COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Future of Bolivian Justice Remains Hazy

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On February 18, Bolivian President Evo Morales appointed 18 interim justices to fill long-vacant posts in the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Judicial Council. These appointments were made possible by the recent passage of the “Ley Corta,” which empowered Morales to fill 20 of 27 total posts in the three judicial bodies until new justices are elected in December 2010. This controversial law has been the subject of a heated debate between its adherents, who argue that the new appointments will strengthen the country’s judicial system by bringing an end to the judicial paralysis created by the vacancies, and its critics, who counter that the law was a political move geared towards increasing government control over the judiciary. On the day the law was passed, opponents wore black to symbolize mourning, with some carrying signs lamenting the death of democracy. While this estimation of the situation may be extreme, Morales’ direct appointment of judicial officers, when viewed alongside the myriad issues already debilitating and complicating the Bolivian justice system, does raise serious questions about the government’s view of justice.

Addressing the severe case backlogs, which number some 13,000 in the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal combined, is undoubtedly crucial. But Morales’ attitude—and that of his Movement towards Socialism (MAS) party more broadly—has led opponents to argue that the government does not respect the very concept of judicial independence. Executive interference in the Bolivian judiciary certainly did not start under the MAS. However, the fights regarding the composition of the judiciary contributed to the creation of the judicial vacuum in the first place, as justices who resigned from their posts in the Constitutional Tribunal in 2007 cited executive harassment as their reason for leaving, and the Supreme Court has also been the forum for political squabbles. Thus the logic becomes somewhat circular: we must appoint judges to fix the backlog that our political disputes helped cause.

 It is worth emphasizing that justice in Bolivia has never been blind. Nonetheless, since coming to power, the MAS has often seemed to be more vigorous about prosecuting opponents rather than supporters. Since Morales’ landslide victory in the December 2009 elections, in which the MAS attained a two-thirds supermajority in the congress, the situation has intensified. Shortly following Morales’ January 2010 inauguration, Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera announced that a priority of the Legislative Assembly would be to continue with the judicial proceedings against former government officials including ex-presidents Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze and Carlos Mesa, former Supreme Court Justice Eddy Fernandez, and ex-magistrate Rosario Canedo, along with a number of government ministers. While some of the cases brought against these officials are undoubtedly merited given Bolivia’s history of corruption, several of the charges are questionable, blurring the line between political disagreement, incompetence, and criminal negligence. What’s more, 59 opposition members currently face charges, including all six of the ex-governors of the departments in the opposition-dominated “Media Luna” region, mostly for corruption or abuse of office. The fact that only one MAS official has been charged along with these opposition members raises concerns over the role that politics has played in these accusations.

This slew of cases against opposition members has been accompanied by legal initiatives with other unclear consequences for justice. In addition to the “Ley Corta,” other laws with troubling provisions include the controversial anticorruption law, which is currently being debated in the legislature. More effective anticorruption efforts in Bolivia would be welcome, but certain provisions – in particular, the issue of what provisions will be retroactive – are extremely controversial. If retroactivity merely signals that corruption crimes that previously would have been dismissed on the basis of statute of limitations are now prosecutable, it is a debatable proposition. If the term means that former officials or citizens can be punished for acts they did not know to be criminal at the time of commission, it is far more problematic. In general, the boldness with which MAS members call for investigations or judgments of people with whom they disagree politically is at times jarring. Finally, the decision to include the election of high judicial authorities in the constitution is controversial in its own right. Very few countries select judges through elections – the US being a massive exception – precisely due to the unavoidable clash between political responsiveness and nonpartisan justice.

Justice for regular citizens is fraught with unresolved questions as well. Although geared towards improving the security of citizens and strengthening law enforcement in the country, the recently proposed changes to the penal code set out in the Fast Law Enforcement Bill also stand to decrease the due process guarantees afforded to alleged criminals. Another issue complicating the country’s justice system includes the problematic process of reconciling community justice with civil law. The new constitution officially endorses the communal justice system, but the question of how the two legal regimes will mesh remains fluid. The recent case of Felix Patzi, a candidate for the governorship of La Paz, Bolivia’s biggest department, is illustrative.  After being arrested for drunk driving on February 4, Patzi was sentenced to make 1,000 bricks under the community justice system. Although Patzi initially withdrew his candidacy at the request of Morales, he later changed his mind, and now argues that his drunk driving charge should not disqualify him from the La Paz race due to the fact that he has already served out his community justice sentence. However, his civil case remains open, leading to controversy over whether or not the communal punishment should suffice. Due to the MAS party’s commendable insistence on using Patzi to set an example regarding behavioral expectations for its candidates and continued unwillingness to allow Patzi to run, he abandoned the MAS.

