COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Former Army Chief Poses Surprising Challenge in Upcoming Sri Lankan Elections

Photo Credit: flickr user foto.rajith

On Sunday, General Sarath Fonseka, the former chief of Sri Lanka’s army, officially announced his candidacy for the country’s presidency, challenging current President Mahinda Rajapaksa, General Fonseka’s wartime partner. Referring to the current president as a “tin-pot dictator,” Fonseka in his announcement promised to “scrap the executive presidency within six months, hold parliamentary elections and adopt a new constitution that will uphold democracy, social justice and media freedoms.” With these words, Fonseka has presented an unexpected and potentially viable competition in the January 26th elections.

The contest will be held in a political climate dominated by the end, last May, of the decades-long war between the government and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE – commonly called the Tamil Tigers) – a war which intensified greatly after Rajapaksa came to power in 2005. By stepping up the campaign, Rajapaksa managed to defeat the rebel group and kill almost all of its leaders. The war’s conclusion, however, was accompanied by a large increase in human rights abuses and persistent allegations that the president was becoming more authoritarian, including by stifling dissent and condoning violent attacks against his opponents. His administration’s attitude toward freedom of the press has worsened from an already less-than-laudable situation: the state dominates the media sector, using highly restrictive slander and libel laws to prevent media criticism of public officials and failing to protect journalists from harassment, intimidation, and, increasingly, physical attacks.

Additionally, as Fonseka implied in his announcement, during his tenure as president Rajapaksa has centralized considerable power in the hands of him and his brothers. Though Sri Lanka’s constitution, which is modeled on the French constitution, does not outline a clear division of power between the three branches of government, Rajapaksa has created an executive branch with much more sweeping powers than its predecessors. His brothers hold major government posts, and effectively most controls over decision making and public spending are in Rajapaksa’s and his brothers’ hands. Rajapaksa has ignored Supreme Court rulings, usurped the powers of the constitutional council, and directly appointed loyalists to important posts in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the police force. In his announcement on Sunday, Fonseka indicated that he intends to limit executive rule.

Rajapaksa has also failed to address the Tamil grievances that contributed to the strength and duration of the Tigers’ insurgency. In order to unify the country in the postwar era, analysts argue that the Sri Lankan government must go beyond freeing Tamils from camps for the internally displaced and take more long-term steps, like repealing the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which allows for the detention of LTTE suspects without legal representation or safeguards, or establish a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate the final weeks of the war.

Fonseka is not without his own potential vulnerabilities on rights questions; indeed, critics protest that his military strategy killed thousands of civilians. However, although he is perceived as sympathetic to nationalist groups, in his speech Fonseka attempted to undermine the president’s populist appeal by condemning the poor conditions of the displaced persons camps in which tens of thousands of Tamils remain, promising to shift more power from the presidency to the parliament, and accusing Rajapaksa of failing to bring together the country after the war’s end. By bringing the grievances of the Tamils to the forefront, Fonseka may be able to gain an advantage among voters who fear the insurgency will return should Tamil grievances remain unaddressed.

At the same time, even though Fonseka provides a glimmer of hope for the Sri Lankan opposition, President Rajapaksa perceives that the defeat of the LTTE will carry him through another election, as long as the balloting happens soon. While the elections were scheduled for November 2011, Rajapaksa signed a decree last month to hold elections in January 2010 in order to maximize political gains from his current popularity. The majority of his support comes from the Sinhalese-dominated south, where, according to the Washington Post, army families sang songs calling him king following the victory over the Tigers. However, dissent against Rajapaksa exists—thousands of protesters marched in November, pointing to encroaching dictatorship, increasing corruption, and a sinking economy.

Though Fonseka’s announcement on Sunday was the first time he formally announced his candidacy, his potential challenge was no secret. Like the president, Fonseka has the victory of the civil war to count on. According to the New York Times, Fonseka’s wartime strategy struck “a mortal blow” to the Tamil army. And his retirement from his post in November, more than a month before the end of his term, prompted rampant rumors that the general would compete in next year’s elections. His letter announcing his retirement to President Rajapaksa was not greeted warmly; though Fonseka requested to retire on December 1st, Rajapaksa said Fonseka could pack his bags and be out two days later, minus his security detail and official residence. The pair’s relations had been strained since the end of the war, when Rajapaksa placed Fonseka in a largely ceremonial post, leading Fonseka to accuse Rajapaska of sidelining him and suspecting him of plotting a coup.

