COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Evolution of Lebanon's Hizbullah Remains Uncertain

As the results of the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections came in, outsiders were surprised to find that Hizbullah, the Shiite Islamist group, and its allies – the favourites to win – had been beaten and had seemingly accepted their continued fate in opposition. Regardless of the results, the relatively smooth voting process was a victory for Lebanese democracy and human rights; however, the internal situation in Lebanon remains precarious and a continued parliamentary majority for the Western-oriented, Sunni-led March 14th alliance will not likely challenge Hizbullah’s continuing reign over large portions of Lebanese territory.

For the last half a century Lebanon has been the Middle East’s battleground, where various factions from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to the Syrian and Israeli intelligence services have fought proxy wars in order to weaken real and perceived threats from their foes. Even before the civil war began in 1975, there had been severe clashes between Lebanon’s three dominant ethno-religious groups, Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims, which resulted in the creations of militias outside of the state military for the protection of each sect as well as the subjugation of their opponents – a zero-sum game that has continued to some degree ever since. The PLO took up residence in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in 1970, upsetting the delicate Christian-Shiite-Sunni balance, and began attacking Israel, prompting a number of military retributions and an occupation that ended only in 2000. Hizbullah’s history runs in parallel with Lebanon’s violent past. Founded in 1982 as a group for the protection of the Shiite community in southern Lebanon that had been abandoned by the state to face Israeli retribution alone, Hizbullah quickly emerged as a formidable anti-Israeli force, an efficient provider of services for Shiites living in the south and east of the country, and an effective defender of Shiite interests within Lebanon.

Understanding the rise of Hizbullah requires navigating the complex history of Shiism in the Middle East and in Lebanon in particular. Shiites, which comprise 10% of the Muslim population worldwide, have historically been discriminated against by the Sunni majority in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Bahrain. Though Shiites were given political space in post-independence Lebanon, Shiite political leaders tended to be unrepresentative political bosses who ran large patronage networks and oversaw the increased impoverishment of their respective population.   

With the increasing politicisation of Palestinians in the south of Lebanon (where most Shiites live) in the late 1960s, the reassertion of Shiism in Iran after 1979, and the rise of Islamism after the hopes of pan-Arabism faded with the death of Nasser,  Shiite politics in Lebanon underwent massive changes. The rise of the Amal movement witnessed the assertion of popular Shiite political power into Lebanese politics for the first time. Yet as the Iranian revolution gained strength and extended its reach, Amal’s secular oriented leadership was challenged by its religious offshoot which would eventually come to be known as Hizbullah (or, “the Party of God”).  Though Hizbullah’s stated goal was the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese territory, it quickly became a provider of social services to Shiites who would witness the organization’s commitment to their security firsthand during the civil war.

Hizbullah’s defining moment - and ironically, the first stage of its forced transformation – came in 1992 , when, after 15 years of civil war, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon. An internal debate within the organization as to whether or not stand for elections ensued. Several of the organization’s ruling clerics were opposed to running for elections on the basis of it being “un-Islamic,” yet important leaders such as the current Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, opted for running. Hizbullah representatives trounced their Shiite counterparts in the south and the Bekaa valley to the east in a deeply flawed election that was largely stage managed by Syria. Beyond their immediate relevance, the 1992 elections effectively brought Hizbullah into the Lebanese political fold, splitting the organization into two parts and ensuring broader Shiite representation in the Serail. Indeed, Hizbullah’s decision was also a signal that it would, at least for the time being, abandon attempts to forcefully impose an Islamic government on the country.

Hizbullah’s second transformative moment came in 2000 when, after a nearly two decades long war of attrition, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon. However, with Israel’s departure from Lebanon, Hizbullah lost its original raison d’être. Although the group disputed the withdrawal as complete, arguing over a piece of land called the Shebaa Farms, some soul-searching began within the organisation and in Lebanese society as a whole. Although Hizbullah’s overall existence was never brought into question given that it operates on a number of non-military levels, issues concerning its maintenance of a significant arsenal in peacetime were raised, and proved to be a serious source of contention in Hizbullah’s relationship with the state and with the international community Indeed, after a spate of political assassinations of Syrian opponents in Lebanon, possibly carried out with implicit or explicit help from Hizbullah, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1559, whose third operating paragraph calls for the disbanding of all militias operating in Lebanon. Given Hizbullah’s quasi-monopoly on force in Lebanon, the resolution was never carried out.

The tense relationship between the state and Hizbullah was exacerbated with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Hitherto Hizbullah had been politically protected by its Syrian patrons, who had occupied Lebanon at the international community and Lebanese state’s behest in 1976. Over the next two decades, Hizbullah had little concern for domestic politics as Damascus ensured that the Lebanese state and military were weak. Furthermore, it was largely due to Syrian influence that Hizbullah was not required to disarm along with the other sectarian militias in 1989 under the Taif Agreement, allowing it to become the strongest military actor in Lebanon. With Sunni leader Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 and the mass anti-Syrian protests known as the Cedar Revolution that paralysed the country and prompted the Syrian departure, Hizbullah was forced to  openly declare its support for Syria  and lead an opposition movement (March 8^th) against the pro-Western ruling alliance (March 14^th).

