COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Dawn in the Horn?Judicial Reform in Ethiopia

On June 30, Human Rights Watch urged Ethiopia to amend its proposed Anti-Terrorism Law.  According to HRW, the draft counterterrorism law would create myriad possibilities for human rights violations. Specifically, the law includes both an extremely broad definition of terrorism and a multitude of pernicious provisions regulating the state’s response to “acts of terrorism.” If passed, the law will provide police with the right to search and arrest individuals without judicial oversight and to detain suspects for months without charge. What’s more, this law is being proposed at a time when Ethiopia is already being extensively criticized by the international human rights community for committing offenses including harassment, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention of political activists and independent journalists. As the country’s human rights climate appears increasingly uncertain, the state of the country’s judicial system will become a critical issue. At this venture, it is important to investigate the health of the legal system that dissidents, “terrorists,” and ordinary citizens alike rely upon for justice.

Ethiopia is one of the oldest and largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is unique in that it largely escaped the 19th-century European race to annex territory on the continent. However, it remains an extremely poor and rural country, with over 80 percent of the population living off subsistence farming. A Marxist-Leninist military junta called the Derg overthrew the emperor in 1974, and was likewise overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as the Soviet Union withdrew financial aid from its allies in Africa. Four years later, a constitution had been agreed upon and Ethiopia’s first multiparty elections occurred. It was then that the incumbent prime minister, Meles Zenawi came to power pledging reform and decentralization.

There were a number of largely uncoordinated though vigorous reform efforts during the 1990s. However, the pace quickened dramatically in 2005 with the implementation of the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP), encompassing civil service reform, district level decentralization, and tax and justice reform. The Justice System Reform Programme (JSRP) in particular has drawn considerable attention. The Ethiopian legal system is complicated due to the country’s federal nature: each of the nine regional states has its own legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, in addition to the national government. Although the successes of the various judicial reform initiatives have been somewhat limited, the strong political support behind the programme – recognised as vital for eventual success – has not lagged.

Some of the main hurdles to judicial reform arise from the issues associated with the end of communism and the post-1995 restructuring. One long-term characteristic of the nation that impedes deeper systemic attempts at reform is previous monarchical and communist regimes’ centralized government authority and the current subjugation of the federal judiciary to the executive, which has maintained a weak judicial branch with insufficient capability of exercising independent action in order to avoid challenges to Zenawi’s government.

One of the most immediate post-revolution issues affecting the Ethiopian judicial system was the total loss of experienced legal personnel who fled when the Derg were overthrown. This in turn resulted in a severe lack of staff in every district, and also forced the government to lower the requirements for posts across the sector. The ramifications of this exodus of talented personnel continue to plague Ethiopia’s judicial system today, especially at the lower levels. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report on Ethiopia explains, judges at the local level are still generally uneducated and oftentimes unacquainted with Ethiopian laws. In addition, the as-yet-incomplete process of decentralization (the inter-ethnic relations angle of which was examined in a previous blog post) continues to complicate matters, partly owing to a lack of communication between the higher and lower courts that has created a situation in which many local officials believe themselves to be unaccountable to higher powers.

There are a number of further issues that require attention. The most prominent is judicial independence. As the 2007 Crossroads report noted, the president draws up the lists of judicial appointees for parliament to (theoretically) scrutinise, which is problematic in as executive-dominant environment as Ethiopia’s; worse yet, the government often interferes in trials by threatening judges, especially when high-profile defendants are involved. Both of these measures limit independent judicial decisions, a situation most prominently criticised by Teshale Aberra, a former president of the Oromo Supreme Court who fled to the UK in 2006. The following year Human Rights Watch reinforced her condemnation of the system. In addition, defense lawyers are attacked for representing unfavourable clients.

The prospects for judicial reform are not entirely bleak. Ethiopia has made progress and has secured a solid core of devoted donor partners. As the 2007 Crossroads Report explains, the general culture of impunity has slightly improved as a result of the JSRP. For example, in 2007, several former members of the deposed Marxist-Leninist regime including Mengistu Haile Mariam, the most prominent officer of the Derg, were accused of crimes against humanity and genocide committed during the Red Terror of the 1970s (though it is important to note that few prosecutions of EPRDF members have occurred, despite ample evidence of human rights and other abuses). In addition, courts in states such as Oromia have also increased their efficiency in the past few years by reducing backlogs and delays and implementing a judicial training program.  At least some of the reforms have enduring significance for the broader region, with the Kenyan Chief Justice visiting Ethiopia last year to learn about the JSRP, specifically its ICT modernization.

Merely incremental progress, marked by occasional missteps, is inevitable considering the very low starting point.  If the Zenawi government maintains the impetus of its reforms, change will be evident over time. Nevertheless, human rights abuses such as the ones listed above can hardly coexist with an effective and just legal system. In the end, there is no question that real change will require political will and a willingness to yield some measure of control, factors that have been in small supply recently.

Shadows Over the Horn: Press Freedom in Eritrea

Eritrea remains the only country in Africa not to have a single private news agency.  In a surprisingly frank and lengthy recent interview with Sweden’s Tv4, Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afewerki, attacked independent journalists in his country “as funded by the CIA.”  President Afewerki brushed off questions about jailed journalist Dawit Isaak, an Eritrean with Swedish nationality, stating that Sweden has “no right” to raise the issue. The President said that Sweden’s demands for more accountability surrounding the case was “part of a larger campaign waged by the CIA against Eritrea.” Regarding the case of Isaak, President Afewerki, obviously annoyed by the interviewer’s insistence, said “I don’t even care, I don’t even know what he is doing. He did a big mistake and he is accountable for what he did and I don’t waste time knowing what he is doing.” As for a free and fair trial, Afewerki replied, “We will not release him nor take him to trial. We know how to deal with him and others like him.”