Fonseka appears to have a substantial following, providing a surprising dose of choice in a country that is often seen as subject to increasingly personalized rule. According to the Washington Post, Fonseka’s Facebook page is covered in messages of “adulation,” including a mock billboard that bore a striking resemblance to the famous Barack Obama “Hope” poster. When rumors arose that Fonseka would appear on the ballot, the country’s other political forces sprouted up to claim him for their own. Former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP) hinted that Fonseka would be their candidate, and urged the Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to support the UNP’s bid. However, the JVP wants Fonseka for itself, and the TNA has not declared their support for the general. As a party that was once seen as a proxy for the Tamil Tigers, they have a history of antipathy toward Fonseka, even having once deployed a suicide bomber to assassinate him.

Signs indicate that Fonseka will not win without a fight, but Rajapaksa already appears nervous. In a particularly lurid manifestation of this insecurity, the president had the nation’s most popular astrologer jailed for nine days this summer for being a threat to national security after the astrologer predicted that Rajapaksa would be kicked out of office or killed. Moreover, after Fonseka criticized the “appalling conditions” of the camps and hinted that he would focus on the treatment of those living there, the Sri Lankan government freed hundreds of thousands of Tamils on December 1. Knowing that even a relatively small Tamil turnout could swing the vote in January, this could be a calculated step on the part of Rajapaksa to attract some of those votes, or at least defuse the issue as a political hot button. Either way, the future of Sri Lankan politics now looks more unpredictable than was anticipated just a few short months ago.

Frelimo secures major victory in Mozambican elections

Photo credit: Flickr user ComSec

Frelimo, the political party that has ruled Mozambique since the country became independent in 1975, scored a victory of unprecedented magnitude in the country’s October 28 presidential election. Frelimo has won every national election since the 1992 peace agreement, this time garnering 75 percent of the vote, in contrast to its main rival, Renamo, which took a mere 16.5 percent. While the victory was unambiguous, it enlarges already instilled fears about growing single party rule in Mozambique. 

With this result, Armando Guebuza, the incumbent president and one of the country’s wealthiest businessmen, surpassed his 2004 triumph over Renamo leader Afonso Dhaklama, when Guebuza gained 63.7 percent of the vote to Dhaklama’s 31.7 percent. According to the New York Times, Frelimo officials anticipated a dramatic victory, with the party spokesman claiming that the Frelimo was “really just competing with ourselves; our aim is to win by a margin greater than in the past.” The opposition party is challenging the election’s legitimacy. Warning of an impending “people’s revolt,” Dhaklama held a session on Thursday to discuss the party’s future and argued that the meeting must decide “whether Renamo will manage to survive as a political force in [Mozambique]; whether democracy will survive, or has ended with the October elections; or whether Renamo, as the force which brought about this democracy will have to launch a demonstration in protest against all that happened on 28 October.”

The history of rivalry between these competing political parties is decades long and marked by brutal violence. From 1975 to 1992, Frelimo and Renamo were the primary two warring armies in one of Africa’s most bloody civil wars (the country’s main north-south road is still adorned with ruined schools and burnt-out health clinics) and they became parties only after 1992. Today, however, what really raises eyebrows in not the competition between the two factions, but the lack thereof. With each additional Frelimo victory, Renamo sinks further; with no viable threat from a third party, only Frelimo is left to fill the vacuum. 

This year’s elections were marred long before Mozambicans went to the polls. In September, the country’s Frelimo-dominated National Election Commission (NEC) announced that because of inadequate paperwork, the newly formed Mozambique Democratic Movement could not compete in most of the country’s voting constituencies. Its creator, Daviz Simango, the mayor of Beira (and the only non-Frelimo mayor in Mozambique), was able to compete as one of three presidential candidates, but the NEC’s decision left MDM only able to win, at most, around a dozen of the 250 seats in parliament. 