The fissure has had serious consequences for Lebanese politics and society. First, it has divided Lebanese society into two camps creating unlikely divisions and even more unlikely allies. Second, it has exacerbated religious tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, who are clearly divided into their respective alliances, with the Christian population spanning both. Third, it has worked to pit Iran against the Sunni Muslim world, particularly Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and France in a bid to define the future of the Lebanese state.

This split has also had unintended consequences for Hizbullah. In the past it had avoided involvement in the sectarian bloodletting, but as various groups sought to fill the security vacuum caused by Syria’s departure and Hizbullah looked to assert the demographic weight of the Shiite population, it began using its militia domestically. The situation exploded in May 2008, when the March 14 government attempted to fire the Hizbullah aligned head of security at Beirut’s international airport. Furthermore, the government sought to investigate Hizbullah’s private telecom network that it had created to wage war against Israel. After repeated assurances that it would never turns its arms on Lebanese citizens, Hezbollah and its allies took to the streets conquering large swathes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon while the Lebanese army looked on helplessly, fearing internal divisions would plunge the country into a larger crisis. The government was quick to back down in the face of a coup, but the political damage had already been done. In the end, the Doha Agreement ended the fighting and gave Hizbullah and its allies a veto in the cabinet, a position Hizbullah had long sought.

Though Hezbollah’s acceptance of its electoral defeat in June was comfort to some observers, it represented a temporary maintenance of the status quo. Yet the Lebanese political arena under the current dual alliance system continues to evolve.  With the return of General Michel Aoun, the Maronite Christians are abdicating their traditional support of the state for vague promises from Hizbullah. General Aoun, like a good many Christians who came to prominence as a military leader, seeks to be president – the constitution requires the office holder to be thus. However, unlike his predecessors, Aoun has allied with Hizbullah, formally signing a memorandum of understanding in February 2006, whereas previously the Christians had always supported the sovereign state. With this move he risks trading long-term influence for short-term safety. Likewise, the fourth main ethno-religious group in Lebanon, the Druze, have attempted to hedge their bets by improving relations with Shiites, although it is unlikely that this fiercely independent faction will formally align itself to one side anytime soon.

Though Hezbollah has certainly proven that it is willing to respect Lebanese democracy in some ways, it is clear that the central government’s lack of a monopoly on force is a constant threat to Lebanese democracy and stability. This should certainly be a cause for concern for governance-watchers. Some observers take concern even further. For instance, Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a fellow at Chatham House, declares that “the (Lebanese) state is not the state, the actual state is the state of Hizbullah. That’s the functioning state, it has an army which is efficient, well funded and well trained... it is the de facto power.” Furthermore, Mr. Hussain suggests that the eventual goal of Hizbullah is a state in which which Shiites reign supreme.

Whatever the true intentions, the concept of a ‘resistance movement’ coexisting alongside the Lebanese state is problematic at best.  Given Hezbollah’s overwhelming force and superior arsenal, there is little chance that the militia will be defeated on the battlefield. And although the strategy of trying to bring Hezbollah further and further into the Lebanese political fold appears to be working on the surface, it is a task fraught with danger and will not likely result in the group surrendering its arms.

Though it is still unclear if Hezbollah will be given formal veto power in the next cabinet, it remains that by force of arms, Hezbollah maintains a de facto veto power unknown in liberal democracies – a veto power which it did not hesitate to use in May 2008 and may not hesitate to use in the future.

In the end, Hezbollah will need to have a third transformative moment in which it finally decides whether to be a party for Lebanon or a party that is beholden to its financial and ideological masters Iran and Syria. It will also need to decide if it will remain a party of grievance or a party of broad appeal. Other actors, both within Lebanon and without, will be influential in this decision, but Hizbullah largely has the power to choose its path. Military strength, after all, brings with it the responsibility to make historic decisions.

Photo Credit: Flickr user hazy jenius

Nigeria's Stumbling Electoral Reform

Nigeria is the definition of a struggling democracy. While all of the country’s institutions are in need of extensive reform, the state of the country’s electoral process – the sine qua non in a democracy – is particularly deplorable. The necessity of election reform first became a high-priority issue in Nigeria following the country’s 2007 elections. According to the Freedom in the World report on Nigeria, these elections were the worst of the few free contests Nigeria has conducted since the end of military rule. The 2007 presidential, state, and legislative elections were characterized by both widespread violence and irregularities including fraud, vote buying, vote-rigging, and ballot-stuffing. Following the balloting, the winner, Umaru Yar’Adua of the PDP, acknowledged in his inaugural address that the elections that brought him to power were deeply flawed. He then pledged to reform the ailing electoral process during his tenure as president.