Indeed, Eritrea has dealt with journalists in some of the most harsh and brutal ways of any nation in recent years. Starting in 2001, all independent media was closed and journalists were targeted in a widespread campaign to suppress freedom of expression and, more particularly, criticism of the ruling party, which was deemed “harmful to national security.” Afewerki, a former guerilla commander who helped secure his country’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has become Africa’s largest jailer of journalists and fourth largest worldwide after China, Cuba, and Burma. Though estimates are difficult given government secrecy and repression, Reporters without Borders has reported that there were at least 17 journalists imprisoned in Eritrea at the start of 2009. In addition, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, several journalists have died in custody since the 2001 crackdown. Moreover, countless others have fled the country into Sudan.

One of the latest journalists to be imprisoned is Daniel Kibrom, a journalist employed by Eritrea’s state-owned Eri TV. Kibrom has been held since October 2006 in a prison camp in the south of the country, where he is serving a sentence of five years of forced labor for trying to cross the border into Ethiopia, according to a report by Reporters Without Borders. According to a former prison guard who escaped Eritrea, Kibrom is likely working on a farm or quarry owned by a party elite or Afewerki ally.

In another incident in February 2009, Eritrean authorities ordered a raid on the premises of Radio Bana, a small station in the heart of the capital that puts out educational programs under the sponsorship of the education ministry. Its entire staff of around 50 journalists were arrested and taken without explanation.  Some of the staff were released, but several remain in custody.

Eritrea was also put on Reporters without Borders’ Internet Enemies list due to the government’s insistence on blocking foreign news websites and blogs critical of the regime and its monitoring of internet cafes with armed guards. Moreover, attacks on press freedom are only one of a series of worrying trends in Eritrea. In its report State Repression and Indefinite Discrimination in Eritrea, Human Rights Watch outlines appalling human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, abysmal detention conditions, forced labor, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship. During the Tv4 interview Afewerki stated, “We will not have elections at any time like the European model. We have our own ways of allowing participation. [Elections] are not an option.” Questioning the democratic bona fides of Europe and North America, Afewerki said bluntly, “Democracy is a way of cheating people.”

Tv4’s interview with Afewerki revealed the deep-seated paranoia in which the Eritrean government operates, particularly through its sense of betrayal towards the West, which has favored Ethiopia as a strategic regional partner, and through its own antipathy towards Ethiopia, against which it fought a decades-long war of independence. In its 2007 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that “the government continued to raise the specter of Ethiopian aggression to justify its absolute control over the media.” Moreover, in 2007, Bush administration officials called Eritrea a “state-sponsor of terror,” further isolating the regime and making it suspicious of Western motives.

Though often overlooked, Eritrea has become one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Basic rights and freedoms are flouted as opposition members and members of the press are jailed or pushed into exile.  In November 2009, Eritrea will be compelled to explain its poor human rights record to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its Universal Periodic Review. One of the most important foci for the review should be Eritrea’s obligations under article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed and ratified. The review will give activists and concerned countries another opportunity to speak out against human rights violations in Eritrea and make the names of journalists imprisoned there be heard. Those names include: Mattewos Habteab, Temesgen Gebreyesus, Dawit Isaak, Isaac Abraham, Girmay Abraham, Dimtsi Hafash, Mulubrhan Habtegebriel, Meles Negusse, Fessehaye "Joshua" Yohannes (presumed dead), Dawit Habtemichael, Yusuf Mohamed Ali, Medhanie Haile, Temesgen Ghebreyesus, Emanuel Asrat, Said Abdulkader and Tura Kubaba.

PEN American Center has actively fought for the rights of many of the above mentioned journalists with a letter writing campaign found here.

Nicaragua's Ortega Brings No Revolution to Women's Rights

Photo Credit: Flickr user svengaarn

In May, the UN Committee against Torture called for Nicaragua to reconsider its absolute ban on abortion. The Committee ruled that the ban, which has been in effect since 2006, infringed on the rights of women and girls by prohibiting abortion in cases in which pregnancy threatened the mother’s life as well as in cases of rape. Moreover, as Amnesty International argues, the ban on abortion violates the right of women not to be subject to “torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” The UN Committee against torture is not the first UN body to admonish Nicaragua for this law; as of today, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the UN Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women have all rebuked Nicaragua for its blanket abortion law and have reminded the country of its obligation to uphold human rights.

The persistence of this particular violation of women’s rights should come as no surprise. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's authoritarian tendencies have presented themselves with increasing frequency since the Contra War of the 1980s. In previous posts, we explored the president’s most recent authoritarian behavior, citing Ortega’s vigorous impingements on press freedom, flagrant manipulation of electoral laws, and wanton disregard for the democratic electoral process. On June 11, the Millennium Challenge Corporation directly punished Nicaragua for its deplorable governance trend by canceling the final $60 million of a $175 million aid agreement. In addition, his malign approach to women's rights is nothing new. While Ortega once supported abortion, he displayed his preference for political expediency by changing his position to ally himself with the Catholic Church during the run up to the 2006 presidential election. Most notorious, however, is Ortega's possible involvement in a sexual abuse scandal involving his stepdaughter. While his stepdaughter ultimately withdrew her case from consideration, she has not withdrawn her accusations. In addition to committing the above transgressions, Ortega has more recently trampled on women's rights by ignoring requests to rescind the absolute ban on abortion, aggressively harassing feminist activists, and largely turning a deaf ear to issues such as discrimination.