While international observers reported no electoral irregularities that would have a significant effect on the results, some flaws were reported. The EU Election Observation Mission noted that officers refused to accept complaints from monitors of the political parties. Renamo is rejecting the results of the elections, accusing Frelimo of stuffing ballots and other acts of electoral fraud. The electoral commission acknowledged that workers at polling stations intentionally marked ballots with ink to invalidate them. And the Mozambican Public Integrity Center and the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa revealed in their analysis that the commission also excluded more than 100,000 ballots. That said, considering the 58.5 percent margin, the irregularities were not nearly enough to change the outcome of the election. Similar observations were made in the country’s 2004 contest, with observers noting ballot-box stuffing, politicization of the NEC, and lack of transparency. Though highly critical of the country’s electoral conduct, the Mozambique Constitutional Council still accepted the election results.

Mozambique is not the only Countries at the Crossroads state in Africa where the prospect of single party rule seems to be looming ever closer. As discussed in an earlier post on this blog, the African National Congress’s overwhelming control of South Africa’s executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. Growing single party rule also affects Tanzania, where state officials favor the ruling party. While all political parties must gain permission from the police to hold rallies, for example, the ruling CCM party appears to hold rallies where and when it pleases, even as opposition parties have trouble securing permission. Moreover, Angola, perhaps the country with a history most similar to that of Mozambique, is a premier exemplar of the perils of single party dominance.

Growing single party rule is not just a threat to democracy on its own terms; rather, it has far reaching consequences for other governance spheres, often exacerbating both grand and petty corruption, unfair campaign finance practices, and inequitable rules on freedom of assembly. Although Frelimo’s victory at the polls is unlikely to be seriously challenged or reversed, the election flaws are not without consequence. Mozambique is the world’s ninth poorest country, with a per capita income of US$770 in 2008, and is highly dependent on foreign aid. The country has drawn in investment and donations as a result of its market-oriented policies and rich mineral resources, and has been seen as a “darling of foreign donors.” But those very donors have expressed disappointment in Frelimo’s electoral behavior.

With Parliament almost entirely under the control of Frelimo, and an entrenched culture of political influence in the judiciary, Guebuza’s actions are likely to be left unchecked by the country’s other political institutions. In the absence of such checks and without any viable challenge at the ballot box, democracy and the foreign aid upon which Mozambique is highly dependent are at risk.

Mo Ibrahim, Festus G. Mogae, and the Art of Promoting Good Governance

Press coverage of the African continent often highlights atrocities, paying the most attention to failed states like Somalia, genocide in Sudan, escalating insurgency threats in the Niger Delta region, and political thuggery in Zimbabwe, to name a few. However, on October 20, when Botswana’s former president Festus G. Mogae was awarded the annual Ibrahim Prize for his demonstration of excellence in African leadership, whispers of approval fluttered across the African plains.  Mo Ibrahim, the Sudanese founder of the prize for Achievement in African Leadership, argues that “nothing, simply nothing, is more important for Africa than good governance,” a statement with which this blog can only concur. He told the New York Times that he hopes that prize will contribute to a lively debate about leadership in Africa, especially since almost everyone knows about Robert Mugabe while far fewer know about Festus G. Mogae. The award of this prize in Africa to an African leader highlights the undeniable fact that democratic changes, however incremental, are slowly occurring across the continent.

As noted in a previous post, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance is an assessment and ranking of 48 sub-Saharan African countries according to five general criteria: (i) safety and security; (ii) rule of law, transparency, and corruption; (iii) participation and human rights; (iv) sustainable economic opportunity; and (v) human development. Note that the index is quick to indicate that it is “based on international and locally acquired data for the 2006 year and does not reflect the myriad social, economic, and political upheavals affecting sub-Saharan Africa during 2007 and 2008.” This is an important qualification: while rigor in use of data is always sound; the fact is that indicator users tend to perceive the tools as reflective of current realities. Thus the Ibrahim index’s transparency about its data timing is welcome and should be taken into account when comparing the results to these of other indicators, including Countries at the Crossroads.