Nevertheless, recent events have cast light on the persistence of Nigeria’s electoral woes. On April 25, re-run elections in the Ido-Osi local government of Ekiti State were closely followed by local and international observers who hoped to see that progress had been made since 2007. The controversy and intrigue surrounding these elections, however, illustrates that Nigeria’s electoral process is still in dire straits. This week, 31 Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) officials faced interrogation regarding their involvement in the N250 million (US$1.7 million) bribery scandal. These officials, who presided over the re-run election, have been accused of receiving 250 million Nairas from one of Nigeria’s political parties. John Onaji, the presiding officer at the elections, blew the whistle on the scandal after another INEC official involved allegedly failed to share the money. This newest twist in the saga of Nigeria’s electoral mishaps occurred after the INEC had been forced to delay the Ekiti elections due to security concerns over gang-related violence that had probable connections to Nigeria’s political parties. An additional difficulty was created when Ayoka Adebayo, Ekiti’s Residential Electoral Commissioner, resigned due to an unwillingness to participate in a process that went “against her conscience,” but then returned to her seat after conferring with the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). After the election, the INEC delayed its release of the results for several days before declaring the PDP candidate the winner. Nigeria’s Action Congress (AC) party has, however, disputed the results.

While these most recent events provide substantive evidence that little headway has been made, this does not mean that the president has turned a deaf ear to the issue. After his election, Yar’Adua succumbed to popular pressure and convened an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) under the leadership of Justice Muhammad Uwais. Chief among the recommendations was that the INEC be made actually independent – currently, the president appoints all members of the commission. The ERC urged the government to establish three new bodies: an Electoral Offences Commission, a Constituency Delimitation Commission, and a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission, to relieve the INEC of some of its duties.

In response, the government has followed some of the ERC’s recommendations. On March 11, the federal government released a white paper stating that it would implement some of the report’s recommendations. It agreed that funding for the INEC should be guaranteed and independent of the executive. In addition, the INEC was given responsibility for state elections, replacing the troubled state election committees. Most importantly, it instituted a secret ballot system. INEC’s Chairman, Maurice Iwu, praised these reforms but, in an eyebrow-raising statement, also stated his support for “the power of the president to appoint the chairman of INEC.” Of course, this is hardly surprising, considering that he was appointed by the party in power. Nonetheless, on April 30, the president submitted 7 bills addressing election reform issues to the National Assembly. In these bills, the president proposed the removal of both the INEC’s control over the party registration process and its supervisory powers over parties. He has also proposed the creation of a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC) to assume these duties in place of the INEC, along with an Electoral Offences Commission. As of today, the government has accepted 73 out of 83 recommendations made by the ERC.

While the president’s reform efforts seem quite extensive, however, he has unfortunately remained intransigent on one of the most crucial reform issues. On May 12, the president reiterated his strong belief that the power to appoint the chairman of the INEC belongs to the president. He argued that transferring this power to the judicial branch would violate the separation of powers. The president’s continued control over the INEC, however, means that the president will retain his power to unfairly influence elections in favor of his party. The widespread victories achieved by the PDP both during and after the 2007 elections have been attributed, at least in part, to the use of the state machinery to manipulate the electoral process. With the newly proposed electoral reforms reducing the powers and responsibilities of the INEC, this phenomenon may become slightly less problematic in the future. Nevertheless, the bills contain provisions which would protect the president’s control over the new electoral bodies. For example, one of the bills states that the governing board of the new PPRRC is to be appointed and directed by the president. As such, not much stands to change.

Not surprisingly, the government’s tentative steps towards reform have not been widely embraced by Nigerians. Following the president’s initial drafting of an electoral reform bill in March, a coalition of opposition parties cried foul and urged the people to take to the streets and defend their voting rights by force. Alhaji Bashir Tofa, a former candidate, used some of the most inflammatory language, saying: “Civil society and labour must mobilise and organise to resist the insult and affront.” Sam Aluko, a famed economist, has “called on Nigerians to defend their votes with guns.” Since the president sent the new bills to the Legislative Assembly, opposition has been slightly less fierce. However, the events of the Ekiti re-run election reinvigorated the movement. On May 14, civil society groups began to plan a nationwide rally in support of a bill requiring the implementation of all of the reforms recommended by the ERC, rather than just the set approved by Yar’Adua.

Yar’Adua’s recent efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral process could be a small step in the right direction. In addition, the interrogation of the INEC officials involved in the recent scandal may serve as evidence that the culture of impunity surrounding electoral fraud is being slowly ameliorated. However, these changes will not be enough to expunge Nigeria’s undemocratic political culture and revamp Nigeria’s electoral process. Events such as the botched Ekiti re-run elections have made Nigerians increasingly suspicious and skeptical of their country’s political process in general and the INEC in particular. Nigerians have come to believe that the outcomes of elections are determined by political thugs rather than the will of the people. In order to bring credibility to the most critical element in any democracy, far-reaching reform is necessary. The perception wrought by the 2007 elections means that partial reform will not suffice. Without change from the ground up, civilian apathy (at best) and violent political unrest at worst will continue to cast a shadow over the Nigerial electoral landscape.