The MAS envisions its political project as a refoundation of Bolivian society, and citizens have repeatedly endorsed its vision in elections. But justice and politics reside in tension in every country, which is the reason that separation of powers is considered such an essential element of democracy. The MAS has not always abused its power – indeed, Morales’ interim selections were viewed as fairly credible by most observers – but the government’s actions have been controversial in many different spheres related to the rule of law. With such political hegemony as the MAS now possesses inevitably comes temptation to abuse it, especially in conditions of unconsolidated institutions. How these issues are addressed will say a great deal about the MAS’s attitude toward basic democratic tenets more generally.

Nigerian Power Vacuum Highlights Institutional Weakness

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On February 9, Nigeria’s presidential crisis reached its denouement, at least for now, when the National Assembly voted to install Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as acting president. Nigeria has effectively lacked a president since November, when President Umaru Yar’Adua left to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Yar’ Adua’s departure spurred a heated debate over the constitutional provisions regulating the matter, with some arguing that Yar’Adua violated the constitution by failing to hand his power over to the vice president, others (including the majority of the cabinet) countering that the president enjoyed a legal right to carry out his presidential duties abroad, and increasing numbers of Nigerians clamoring for his resignation. In the face of increasing unrest, with citizens taking to the streets with calls of “Umaru Where Are You” and rumors circulating of impending coup attempts, the National Assembly voted to empower Jonathan in the name of “peace, order and good government.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that this ruling will achieve a lasting resolution of the matter, and the current turmoil is not an aberration, but rather a symptom of Nigeria’s unresolved institutional issues.

For one thing, informal understandings play a key role in the stability of the country’s democracy. In this case, contentious ethno-religious issues surrounding the presidency could be exacerbated as the ascendancy of Jonathan, a southern Christian, to the presidency in place of Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, could throw a wrench in the tension-reducing system of alteration of power between members of the two faiths. In addition to the presidency, other institutions remain either frail or politically compromised, limiting the country’s ability to follow good governance practices. Political parties are feeble, with competitive politics rendered extremely difficult by the increasing dominance of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which has been ensured through the manipulation of the state machinery, especially in the fraudulent 2007 elections. In a related vein, the country’s electoral institutions remain underdeveloped; the primary institution in charge of overseeing elections, the Independent Electoral Commission, has been accused of being a tool of the executive branch and implicated in several scandals. Promised electoral reforms geared toward addressing these issues have yet to arrive. In addition, the country’s new anticorruption institutions, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, have handed down few convictions, especially in cases implicating politicians with links to Yar’Adua. Finally, the government security apparatus continues to commit rampant abuses with impunity despite increased civilian control over the security sector.

The dilapidated nature of these institutions is inextricably linked to Nigeria’s political and social problems. Institutional ineffectiveness has paralyzed Nigeria’s response to serious internal challenges, most notably the presence of ethnic and religious tension between Muslims and Christians, which has claimed 13,500 lives since 1999, and the precarious peace in the Niger Delta, where the conflict over oil continues to simmer. Due to the institutional failure to address the root causes of these problems, they have persisted, with positive steps made towards resolution consistently impossible to maintain. Moreover, in some cases, the state’s incapacity to effectively provide basic services, an equitable distribution of resources, and the establishment of the rule of law directly contributed to the creation of the problems in the first place. It becomes a vicious circle: by fueling the most severe crises, institutional weaknesses has stymied efforts to address baseline governance concerns including electoral reform and corruption.

The eruption of violence in the months since Yar’Adua’s departure serves as an extreme example of the link between institutional failure-in this case the failure of the executive institution- and the country’s internal struggles. In the North, sectarian strife claimed more lives on January 19, when armed men, believed to be Christian, attacked the predominantly Muslim population of Kuru Karama, killing 150. The violence then spread to neighboring communities, where additional attacks brought the death toll up to at least 364.While this outbreak of violence was not the direct result of Yar'Adua's absence, the ethno-religious facet of presidential crisis, namely the alteration of power issue, has undoubtedly heightened tensions between the two groups during this time. The violence also illustrates that Muslim-Christian friction could stand to worsen if Yar'Adua cedes the rest of his term to a Christian. Following the attacks, Jonathan promised to immediately investigate the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice, although the halting pace of past investigations raises doubt over the probability of this taking place. This conflict was soon followed by an end to the truce in the Niger Delta. On January 30, Jomo Gbomo, declaring himself the spokesperson for a militant group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), announced the end of the ceasefire in the region, citing a belief that the government would never empower the region’s inhabitants with control over its hydrocarbon resources. The demise of the ceasefire was partly the result of the stalling of the amnesty program on account of Yar’ Adua’s absence.

Until Nigeria’s struggling institutions are empowered with increased capacity and find mechanisms to decrease the perceived zero-sum nature of politics, severe governance deficits will remain. Although no one would expect a country a country with such a short history of elected rule to feature pristine institutions, the lack of progress is disheartening, and a lack of political will has been a contributing factor. Regardless of the cause, the recent saga has crystallized the ongoing challenges, and hopefully will spur the country’s political class to do something about it.