This year’s index also seems to demonstrate that size matters when examining issues of governance: most of ten best-run countries have relatively small populations. Moreover, as the Economist notes, “the resource-rich countries fill the bottom of the table” with lower scores on governance. This juxtaposition of larger against smaller countries raises the familiar questions about the effective and efficient use of resources by the larger countries, including Angola, the Congo-DRC, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sudan to construct the necessary democratic institutions to combat graft and anticorruption while establishing rule of law and giving civil liberties and public voice to their citizens. While such programs as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have increased the pressure on resource-rich countries to harness such abundance to improved governance and equitable development, the lack of improvement is sobering.

As the 2008 Index indicates, 11 of the 16 countries covered in Countries at the Crossroads have declined in their rankings. Some of the comparisons are odd due to the differing time overlaps. For instance, the Ibrahim Index shows that Mauritania has the largest decrease in its ranking, plunging from 21st ranked in 2007 to 31st ranked in 2008. But being based on earlier data, the index does not take into account Mauritania’s brief democratic flowering, which peaked with the 2007 elections. Countries at the Crossroads 2007, conversely, showed Mauritania as sub-Saharan Africa’s largest gainer (out of a much smaller set) as the survey was published soon after Mauritania’s relatively strong balloting. Of course, now that the country has regressed, the Ibrahim rankings momentarily look appropriate. But again, the central message is that coverage periods are critical in terms of rankings.

Yet the question remains: can spotlighting the good work of African leaders (work which ideally would have been done anyway) really bring democratic changes to the continent? Probably not, or at least not on a continental scale. But if the prize helps even at the margins, citizens will benefit. In addition, much like the “MCC Effect,” an element of competition can induce policymakers to adopt a broader view. So while leaders should certainly be improving governance anyway – and proper systems of accountability are supposed to provide political incentives to do so – the Ibrahim Prize can’t hurt. In addition, if one takes a look at the recent influx of foreign leaders to the continent, Africa is clearly being courted by the world. As the Economist notes, hardly a “month has gone by without a country or group playing host to African leaders to win their favors.” Moreover, the IMF has selected Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia as stable enough countries to merit the rank of “emerging markets.” With more international attention being paid to the continent, perhaps leaders will perceive that greater benefits than previously can accrue to those who are viewed as successful leaders.

In the end, hopefully lessons about core democratic and governance principles can be learned and inculcated into the structures and institutions of African countries and the Ibrahim prize will no longer be necessary. So while some may call the Ibrahim prize a bribe or protection money to African leaders, now is the time to envisage what a stable, proposing and democratic African continent can look like and provide incentives to move countries toward achieving it. Festus G. Mogae’s work in consolidating democracy, stepping down after the end of his presidency, respecting civil liberties and the rule of law, and enacting anticorruption and transparency measures, all while fighting the AIDS pandemic, serves as one small example of the positive trends of democratic transition in Africa.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Christopher H. Fleming

Fodder for Governance Eggheads Unveiled

The World Bank recently released its annual World Governance Indicators (WGI) report. The WGI is one of the most widely utilized and analyzed indicators. For those who don’t follow indicators in all their stultifying minutiae, the key element of the WGI is that it is an aggregate indicator. This means that rather than attempting to measure governance directly, it draws on the ever-growing army of indicators, including those produced here at Freedom House, and combines them in order to detail the gains and losses made in governance across the world. Utilizing a definition of governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised,” the report offers measurements of six different aspects of governance: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption (CC).

Weekly Governance Links: Rule of Law

As a March article in The Economist indicated, rule of law is a nebulous concept even for academics. For the purposes of the Countries at the Crossroads survey, rule of law is a fairly broad category encompassing areas such as the independence of the judiciary, civil and criminal proceedings, accountability of security forces to civilians, property rights, and equal protection under the law. This week we take a quick snapshot of recent developments dealing with the rule of law across a subset of Crossroads nations.