Photo Credit: Flickr user usnico

Iran's Presidential Factional Maze

 

With Iran’s June 12 presidential election fast approaching, the factional dynamics in the political system are shifting furiously and causing notable political strife. Although the election is effectively a referendum on the incumbent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his neoconservative Islamism characterized by a bellicose anti-western foreign policy and a financially crippling domestic policy, opposition groups – both liberal and conservative – are highly fractured, and the battle lines ever-evolving.

Ahmadinejad’s principle competitors for the presidency are Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a reformist who seeks to ease pressures on the media and engage abroad while maintaining the system’s basic structure. He was the last prime minister of Iran between 1981 and 1989 and was popular during his tenure. Mehdi Karroubi, a politician and cleric and the other “reformist” in the race, is more moderate and pragmatic regarding domestic reform in Iran and changing its foreign policy; he served as the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) for a total of seven years over two terms.

Ahmadinejad has been fiercely attacked on all sides for his militarization of Iranian politics. The President’s base of support is firmly embedded in the military and paramilitary elements and extremist clerics of the Haqqani school – an archconservative Shiite sect that unequivocally adheres to the notion of a divine state and leaves no room for popular sovereignty. The most important and influential of these clerics is Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the spiritual adviser to Ahmadinejad and a member of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with electing the Supreme Leader. This makeshift radical alliance had been pushed to the margins of the Iranian power structure before Ahmadinejad’s rise, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s level of commitment to their continued preservation in power has always been extremely vague to outsiders. Furthermore, although in the last four years Ahmadinejad has managed to promote his allies to positions of power, with Ahmad Jannati, another founding member of the Haqqani school, serving as the chairman of the powerful Guardian Council, three other key institutions remain outside the incumbent’s control. These are the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory body to Ayatollah Khamenei helping to resolve issues with parliament, and the Majlis.

Ahmadinejad’s role in increasing the influence of the army and extremist clerics in everyday life has earned him powerful enemies who would be classified as conservative by western standards, but juxtaposed to the current administration appear rather more moderate. One of these is Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former two-term president and current chairman of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council. Though the dynamic has changed somewhat, the principle issue that has separated Ahmadinejad from the more pragmatic conservatives – let alone the reformists – is relations with the US. Whereas the former and his ilk are willing to accept great sacrifices in their striving for a “pure” Islamic republic, the latter are less confrontational and more actively seek engagement. This debate takes place in the wider context of evaluating Iran’s position in the world and is manifested at every level of domestic politics, especially during election season. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment explains that Ahmadinejad is attempting to balance his clerical backers, who believe that one of the “fundamental pillars of the revolution, and one of the central identities of the Islamic republic, to retain an adversarial relationship with the United States.” However, Iran also has a very young population, much of which wants to normalize relations with the western world and sees the current antagonism as crippling Iran economically and isolating it politically, socially, and culturally. Walking the line between the ire of both groups is a constant challenge for the president.

Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy has also cost him support among conservatives. Mohsen Rezai, the former head of the Revolutionary Guards and an ally of the president in the 2005 elections, has recently criticized Ahmadinejad and announced his candidacy for the race. This move crucially splits the Principalists, a major conservative faction, who are far more inclined towards a free market economy than Ahmadinejad and the Haqqani school. As with Rezai, the Principalists fully supported Ahmadinejad in 2005, yet after four years of ever increasing inflation and unemployment, and crude government injections of money to support food subsidies and massive wage boosts, people have clearly realized that Iran’s development policy is lacking in coherence. Furthermore, Rezai has even declared his support for dialogue with the US. Whether this was done out of real conviction, or merely to raise support, or even out of purely economic considerations, the emerging consensus that there is a need to engage with the US can only be seen as a positive step.

Such dissent from Rezai might not be so disconcerting to Ahmadinejad – the former is not seen as a primary contender – had it not been for Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent public disapproval of the incumbent, as a recent New York Times article indicated. Furthermore, during Ahmadinejad’s recent visits to provincial capitals to raise support the state media took the step of specifically not airing coverage of Ahmadinejad’s trip. It is always possible to read too far into such signs, especially with Iran, where western knowledge of the local higher echelon politics is limited at best; however, the series of recent blows he has taken are certainly significant, even if potentially overestimated.

Yet while Ahmadinejad’s group appear to be under pressure to amend their stringent domestic policies, the reformist camp is faring little better. In February, Mohammad Khatami, a former president and candidate until he withdrew from the race in favour of Mousavi, was forced to abandon his advocation of democracy and publicly reaffirm the supremacy of the Islamic system as the foundation of any future state. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad is employing the full powers of the state against Mousavi and Karroubi, including the distribution of checks in poor neighborhoods and the persuasion of generals to endorse him. The greatest shock came in the last week of April, when the elections supervisor at the Ministry of the Interior predicted a clear Ahmadinejad victory. Naturally the state’s more coercive instruments have also been used to attack a wide range of opposition groups, from human rights activists to those pressing for democratization.