The fact that the country’s respect for women’s rights has begun to backslide is particularly disheartening considering the lamentable state of gender equality even before Ortega assumed the presidency in 2007. As the Countries at the Crossroads Report on Nicaragua noted, as of 2006 women were inadequately protected against sexual abuse and were not supported by any notable state commitment to reverse rampant discrimination. In cases of abuse, women were frequently referred to civil society organizations for further help after lodging complaints with the national police. Although constitutional safeguards exist, high levels of both discrimination and harassment against women in the workplace have persisted since this time. More recently, the State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report on Nicaragua stated that while laws criminalizing rape and domestic violence exist, the laws against domestic violence were selectively enforced. Both the country’s Special Prosecutor for Women and the national police reported that violence against women increased in 2008. As is the case in other Latin American countries, a strong “machista” culture is firmly ingrained in Nicaraguan society, which fuels and exacerbates the aforementioned problems.

One of the most alarming examples of the government’s deficient attitude towards women’s rights is its belligerent conduct towards women’s rights organizations. Since 2006, the government has aggressively attacked women’s rights advocates. As Human Rights Watch notes, women’s rights organizations protesting the ban on abortion have been investigated and intimidated by the government, which ramped up its campaign against these organizations in 2008. Last year, 9 women’s rights advocates were criminally investigated, while the offices of the organizations they represented were raided due to questionable allegations regarding funding sources. Reporters without Borders also claimed that Sofia Montenegro, the director of the Autonomous Women’s Movement, had been the victim of a government smear campaign. Despite the looming threat of government persecution, women’s organizations have remained dedicated to their quest to revoke the law. In late May of this year, 500 women protested the abortion law outside of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. 

 The excessive harassment of feminist activists and NGOs is part of a larger government campaign against freedom of association. Due to the fact that Nicaraguan women often rely on NGO support in cases of domestic abuse and rape, the government’s quest to suppress the activities of these organizations has especially regrettable consequences.

Ortega’s war against feminist organizations provides additional evidence that the Sandinista revolution’s dedication to social change is extremely subordinate to his desire to accrue and maintain power.  On a superficial level, the Sandinista government has in some ways upheld its commitment to the empowerment of women by launching healthcare, anti-poverty, and literacy programs. A recent article lauded the strides made by the Nicaraguan government to address the country’s pronounced gender inequality through its literacy campaign. Nicaraguan women, who make up somewhere between 15 and 52 percent of the country’s illiterate population, have garnered notable benefits from this program. However, as the article notes, seemingly positive government policies such as this one are being carried out against a backdrop of increased violence against Nicaraguan women and could even be considered a veil for the government’s abusive actions.

Due to the restrictive, oppressive climate being generated by the Ortega regime, any sustained progress on women’s rights seems highly unlikely at this time. Ortega has firmly locked Nicaragua in a downward spiral on governance matters. As Ortega continues to wage war against his adversaries, feminist activists and women’s rights organizations will number among his victims, and the comprehensive change Nicaragua needs will remain far from realization. 

Violence in Peru: The Government's Role

Last Friday a brutal clash occurred between Peruvian police attempting to open up a highway and the hundreds of Amazonian indigenous protesters that had been blocking the road for weeks. At least a dozen police and 9 protesters – though possibly many more – were killed during the protests; Saturday brought the discovery of another dozen dead police who had been held hostage by protesters. The protests, which have mobilized a number of different tribes throughout the vast Peruvian Amazon, are based on a series of decree laws issued by the government in the first half of 2008. The protesters perceive that these laws will violate their ancestral territorial rights by opening their lands to resource exploitation. In addition, they were not consulted – as is necessary under international agreements to which Peru is a party, including International Labor Organization Convention 169 – prior to the enactment of the decrees. Thus, their stance was that the laws must be rescinded entirely. The government refused to cede, arguing that the laws were necessary for Peru’s modernization and that the violence was entirely the fault of the protesters. President Alan Garcia has been particularly aggressive in declaring that the violence was the result of a conspiracy carried out by malign forces, both international and domestic, that who do not wish to see Peru advance.

No proof has been offered for what appear to be these absurd accusations. Moreover, while the government is absolutely correct that the killings of the police are unacceptable and must be investigated and perpetrators held accountable, the government’s own attitudes and actions have been determinant during the course of the conflict. President Garcia’s statements, which repeatedly state that the indigenous are being manipulated by outsiders, treat them like sheep and deny them all agency. The government also seems to lack any context – regardless of the content of these specific decrees, the government should be able to understand why a group of people who have been excluded from policy decisions regarding their ancestral lands for hundreds of years might have justifiable suspicions regarding their future. The protesters have undoubtedly made serious mistakes, but the government’s attitude has represented the worst facets of a state that is prone to Lima-centric political fiddling while the jungle (or mountains, or anywhere else outside the capital) burns. Below is the translation of a column from Tuesday’s La Republica in which the well-known, centrist Peruvian political scientist Martin Tanaka provides some of that context.

The State, Organizer of the Protest

Martin Tanaka, La Republica (Lima), 6/9/09

Social organization in the Amazon, like the country as whole, has been marked in recent years by localism and fragmentation. It could be argued that the broad protest movement throughout the Amazon is the consequence of government action: the adoption of the DL [decree laws] without indigenous consultation created the perception that the indigenous way of life was at risk, triggered the memory of historical grievances and feelings of regional exclusion and distance from the state, and laid the foundations for a conflict in which the general identity and dignity of the Amazon was at stake. It also created a common demand (the repeal of the DL) and a single adversary, the central government, which must be addressed. AIDESEP ended up circumstantially channeling these demands, as it was the organization best positioned to lead the demands of the widely heterogeneous groups.

The demand for the repeal of the decrees is also the creation of the state. Since the protests of September of last year and until very recently the government gave signals that it would repeal the decrees in question (like 1090, which was declared unconstitutional by the [congressional] Constitutional Commission on May 20). It was only in recent weeks that the government took the position of defending the constitutionality of the decrees, and proposed a comprehensive revision of these decrees in the PCM [council of ministers].