During the first quarter, the Washington-based Property Rights Alliance, a consortium of international NGOs, released the 2008 International Property Rights Index. The group’s annual international report of private property defenders and offenders ranks states according to three metrics: legal and political environment, physical property rights, and intellectual property rights. Seven of the ten worst aggregate scores for defending property rights belong to Crossroads countries, with Bangladesh and Zimbabwe bringing up the rear.

In the area of constitutional reforms, it is anticipated that Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will deliver a sweeping package of legislative reforms later in May, including changes to the judiciary, defense and law enforcement agencies, and local self-government. Analysts view the reforms as a move to establish a parliamentary republic in Ukraine modeled after Germany, though Tymoshenko’s unilateral move suggests yet another growing rift in the fragile Orange coalition that also includes President Viktor Yushchenko.

Colombia this week extradited to the US a number of top paramilitary commanders who had previously demobilized under the Justice and Peace Law. The move was extremely controversial, with Human Rights Watch and other victims groups claiming that the extradition would effectively end any possibility of a full accounting of paramilitary crimes. Others, however, noted that the paramilitaries were making a mockery of justice by continuing to run their drug trafficking networks from prison, and that they are far more likely to spend significant time in prison in the US than in Colombia. The middle ground position, adopted by the Center for International Policy, is that the justness of the move will hinge on whether Colombian investigators have access to the prisoners and continue to vigorously investigate their crimes. In other recent Colombia news, a positive step occurred that will hopefully strengthen the military’s accountability when a Colombian colonel and 14 other soldiers were sentenced to up to 54 years in prison for the killing of 10 undercover police officers in 2006.

The International Crisis Group also recently released a report outlining the challenges facing judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan. A politicized judiciary was at the heart of the crisis during the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” that resulted in the ouster of President Askar Akayev. The report cautions that the development of a pluralistic and stable political system over the long term hangs in the balance for the country, as sweeping judicial reforms are critical to tackling widespread corruption and encouraging development.

The Open Society Institute’s Justice Initiative recently published an analysis of the use and abuse of pretrial detention, a common problem throughout both the developing and the developed world. Another OSI report, “Alone in the Courtroom: Accessibility and Impact of Criminal Legal Aid before Istanbul Courts,” details the lack of legal representation in Turkish courtrooms. Focused narrowly on the situation in Istanbul’s courts – where aid services are more readily available than in other parts of the country – the study highlights how only a limited number of defendants are able to actually exercise their right to free legal aid as guaranteed by Turkey's Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the survey, only ten percent of criminal defendants in Istanbul are represented by a lawyer.

Syria recently passed its first Competition and Anti-Trust Law. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes, the measure follows several new laws recently issued –including a new commercial law, an incorporation law, and an arbitration law – that supersede old statues on the books in Syria since the country’s founding in 1949. While the recent legal reforms will help to facilitate Syria’s integration into the global economy may assist in combating corruption, observers caution that the law will be difficult to implement without accompanying political reforms to free the Syrian marketplace from state pressures. Finally, as in many Middle Eastern countries, much of Syrian civil law is based on Sharia. The International Herald Tribune recently published a lengthy analysis of Shariah law in the broader framework of rule of law.

Weekly Governance Links: Africa

Africa has drawn greater than its usual portion of international attention recently; unfortunately, this has mostly been due to negative factors such as the ethnic violence in Kenya and scandal in South Africa; as well as electoral developments in Zimbabwe, where the balance of positive and negative are yet to be determined. The Countries at the Crossroads survey observes the fragility of institutions and governance across seventeen nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though many states are much improved, the majority remain threatened by persistent corruption, weak rule of law, and political repression. Below are some links to recent developments on the governance front across the region.

Beginning with the story grabbing headlines at the moment, the wait for election returns in Zimbabwe continues as embattled president Robert Mugabe fights to remain in power.  Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai claims to have cleared the 50% threshold necessary for a majority victory, though all indications point toward a massaged vote count that will force a run-off with Mugabe. Tensions are high and opposition supporters are bracing for a possible crackdown as Mugabe tightens the screws following the March 28th vote. Four American citizens were arrested on Thursday, and two individuals  – a New York Times journalist and a democracy assistance worker –remain in custody without any public acknowledgment by the Mugabe regime. As a testimony to the historic significance of the election, it has already been confirmed that the ruling ZANU-PF lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1980; however, the Financial Times notes that internal disputes within the MDC resulted in the attainment of a strong plurality rather than an outright parliamentary majority.

