KPK’s right to prosecute and tap telephones, the bill passed by parliament allows for the Court to staff a majority of its judges from the regular justice system. Previously, a majority of the judges had to come from outside of the government—including practicing lawyers, academics, and retired prosecutors, among others. As career judges do not tend to have impeccable reputations in corruption cases in Indonesia, such a requirement was seen to allow the court more independence.

The weakening of the KPK and the Corrupt Crimes Court was not the only blow to Indonesia’s anticorruption efforts last month. On September 15, Indonesian police named two of the four deputy chairmen of the KPK as suspects in a bribery case. The facts of the crime are a bit dubious (according to the Economist, one of the suspects was in Peru when he allegedly took a bribe in Jakarta), but nevertheless the two have been formally accused of abuse of power and taking bribes. To top off the anticorruption campaign’s woes, the well-respected head of the KPK went on trial in early October for allegedly masterminding the drive-by shooting of Nasrudin Zulkarnaen, the state-owned pharmaceuticals company director, in what appears to be a love triangle-turned-deadly.   

Finally, the president’s new cabinet—expected to lack experience to carry out substantial economic overhaul—raises doubts among analysts that necessary institutional reforms to combat corruption will take place in the near future.

Combating graft is always a frustrating endeavor, let alone in one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and resistance to such efforts is nothing new.  Corruption is endemic to the expansive web of Indonesian bureaucracy as a result of Suharto’s 32-year-long presidency, a kleptocracy marked by brutality and cronyism. Following his death in 1998, corruption was so entrenched in the Indonesian bureaucratic apparatus that bribes were an expected part of nearly all citizen interactions with the state. Despite efforts to reduce opportunities for corruption, such practices have not been sufficiently abated. Note that petty corruption can be combated much more effectively through technocratic reforms than grand corruption, which inevitably hinges on political will.The KPK was created in 2003 to investigate large-scale corruption, defined as official misconduct that cost the state more than US$85,000. Its success at first was highly mixed and it was criticized for failing to convict prosecutors and police. According to Freedom in the World, a 2008 survey revealed that while the KPK is considered highly credible relative to other Indonesian government institutions, almost three-fourths of those polled thought the Commission had not created enough of a “culture of shame” to prevent state officials from engaging in corruption.

However, in more recent years, the Commission has been lauded for its progress, albeit modest, in rooting out corruption and improving Indonesia’s image. According to the New York Times, since 2003 the commission has achieved a 100 percent conviction rate in 86 cases of bribery and graft brought to trial. In 2008, specifically, a string of high-level prosecutions helped solidify the legitimacy of the Commission and fostered an increased fear of prosecution within Indonesia’s political institutions. That October, the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia was slapped with a five-year sentence for embezzling US$10.3 million in central bank funds. Though critics claimed that such a sentence was not harsh enough to serve as an effective deterrent, generally speaking it was seen as a step in the right direction.

Efforts to combat corruption have been made on a more macro level as well. Direct elections at the local level, held since 2005, have helped to reduce patronage. A number of local initiatives, for example, have reduced the likelihood of bribery by simplifying the process of obtaining business permits and making secondary school applications an online process. Such efforts bumped up Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index; in 2007, Indonesia was ranked 143rd of 180 countries (with 180 being Somalia, the most corrupt), while in 2008, it moved up to 126th place.

That said, 126th place is still not an enviable place to be. Corruption is still rampant in all branches of government on both the local and national level and impunity is pervasive. Moreover, with the recent pushback by Parliament, it appears that the reform project is at risk of backsliding.

Few countries have managed to successfully wage the battle against corruption without setbacks. However, given the fight’s centrality to the future of Indonesia’s institutions and the country’s ability to sustain economic growth, President Yudhoyono should certainly consider spending some of his hard-earned political capital to ensure that Indonesia’s reputation as a country on the right trajectory remains intact.           

Heavy Hitters Face Hardcore Challenges in Haiti

 Photo Credit: Flickr users World Economic Forum and M-J Milloy

On August 11, Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, named Dr. Paul Farmer as his deputy. These posts were recently created by the UN in an effort to more effectively promote economic development in the turmoil-racked country. In recent years, both Clinton and Farmer have demonstrated their dedication to aiding Haiti, the Western Hemisphere’s poorest nation. As president, Clinton sent the U.S. military into Haiti in 1994 in order to return democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his post, subsequently turning the operation over to a UN force. While this effort was not successful in the long-run, Clinton remained committed to assisting the nation through other means, in large part through his foundation’s work to combat HIV/AIDS and support recovery efforts after 2008’s destructive hurricanes. Paul Farmer, the co-founder of Partners in Health, an international nonprofit that provides health care services to the Haitian poor and carries out research and advocacy work, has received international acclaim for the work he has done to provide free medical treatment and promote social justice in Haiti throughout the past 3 decades.

With these two heavyweights now serving at the forefront of Haiti’s international advisory team, it is possible that the country might have a greater chance at combating its monumental economic, political, and environmental troubles. Both Clinton and Farmer bring impressive skills and a strong sense of optimism to the table. In fact, Clinton has stated, “I think Haiti, notwithstanding the total destruction of four storms last year, has the best chance to escape its dark history in the 35 years I've been going there …What I want to do is help the Haitian people take control of their own destiny." Nevertheless, Clinton and Farmer have their work cut out for them. The most dire and pressing issue facing Haiti is the nation’s soaring poverty level, which is complicated by a severe food shortage and deteriorating health conditions, along with the destruction left in the wake of last year’s storms. Over 80% of Haitians live in poverty, with the unemployment rate hovering around a shocking 90%. As the island is highly dependent on imports, the 2008 global food crisis hit it especially hard and sparked intense protests. The health of Haiti’s poor is deplorable; the country’s child mortality rates are sky-high, and 6% of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS. These problems are exacerbated and complicated by the government’s poor governance record. Haiti suffers from an extreme lack of services, unsurprising given the country’s political instability, ailing rule of law, and rampant corruption. While the country has recently made some governance improvements that will facilitate Clinton’s and Farmer’s efforts to drive development, colossal challenges remain.

In a March 2009 report, the International Crisis Group stressed that a major focal point of the Haitian government must be electoral and institutional reform efforts. Since its independence, Haiti’s political history has been dominated by instability including foreign intervention, military coups, flawed elections, and multiple authoritarian interludes. Most recently, the 2004 re-ouster of President Aristide split Haiti and left it with no functioning political institutions. Nevertheless, the country has made some strides toward institutional rebuilding in the past few years. In 2006, Haiti elected Rene Preval, who has received international acclaim for his attempts to address unemployment and poverty during a previous term, to the presidency in a free and fair contest that was lauded as “a step toward political stability” and subsequently restored an elected parliament. However, yet another political crisis shook Haiti when Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis was ousted from his post by a Senate vote in the midst of last April’s deadly food protests; the post remained vacant until September, when Michele Pierre-Louis was approved. Furthermore, congressional elections originally scheduled for December 2007 were postponed until this year, which resulted in Senate inactivity as the body was frequently inquorate. The country’s persistent state of institutional instability has effectively stymied any progress on the development of anti-poverty and healthcare programs, along with the effective use of foreign assistance. In fact, it has led most international donors to filter money through NGOs rather than the government – the lack of accountability within the country’s civil society sector notwithstanding.

The absence of effective rule of law in the country is equally troubling. As an ICG report explains, “The state is able to guarantee neither the security of its citizens nor the rights of defendants.” More specifically, lawlessness and crime have reigned supreme since the collapse of the police force following the events of 2004. Gangs have gained control of large areas and committed kidnappings, murders, and other violent crimes against helpless citizens. Unfortunately, these crimes are largely met with impunity due to the dysfunctional state of the country’s judicial system.  Nevertheless, according to the UN, the security situation has been moderately ameliorated. Crime rates are down following efforts by the Haitian police, with the assistance of UN forces, to dismantle the gangs and reinstate control over gang territories. In addition, the UN forces have succeeded in increasing the number of police from 5,000 in 2005 to 9,000 today. Nevertheless, as another ICG report argues, much remains to be done in order to consolidate effective security sector reform.  The report claims that the police force requires further professionalization and that the vetting and training process must become more transparent in order to address concerns regarding personnel guilty of human rights violations and corruption. Human Rights Watch corroborated this, arguing that kidnappings and other crimes persist at an alarming rate while both police lawlessness and a lack of justice continue unchecked. As such, the internal security crisis continues to undermine domestic and international efforts to implement anti-poverty and hurricane recovery efforts and attract foreign direct investment.