Too late: the government created the image of having been “rocking” the indigenous peoples. This led to the radicalization of the protests. The violence unleashed as a result of attempting to clear the Fernando Belaunde roadway is also the creation of the state; many leaders in the area are reserve soldiers, former patrolmen and members of self-defense groups, ex-soldiers from Cenepa [ed.: a reference to the brief 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru]. The existence of these capabilities for mobilization explains why the resistance to police action has been so fierce.

The government’s mishandling of the whole situation can help one to understand the ease with which extremist speeches are propagated, irresponsible leaders are exalted, false information is taken as true (such as the information that speaks of the killing of tens or even hundreds of indigenous people), all of which results in the brutal assassination of policemen. Those who sympathize (and we do sympathize) which the demands of the indigenous population should be the first to say clearly that no protest, no matter how just it may be, that confronts a democratic government, however misguided it may be, justifies the murder of unarmed policemen.

The worst thing is that even today the government’s answer continues to create conditions for more protests and violence. The persecution of indigenous leaders, the talk of manipulation, ignorance, misinformation, and the presence of foreign interests only increase the anger and annoyance of the Amazonians. The president of the republic himself has made frankly irresponsible declarations. A path of relaxation, prudence, and dialogue such as that being promoted by the Ombudsman must be opened.

Photo Credit: Flickr user powless

20 Years After Tiananmen, a Different Form of Undermining Democracy

Freedom House has just released a new report, Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, describing the efforts of authoritarian states including China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to sustain their autocratic models and even advance alternatives to democracy in other countries. The report explores how these leading authoritarian regimes are threatening democratic development by promoting repressive policies and manipulating and distorting democratic discourse. Their efforts to redefine – and ultimately empty out – the concept of democracy have not only been pursued within their borders, but have also been exported abroad.

Among the tools that these regimes have used to further their interests internationally, the promotion of “win-win” economic arrangements and “no-strings-attached aid” stand out. In April, we addressed this issue in a blog post about China’s aid policy towards Africa in particular. At the time, we discussed the dangers of championing China’s unique development model, along with the pernicious effects that China’s offers of unconditional aid can have for governance. Because Beijing’s foreign assistance isn’t conditioned on the adoption of reforms and a general respect for human rights, it opens the door for corruption and neglect of the rule of law. Undermining Democracy includes a more comprehensive analysis of China’s foreign assistance efforts, along with those of other authoritarian regimes, analyzing the modern strategies and methods used to project authoritarian influence.

As Undermining Democracy explains, China’s is systematically developing its own brand of “soft power.”  After becoming aware of the necessity of increasing its clout in an increasingly interdependent international system, China began to ramp up efforts to promote its own model of political and economic development in its international relations. Due to China’s impressive economic development, the model is often touted as a superior alternative to Western prescriptions.

As it happens, Undermining Democracy has been released on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. An article in the Financial Times last week traced China’s political trajectory since the crackdown, explaining how China’s Communist Party weathered both extensive criticism and countless predictions of its demise to propel its country to a leading role in the world sphere. As it notes, Chinese officials have ceased to adopt an outwardly apologetic stance towards their more repressive political policies, instead becoming increasingly confident in their model’s superiority over its Western counterpart. Most importantly, it argues that China’s remarkable ability to persevere and prosper can be attributed to its willingness to adapt and modernize. In other words, whereas mere repression might not have been enough to counteract the pre- and post-Tiananmen calls for change, China has survived and flourished due to its policy of economic opening. While these reforms have boosted growth and ameliorated some citizen complaints, more fundamental reforms of accountability and transparency have been absent.

China’s economic success has created a major dilemma for advocates of good governance. This success has obvious appeal as a formula for economic prosperity for struggling developing countries.  Nevertheless, there are some important points to consider. First, by championing the undemocratic Chinese model, the benefits in terms of basic ethics and justice of democratic rule in comparison to China’s oppressive political regime are ignored. The coercive nature of China’s political regime cannot be underemphasized. China is a highly repressive state, which is evidenced by the regime’s dismal human rights record. China has, every year, by far the highest number of executions of any country and has consistently and arbitrarily applied state power to restrict basic freedoms including freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

Secondly, it is important to realize that the Chinese model of adaptation is not the norm. As the Financial Times article notes, China was successfully able to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes and to become aware of the need to “adapt and change or atrophy and die.” If any lessons are to be learned from the past, however, China’s adaption method is the exception: authoritarians are often drawn to the repressive part of the model while ignoring the technocratic, adaptive element. Some but certainly not all developing countries will be able to follow China’s trajectory. For example, in the past few months, Hugo Chavez has frequently praised the comparative advantages of the Chinese model over the Washington Consensus at the same time that he has ramped up his efforts to curb trade union autonomy and freedom of the press in the country.  In addition, Kremlin officials have frequently evoked the Chinese success story to justify Russia’s autocratic policies. In addition to providing these leaders with validation for their despotic ventures, the opportunities the model provides for corrupt practices are extensive, as is evidenced by China’s ranking of 72 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Moreover, it is not just the model in conceptual terms that is a threat to the democratic order, but also China’s means of promoting it. Most notably, China has sought to facilitate the model’s advancement by offering “win-win” economic arrangements to foreign countries and coupling its aid provision with a promise of “non-interference” in domestic affairs. Apart from the African countries listed in our previous post, China has provided unconditional assistance to numerous Latin American countries and several Asian countries, most notably Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, many of which have questionable or downright execrable human rights records. As we noted in our previous post, the negative consequences of providing unconditional aid are a real threat to democratic governance.  As Undermining Democracy argues, these arrangements also threaten democratic development on a greater scale. By framing these new economic relationships in “win-win” terms, China seeks to tarnish the legitimacy of the Western development model, and more particularly the traditional Western requirement that aid be conditional upon reform and respect for human rights standards.