While it appeared that the fragile truce mediated by Kofi Annan in Kenya was on the verge of collapse, this week the main rival groups reached a compromise on forming a new coalition government. Many international organizations, such as Berlin-based Transparency International, have criticized factions loyal to both President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister-designate Raila Odinga for the sluggish pace in forming a government, thereby furthering weakening state institutions and creating a power vacuum in which corruption can thrive. For in-depth coverage, Human Rights Watch recently published “Ballots to Bullets,” a comprehensive report on the governance challenges facing Kenya in the wake of the ethnic violence following the disputed December 27th general elections. On a separate note, the IMF recently released a review of fiscal transparency in the country, an area in which gains will be fundamental to effectively combating the country’s sustained high levels of corruption as well as assuring Kenya’s fractious groups that revenues are being distributed equitably.

Inconsistent anticorruption efforts appear to remain the name of the game in Nigeria following the January sacking of Nuhu Ribadu, the young, crusading head of the nation’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The move was roundly condemned by Human Rights Watch as “a thinly veiled attempt to gut the only law enforcement agency that has tried to hold prominent ruling party politicians to account for their many crimes.” Nonetheless, the EFCC made good on a promise made by Ribadu in 2007 by recently opening a corruption probe against former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Ironically, the EFCC was formed in 2002 at the behest of Obasanjo in his internationally-encouraged effort to fight the endemic corruption that has plagued Nigeria throughout its existence. Transparency International offers fresh analysis of Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts following the election of President Umaru Yar’Adua in April, 2007. Two recent articles in the FT also represent the sporadic nature of anticorruption efforts: last week two ministers were fired over corruption allegations, but this week the privatization of a major steel plant was halted following the discovery of major abuses.

All is not gloom and doom, however, as Mozambique continues to make strides toward boosting state capacity and improving governance. Recently, the Mozambican government proposed increasing the number of municipalities in the country from 33 to 43, thereby devolving certain powers to local authorities and encouraging improvements in local governance. Furthermore, in a move that will undoubtedly please the World Bank’s “Doing Business” researchers, the Minister of Industry and Trade recently issued a decree that will streamline the registration process for business by creating one-stop shops for the issuance of licenses and permits.

In other encouraging legislative news in the region, the government of Zambia is moving to implement a Freedom of Information law that will strengthen the practice of journalism and hopefully provide a useful tool for all citizens to hold the government accountable. Zambia has also been active on the anticorruption front, summoning ex-President Frederick Chiluba to the Task Force on Corruption to answer allegations of rigged commodities deals during his reign in the 1990s. Such developments are certainly welcome, but as Michael Gerson observed in an op-ed in the Washington Post, rule of law remains fundamentally weak in Zambia, particularly protections for women and girls.

Several other miscellaneous links provide useful information about cross-border issues. Transparency International released a report discussing the variety of corruption-mapping tools being used in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank, meanwhile, surveys the region’s general macroeconomic prospects and emerges cautiously optimistic. On a similar note, a report from the Center for Global Development affirms that growth prospects have improved, and gives significant credit to increased democratic stability. Finally, another World Bank report examines a very topical issue: the lessons China’s development strategy holds for African nations.

Map Credit: NPR

Deflating the Bolivarian Revolution?

Toward the end of this post a few weeks ago we noted that a new and provocative piece had been published in Foreign Affairs arguing that the much-heralded gains of Venezuela's poor during the Hugo Chavez era were difficult to back up with data. We also linked to a piece by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which has defended Venezuela's economic performance since Chavez assumed office in 1999. Unsurprisingly, the dispute between the two sides has intensified: CEPR's Mark Weisbrot posted an analysis purporting to debunk the Foreign Affairs piece, while Francisco Rodriguez, the author of the article, responded to Weisbrot with a more detailed look at the way he arrived at his conclusions. This debate will likely be one that is seen with greater frequency, especially if the one point on which the two sides are in agreement - that Venezuela has troubling macroeconomic balances that could cause severe pain in the future - remains unaddressed (see this Financial Times article from yesterday on one way the government might start to deal with the currency imbalance).