Finally, endemic corruption continues to be an especially pernicious problem. In its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Haiti 177 out of 180 countries, with only Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia in worse condition. Preval has made some efforts to eradicate corruption by requiring the disclosure of top government officials’ assets and purging corrupt police officers from the force, but the entrenched, pervasive nature of the problem will require a more systematic approach.

There is no denying the fact that Haiti and its new UN envoys have a long road ahead of them. The country continues to face substantial challenges in all realms of governance and as a result, sustainable progress on economic development issues will be slow. That said, Haiti’s institutions have been rebuilt since the post-2004 nadir and political stability and internal security have improved mildly. In addition, as the new UN appointments, recent U.S. trade legislation offering Haiti duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets, and international pledges of additional aid demonstrate, the international community, especially the United States, may have finally become more committed to encouraging development in the country. While UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s statement that “Haiti stands a better chance than almost any emerging economy…to prosper” may be somewhat hyperbolic, that he said it all symbolizes an important change in expectations for the country.

Can Incremental Change Turn the Tide in Tumultous Pakistan?

Photo Credit: Flickr user U.S. Department of State

In July and August, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, announced two high-profile reform initiatives to improve governance: an electronic governance program and a wide-ranging reform of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The E-governance initiative envisages the computerization of government services from voting to the viewing of land records, thereby increasing the ease and frequency of people’s interaction with the state and promoting transparency and reliability. The reform of the FATA is a far more ambitious project as those regions have previously had a centralized regime with political activity banned, a system reminiscent of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Zardari plans to bring the population of the territory into the mainstream political system by allowing them to join and vote for parties and ending particularly hard-edged tribal measures such as detention without trial and communal punishment.

These are indeed significant strides, but it is debatable whether Zardari, with limited experience in public service and political capital stemming mainly from his status as the widower of the assassinated Benazir Bhutto, will be able to successfully implement such ambitious changes. Expectations were low at the onset of his presidency. Even though Zardari publicly expressed his commitment to gradual democratization during and after his presidential campaign, he is widely believed to have forsaken the Charter of Democracy, which was the outcome of a May 2006 meeting between Bhutto and her long-time political rival, Nawaz Sharif. In that meeting, they established common ground against the Pervez Musharraf-led military junta, including rescinding the power of the president and ending the executive appointment of judges. Zardari has officially signed on to this agreement, but has taken no steps to implement it. One of the primary issues is Article 58(2)(b): allowing for the dissolution of the National Assembly and sacking of the prime minister by the president. Zardari has deemed the internal security situation too serious for this and other powers of the president to be stripped and fears that restoring the judiciary would undermine his rule. Another hallmark of the military’s rule that has stayed fully implemented are the oaths of loyalty extracted from judges, a controversial step initiated by Musharraf in 2007. Furthermore, Zardari’s mindset brings him into frequent conflict with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, who is unenthusiastic about Zardari’s policies and appointment of friends with no political experience into important positions.

In addition to adopting this undedicated approach to democratic reform, Zardari has implemented several policies with distinctly authoritarian features. For example, he recently passed the Cyber Crimes Act, under which jokes that insult the political leadership electronically can be traced and the people responsible prosecuted. Furthermore, Zardari’s decision to authorize the use of force against protestors demonstrating in favor of the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to his post earlier this year also raised eyebrows.

If there is one area where Zardari’s influence is more positive, it is his view of Pakistan’s security situation. Zardari is not immersed in the military’s security culture, which has centered on India as Pakistan’s primary adversary to such a degree that tolerance and even cooperation with militant groups has been notoriously common. Zardari, whether out of conviction or in response to international admonitions, has shown greater signs than did Musharraf of understanding that the primary threat to the government may in fact come from within and internal militants must be confronted. However, it has yet to be seen whether his viewpoint will be translated into effective action; while the Pakistani security forces have made some strides in reclaiming the Swat valley from militants and putting pressure on radical forces in South Waziristan, the prospects of improving governance enough to make these gains sustainable remains uncertain at best.

To make matters worse for the population, the economy has come close to complete collapse since 2008, with the agricultural sector – which provides employment for 44% of the workforce – taking especially severe hits in the last two decades due to economic modernization as well as crop failure in 2007-2008. Combined with the political instability that has ravaged the country this decade, both GDP and the nation’s exports have fallen significantly. Though this is not entirely Zardari’s fault, there has been a marked absence of plans for agricultural reform or the building of infrastructure, and many segments of the population, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas, are slowly falling back upon remittances sent by family working abroad to live. According to Minister of Finance Shaukat Tarin, this lack of planning is largely the result of bureaucratic mismanagement. More specifically, Shaukat argues that “there’s no performance management…no merit, a lot of nepotism.”

This economic decline has only been exacerbated by rampant corruption. Two examples in particular of companies being stripped of their assets are the crashes of Pakistan Steel and Pakistan International Airlines, both great domestic successes whose resources were whittled away. The downfall of these two companies was largely brought about by the corrupt practices of the government cronies who made up their upper management. For firms with looser government ties, corruption, and more particularly graft, is an equally destructive problem. A recent World Bank report found that “Corruption…is largely associated with the business-government interface…it is common for firms in Pakistan to pay informal payments to government officials to get things done.” The report noted that 57% of Pakistani firms consider corruption to be a severe constraint. Unfortunately, Zardari has not made a dedicated effort to tackle this destructive governance scourge since taking office. Under Zardari’s tenure, investigation into corruption allegations, especially those stemming from Musharraf’s reign, has been negligible. Alarmingly, both foreign assistance and internal funding for social welfare programs have also been lost to corruption. A recent Foreign Policy article reported that U.S. aid has enriched officials in the Pakistani army and intelligence service, whose influence in the country has enabled them to form their own powerful patronage networks, rather than contributing to the building of a stronger civilian government with greater control over these institutions. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International ranked Pakistan a dismal 134 out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perception Index.

As the above shows, Zardari has yet to take the steps necessary to achieve qualitative government improvements. As such, while the passage of new governance reforms is in itself encouraging, the chances that the E-governance initiative and the FATA reforms will be fully carried out, let alone bring about real change, is questionable. Zardari’s dubious degree of dedication, along with his understandable preoccupation with the country’s worsening security situation, suggests that these initiatives may well join others on the long list of Pakistan’s stalled reform efforts.

The Johnson-Sirleaf Allegations: A Bump in the Road to Liberian Reconstruction?

Photo Credit: Flickr user World Economic Forum

In early July, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, president of Liberia since January 2006 and the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa, was accused of having indirectly given funds to former president Charles Taylor, who is currently on trial for war crimes at The Hague. The allegation from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an independent body established in 2005 to investigate Liberia’s bloody past, has caught the nation and its foreign backers off guard, as Johnson-Sirleaf is seen as the linchpin of the country’s stability. Even more disturbing is the commission’s recommendation that she be banned from holding public office for 30 years. She has previously admitted that she had formal ties with Charles Taylor as they both rose to prominence fighting Samuel Doe’s oppressive regime in the late 1980s. However, she has denied ever being a member of Taylor’s movement and says she regrets her involvement with Taylor. Considering Liberia’s record, the fact that an independent body could arrive at and publicize such a conclusion is cause for celebration. Nevertheless, removing Johnson-Sirleaf from office could deal a serious blow to her administration’s tangible successes in governance and reconstruction, though these have been tempered by consistent setbacks and lingering concerns.

Five years after the end of its brutal 14-year internal conflict, Liberia continues to suffer from a major governance deficit. The biggest challenge is security reform, entailing not just police and military training, but also the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants. There have been steady gains in the latter effort, with over 70,000 combatants disarmed between 1998 and 2002, and over 75 percent applying to join reintegration programs. Provisions for the return of 750,000 displaced civilians were also implemented quickly and efficiently, and both programs have assisted Liberians with job training and recruitment.

Police and military reform has made slower progress. The old military was deactivated in 2003, and responsibility for internal security was transferred to UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia). The task of rebuilding the army fell to the United States, while the UN tackled police training. The U.S.-led military reform project was outsourced to the private contractors DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers, whose culturally insensitive approach has complicated the process. Moreover, funding problems have delayed the vetting and recruitment of new soldiers and reduced training on human rights and civil-military relations. To the U.S. government’s credit, the mission has recently received more attention, and a number of Marine Corps advisers were deployed in January to step up training. And despite the delays, the final results have been generally satisfactory. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, army reform is considered “a provisional success,” given that 2,000 Liberian privates have now been trained.