Other contemporary authoritarian regimes have used foreign assistance of one sort or another to exert influence. Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, for instance, have used their oil wealth to court developing nations, leading them to ignore governance reform.  While these active efforts are providing new competition to reform-based assistance, the authoritarians’ approach is not perfect. As Undermining Democracy notes, China’s increasingly powerful position – and even more so the other states – has its own inherent flaws. The global economic crisis, along with other factors, could hamper its efforts to propel the new model; alternatively, discontent at home could herald a loosening of the authoritarian reins. In any case, 20 years after Tiananmen, the Chinese authorities have modernized their authoritarianism and, for the time being at least, offer a serious challenge to the notion that economic growth in China would inevitably lead to political liberalization and sounder governance. 

Thailand's Military: A Constant Amongst Turmoil

Shortly after political unrest rocked Thailand yet again in April, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva quietly transferred several senior military officers who were classmates of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at the Armed Forces Preparatory School to inactive posts. The general public has interpreted the government’s actions as a thinly veiled attempt to eradicate Thaksin’s remaining allies from the country’s political scene. This military reshuffle should come as no surprise, considering the skepticism that has arisen surrounding the military’s response to the April protests. While the military ultimately played an instrumental role in quelling the political violence that shook the nation for three weeks, their loyalty to the government was questioned at various times. These most recent events highlight one of Thailand’s most persistent and troubling rule of law issues: the continued lack of civilian control over the security sector and debilitating impact of this phenomenon on reform efforts.

Thailand’s most recent political chaos erupted when the red-shirted supporters of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a movement that is spearheaded by the self-exiled Thaksin, charged the resort where an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting was to be held, assailed Abhisit’s offices, home, and car, and seized control of a large area in Bangkok’s government district, clashing with adherents of the pro-Abhisit People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) at various points along the way. As the New York Times explains, the fact that Thaksin’s supporters were able to overrun security forces at the easily-protected location of the Asean summit, among other places, raised questions about the military’s allegiance to the Abhisit government. In addition, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul has accused Thaksin's military allies of carrying out an assassination attempt against him on April 17. It has been rumored that Thaksin still has several loyal allies within the military, and the accusations and peculiarities noted above fueled widespread rumors of a possible Thaksin-orchestrated military coup throughout the protests. It is important to note that the security forces eventually contained the violence by surrounding the main protest camp. In response to this, however, UDD protestors accused the military forces of discriminating against them in favor of the PAD, pointing out the fact that military forces failed to use emergency powers to put an end to the PAD’s occupation of Bangkok’s airport last year, which was seemingly a greater security threat. In any case, these events demonstrate that the subordination of the military forces to civilian rule remains subject to constant questioning, while the professional, politically impartial nature of the military is extremely suspect.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report explains, the Thai military and police forces have played an influential and oftentimes deplorable role in the country’s political history. The military has traditionally assumed the role of veto player in Thai politics. Due to the power wielded by Thailand’s military institution, the success of any political regime has been largely determined by military judgment; in short, military approval has translated into political success while disapproval has led to failure, oftentimes in the form of a military-led overthrow. The military’s instrumental role in this process is largely tied to its strong relationship with Thailand’s monarchy. Over the course of Thailand’s history, the two institutions have oftentimes worked together to guide or force Thailand’s political trajectory in their desired direction. From 1932-1992, the military played a direct role in the country’s political process by staging numerous coups, and the security forces retained a prominent position during the rule of Thaksin, with whom they were strongly allied. During his reign, Thaksin, a former police officer, awarded his cronies with key security posts in order to consolidate his control over the security sector and the country. Later on, however, members of the military directly interfered in Thailand’s democratic process yet again by carrying out a coup against Thaksin and installing a former army commander as prime minister. After ruling the country for 15 months following the coup, the military returned to the barracks, although it has continued to play a central role in Thai politics from outside. In fact, Abhisit was propelled to his current position as prime minister in part due to the military’s support.

In many ways, the military’s perennial independence from the government can be easily understood. Thailand has been plagued by political instability for years. Since 2006, the country has been ruled by four different prime ministers, one of whom was a former military commander and two of whom were forced from office for violating provisions of the Constitution.  As such, for the military, allegiance to any of these short-lived, unsteady governments has proved to be both unnecessary and imprudent.  Regardless of this fact, however, the military’s power and politicization has had decidedly negative consequences for governance. First, in addition to wreaking havoc on the electoral process, it has constituted a major impediment to the implementation of much-needed political reforms. As the 2008 Freedom in the World Report notes, it has often been quite difficult for civilian leaders to enact reforms that in any way affect the military’s privileged position and to address some of the remaining repressive laws that were set in place during the recent period of military rule. In other cases, military-fueled unrest has been responsible for foiling plans for reform.  For example, since Abhisit’s election in December of 2008, his reform agenda, which is rooted in the modification of the largely undemocratic constitution, has been rendered impossible to implement by turmoil that has been at least partly exacerbated by Thaksin’s manipulation of the security sector. As the Economist explains, Thaksin counted on several members of the security forces, who for the most part belong to the same classes as the UDD protestors and have demonstrated their partiality towards Thaksin in the past, to abandon Abhisit during the protest.

Secondly, military power has also blocked Abhisit, along with other past prime ministers, from addressing the numerous allegations accusing members of the security forces of committing human rights abuses. Abhisit is in many ways dependent upon the military due to the institution’s political role. Without the military’s support, Abhisit’s position as prime minister would likely become untenable. Thus, appeasing the military is essential. Unfortunately, this situation has seriously negative consequences for rule of law. Over the years, the power of the security forces has provided its members with immunity from judicial prosecution, which has allowed them to commit flagrant human rights violations without punishment. One of the military’s most brutal campaigns was carried out during Thaksin’s 2003 war on drugs. As Human Rights Watch reports, security forces committed an extraordinarily large number of arbitrary killings during this war. In addition, as Amnesty International reports, the military has committed human rights violations including torture throughout the counter-insurgency campaign it has carried out since 2004. Unfortunately, these abuses continue today. The State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report revealed that there were several allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrest being committed by security forces, especially during counter- insurgency efforts. Most recently, security forces have been accused of beating refugees from a minority Muslim group in Myanmar and subsequently casting them out to sea without supplies. While the government has investigated some of these instances, members of the security forces have not been prosecuted for their actions thus far. While Abhisit has promised to address this culture of impunity surrounding military abuses, it is extremely unlikely that he will risk upsetting the military members upon whose support his position depends.