Leaving aside the very interesting methodological dispute, there are a couple of broader governance-related points to note here. First, one of the problems in the debate is data-related. Venezuela's data have been poor and untimely, making the issue of what sets to use and their relevance more problematic than would otherwise be the case. Although the constitution references citizens' right to information, no systematic transparency and access to information law has been enacted. A lack of transparency, combined with a politicized judicial system and large increases in government spending, will almost inevitably lead to increased corruption, one of Venezuela's other serious governance problems.

Perhaps more interesting, however, is the broader question of where Hugo Chavez's Venezuela fits into the international system, not in terms of geopolitics but in terms of ideology and political economy. The defense of his much-questioned presidency rests on two fundamental tenets. One is increased political participation opportunities for average Venezuelans. Proponents of this view argue that "the appeal of Chávez and 21st-century socialism is as much to do with this being a project of political empowerment as it is one of oil-'rent' distribution." There is little question that Venezuela's previous two-party system was not particularly representative. However, as Venezuela continues to tread a path in which executive branch power grows - or, in the case of the failed constitutional reform, nearly grows - as traditional institutions that can check it wither, the proposition that citizen participation can adequately replace traditional mechanisms of liberal democracy will be tested.

The other fundamental tenet of Chavismo is economic growth and material improvements in people's lives. Some people see Venezuela's significant post-2003 economic growth as a repudiation of neoliberal economics. This is difficult to prove or disprove, given the windfall from the oil boom of the last few years (growth in Argentina is perhaps a more interesting case here, as was recently discussed, and eventually dismissed, in The Economist). Others point to the concrete gains of the poor, both in monetary terms and in increased provision of state services. But the longer Chavez remains in power, the greater the expectations will be, and the less excuse the government will have for continued failures (such as the stratospheric violent crime rate). Murky data and all, one can expect more frequent debates over the empirical results of Chavismo in the coming years.

Photo found at CaracasChronicles

Millennium Challenge Account Decision

On December 12, the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Board of Directors announced countries selected as eligible for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), multi-billion dollar assistance program established to target development funds to countries that rule justly, invest in their own citizens, and foster economic freedom. Malawi was the sole country added to the group eligible to apply for an MCA compact.  Mauritania was selected to participate in a threshold program.

A press release put out by the MCC explains their selection decisions.

A range of countries are already participating in the program and were reselected by the MCC’s Board as eligible for 2008 fiscal year compact funding. These countries are:  Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Jordan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, and Vanuatu.

Meanwhile, on the subject of influential foreign assistance, a front page article in the Financial Times looks at a World Bank effort to work with the Chinese government on aid programs to Africa.

The piece by Richard McGregor notes that

Multilateral lenders including the African Development Bank have been trying to persuade the Chinese to raise standards of transparency in their lending, amid concerns that a fresh build-up of loans could destabilize economies only recently relieved of long-standing debt.

China’s thirst for energy resources is deeply intertwined with its evolving use of soft power through investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

China has so far closely aligned its development assistance to Africa with its quest for resources on the continent to fuel its booming economy.

For a deeper look at this subject, a book by Joshua Kurlantzick – “Charm Offensive” – provides insight to how China is exerting its influence in the contemporary context.

Mo Ibrahim Index in Spotlight: Is Zimbabwe Better Governed Than Nigeria?

Several weeks ago, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released the inaugural edition of the Index of African Governance. The index, sponsored by Mr. Ibrahim, a cell phone magnate and founder of Celtel, assesses Sub-Sahara's 48 states in five categories: safety and security; rule of law, transparency, and corruption; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. While the survey is a welcomed addition to the field, particularly given its comprehensive coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa, several methodology kinks need to be worked out before its rankings can be used as a more precise tool for comparing these states.