Although the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report affirms that the independence of the judiciary has somewhat improved in recent years, these gains seem to have been put on hold with the elections so close. One example relates to one of the few developments in Iran’s factional battles that is easily observable from abroad: the case of Roxana Saberi, an American-Iranian journalist with US citizenship who was arrested for espionage. Her detention in itself seemed surprising; although Saberi wrote about the moderately taboo issue of the gender segregation in social life, she was careful to not aggravate the authorities with confrontational articles. That Saberi was arrested and her trial rushed through the courts was seen as evidence of the conservatives flexing their muscles to warn both international and domestic opponents ahead of the elections. However, Ahmadinejad’s subsequent call for Saberi’s case to be examined more closely by the judiciary, and her subsequent release, further highlights the factionalism in the conservative bloc, Ahmadinejad’s interest in avoiding choking off the possibility of dialogue with the west, and – perhaps most of all – the degree to which, in the current season, outside observers must largely simply watch and wait.

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

Algeria's Election Heralds Continuation of Status Quo

Algeria’s recent presidential elections yielded unsurprising results. On April 9, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika , who has ruled Algeria since 1999, was re-elected to a third term with 90.23% of the national vote. This extremely high margin of victory is undoubtedly inflated. While the participation rate was officially measured at 74.5%, the opposition estimated that roughly 24% of eligible voters participated. According to official tallies, opposition candidate Louisa Hanaoune came in second place with 4.5% of the vote, while none of the other candidates were able to garner more than a few percentage points.

While these results were expected, they are troubling nonetheless. Both the run-up to the election and the balloting itself were decidedly undemocratic. The president’s reelection bid was only made possible after the parliament approved his proposed amendment to the constitutional provision that had previously set a two term limit on the presidency. This amendment essentially determined the outcome of the election in advance. During the presidential campaign, the absence of a viable opposition was striking. This was partially the result of direct government interference in the campaign activities of the opposition. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the development of a competitive party system in Algeria has been hampered by the government’s practice of refusing to award legal status to opposition parties. Without official authorization, parties are generally unable to participate in elections. As a result of this, the presidential election featured opposition candidates with little popular support. These candidates were widely considered to be “token opponents.” Several opposition leaders who were barred from participating attempted to stage a mass boycott as a last-ditch effort to influence the election’s results, but the protests were predictably stifled. Meanwhile, President Bouteflika utilized the resources of the state to exert control over the media and win over supporters on the campaign trail with extensive political handouts.

Apart from the government’s meddling, equally disconcerting is the prevailing environment of political apathy in which the election took place. Among both the general public and the formal opposition, the predominant line of thought seems to be that measurable change is unfeasible. While the opposition’s poor showing was principally the result of unfair government restrictions, a general lack of popular support and mobilization for the opposition was also a factor.

Unfortunately, in the realm of governance, a change of course is exactly what Algeria needs. Although the country must implement substantial reforms before governance can be improved, let alone democratized, Bouteflika failed to include any innovative policy proposals in the campaign. Instead, he repeatedly promised to boost economic growth and protect stability and security – important issues, to be sure, but far from visionary. The president’s health is another complication. Over the past few years, the 72- year-old president has been repeatedly hospitalized, possibly for stomach cancer. On top of all of this, he will likely have to focus much of his attention on the recent surge of terrorist attacks committed by the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. As a result of these factors, chances are slim that further headway will be made on crucial reforms with Bouteflika at the helm.

The details of the presidential elections serve as evidence of the country’s lack of progress in the sphere of accountability and public voice. While the election was generally free of violence, it was rife with fraud. In addition, Bouteflika has consolidated authority in the executive branch, largely through the support of the powerful military establishment. The president himself verified his half-hearted respect for important democratic principles: following the ratification of the constitutional amendment on term limits, he stated that democracy cannot “constitute a single, universal model…a model that must be adhered to and applied at all times and in all places.”

Moreover, Algeria’s level of respect for human rights and the rule of law is complicated by the president’s continuing focus on a particular conception of national reconciliation. As the 2008 Freedom in the World report on Algeria reports, the excessive amnesty laws passed by the government have resulted in an undermining of the justice system. As Human Rights Watch notes, terrorists and militants who committed heinous crimes during the civil conflict of the 1990s, during which 150,000 Algerians died and 6,000 disappeared, have escaped punishment, while groups representing the victims have been ignored and even actively harassed by the government. More recently, Bouteflika has expressed his willingness to pardon Islamic extremists responsible for organizing suicide bombings. In response to this, Amnesty International released a document earlier this year which denounced Bouteflika’s “legacy of impunity.” Due to the fact that reconciliation remained Bouteflika’s top campaign issue, nothing is likely to change in the near future. Relatedly, the state of emergency, which has been in effect for 17 years, gives the government the authority to unjustly imprison journalists and political dissidents, and Bouteflika has shown no inclination towards the revocation of the act.