Meanwhile, UNMIL’s police reforms have suffered from insufficient funding, flawed recruitment, and the lack of momentum associated with operations in which no single nation takes the lead. Today, the Liberian police continue to engage in deplorable and often criminal behavior, and have been generally unable to address the worsening internal security situation. The service is also apparently rife with corruption. As a result, the 13,000-strong UNMIL force has stayed on and even increased its numbers in recent years. The police therefore have little incentive to intensify training, which has been far less thorough than the army’s. The one real success story of the UNMIL effort has been the development of the new Emergency Response Unit as a dependable force.

Some have argued that Johnson-Sirleaf should be more actively involved in the reform process, and on some of the other rule of law issues for which the president is directly responsible, she has failed to make substantial headway. Notably, judicial reform has made little progress, and there have been a number of high-level cases in which the course of justice has been perverted. The country’s most prevalent judicial deficiencies include a paucity of trained legal personnel, a lack of infrastructure, and outdated rules of procedure. Impunity also continues to hamper reform, especially with respect to abuses committed during the internal conflict.

Nevertheless, Johnson-Sirleaf’s record is generally impressive when it comes to other pressing governance concerns. Last year, she laid out a three-year poverty reduction strategy with four pillars: peace and security, governance and the rule of law, infrastructure and basic services, and economic revitalization. While progress has been sluggish on rule of law issues, Johnson-Sirleaf has already made a substantial effort to deliver on her other promises. Indeed, in the 2008 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Liberia moved up six places between 2005 and 2006, placing it at 38th among sub-Saharan countries, with a score of 48.7 out of 100. The area where Liberia’s progress has been the most dramatic is economic development, and here Johnson-Sirleaf, a Harvard-trained economist and former finance minister, has proven instrumental. Recent progress has been fueled by foreign aid and investment, with many companies seeing great opportunities in the nation’s natural resources, which had been neglected during the civil wars. This financial stimulus has driven the rapid development of Liberia’s infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, and facilitated annual economic growth rates of about 8 percent. Johnson-Sirleaf made a campaign pledge to restore electricity to Monrovia by July 26, 2006, and this was accomplished, albeit with significantly less coverage than originally planned. Forest management has emerged as a way to both create jobs and earn export revenues in a transparent and sustainable manner. The president’s “zero-tolerance” approach to combating entrenched corruption has helped to remove an obstacle that had thwarted economic growth and denied Liberian citizens basic services for years. While several high-profile corruption scandals involving top officials have weighed down her efforts, the president successfully oversaw the creation of the country’s first Anti-Corruption Commission, along with the dismissal or arrest of numerous corrupt officials in 2008. On July 10 of this year, she signed a new transparency law aimed at eradicating corruption from the country’s lucrative extractive industries.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work is of exceptional importance to Liberia’s post-conflict reconstruction process. However, the benefits of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s leadership, particularly with respect to development and governance improvements, are also undeniable. In this case, a line may need to be drawn between those who actively facilitated the civil war and those who were caught up in it and naturally took sides. Johnson-Sirleaf seems to belong to the latter group. Before ruling on the commission’s recommendation, the Liberian parliament should fully evaluate the gravity of the matter, and consider both the gains Johnson-Sirleaf has brought to Liberia and the losses that could accrue if she were forced out of the picture.

Note: This is an update of an entry that was initially posted at 11:27 AM.

Can a Concert Kill Cambodian Corruption?

Photo: Billboard depicting the official symbol of the Cambodian Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption's 1 Million Signatures Campaign; Photo Credit: Flickr user chrislang

On May 30, Cambodian nongovernmental organizations including Pact Cambodia and members of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption joined together to put on the “Clean Hands Concert,” an event that was geared towards raising awareness of the country’s grave corruption problem. Roughly 50,000 people attended the event, an enormous turnout for such an event.  The concert took place on the 1 year anniversary of the 1 Million Signatures Campaign, a movement that was geared towards garnering support and political will for the passage of an anticorruption law. In the opening speech, U.S. Ambassador Carol Rodley claimed that corruption was a major impediment to economic growth in the country. She argued that corruption costs Cambodia up to $500 million per year in lost revenue. In response, the Cambodian government vehemently denied these claims.  Hor Nambora, the Cambodian ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated that Rodley had joined forces with such anticorruption agencies as Global Witness, “which continually engages in virulent and malicious campaigns against the Royal Government of Cambodia.”

Both the concert’s high turn-out and the government’s harsh rhetorical response to the concert speak volumes about the immense magnitude of Cambodia’s corruption problem. The 2006 Countries at the Crossroads Report on Cambodia echoes Ambassador Rodley’s recent claim, noting that roughly 10% of Cambodia’s GDP is lost to corruption. The report explains that the possibilities for graft are endless in the country’s “cumbersome, politicized, and unregulated” bureaucracy. In addition, it notes that corruption permeates all of Cambodia’s institutions, especially the judiciary. Over the past few years, the scourge of corruption has continued unchecked. In a recent report, Global Witness argues that Cambodia is run by a kleptocratic elite that clandestinely and corruptly allocates rights to oil, gas, and mineral exploitation. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International also ranked Cambodia  a dismal 166th out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, in Transparency’s 2009 Corruption Barometer, fully 47% of Cambodian respondents reported paying a bribe in the last 12 months.

Despite the clearly negative consequences created by the problem, the administration of Prime Minister Hun Sen has been extremely recalcitrant on the issue of anticorruption measures. Sen, a former Khmer Rouge and key leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) who became Prime Minister after staging a coup in 1997, has not succeeded in passing any notable anticorruption legislation. The long-awaited Anticorruption Law, which was first drafted in 1994, has remained in the hands of the Council of Ministers since 2006. Although the Coalition against Corruption presented the government with a petition signed by more than 1 million citizens requesting the enforcement of the anticorruption law, little further progress has been made on the matter. While several Cambodian parties responded to the group’s request, the ruling CPP remained entirely silent. As a result, there are still no functioning independent anticorruption bodies. In addition, even if this law is eventually passed, it presently falls short of international standards.

While an effective response to Cambodian corruption lags, several developments have at least served to bring increased domestic and international attention to the issue. The signature campaign and the concert underscore the strength of the country’s anticorruption civil society movement, along with the high level of domestic support for anticorruption measures. In addition, a high-profile judicial corruption case has increased international awareness of the pervasive corruption plaguing the country’s judicial system. The UN is currently investigating charges that Cambodian personnel employed by the UN-backed Khmer Rouge Tribunal, were forced to pay kickbacks in order to obtain and retain their positions. While this case certainly made the problem more apparent to international actors, it also highlighted the immensely graft-ridden nature of Cambodian government and society.

Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging the problem and working with both the domestic and international civil society movement to combat corruption, the Cambodian government has assumed the defensive. Since the Clean Hands Concert, the government has frequently claimed that anticorruption organizations are united in a struggle to undermine the Cambodian government with false and disparaging remarks. On June 6, popular comedian Chy Koy characterized anticorruption NGOs as “money hungry fabricators of non-existent corruption” when he appeared on the CPP-owned television station. This NGO-related conspiracy theory is one of many contrived by the Cambodian government of late. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the government allows these NGOs to operate relatively freely, and in this case to organize a high-profile concert aimed at chiding the government for its inaction on corruption, provides some evidence that the environment in Cambodia is not entirely repressive.   

Unfortunately, however, the government's tolerance for civil society and criticism seems to be waning. In September of 2008, Sen exclaimed that "Cambodia has been a heaven for NGOs for too long...the NGOs are out of control...". At the same time,he called for the revival of a restrictive NGO law.  In addition, the government's verbal attacks on anti-corruption NGOs are being carried out alongside agreater campaign against government criticism. For example, the government has used criminal defamation laws to intimidate and imprison activists, union leaders, and journalists alike.  In this inauspicious climate, it seems unlikely that the Cambodia will engage in a dialogue with the government-critical anticorruption movement. The fight against graft officially remains a high-priority government issue for the 2008-2013 mandate. Nevertheless, the government’s past reluctance and present state of denial seem to spell further delays, and even setbacks, in the effort to rid Cambodia of this governance scourge.

Chavez's Post-Referendum Offensive

Photo Credit: Flickr user !Que comunismo!