Thus, the lamentable lack of civilian control over the military has had numerous and varied negative effects on governance. Unfortunately, until the current political crisis between anti- and pro-Thaksin factions is resolved, the chances of consolidating civilian control and depoliticizing the military are slim to none. While Thailand’s political situation remains unstable, the military will continue to defy civilian power and exert its influence in myriad ways. As an upshot, the military will retain its ability to commit abuses with impunity.

Photo Credit: Flickr user interactimages

Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

Photo Credit: Flickr user jessicamulley

The Fading Shadow of Brazil's Dictatorship

On April 30, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal abolished the country’s 1967 Press Law after ruling that the law violated constitutional guarantees of free expression. This act, which came into effect during the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1961 and 1985, sought to repress criticism of the dictatorship by setting prison terms of up to 3 years for journalists convicted of defamation crimes. Such crimes were defined in very expansive terms and included “reporting deemed offensive to public morals; reporting that a plaintiff finds damaging to his reputation or offensive to his dignity; reporting that is considered subversive to public and political order; and reporting ‘true’ facts that are considered distorted or provocative.” The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that both during and after the dictatorship, the law was used by businessmen and politicians in thousands of cases to attack critical journalists. As such, the long overdue abolition is a momentous victory for freedom of the press in the country. In addition, it should be viewed as an important accomplishment in the country’s attempt to slowly chip away at the lingering legacies of dictatorship.

Brazil’s military dictatorship left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics and society. The brutal military regime not only passed repressive laws like the one above, but also committed extensive human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and large-scale arbitrary detention during its campaign to suppress a communist guerrilla movement. According to official government tallies, roughly 400 people were killed, 160 were disappeared, and hundreds of others were tortured during the dictatorship. Moreover, Brazil lags far behind its neighbors in its attempts to confront the shrouded events of its military past and unveil the details of the regime’s activities to Brazilian citizens. In 1979, the Brazilian government passed an amnesty law that protected military and public officials and political dissidents from prosecution for crimes committed during the dictatorship. As a result, no one has been prosecuted for human rights offenses committed during the period. In addition, Brazil has not convened a truth commission, nor has the country given a full account of the military regime’s activities, although it did publish a 500 page report on disappearances in 2007. 

The remaining legacies of the dictatorship have had important consequences for governance. Most obviously, laws such as the Press Law have continued to restrict Brazilian civil liberties in the 25 years since the country’s transition to democratic rule. However, the country’s failure to fully address the misdeeds of the dictatorship has had other damaging results. While the military has argued that Brazil’s pacted transition was a reasonable price to pay in order to bring about a peaceful transition to civilian rule, others have argued that allowing the military to maintain their power and escape punishment has hampered the country’s process of democratic consolidation. Most notably, rule of law has suffered. Indeed, one of Brazil’s most troubled governance issues is the ineptitude and corruption of the justice system, which has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.  Unfortunately, rather than using fair, unbiased human rights trials to build confidence in the justice system (as recently done in Peru, Argentina, and others), the government’s treatment of past crimes has reinforced the culture of
impunity. 

Thus, directly confronting the events of the military dictatorship is crucial to the attainment of a truly democratic future for the country. Fortunately, Brazil’s recent repeal of the Press Law has been accompanied by other steps towards confronting the past. Recently, federal prosecutors have requested that investigations against several individuals suspected of committing human rights violations be carried out. In October 2008, a Sao Paulo civil court found a military colonel civilly responsible for human rights violations committed while serving as director of an intelligence agency. In addition, last week, Brazil launched a website containing information about the events that occurred in the country between 1964 and 1985. The site includes official documents from the dictatorship that are part of the national archives. At its launch, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva acknowledged the link between national reconciliation and the country’s democratic well-being when he proclaimed “We are doing Brazilian democracy a service when we unveil some of the mysteries that persist about our past.” Finally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal is preparing to review the 1979 Amnesty Law in the face of several pending cases that challenge the law’s legitimacy. Among these cases, the court will consider the Brazilian Bar Association’s assertion that the current interpretation of the law erroneously provides for the protection of state agents from prosecution in all cases when in reality, it should not shield them from prosecution for crimes such as torture.

Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts may be ramped up in the future. On April 8, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that amnesties and statutes of limitations should not be applied to crimes against humanity that were committed during Brazil’s dictatorship. This is the first international decision to be made regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil during this era. While the decision is not binding, concerns over international legitimacy and approval may compel Brazil to become more open to a reinterpretation of the amnesty law.

Brazil should be lauded for breaking out of its decades-long resignation to allowing several of the debilitating legacies of the dictatorship to persist.  Nevertheless, the country still has a long road ahead. It has yet to fully open military and police archives to the public, and the active prosecution of human rights offenders is a long way off even if the court rules against the current interpretation of the amnesty law. Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation of this law is a very polemical issue. The Brazilian military, which staunchly opposes all efforts to reinterpret the amnesty law, is an extremely powerful and influential institution. Furthermore, while Lula has taken measures to disclose more information about the military dictatorship to the public, his solicitor general’s office has officially opposed challenges to the law. In recent years Brazil has sought to pose as both a leader and model for developing countries. Confronting the past while strengthening democracy and justice can only improve the country’s standing and add further momentum to a South American success story.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Samory Santos

Algeria's Election Heralds Continuation of Status Quo

Algeria’s recent presidential elections yielded unsurprising results. On April 9, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika , who has ruled Algeria since 1999, was re-elected to a third term with 90.23% of the national vote. This extremely high margin of victory is undoubtedly inflated. While the participation rate was officially measured at 74.5%, the opposition estimated that roughly 24% of eligible voters participated. According to official tallies, opposition candidate Louisa Hanaoune came in second place with 4.5% of the vote, while none of the other candidates were able to garner more than a few percentage points.