The index posits Mauritius, Seychelles, and Botswana as the best-governed countries in Africa, while the worst, not surprisingly, include Chad, DR Congo, and Somalia. Rather remarkably, however, Rwanda is ranked 19th, on the same level as Zambia and better than Mozambique. Perhaps even more puzzling is the assessment that Zimbabwe is better governed than Nigeria. Freedom House recently released in-depth reports examining governance in all five of these countries and our research is at odds with these conclusions.

Rwanda transitioned from dictatorship to nominal democracy after the 2003 elections, yet the ruling RPF party continues to hold power and exert overwhelming influence over political and civil rights. In the last three years, this dominance only increased (see the Countries at the Crossroads Rwanda report). There is no significant opposition, as most opposition leaders have been targeted for persecution. Neither the legislative nor the judiciary branches are independent of the RPF party or provide oversight of the executive. The government has also shut down or refused to re-register numerous nongovernmental organizations, and has similarly targeted independent media, using intimidation and arbitrary charges to shut down organizations critical of government actions. Given, Rwanda has stepped up its anticorruption efforts, but it is yet to be seen whether the reforms will cause any real, institutional change.

On the other hand, Zambia, although not without problems, continues to move incrementally down a path of improved governance. A new Electoral Act and last year's generally free and fair elections evidence Zambia's slowly maturing electoral institutions. The state generally respects the right of interest groups to organize (although tensions surfaced this year between the government and civil society over constitutional reform) and the civil society sector is vibrant. Despite troubles, many of which have to do with the lack of resources, the judiciary exhibits a fair degree of independence and the government generally complies with unfavorable decisions. Zambia is still a long way from becoming a consolidated democracy; however, our research suggests that it outperforms Rwanda in key categories such as government accountability, civil liberties, rule of law, and anticorruption and transparency (see the complete Zambia report).

Even more striking are differences between Zimbabwe and Nigeria. In Zimbabwe - a country that has, in fact, become a failed state - the economy is at the verge of complete collapse, its already dreadful human rights situation is deteriorating even further, and civic organizations are being continually suppressed, all while President Robert Mugabe's grip to power is becoming stronger. Over the past few years, the government has expanded its crackdown on the country's few remaining media outlets, using new strategies to jam radio broadcasts and limit internet freedom. All this as annual inflation reaches a whopping 11,000 percent, placing basic life necessities, such as food and clothing, out of reach for most of the population.

While Nigeria remains a highly problematic country, as evidenced by the widespread irregularities and violence during the April elections, its economic, political, and human rights conditions are certainly better than Zimbabwe's. The media is vibrant and enjoys a moderate degree of freedom, although the state does not shy away from using extralegal measures to suppress political criticism (still, not comparable to the levels in Zimbabwe). Likewise, Nigeria's civil society sector operates without many major impediments and has even made some strides in efforts to influence government, managing to make its voices heard on issues such as fuel hikes and some other legislation. Still, corruption and graft in Nigeria are deep and widespread, and the judiciary remains prone to bribery and political influence. However, in our view, Nigeria outperforms Zimbabwe in most of these areas.

What then explains Rwanda and Zimbabwe's better-than-expected performance on the Ibrahim Index? After taking a closer look at its methodology, it appears that at least a part of the surprising assessments could be attributed to the survey's coverage delay, as well as its inability to effectively capture issues such as minority rights and government transparency.

For example, while the absence of gender discrimination is an important component of the Participation and Human Rights category, other types of discrimination, such as ethnic and racial, are captured only indirectly, through measuring state adherence to various human rights conventions (in Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption). Hence, the states that do not protect rights of ethnic and racial minorities can arguably perform reasonably well in this category.

Moreover, the Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption category, despite its name, does not really have a direct measure for government transparency. In our view, government transparency is an important indicator of good governance and can be assessed by looking as the existence and effective implementation of freedom of information laws; the ability of state to ensure transparency, open-bidding, and effective competition in the awarding of government contracts; legislative review of the executive budget-making process; and the presence of detailed accounting of government expenditures - as is done in the Countries at the Crossroads survey.

Finally, like many other surveys, such as the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators and Transparency International's CPI, the Ibrahim Index suffers from a notable coverage delay. The recently released edition evaluates African governance only through the end of 2005.