Hugo Chavez has continued his attacks on his chief television adversary, Globovision, with a personal phone call two weeks ago to the station’s executives warning them to “behave correctly.” Invective against Globovision is nothing new, with Chavez frequently calling for its closure and even labeling its work as “media terrorism.” The station has been a vociferous critic of Chavez and has been accused by the president of trying to thwart the efforts of the elected government and even promoting his assassination. In an address to Latin American diplomats in Washington last April, Andrés Izarra, a former media executive and now Venezuelan government official, likened Globovisión's coverage to Rwandan radio broadcasts that helped provoke genocide in 1994. 

Chavez has recently stepped up his criticism of the channel, matching words with actions. This month, the station was slapped with a US$4.19 million fine for alleged unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the station’s top executive’s home was raided in May by more than 100 Venezuelan police officers accusing him of running a car smuggling ring  (Globovision’s President, Guillermo Zuloaga, co-owns a Toyota dealership). Both investigations were undertaken at the request of pro-Chavez lawmakers. New charges were brought against the station for supposedly breaking the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television (Ley Resorte), a vague law criticized by human rights groups for its potential to hinder media freedoms.

Indeed, the media has been a battleground since Chavez’s election in 1998 and, more acutely, since a brief 2002 coup. RCTV, Venezuela’s oldest television channel, was not allowed to renew its terrestrial broadcast license in 2007 after being accused of supporting the coup against Chavez and the subsequent oil strike that sought to topple the government. The recent campaign against Globovision is also directly linked to the network’s involvement in opposition activities. In the case at hand, Globovision has been accused of giving air-time to opposition organizations including Women for Liberty and Democratic Renewal, without paying the requisite taxes. 

RCTV, Globovision, and two other networks, Televen and Venevision, had openly supported the unseating of Chavez and played key roles in the 2002 coup attempt through media blackouts and selective coverage. Few contest the fact that RCTV and other stations have taken sides, often aggressively, against Chavez, with commentators openly calling for his demise. Pressure on the government by Televen and Venevision eased notably in following years, however, and unsurprisingly, they have been the target of far less official attention.

"I'm happy that the institutions are working, we have to keep moving against impunity. Let them say what they'll say," Chavez is quoted as saying by AFP. Indeed, several weeks before, Chavez ordered the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to “fulfill your obligation” and take action against Globovision in light of their breaking a story on a minor recent earthquake which the government had not yet reported. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in particular, makes clear that Chavez’s notion of “institutions working” apparently does not include the idea of separation of powers.

Such moves against Globovision must be seen in light of a broader effort by the Chavez government to deepen the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” after the February referendum that removed term limits for public officials, thus allowing Chavez to run for a third term in 2012. Chavez terms this new push the “third phase” of the revolution.

Following the election, Michael Shifter, of the US-based think-tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that “[Chavez is] going to be very emboldened. He’s going to move ahead in radical fashion with his revolution.” Shifter’s words were prescient.

Chavez’s efforts to bolster the revolution post-referendum have principally focused on a specific set of issues: 1. Reining in unruly media outlets, especially Globovision; 2. Undermining the power of both private and public sector unions; 3. Continuing with his agenda of nationalization and expropriation of foreign companies operating in Venezuela; 4. Weakening opposition parties; and 5. Accruing powers for the central government at the expense of local governments.

Chavez’s attempts at undermining the power of unions that oppose or contradict his revolutionary vision is not new. In its report, A Decade Under Chavez, Human Rights Watch states,"The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by promoting state interference in union elections, refusing to bargain collectively with established unions, and engaging in favoritism toward pro-government unions. It has also punished workers with job dismissals and blacklisting for legitimate strike activity. And it has supported the creation of alternative labor organizations that undercut the country's labor laws, risk undermining established unions, and leave workers particularly vulnerable to political discrimination."

This judgment was echoed by a Freedom House report from last year, Freedom of Association Under Threat. A bill that was recently introduced in the National Assembly would cripple unions by eliminating collective bargaining and giving powers in regards to labor matters to “worker’s councils,” usually controlled by ruling party members.

Chavez has also continued his plan to nationalize both foreign and domestic companies. In March, Chavez expropriated local operations of US food giant Cargill, accusing the company of avoiding price controls. While the petrochemicals industry has already witnessed substantial intervention, along with steel, cement, electricity and telecommunications, the May announcement that a set of privately owned oil services firms would be taken over marked a new foray into the country’s dominant economic sector.

Chavez has also continued to undermine democratic freedoms through attacks on opposition members and weakening the country’s local leaders. Manuel Rosales, the main opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and recently elected mayor of Venezuela’s second largest city, was recently forced to seek asylum in Peru after being charged with corruption. Other prominent opposition members including former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel have also been placed under investigation on corruption charges. In addition, Chavez has stepped up his offensive against regional governors, who won victories in some important states in last November’s regional and local elections, by pushing a law through the Parliament which would see their powers diminished by regional “vice presidents” subordinate to the President.

With oil prices rising again, opposition members fleeing the country, and media outlets in the crosshairs, it looks as though there is little to slow Chavez’s offensive in the short term. In a recent statement reported by Reuters, Chavez stated to his party stalwarts: "I've said it before and I repeat, we must keep up the offensive, bulldozing the counter-revolution. We can no longer be the idiots we were." If Chavez has made one thing clear during his ten years in power, it’s that when he says he’ll do something, it probably will happen. Such is the personalist nature of 21st century socialism.

Greed and Graft Grow in Sub-Saharan Africa

According to Transparency International’s recently released 2009 Global Corruption Barometer, corruption continues to wreak havoc on Sub-Saharan Africa’s governance record. Notably, of the 9 sub-Saharan countries examined in the report, Crossroads countries including Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, numbered among the states most afflicted by petty bribery. In all of these countries, over 23% of respondents reported paying a bribe within the last year. Furthermore, in line with this finding, respondents in most of the countries named the civil service as one of the most corrupt sectors, with the majority labeling it the single most corrupt institution. On a slightly more positive note, in most of the Crossroads countries examined, citizens remain relatively confident in their governments’ anti-corruption efforts. In sub-Saharan Africa, 64% of respondents were satisfied with their governments’ anti-corruption programs. Unfortunately, as the New York Times reports, the political will to combat corruption in these countries is swiftly fading. In addition, the positive public perceptions pale in comparison to the generally bleak picture of rampant regional corruption painted by the report.

Of the Crossroads countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone and Uganda are in particularly dire straits. Alarmingly, 62% of respondents in Sierra Leone and 55% of respondents in Uganda reported paying a bribe in the last year. Along with Cameroon and Liberia, they were the only countries included in the survey to reach the 50% mark. These new findings, in combination with their rankings of 158 and 126, respectively, in Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, place Sierra Leone and Uganda among the most corrupt countries in the world. Their dismal performance in the recent Barometer report merits a closer examination of corruption in these two countries, along with the prospects for an amelioration of the problem in the future.

In Sierra Leone, pervasive corruption affects all levels and sectors of society. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption largely drove the collapse of the state before war was launched against the Revolutionary United Front in 1991, and the lingering legacies of the extensive patronage networks and general mismanagement that plagued the country until the end of the war in 2002 continue to hamper reform efforts. Petty corruption remains unhindered due to extensive bureaucratic red tape, a phenomenon that illuminates the country’s poor performance in the Barometer’s bribery category. Furthermore, the report explains that as of 2006, state efforts were extremely lackluster, in part due to both the inability of the auditor general to filter her reports through the various government ministries and the failure of the attorney general to prosecute cases reported by the Anti-Corruption Commission. In 2007, the problem continued unchecked. According to a report commissioned by the president, a lack of oversight mechanisms and a general culture of corruption in government ministries enabled thousands of dollars to be diverted from their intended recipients.

 Despite all of this, however, TI’s Barometer reported that 64% of respondents in Sierra Leone considered their government’s efforts in the fight against corruption be effective. Although an alarmingly high prevalence of petty bribery is reported in the Barometer, out of all of the Sub-Saharan African countries included in the survey, Sierra Leone’s citizens were the most content with their government’s performance in this area. This is most likely due to the initial efforts that President Ernest Koroma, who came to office after winning the democratic election run-off in September 2007, has made to develop a comprehensive approach to the daunting issue. In 2007, Koroma made battling corruption his top priority and immediately moved to examine the roots of the corruption problem by commissioning the report noted above. Furthermore, in September of last year, Komora enacted an anti-corruption law. The law moves to address high-level corruption by requiring all public officials to declare their assets and broadening the Anti-Corruption Commission’s powers to eradicate graft and protect whistle-blowers. Since the law was passed, the Commission has ramped up its investigations into graft allegations. As is shown by the high approval rating reported by TI, Komora’s accomplishments in the fight against corruption are noteworthy. Nevertheless, the entrenched nature of bribery and thievery in the public sector, along with the presence of other complications created by both the legacies of the civil war and the current economic crisis, will make it extremely difficult for Komora to achieve substantial progress on the issue.