While these results were expected, they are troubling nonetheless. Both the run-up to the election and the balloting itself were decidedly undemocratic. The president’s reelection bid was only made possible after the parliament approved his proposed amendment to the constitutional provision that had previously set a two term limit on the presidency. This amendment essentially determined the outcome of the election in advance. During the presidential campaign, the absence of a viable opposition was striking. This was partially the result of direct government interference in the campaign activities of the opposition. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the development of a competitive party system in Algeria has been hampered by the government’s practice of refusing to award legal status to opposition parties. Without official authorization, parties are generally unable to participate in elections. As a result of this, the presidential election featured opposition candidates with little popular support. These candidates were widely considered to be “token opponents.” Several opposition leaders who were barred from participating attempted to stage a mass boycott as a last-ditch effort to influence the election’s results, but the protests were predictably stifled. Meanwhile, President Bouteflika utilized the resources of the state to exert control over the media and win over supporters on the campaign trail with extensive political handouts.

Apart from the government’s meddling, equally disconcerting is the prevailing environment of political apathy in which the election took place. Among both the general public and the formal opposition, the predominant line of thought seems to be that measurable change is unfeasible. While the opposition’s poor showing was principally the result of unfair government restrictions, a general lack of popular support and mobilization for the opposition was also a factor.

Unfortunately, in the realm of governance, a change of course is exactly what Algeria needs. Although the country must implement substantial reforms before governance can be improved, let alone democratized, Bouteflika failed to include any innovative policy proposals in the campaign. Instead, he repeatedly promised to boost economic growth and protect stability and security – important issues, to be sure, but far from visionary. The president’s health is another complication. Over the past few years, the 72- year-old president has been repeatedly hospitalized, possibly for stomach cancer. On top of all of this, he will likely have to focus much of his attention on the recent surge of terrorist attacks committed by the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. As a result of these factors, chances are slim that further headway will be made on crucial reforms with Bouteflika at the helm.

The details of the presidential elections serve as evidence of the country’s lack of progress in the sphere of accountability and public voice. While the election was generally free of violence, it was rife with fraud. In addition, Bouteflika has consolidated authority in the executive branch, largely through the support of the powerful military establishment. The president himself verified his half-hearted respect for important democratic principles: following the ratification of the constitutional amendment on term limits, he stated that democracy cannot “constitute a single, universal model…a model that must be adhered to and applied at all times and in all places.”

Moreover, Algeria’s level of respect for human rights and the rule of law is complicated by the president’s continuing focus on a particular conception of national reconciliation. As the 2008 Freedom in the World report on Algeria reports, the excessive amnesty laws passed by the government have resulted in an undermining of the justice system. As Human Rights Watch notes, terrorists and militants who committed heinous crimes during the civil conflict of the 1990s, during which 150,000 Algerians died and 6,000 disappeared, have escaped punishment, while groups representing the victims have been ignored and even actively harassed by the government. More recently, Bouteflika has expressed his willingness to pardon Islamic extremists responsible for organizing suicide bombings. In response to this, Amnesty International released a document earlier this year which denounced Bouteflika’s “legacy of impunity.” Due to the fact that reconciliation remained Bouteflika’s top campaign issue, nothing is likely to change in the near future. Relatedly, the state of emergency, which has been in effect for 17 years, gives the government the authority to unjustly imprison journalists and political dissidents, and Bouteflika has shown no inclination towards the revocation of the act.

Finally, the level of transparency in Algeria’s government is lamentable. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption is entrenched in the country. In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 90th out of 180. Despite his early promises to sweep Algeria’s political scene of corrupt officials, Bouteflika has largely turned a blind eye. Backroom dealings, often including cash handouts, were pervasive throughout the election. The separation of politics from business remains moribund, as do efforts to reform the military's role in commercial enterprise.

In essence, the president’s conduct during election season provides no evidence that Algeria’s poor governance record will be rectified. Real change in Algeria will require a changing of the guard. Given the constraints on the opposition, it is questionable how this will come about other than via a decline in Bouteflika’s health, which would create a dangerous vacuum. For now, then, Algerian governance will remain at the mercy of global economic fortunes and the interests of a narrow political class, and dispatches from the country will continue to feature descriptors like “stagnation” and “weak prospects” rather than “reform” and “justice.”

Photo Credit: Flickr user Franck Prevel

Chinese Assistance: A New Model or a Short-term Fix?

 

In January 2006, China released a major foreign policy document outlining its involvement with African countries. The document described both the much-criticized principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and the “one China policy,” whereby African countries must have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This step was a culmination of years of mutual aid and trust building, the two most important elements of which were the initiation of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China’s cancellation of $1.3 billion worth of debt three years later. These diplomatic maneuvers and gestures have been coupled with a massive increase in trade and aid. Trade has increased four-fold in the last four years – China has replaced the UK to become Africa’s third largest trade partner – and if Beijing’s promises to double aid between 2008 and 2009 come to pass China will give fully one-third the amount of the US. These facets of Chinese policy in Africa paint a picture of an emerging economic behemoth willing to grant, lend, or invest large sums regardless of the beneficiary as long as there is a business or geopolitical opportunity. Thus, for the international good governance and democracy promotion movement, the greatest concern is to what degree this shift will result in the protection and preservation of autocratic regimes.