Finally, the level of transparency in Algeria’s government is lamentable. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption is entrenched in the country. In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 90th out of 180. Despite his early promises to sweep Algeria’s political scene of corrupt officials, Bouteflika has largely turned a blind eye. Backroom dealings, often including cash handouts, were pervasive throughout the election. The separation of politics from business remains moribund, as do efforts to reform the military's role in commercial enterprise.

In essence, the president’s conduct during election season provides no evidence that Algeria’s poor governance record will be rectified. Real change in Algeria will require a changing of the guard. Given the constraints on the opposition, it is questionable how this will come about other than via a decline in Bouteflika’s health, which would create a dangerous vacuum. For now, then, Algerian governance will remain at the mercy of global economic fortunes and the interests of a narrow political class, and dispatches from the country will continue to feature descriptors like “stagnation” and “weak prospects” rather than “reform” and “justice.”

Photo Credit: Flickr user Franck Prevel

A Tale of Two Southeast Asian States

A recent article in the Economist dubbed Indonesia “South-East Asia’s only fully functioning democracy.” Considering the great strides the country has made towards democratic consolidation since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, this accolade is for the most part well-deserved. In fact, Indonesia is the only South-East Asian country to receive the “free” distinction in the Freedom in the World survey. The country’s reformasi, or reform movement, has given rise to an increasingly open political system characterized by respect for basic civil and political liberties. Indonesia’s democracy is certainly not beyond reproach. As the Economist notes, corruption continues to be prevalent, while the electoral process tends to be overcomplicated, chaotic, and at times overtly undemocratic. Nevertheless, the country’s political climate does boast a robust, competitive party system and a strong degree of pluralism – as befits such an ethnically and geographically diverse land – which has been regularly exemplified during the run-up to the country’s April 9 parliamentary elections and July 8 presidential elections.
The Economist described the campaign for Indonesia’s parliamentary election as a “carnival of democratic competition.” Over the past few months, candidates from a multitude of parties hit the campaign trail with a flurry of rallies featuring both political speeches and singing and dancing. There are currently 38 national parties registered in Indonesia. The assimilation of Islamist parties into this system, and more particularly their willingness to compromise and join forces with secular parties, is quite remarkable considering Indonesia’s past problems with Islamic extremism. During this election season, these parties were able to freely campaign without any restrictions on their activity by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The Election Day proceedings also demonstrated how far Indonesia’s electoral institutions have come. On April 9, 100 million Indonesians headed to the polls. While all of the votes have not yet been tallied, it looks likely that Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party will win the most seats with roughly 20% of the national vote. Polls show that the parties of the Suharto era, the Golkar Party and the Democratic Party of Struggle, have both sustained a substantial decrease in popularity. In addition, several of the smaller Muslim parties took a hit. Regrettably, 5 were killed in Papua, a province in which a separatist movement remains strong. Nevertheless, this outbreak pales in comparison to the bloodshed that once dominated Indonesia’s political scene.

When Indonesia is compared to other Southeast Asian countries, its relative superiority in terms of accountability and public voice is obvious. Thailand’s recent political history has been plagued by military rule and mounting instability, which reached a peak in recent days with the failure of an ASEAN summit and significant violence in Bangkok caused by anti-government protesters. The situation in the Philippines is equally troubling. Supposed coup attempts against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have abounded, while recent elections have been extremely violent. Generally, Malaysia can also be lumped with these troubled countries. Nevertheless, recent developments in this country serve as an indication that at least one of Indonesia’s neighbors may be taking baby steps towards a more democratic future.

In comparison to Indonesia, the political state of affairs in Malaysia is primitive. The corrupt, authoritarian United Malays National Organization (UNMO) party has ruled the country since 1957. In late March, the UMNO selected Najib Razak, a party insider who has been accused of the brutal murder of a Mongolian woman, to succeed Abdullah Badawi as Malaysia’s next prime minister. The UMNO and its coalition, the National Front, have wielded complete authority over the country’s political system despite the fact that a multiparty system formally exists. Throughout UMNO’s reign, opposition activities have been repeatedly restricted. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, campaign periods are extremely short, and with strong control of the media by the government. During the run-up to both the March 2008 parliamentary election and the by-elections that followed, the government’s interference in the campaign activities of the opposition was as bold as ever. At the end of this March, for example, police broke up an opposition rally by seizing DVDs and detaining an opposition leader. They also fired tear gas into a crowd while opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was giving a speech. Harassment of Anwar is no surprise; the repeated charges against the opposition’s most popular leader have epitomized UMNO’s style of frontal combat style politics.