While corruption is not quite as endemic in Uganda, which has somewhat more stable institutions, it is still an onerous governance problem. In the 2009 Barometer, Ugandan respondents named the judiciary as the most corrupt institution, with the civil service coming in at a close second. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report on Uganda argues, one of the main reasons that the environment for corruption remains favorable is that President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for over 20 years, has never made any dedicated effort to curb corruption within the public sector. Over the course of his reign, he has shown great reluctance to prosecute government officials accused of corruption and has even directly thwarted the efforts of the inspector-general of government, Uganda’s most powerful anti-corruption agency. Furthermore, the 2008 Freedom in the World report added that Uganda lacked the resources to enforce the legislative measures that exist to combat corruption. As a result of these factors, the corruption problem worsened over the past few years, as evidenced by both the country’s slip in TI’s Corruption Perception Index and the results of a Ugandan Bureau of Statistics Survey.

Recently, however, Museveni’s rhetoric has been teeming with declarations of war against corruption. Most notably, on his June 3 State of the Nation Address, Museveni claimed that the war against corruption was the only war remaining in the country, stating that his government has “zero tolerance for corruption.” In addition, the government has made some new efforts to uproot corruption. For example, in May, the Ugandan parliament passed an Anti-Corruption bill that addresses public sector corruption by expanding the investigative powers of the Inspector General and creating punishments for public officials who fail to explain the source of their wealth. In addition, the parliament tabled a Whistleblower’s Bill.  These developments are potentially promising, but the same lack of resources that has always debilitated anti-corruption efforts will remain. Furthermore, if Museveni’s past approach towards corruption is any indication of his future stance towards the issue, the chances that corruption will be aggressively tackled while he remains at the helm of government are slim.

In both Sierra Leone and Uganda, corruption constitutes a fundamental, pernicious governance concern. Unfortunately, neither country has extremely auspicious prospects of stamping out the problem in the short term. While Sierra Leone’s president may have the will to address the issue, the existence of sizeable constraints – notably a severe lack of resources – will seriously complicate his efforts.  In Uganda, a lack of presidential will, and to a lesser extent resource shortages, could stand to impede the country’s war against corruption. Nevertheless, hope for the future is not lost. While the current forecast may be dreary, the recent adoption of new legislative measures in both countries could pave the way for a more effective approach to the issue under more amenable future circumstances.

Photo Credit: Flickr user M*rten

20 Years After Tiananmen, a Different Form of Undermining Democracy

Freedom House has just released a new report, Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, describing the efforts of authoritarian states including China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to sustain their autocratic models and even advance alternatives to democracy in other countries. The report explores how these leading authoritarian regimes are threatening democratic development by promoting repressive policies and manipulating and distorting democratic discourse. Their efforts to redefine – and ultimately empty out – the concept of democracy have not only been pursued within their borders, but have also been exported abroad.

Among the tools that these regimes have used to further their interests internationally, the promotion of “win-win” economic arrangements and “no-strings-attached aid” stand out. In April, we addressed this issue in a blog post about China’s aid policy towards Africa in particular. At the time, we discussed the dangers of championing China’s unique development model, along with the pernicious effects that China’s offers of unconditional aid can have for governance. Because Beijing’s foreign assistance isn’t conditioned on the adoption of reforms and a general respect for human rights, it opens the door for corruption and neglect of the rule of law. Undermining Democracy includes a more comprehensive analysis of China’s foreign assistance efforts, along with those of other authoritarian regimes, analyzing the modern strategies and methods used to project authoritarian influence.

As Undermining Democracy explains, China’s is systematically developing its own brand of “soft power.”  After becoming aware of the necessity of increasing its clout in an increasingly interdependent international system, China began to ramp up efforts to promote its own model of political and economic development in its international relations. Due to China’s impressive economic development, the model is often touted as a superior alternative to Western prescriptions.

As it happens, Undermining Democracy has been released on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. An article in the Financial Times last week traced China’s political trajectory since the crackdown, explaining how China’s Communist Party weathered both extensive criticism and countless predictions of its demise to propel its country to a leading role in the world sphere. As it notes, Chinese officials have ceased to adopt an outwardly apologetic stance towards their more repressive political policies, instead becoming increasingly confident in their model’s superiority over its Western counterpart. Most importantly, it argues that China’s remarkable ability to persevere and prosper can be attributed to its willingness to adapt and modernize. In other words, whereas mere repression might not have been enough to counteract the pre- and post-Tiananmen calls for change, China has survived and flourished due to its policy of economic opening. While these reforms have boosted growth and ameliorated some citizen complaints, more fundamental reforms of accountability and transparency have been absent.

China’s economic success has created a major dilemma for advocates of good governance. This success has obvious appeal as a formula for economic prosperity for struggling developing countries.  Nevertheless, there are some important points to consider. First, by championing the undemocratic Chinese model, the benefits in terms of basic ethics and justice of democratic rule in comparison to China’s oppressive political regime are ignored. The coercive nature of China’s political regime cannot be underemphasized. China is a highly repressive state, which is evidenced by the regime’s dismal human rights record. China has, every year, by far the highest number of executions of any country and has consistently and arbitrarily applied state power to restrict basic freedoms including freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

Secondly, it is important to realize that the Chinese model of adaptation is not the norm. As the Financial Times article notes, China was successfully able to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes and to become aware of the need to “adapt and change or atrophy and die.” If any lessons are to be learned from the past, however, China’s adaption method is the exception: authoritarians are often drawn to the repressive part of the model while ignoring the technocratic, adaptive element. Some but certainly not all developing countries will be able to follow China’s trajectory. For example, in the past few months, Hugo Chavez has frequently praised the comparative advantages of the Chinese model over the Washington Consensus at the same time that he has ramped up his efforts to curb trade union autonomy and freedom of the press in the country.  In addition, Kremlin officials have frequently evoked the Chinese success story to justify Russia’s autocratic policies. In addition to providing these leaders with validation for their despotic ventures, the opportunities the model provides for corrupt practices are extensive, as is evidenced by China’s ranking of 72 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Moreover, it is not just the model in conceptual terms that is a threat to the democratic order, but also China’s means of promoting it. Most notably, China has sought to facilitate the model’s advancement by offering “win-win” economic arrangements to foreign countries and coupling its aid provision with a promise of “non-interference” in domestic affairs. Apart from the African countries listed in our previous post, China has provided unconditional assistance to numerous Latin American countries and several Asian countries, most notably Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, many of which have questionable or downright execrable human rights records. As we noted in our previous post, the negative consequences of providing unconditional aid are a real threat to democratic governance.  As Undermining Democracy argues, these arrangements also threaten democratic development on a greater scale. By framing these new economic relationships in “win-win” terms, China seeks to tarnish the legitimacy of the Western development model, and more particularly the traditional Western requirement that aid be conditional upon reform and respect for human rights standards.

Other contemporary authoritarian regimes have used foreign assistance of one sort or another to exert influence. Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, for instance, have used their oil wealth to court developing nations, leading them to ignore governance reform.  While these active efforts are providing new competition to reform-based assistance, the authoritarians’ approach is not perfect. As Undermining Democracy notes, China’s increasingly powerful position – and even more so the other states – has its own inherent flaws. The global economic crisis, along with other factors, could hamper its efforts to propel the new model; alternatively, discontent at home could herald a loosening of the authoritarian reins. In any case, 20 years after Tiananmen, the Chinese authorities have modernized their authoritarianism and, for the time being at least, offer a serious challenge to the notion that economic growth in China would inevitably lead to political liberalization and sounder governance. 

Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

Photo Credit: Flickr user jessicamulley

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

Chinese Assistance: A New Model or a Short-term Fix?

 

In January 2006, China released a major foreign policy document outlining its involvement with African countries. The document described both the much-criticized principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the “one China policy,” whereby African countries must have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This step was a culmination of years of mutual aid and trust building, the two most important elements of which were the initiation of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China’s cancellation of $1.3 billion worth of debt three years later. These diplomatic maneuvers and gestures have been coupled with a massive increase in trade and aid. Trade has increased four-fold in the last four years – China has replaced the UK to become Africa’s third largest trade partner – and if Beijing’s promises to double aid between 2008 and 2009 come to pass China will give fully one-third the amount of the US. These facets of Chinese policy in Africa paint a picture of an emerging economic behemoth willing to grant, lend, or invest large sums regardless of the beneficiary as long as there is a business or geopolitical opportunity. Thus, for the international good governance and democracy promotion movement, the greatest concern is to what degree this shift will result in the protection and preservation of autocratic regimes.