That African countries – autocratic and democratic alike – are snatching up Chinese loans and business deals should not come as a surprise. Until recently, Africa had been almost exclusively dependent upon the West for financial assistance. Western aid, however, almost always came with strings attached. Donors usually demanded that the provision of aid to African countries be conditional upon the adoption of economic reforms, respect for human rights standards, and progressive democratization. Now China has appeared, offering the same supply of goods and capital without the attendant loss of sovereignty. However, there is a time-horizon problem: what’s good for politicians’ short-term needs may indeed benefit the country, but also may carry costs over the longer term. Thus, the new Sino-African relationship should not be viewed as a question of whether or not Africa gains or loses, but whether the initial gains are worth the potential governance costs in the medium- to long-term.

Sudan is the country where China’s influence is most obviously pernicious. Khartoum has been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the State Department since 1993, and by the millennium the EU and US had cut ties with the regime. Then, China came to the rescue. Sino-Sudanese relations picked up when Beijing began to pump money into exploiting Sudan’s oil reserves. China’s financial assistance made it far easier for Sudan to maintain production levels adequate to fund the government’s activities – including most notoriously the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur – without having to bow to Western conditions.

Zimbabwe offers a strikingly similar example of China upholding a regime economically, politically, and militarily that might otherwise have collapsed due to international pressure and catastrophic internal policies. President Mugabe has made deliberate efforts to “turn East” in an effort to escape pressure for democratic reform. China has provided some export credits and soft loans, possibly tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and in exchange for certain mining concessions. Most importantly, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to the country, including the delivery of military aircraft and other vehicles, while scuttling Anglo-American/French attempts to impose harsher restrictions in the UN Security Council.

China can be accused of scuttling western efforts at inducing reform and promoting corruption in other African countries as well. In 2004, the international community was pressing Angola to improve the transparency of its oil sector and to make other reforms as a prerequisite for any talks concerning extending credit. Then, China offered a $2 billion loan with the expected result that Luanda largely shelved reform efforts.

Likewise, China has a committed interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt and has completed a lucrative deal in which Beijing receives vital raw materials for its manufacturing sector and in return builds for Kinshasa necessary transportation infrastructure and even some hospitals. Nevertheless, concerns over the effective management of this deal within the DRC’s corrupt economic environment have frequently been raised.

China's relations with Mozambique date back to the Cold War, when Beijing backed the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO party. Interest dropped afterwards, but suddenly reappeared in recent years. Trade stood at a mere US$70 million in 2004, but tripled in two years. Beijing has coupled this increase in trade with writing off debt and the elimination of tariffs on a number of exports. This financial relationship is expected to soar as Chinese firms are tempted to relocate to Mozambique, with its cheap labor force proximity to raw materials.

In Zambia, hopes had been raised by the substantial resources China had been devoting to transportation and communication infrastructure. Locals praised a multi-dimensional initiative that nominally envisaged Africa as an ally and not a colony, as “a growing market and possibly a source over the long run for food, manufacturing, and industrial goods.” However, the abysmal pay and working conditions in Chinese-operated mines became an election issue championed by Michael Sata in 2006. In reaction, Beijing declared that new investment had been put on hold pending the result of the elections. Had Sata come close to victory in the presidential elections, Beijing might well have shown the limitations on sovereignty its assistance carries. In addition, the focus on physical infrastructure has been welcomed by many, but the procurement prescriptions and general lack of coordination with local actors has been criticized for reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Such tied aid through Chinese companies also makes it difficult to scrutinize the aid flows to check against corruption or to uphold environmental standards, exacerbating the accountability concerns.

The future of Chinese involvement is possibly more promising than the present, as there are signs that Beijing’s policy might fall more in line with American and European efforts in the future. Most importantly, the financial hazards of conducting business with regimes that are unaccountable and un-transparent will unavoidably come to the fore as China becomes more deeply tied to African economies. In fact, as the New York Times recently reported, China is already becoming aware of these risks as it suffers the effects of the global economic slow-down. In the short run, however, this realization could bring about decidedly unfortunate consequences. As China becomes more cautious when choosing the countries and sectors in which it will invest, the development prospects of several African countries that have become highly dependent on Chinese assistance will undoubtedly suffer. The example of the Congo is illustrative: as prices have fallen, the $9 billion dollar copper deal between the DRC and China has become shaky. As a result, the Congo may be left in the lurch. Should this be the case, the negative consequences for the country’s development prospects will be even more pronounced due to the fact that China failed to make its aid conditional upon the adoption of reforms aimed at boosting sustainability.

Perhaps China will become less of an inhibitor of governance reforms in the future. Although it will certainly not emerge at the forefront of demands for democracy and human rights, it may also not be as likely to actively undermine the development of good governance practices. Unfortunately, however, China may continue to frustrate governance efforts in a more indirect way. Specifically, the Chinese economic model, the ill-defined “Beijing Consensus”, could be used by African countries to provide an excuse for authoritarianism. Due to China’s remarkable economic achievements, the Beijing Consensus is often touted as an effective formula for growth in developing countries. Nevertheless, the strict adoption of the Chinese model, which includes an initial focus on economic reform which is later followed by political and cultural change, would signify an actual regression in the level of democratic reform in most African countries, rather than merely a slower pace of democratization.  The fact that China’s economic reforms were carried out in an environment of political repression is oftentimes ignored by those championing the model. Turning towards the Chinese model is based in part on the perceived failure of the “Washington consensus,” but also is closely related to resentment about the role of developed countries in Africa. Nonetheless, as many of these states are already learning, replacing the “imperialist” model with a seemingly less paternalistic one may not be the panacea that many leaders and citizens are hoping for.

Photo credit: Flickr user Pan-African News Wire Photo File