That said, there are signs that the UMNO’s monopoly over Malaysia’s political scene may be waning. In comparison with previously, pluralism is at a new high in the country. Recently, the strength of the opposition, as well as its participation in mainstream politics, has steadily mounted. The opposition is made up of a coalition of three parties: the Malay-dominated Parti Keadilan, the Chinese Democratic Action Party, and the Islamic Pan Malaysian Islamic Party. As a previous post explains, the UMNO lost their two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections of 2008. In this election, the opposition achieved victories in 5 of 13 Malaysian states. They have subsequently lost seats in two by-elections. The most recent loss took place on April 7, when UMNO lost a state parliament seat. In addition, the opposition won another seat in the national parliament in Perak.

Surprisingly, under the newly elected prime minister, the government itself has made some preliminary efforts to respect, or at least not directly smother, the country’s burgeoning competitive party system. For example, Prime Minister Najib lifted the three-month ban on Harakah and Suara Keadlin, two opposition newspapers. However, on the whole, Najib's initial performance has left observers unimpressed.

It is obvious that the current situation in Malaysia leaves much to be desired.  It will still take a sizeable effort to effectively challenge or even to significantly influence the agenda of the entrenched UMNO party. Nevertheless, healthy pluralism has a higher chance than ever before of becoming firmly established in the country. Interestingly enough, Malaysia’s level of true pluralism could one day overshadow that of its neighbor should this prove to be the case. While the number of parties represented in Indonesia’s system is impressive, the diversity of interests and ideas espoused by these parties is not. As both the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report and The Economist note, most of Indonesia’s parties share strikingly similar platforms. The candidates’ policy proposals and opinions on key issues are fairly comparable. Unfortunately, their plans for the future are also equally vague. This dearth of ideological competition may soon contribute to a standstill in Indonesia’s path towards governance reform. 

Conversely, the ideas represented in Malaysia’s party system are more diverse than ever before. The interests, beliefs, and political ideologies of the majority of Malaysia’s inhabitants have finally entered the political scene. Most notably, the concerns of traditionally marginalized non-Malays, including the Chinese and smaller indigenous populations, have become part of political discourse. Opposition parties have also come forward with an abundance of ideas about how to address the problems currently debilitating Malaysian politics and society. Thus far, conflict has been the norm in Malaysia’s system. Nevertheless, if the opposition continues to increase its influence just as the negative effects of the global economic slowdown reach Malaysia’s shores, this exchange of ideas may become crucial. Malaysia certainly has a long road ahead. Nevertheless, for the first time in 50 years, there is a chance that it may one day join Indonesia as one of the region’s democratic exemplars.

Photo Credit: Flickr user 12th St. David

Colombia's Uribe and the Shadow of Reelection

In late January, El Colombiano, Medellin’s daily newspaper, purported to have received confirmation from a government minister that President Alvaro Uribe would not seek reelection in 2010. While this would be a welcome development in a country increasingly uneasy about the uncertainty and confusion surrounding Uribe’s possible reelection bid, the chances that the president and his supporters would abandon their efforts at this stage seems unlikely.

The contentious issue of Uribe’s reelection has been the omnipresent backdrop to the country’s political scene for the past year. Throughout this time, Uribe has evaded making any formal announcement regarding his intentions. In Colombia, reelection has been fodder for intense debate with respect to both the constitutionality and legality of such an endeavor, as well as the practical consequences that reelection would effect on the functioning of the country’s political apparatus.

As it stands today, the constitution prohibits Uribe from seeking a third term. While constitutional barriers did not stop Uribe from successfully seeking reelection in 2006, he now has to reckon with the Constitutional Court ruling from his previous bid, which states that, in order to assure that the balance of powers created by the Constitution is preserved, a president may only seek reelection once.

Uribe’s reelection first became a definite possibility in early 2008, when his supporters organized a committee to promote a referendum on a prospective 2010 reelection and collected 5 million signatures from the Colombian populace. A referendum proposal on a constitutional amendment permitting Uribe to run in 2010 was submitted to the Colombian Congress later in the year. This proposal, however, was defeated by the House after a debate on the specific language used in the referendum proposal to discuss the issue of reelection. Instead, in December, the House approved a referendum on an amendment permitting reelection in 2014. At this time, the measure was sent to the Senate, where deliberations are still in progress. As part of the Senate debate, Uribe’s supporters will put forward an amendment to the proposal which would clarify that the reelection bid applies to 2010.  If the referendum is passed by the Senate, it will then require the approval of both the Electoral Council and Constitutional Court before it can be scheduled.

This entire process has felt rather disingenuous. Uribe claims that his only interest is in the maintenance of his “democratic security” policy, but most Colombian observers have long been convinced that he longs for another term. Throughout the last few months, intrigue and irregularities have tarnished the inner workings of Colombia’s democracy. They have also led to unwelcome comparisons with Uribe’s nemesis, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who recently achieved success in his own bid to end reelection limits altogether.

Aside from the general distraction caused by the time spent reading smoke signals, a certain amount of government bullying may have been responsible for the House’s decision on the referendum. According to leading newsweekly Semana, the measure “was approved by the House of Representatives after a mini coup d’état by the government in the congress at the stroke of midnight- and via some irregular extra sessions.” According to Senator Juan Fernando Cristo, by decreeing that extra sessions take place while Congress was in session rather than in recess, Uribe was essentially sending the message that “nobody is leaving until you vote on this.” It was also reported that all six government ministers presided over the vote, while advisors guarded the doors to ensure that no votes were lost. 