That African countries – autocratic and democratic alike – are snatching up Chinese loans and business deals should not come as a surprise. Until recently, Africa had been almost exclusively dependent upon the West for financial assistance. Western aid, however, almost always came with strings attached. Donors usually demanded that the provision of aid to African countries be conditional upon the adoption of economic reforms, respect for human rights standards, and progressive democratization. Now China has appeared, offering the same supply of goods and capital without the attendant loss of sovereignty. However, there is a time-horizon problem: what’s good for politicians’ short-term needs may indeed benefit the country, but also may carry costs over the longer term. Thus, the new Sino-African relationship should not be viewed as a question of whether or not Africa gains or loses, but whether the initial gains are worth the potential governance costs in the medium- to long-term.

Sudan is the country where China’s influence is most obviously pernicious. Khartoum has been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the State Department since 1993, and by the millennium the EU and US had cut ties with the regime. Then, China came to the rescue. Sino-Sudanese relations picked up when Beijing began to pump money into exploiting Sudan’s oil reserves. China’s financial assistance made it far easier for Sudan to maintain production levels adequate to fund the government’s activities – including most notoriously the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur – without having to bow to Western conditions.

Zimbabwe offers a strikingly similar example of China upholding a regime economically, politically, and militarily that might otherwise have collapsed due to international pressure and catastrophic internal policies. President Mugabe has made deliberate efforts to “turn East” in an effort to escape pressure for democratic reform. China has provided some export credits and soft loans, possibly tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and in exchange for certain mining concessions. Most importantly, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to the country, including the delivery of military aircraft and other vehicles, while scuttling Anglo-American/French attempts to impose harsher restrictions in the UN Security Council.

China can be accused of scuttling western efforts at inducing reform and promoting corruption in other African countries as well. In 2004, the international community was pressing Angola to improve the transparency of its oil sector and to make other reforms as a prerequisite for any talks concerning extending credit. Then, China offered a $2 billion loan with the expected result that Luanda largely shelved reform efforts.

Likewise, China has a committed interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt and has completed a lucrative deal in which Beijing receives vital raw materials for its manufacturing sector and in return builds for Kinshasa necessary transportation infrastructure and even some hospitals. Nevertheless, concerns over the effective management of this deal within the DRC’s corrupt economic environment have frequently been raised.

China's relations with Mozambique date back to the Cold War, when Beijing backed the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO party. Interest dropped afterwards, but suddenly reappeared in recent years. Trade stood at a mere US$70 million in 2004, but tripled in two years. Beijing has coupled this increase in trade with writing off debt and the elimination of tariffs on a number of exports. This financial relationship is expected to soar as Chinese firms are tempted to relocate to Mozambique, with its cheap labor force proximity to raw materials.

In Zambia, hopes had been raised by the substantial resources China had been devoting to transportation and communication infrastructure. Locals praised a multi-dimensional initiative that nominally envisaged Africa as an ally and not a colony, as “a growing market and possibly a source over the long run for food, manufacturing, and industrial goods.” However, the abysmal pay and working conditions in Chinese-operated mines became an election issue championed by Michael Sata in 2006. In reaction, Beijing declared that new investment had been put on hold pending the result of the elections. Had Sata come close to victory in the presidential elections, Beijing might well have shown the limitations on sovereignty its assistance carries. In addition, the focus on physical infrastructure has been welcomed by many, but the procurement prescriptions and general lack of coordination with local actors has been criticized for reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Such tied aid through Chinese companies also makes it difficult to scrutinize the aid flows to check against corruption or to uphold environmental standards, exacerbating the accountability concerns.

The future of Chinese involvement is possibly more promising than the present, as there are signs that Beijing’s policy might fall more in line with American and European efforts in the future. Most importantly, the financial hazards of conducting business with regimes that are unaccountable and un-transparent will unavoidably come to the fore as China becomes more deeply tied to African economies. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, China is already becoming aware of these risks as it suffers the effects of the global economic slow-down. In the short run, however, this realization could bring about decidedly unfortunate consequences. As China becomes more cautious when choosing the countries and sectors in which it will invest, the development prospects of several African countries that have become highly dependent on Chinese assistance will undoubtedly suffer. The example of the Congo is illustrative: as prices have fallen, the $9 billion dollar copper deal between the DRC and China has become shaky. As a result, the Congo may be left in the lurch. Should this be the case, the negative consequences for the country’s development prospects will be even more pronounced due to the fact that China failed to make its aid conditional upon the adoption of reforms aimed at boosting sustainability.

Perhaps China will become less of an inhibitor of governance reforms in the future. Although it will certainly not emerge at the forefront of demands for democracy and human rights, it may also not be as likely to actively undermine the development of good governance practices. Unfortunately, however, China may continue to frustrate governance efforts in a more indirect way. Specifically, the Chinese economic model, the ill-defined “Beijing Consensus”, could be used by African countries to provide an excuse for authoritarianism. Due to China’s remarkable economic achievements, the Beijing Consensus is often touted as an effective formula for growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, the strict adoption of the Chinese model, which includes an initial focus on economic reform which is later followed by political and cultural change, would signify an actual regression in the level of democratic reform in most African countries, rather than merely a slower pace of democratization.  The fact that China’s economic reforms were carried out in an environment of political repression is oftentimes ignored by those championing the model. Turning towards the Chinese model is based in part on the perceived failure of the “Washington consensus,” but also is closely related to resentment about the role of developed countries in Africa. Nonetheless, as many of these states are already learning, replacing the “imperialist” model with a seemingly less paternalistic one may not be the panacea that many leaders and citizens are hoping for.

Photo credit: Flickr user Pan-African News Wire Photo File

Pakistan's Long-Brewing Political Showdown

Three days of violence in Pakistan’s Punjab province was the popular reaction to the Supreme Court’s barring of ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from politics last week. The ruling was generally viewed as a blatantly political act by an unpopular and unconstitutional court that is beholden to President Asif Ali Zardari, who broke a campaign promise to restore an independent Supreme Court.

In the Asian Human Rights Commission’s report on the year 2008 in Pakistan, the Commission describes the popular resistance to the Supreme Court and the Zardari administration that has been building since ex-strongman Pervez Musharraf dismissed nine of the fourteen Supreme Court Justices in late 2007. Last year’s parliamentary elections, the first credible elections in Pakistan in a decade, were supposed to mark a return to the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, Zardari made written promises before his election in September that he would restore the 2007 court within 30 days of taking power. Instead, only three Supreme Court justices were restored. They, and the other new appointments, were made to take loyalty oaths much like those that Musharraf demanded of his tame appointees. Pakistani lawyers were the most active protesters against Musharraf’s illegal firings, and continued their protests when it became clear that the Zardari government meant to keep a puppet court instead of restoring justices who would defend the constitution. Zardari’s credibility was damaged further by the violent police reaction to the protests, the arrest of more than one hundred lawyers on criminal charges, and the suspension of five lawyers’ license to practice law.

The AHRC followed up by releasing a note on March 3 stating that the Supreme Court was sabotaging democracy in Pakistan. The ruling banning Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz from politics was described as “a two sentence, non-reasoned order.” They went further to state that the court’s “allegiance is not to the people of the country, but pledged to those in power.” Nawaz Sharif, whose presidency followed that of Zardari’s wife, Benazir Bhutto, was barred from politics on the basis of his criminal convictions, which were handed down by a kangaroo court under Musharraf. The charges of irregularities in the election of Shahbaz are slightly more credible, but also not lacking elements of political motivation.

The Supreme Court has lacked credibility since 2007, when Musharraf declared a state of emergency to extend the powers he had seized by force. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chuadhry and eight others declared the move unconstitutional, for which they were dismissed at gunpoint. Justices of the new court were sworn in under a Provisional Constitutional Order that included language declaring their loyalty to Musharraf and not the Pakistani constitution. Musharraf’s party was soundly defeated in the February 2008 elections, and the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N branch) formed a coalition government dedicated to restoring the constitution. The chairmen of these parties were Zardari and Sharif, respectively, and the two men managed to put aside their ambitions long enough to force Musharraf’s resignation. After Zardari’s election, it became clear that he intended to keep the Supreme Court as a political tool, and PML-N split with the PPP.