What’s more, limit-pushing of a similar sort may taint Colombian politics in the future. The Electoral Council and the Constitutional Court may well object to the referendum due to both the procedural irregularities and strict rules which prohibit constitutional revisions that do not respond to a previous error in interpretation. A scandal regarding referendum financing is also at issue. Specifically, the foundation responsible for funding the referendum has refused to disclose information on its contributors. Semana predicts that the government will attempt to fill the Constitutional Court’s vacant seats with supporters of Uribe in order to ensure that the measure passes despite these irregularities, while a highly optimistic (from the Uribista perspective) article in leading daily El Tiempo suggests that the government feels confident that the Court will not strike down a referendum that has both the necessary signatures and the approval of congress.

The reelection issue, and the murkiness that has surrounded it, has already had a decidedly negative impact in terms of governance. As noted above, the level of transparency surrounding the matter has been insufficient. In addition, the fate of many other potential candidates hangs in the balance. As Semana notes, qualified and viable candidates for the presidency have been unable or unwilling to begin campaigning while Uribe’s candidacy remains questionable. Ironically, potential Uribista candidates are the ones most directly affected by this uncertainty. According to Colombia Reports, those few Uribistas who have decided to vote against Uribe’s reelection and organize their own campaigns have been targeted by the government. 

Should the attempt to reelect Uribe prove successful, the consequences will be even more unfavorable. The country’s healthy rotation of power is at stake. A 2010 Uribe reelection would mean 12 years of uninterrupted presidential rule in a country in which the executive is invested with expansive powers in comparison with the other branches of government. The upshot of such a development could be that, if Uribe is reelected, the precarious balance of power in the country will be debilitated. More specifically, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 includes provisions which protect public institutions from overbearing presidential control by ensuring that important public appointments do not coincide with presidential terms. By the end of a third term, however, Uribe will have appointed all or a substantial portion of the members of some of the country’s key institutions, including the Constitutional Court, the State Council, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and the National Bank, all of which stand to be increasingly dominated by Uribe and his followers. This has led both Colombians and outsiders to warn against a turn towards caudillismo in the country.

However, Uribe confronts significant obstacles in several regards. There is some (though decreasing) probability that the referendum proposal will be defeated by one of the institutional bodies. The language regarding 2010 vs. 2014 will need to be reconciled. For reasons stated above, the Electoral Council or the Constitutional Court may find fault with the proposal for a referendum on 2010, if not on 2014. In addition, even if the proposal for a referendum is passed, it is by no means certain that the Colombian people will vote in favor of a constitutional amendment. While Uribe has enjoyed incredibly high popularity, the level of support for his reelection has recently declined to around 50%.

Nevertheless, even if the proposal for a referendum is defeated, reelection could be made possible through a direct constitutional reform. In this scenario, Uribe supporters would look to the Congress to endorse his reelection bid. Reelection by this route, however, is still difficult to attain due to the fact that the constitutional reform would need to be passed twice by both houses of Congress. Given that it is already well into 2009, the clock is ticking. In the meantime, those concerned with Colombia’s potential turn for the worse can only adopt a “wait and see” approach. Colombia’s institutions have long been admired within the region, and their durability is particularly notable considering the country’s tumultuous history and the distinct institutional deficit in most neighboring countries. Whatever happens with the reelection issue, the president and his followers would be well-served by keeping in mind that those institutions are far more important than any one man.

Photo Credit: Flickr user A Look Askance

Same Old Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in Tunisia

Tunisia is widely known for its stunning beaches and plentiful tourist locales. While visitors are delighted by the sunny climate and the wonderful scenery, foreign leaders praise the country’s political stability, its economic performance and its role as faithful ally in the war against against terrorism. But the sunny surface masks a darker political reality in North Africa’s most westernized state.

Zimbabwe and Kenya - Power-Sharing, or Reckonings Postponed?

Following their well-publicized post-electoral meltdowns, Zimbabwe and Kenya are working through tricky governance issues involving power-sharing among multiple, mutually suspicious political parties. These situations are important to monitor as sub-Saharan Africa has all too rarely seen harmonious transitions even when the handover of power is straightforward, let alone when it involves powerful personalities and deep grievances. Ideally, these nations will succeed in peacefully distributing authority among the stakeholders, but the fragility of the processes is severe.

New Ministers in Iran May Quash Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plans

Last week, Iran’s parliament, or Majles, gave its vote of confidence to three new cabinet ministers. The relatively moderate Shamseddin Hosseini and Ali Kordan will take up crucial roles as the economy and interior ministers, respectively, while Hamid Behbahani will head the Ministry of Transport. The Financial Times described Hosseini and Kordan as compromise candidates and called their appointment a blow to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his fundamentalist administration.