The fallout between the PML-N and the PPP and the animosity between their leaders represents Pakistan living down to its traditional dysfunction. In the eyes of most analysts, both men have always put their own good before Pakistan’s. While Bhutto was Prime Minister, her husband Zardari was known as Mr. Ten Percent for the kickbacks he demanded in return for patronage positions. The corruption of the Bhutto/Zardari regime was quite well documented, as shown in this enormous Times piece. Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister both before and after Bhutto and was deposed and exiled by Musharraf. He was considered equally corrupt – if less successful. At least in his case some irony tempers the tragedy of his abuses; his stunningly lengthy corruption rap sheet is marred by accusations against the prosecutor. Thus, Pakistanis can be forgiven for seeing little new in all the machinations.

Since Zardari’s puppet court banned the Sharifs from politics, popular displeasure has run high. Shahbaz was chief minister of a Punjab, which is Pakistan’s richest province and is home to half of its population. Both brothers called for protests, which unsurprisingly turned violent. Nawaz Sharif feigned disapproval of the violence, but claimed that it was the will of the people; Zardari used military force against the protestors; Sharif moved closer to the edge, saying that violence will continue if Islamabad attempts to regain control, and even telling the police not to obey the federal governor.

With Sharif calling for a march on Islamabad and adopting the pose of a revolutionary, Zardari has been goaded into cracking down even further, barring the gathering of groups of more than four people in Punjab and Sindh and arresting and harassing numerous Sharif supporters. What happens over the weekend could be momentous in determining Pakistan’s short- and medium- term political future. All this is occurring, of course, at a moment when the rest of the world is begging the country to focus its attention on Islamic militancy and the effects of the economic crisis. If there’s one thing Pakistan’s political class has repeatedly demonstrated, however, it’s that it has no time for such interruptions of its ongoing soap opera.

Photo Credit: Flickr user orionoir

Mexico's Calderon, in His Own Words

A new feature on the Crossroads blog will feature translations of governance-related articles from their original foreign language sources. The following translation provides excerpts of a long interview with Mexican president Felipe Calderon published last week by Mexico City’s El Universal newspaper. The interview was conducted by Jorge Zepeda Patterson, El Universal’s editorial director and formerly a very incisive weekly columnist for the paper.

From a governance perspective, several things stand out in the interview. First of all, Zepeda’s questions are very well-targeted and hit on real points of weakness within the Mexican government, including human rights issues, corruption, institutional stagnation, and the question of how political will can be translated into concrete achievements.

Calderon’s answers are of variable quality. He deserves credit for his forthrightness about the scale of the crime problem as well as his dual acknowledgments that institutional reconstruction is necessary and that previous administrations – including that of his National Action Party colleague, Vicente Fox – were overly lax in their attitude toward drug traffickers. However, some of his other answers are suboptimal from a human rights and governance perspective. For instance, while even the most idealistic activist understands that isolated incidents of abuse are inevitable in a conflict on the scale of Mexico’s war against the cartels, Calderon is overly mild in discussing the issue, and in fact comes close to adopting a “to make an omelet, you have to break a few eggs” attitude. This is unfortunate: Mexico continues to suffer from severe deficits in human rights, and in 2008 the military received hundreds of complaints from civilians about its actions. Signals matter, and it would have been far more encouraging for the president to firmly state that human rights abuses are unacceptable and will be investigated.

Indeed, this gets at the most significant missing concept in the interview: impunity. One of the key drivers of Mexico’s rule of law problems is the fact that criminals are hardly ever punished for their crimes. Likewise with corruption, which is why Zepeda does well to bring up the embarrassing fact that no major political figure has been convicted of corruption since 1999, a reality that no Mexican would attribute to a newfound zeal for probity among public officials. Calderon’s statement that new institutions are needed is welcome, but it would have been even better had he explicitly noted the obvious thread running between crime, human rights abuses, and corruption: impunity.

The excerpts are long, so the rest can be found below the fold.

Corruption: A Heavy Cross for Paraguay's Lugo to Bear

On January 12th, Martin Ocampos Paez, the director of Paraguay's Hugua Nandu FM community radio station, was assassinated at his home in the city of Concepcion. The crime raised a red flag for activists concerned with Paraguay's ongoing battle with large-scale corruption, not to mention those monitoring press freedom. More specifically, members of Paraguay's journalists union have speculated that Paez's death was linked to comments he had made regarding ties between high-level Paraguayan politicians and illegal drug trafficking.

This tragic event takes place at a time when the Paraguay is supposedly engaged in a fierce battle against the endemic corruption that has eternally characterized its political scene. Last April 13, Fernando Lugo, a left-leaning former Catholic bishop, successfully challenged the long-dominant Colorado Party and won the country's presidential election. Throughout his campaign he made promises to combat the corruption and social inequality which had become embedded in Paraguayan politics and society during 61 years of uninterrupted Colorado Party rule. Indeed, in his inaugural address (Spanish link), Lugo proclaimed that “today, the exclusive, secretive Paraguay notorious for its corruption ends. Today, the history of a Paraguay whose authorities and citizens will be unconditional begins.”

For the majority of Paraguayans, Lugo’s victory represented the end of a dark (or at least gray) period in their country’s political history. Six months into his presidency, however, it is important to analyze the strides (or lack thereof) that Lugo has made towards the fulfillment of these difficult promises. The task that Lugo took upon his shoulders is colossal. In Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Paraguay received a score of 2.4 out of 10 and a rank of 138 out of 180 countries. In the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, Paraguay was awarded a score of just 3.33 out of 7 in the “Anticorruption and Transparency” category; in the “Rule of Law” category, the country’s score was no better at 3.32. One of the biggest problems emphasized in the report is the incompetent, non-independent nature of the country’s judicial system. Given the politicization of the Supreme Court and most prosecutors' offices, investigations into the corrupt dealings of public officials are rare. In an encouraging interview with Transparency International, Lugo made an attempt to more specifically characterize Paraguay’s corruption problem. He identified the misappropriation of public funds, especially for personal enrichment, and the socially ingrained institution of the bribe as the most prevalent manifestations of the issue, along with old-fashioned clientelism and patronage.

Unsurprisingly, given the short time period, not much in the way of measurable progress has been made toward eliminating this systemic corruption. This is not to say that Lugo has completely ignored the issue. Thus far, he has attempted to combat corruption in both the National Administration of Navigation and Ports and the bodies responsible for operating the hydroelectric stations at Itaipu. In addition, the efforts of finance minister Dionisio Borda, who has been a key figure in the fight against corruption since even before Lugo's election, are laudable. Since August, Borda has initiated an overhaul of Paraguay's finance and customs ministries. Nevertheless, for the most part, Lugo’s initial promises have been only been followed up by more promises. Since his election, Lugo has vowed to create a National Anti-corruption Ministry and has also expressed his desire to institute controls within each government department. He has also vowed to address the lack of judicial independence in the country through constitutional reform. These things, however, require the sorts of political negotiations that a relative neophyte like Lugo may take time to learn, especially given his coalition's lack of a congressional majority.

Unfortunately, however, the grace period Paraguayans have thus far allowed Lugo to make good on his promises seems to be nearing its end. Recently, an ever-growing number of Paraguayans have expressed their displeasure at Lugo’s inaction. For example, activist Martin Almada alleged that the same government officials who have been in power since the dictatorship continue to rule the country. Furthermore, in a recent poll (Spanish link) by Paraguay’s Institute for Communication and Art, just 37% of Paraguayan respondents declared their belief that Lugo would be unable to decrease corruption. In another poll, 33.4% of the respondents revealed their conviction that Lugo has not fulfilled his campaign promises, while 30% expressed their opinion that Lugo has not named suitable candidates to important government posts. In the meantime, the arrival of the global economic crisis means that the president may find himself spending time originally intended for institutional reform instead devoted to putting out fires on the economic front.

The prospects for an effective resolution of this problem seem uncertain at best. Despite the rumblings of popular discontent, time is still on Lugo’s side. Nevertheless, in many ways, Lugo’s hands are tied. While he may have won the presidency, the Colorado Party, the veritable embodiment of the country’s corruption problem, retains control of both Congress and the judiciary. Considering that a systemic overhaul reaching into all corners of Paraguayan government will be necessary in order to truly bring about an end to country’s culture of corruption, the strength of the opposition poses a serious problem. As it stands today, even if Lugo remains dedicated to his current crusade against corruption, he may potentially be destined to win a few battles while losing the war.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Fernando Lugo APC

Morocco's Reform Malaise

Several weeks ago, corresponding with their thirteenth annual general meeting, Transparency Maroc – a Rabat-based anticorruption NGO affiliated with Transparency International – delivered a dismal review of Morocco’s bureaucracy. The group stated that, according to a survey it administered, 46% of Moroccan businessmen admitted to engaging in corrupt practices and/or using family and personal contacts to facilitate administrative procedures on a regular basis. Furthermore, 33% of respondents also use these contacts to influence decisions on state contracts. As such, the ubiquitous use of patronage is nothing new in Morocco. What is disturbing is that it has not even marginally decreased despite nearly a decade of alleged efforts, a point that Transparency Maroc’s survey focuses on. The group reports that 67% of those same business leaders rated the government’s actions in fighting corruption as completely ineffective, with 27% labeling it effective and a mere 3% very effective.

The Moroccan government is attempting to create new mechanisms in the fight against corruption, most recently the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption, which has been on legislative hiatus for over a year. Last August, King Mohammed VI appointed Abdesselam Boudrar, a founder of Transparency Maroc, as the body’s director; however, many are concerned about whether it will be able to exercise full independence from the government. Analogous pseudoautonomous organizations working on other governance dimensions, such as the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights, have not always been able to achieve full cooperation from the state when sensitive issues (such as torture) arise. The prospects are even grimmer for the Central Authority, considering that Transparency Maroc rated the legal system as the most corrupt of state institutions, followed closely by the police.

Were corruption an anomaly in a country otherwise striding towards democracy, it would be more understandable; after all, most developing countries continue to struggle with corruption even as their political systems become more open and pluralistic. However, a great many of King Mohammed VI’s initial spate of reforms have stagnated in the last half decade. Since the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report, Morocco’s political conditions have at best held steady and at worst declined further.

In terms of media freedom, Reporters Without Borders stated that in 2008 arrests of journalists and the closing of publications continued without any sign of abating, even though on the surface taboo subjects are fewer. The most recent victim of a prison sentence was Mostapha Hurmatallah, who wrote a piece on the Moroccan army, while nearly a hundred thousand copies of the Nichane and Tel Quel were destroyed due to their alleged disrespect of Mohammed VI. Accountability for detention-related abuses, meanwhile, has improved somewhat, but the state remains a serial violator of basic human rights in relation to arrest standards and treatment of detainees.

This general stagnation of the reforms that Mohammed VI initiated has had a grave effect on the political culture of the nation. Disillusionment with the state, political system, and the absurdly bloated bureaucracy is starkly manifestation in voter turnout. While in the 1997 parliamentary elections it was 58%, it fell to 51% in 2002 and reached just 37% by 2007. If the population’s expectations are not fulfilled, if nepotism remains a necessity for a successful business and for career advancement, and if the press continues to be muzzled, Mohammed VI’s efforts at reform will be at risk of disappearing into the overflowing ashbin of Middle Eastern political reform efforts and the nation could sink further into apathy.

Photo credit: Flickr user snarl

THE LEADER FOR LIFE, CONTINUED

In March of this year, we posted on the subject of presidential succession (The Leader for Life), noting the absence of a meaningful rotation of power in a number of strategically important countries and its negative impact on democratic governance.  Among other things, these countries exhibit exceedingly high levels of corruption. A chart detailing time in office for leaders in 20 states indicated that none of these politically managed systems could perform better than 105 (out of 179 countries examined) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Egypt came in at 105; the next best were Yemen and Iran at 131.

Since that time, several critical countries have made news by virtue of their leaderships’ determined effort to extend their term in office.

In Zimbabwe, discredited President Robert Mugabe said on December 19 that he would “never surrender”.  To emphasize the point, Mugabe added that “Zimbabwe is mine”.  Meanwhile, his beleaguered and impoverished country is suffering from a growing list of severe problems, including an outbreak of cholera that has killed hundreds of people. A BBC video clip explains in horrifying detail the devastating price cholera is exacting on ordinary Zimbabweans.

In Russia, CNN reported that the country’s upper house of parliament on December 22 approved an extension of the presidential term from four years to six, a step that could presage former President Vladimir Putin’s return to the nation's top office. Putin now serves as prime minister but is viewed by many as the country’s paramount leader.  The speedy move to amend the constitution comes at a time when low energy prices are putting increasing pressure on the Russian leadership’s ability to maintain the social and economic model that has been forged under Putin.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is also working diligently to remove institutional checks on his power.  On December 22, Chavez suggested that a referendum could be held on February 15, 2009 that would among other measures lift term limits. A December 2007 referendum that included a host of measures that would have removed checks on presidential power was narrowly defeated. Like Russia’s leadership, Chavez confronts a rapidly shifting and less predictable political landscape, as the energy resources that have been integral to his power dwindle.

A December 19 Washington Post editorial observes that while democracy advocates might welcome a vote of this sort in Venezuela, it carries real risks because:

"elections in Venezuela are no longer free and fair. Mr. Chavez has turned national television into a state propaganda outlet, and the Miami Herald reported [on December 14] that the government spent tens of millions of dollars to buy votes in the recent state and local elections. The state election authority, which is controlled by Mr. Chavez's loyalists, delayed the announcement of his defeat in last year's referendum; reliable sources say the president conceded only after he was told by military commanders that they would not put down protests against a falsified result. The official results, showing the margin of Mr. Chavez's loss, have not been released".

Unlike the Russian petrostate, where opposition has tended to be muted, in Venezuela opposing voices still make themselves heard.

Conflict in the Niger Delta Simmers on and Flares Up

When President Umaru Yar’Adua came to power a year and a half ago in Nigeria, a country with 140m people speaking some 250 languages, he detailed a seven-point agenda (energy, security, wealth creation, education, land reform, mass transit, and the execution the Niger Delta plan) to propel development via good governance. Topping President Yar’Adua’s agenda was achieving progress in the Niger Delta Region, where 23 percent of Nigerians reside and where instability reigns, with frequent inter-ethnic clashes over the allocation of oil wealth and resources. The Delta has always been a source of conflict: since initial oil deposits were founded in 1956, residents have been paid pittances, lost their lands, and suffered environmental degradation. Though there have been a few encouraging signs of incremental decreases in tensions, the complexity of the problem means that there is still little hope of an imminent resolution.

Bangladesh's Fizzled Makeover

Bangladesh’s current government is an interim regime installed by the military in a January 2007 coup. The government was supposed to direct the country away from its entrenched politics based on patronage and personality to a cleaner, more democratic form of governance. The primary goal was to create an alternative to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, and the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina. The two parties, bitter rivals, have long dominated Bangladeshi politics: Zia was prime minister from 1991-1996 and 2001-2006, and Hasina was prime minister from 1996-2001. They are known as the two “begums” – Muslim women of high rank – and each of their administrations was characterized by rampant corruption and a cult of personality centered on the respective leader. Since the coup, the army has tried to push the begums aside, jailing them and splitting their parties. However, by calling elections that will likely include both begums, the military has implicitly admitted that its mission has been less than successful.

Crackdown in Progress in Vietnam

Rapid economic growth in countries like Vietnam and China has fed the debate regarding the tradeoff between democracy and development. Although not free, citizens of these nations have benefited from significant wealth increases and poverty reduction. Yet not only has the expansion of freedom been slow, but the gains are often quite fragile. Indeed, facing setbacks to economic growth, undemocratic governments may quickly reverse advances in liberty. This appears to be the case in Vietnam. Like neighboring China, Vietnam has experienced impressive economic growth after pursuing market-oriented reforms. Yet Vietnam also shares with China a profound reluctance to permit political reforms. And now, in the face of recent financial reversals, Vietnam’s government has once again moved to stifle outcroppings of freedom and democracy in the country.

Crossroads Dispatch – Notes from the Field: Peru

In the spirit of last week’s post on Colombia, what follows are observations by Crossroads staff regarding governance in Peru. While not in a state of internal conflict like its neighbor Colombia, Peru also exhibits serious shortcomings in a number of the spheres of governance analyzed in Countries at the Crossroads. As in Colombia, the nation is headed by a charismatic, media-comfortable, US-and-market friendly president; unlike Alvaro Uribe, however, Peru’s Alan Garcia has had little success in translating rapid economic growth into high approval ratings.