Cultivation of Corruption Among South Africa's Elites

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Criminal proceeding against Jackie Selebi, the South African police commissioner, began in Johannesburg this month. Selebi, whose CV includes positions such as former ambassador to the United Nations and chief of the international crime group Interpol, is on trial for corruption and other serious crimes. In one of the more colorful moments of the trial thus far, Glenn Agliotti, one of the country’s more notorious drug smugglers, testified to picking up the tab for Selebi’s designer clothing. He also bought couture handbags for Mr. Selebi’s wife, and paid the commissioner about $135,000 in cash in exchange for sensitive information.

Agliotti, for his part, is accused of murdering a corrupt mining magnate in a separate trial, and made a deal with the state to testify in exchange for indemnity for his dealings with Selebi. 

South Africa is far from the most corrupt country in the world (it ranked 54th best out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index), yet neither is the anticorruption record of the country’s leaders impeccable. In 2004, Tony Yengeny, the anti-Apartheid activist and former African National Congress (ANC) speaker of parliament, was convicted for taking bribes from a weapons manufacturer. He served four months of a four-year prison sentence. And Jacob Zuma, the current president, was charged with corruption in 2005 and sacked from his position as deputy president, though after years of legal battles all charges were dropped in April 2009. The now-dormant charges against Zuma were related to a multi-billion dollar arms purchase in the 1990s an illustrative case as the awarding of government contracts has been an area of activity plagued by graft accusations.

The ANC’s overwhelming control of the executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. The Parliament has been criticized for failing to sufficiently investigate corruption scandals of members of the executive branch. In addition, political interference hampers the ability of the judiciary to fully combat corruption. The politicization of the judiciary was especially apparent in the corruption prosecution of Zuma and the suspension of Vusi Pikoli as National Director of Public Prosecutions by justice minister Brigitte Mabandla. In the latter case, it became apparent that the suspension was related at least partially to the fact that Pikoli approved an arrest warrant for Selebi.

South Africa’s constitution outlines three institutions meant to combat corruption, but for various reasons, none of them are fully effective. The Office of the Auditor General is responsible for reporting to the National Assembly on the finances of any agency that receives public funding, but suffers countless deficiencies such as a lack of resources and incomplete reporting by agencies. The Public Prosecutor investigates complaints on the part of the public against governmental officials, but its independence has been called into question, especially since the current PP, Leonard Mushwana, is a former ANC MP and has been accused of inhibiting investigations of senior ANC members and the party itself. Finally, while the Independent Electoral Commission regulates the public finances through the Represented Political Parties’ Fund, private contributions are totally unregulated, and parties do not have to reveal the size or sources of their donations. There are a handful of other, smaller agencies in the government that combat corruption, but all have similar limitations.

Furthermore, while South Africa has an independent media, government and especially ANC-affiliated officials have accused investigative journalists of treason or racism. A number of private newspapers and magazines—among them, the Mail & Guardian, the Cape Times, and the Sunday Times—express sharp criticism of the government, to which the ANC has been particularly sensitive. As a result, many private media outlets have been issued gag orders and lawsuits related to investigations into corruption, and the ANC has in some cases even threatened to withdraw advertising. 

As a result, about half of South Africa’s population believes corruption is widespread among government officials and civil servants. This perception is intensified by a heightened awareness of inequality between South Africa’s elites and the population as a whole. While much of South Africa’s society is poor and lacking running water, electricity, and toilets, members of the ruling class flaunt luxurious lifestyles. Haroon Bhroat, an economist at the University of Cape Town, reported that South Africa now harbors “the most unequal society in the world.” According to Bhroat’s calculations, South Africa’s Gini coefficient, which measures the level of income inequality in a given country, is at 0.679 (0 is completely equal, 1 is completely unequal). He warned that the situation could lead to social instability and, indeed, protests comprised of citizens from the lower rungs of society have recently broken out in Johannesburg.

President Zuma says he is committed to rooting out corruption, and in fact he has made some progress in certain fields. A “mood of intolerance” toward corruption is newly noticeable and criminal charges, rather than light wrist slaps, are becoming a more regular punishment for accused officials. He is also trying to make public finances more transparent and to create more barriers between companies that perform work for public bodies and public sector employees, forbidding the latter to seek employment with the former. How effective such measures will be has yet to be determined, and it’s perhaps a bit difficult to believe that Zuma--  whose involvement in one of South Africa’s most serious corruption scandals was thrown on out due to prosecutorial transgressions rather than a determination of innocence-- when he talks about rooting out graft. If the experience of other single party-dominant regimes is any guide, the overwhelming control of the ANC in South African politics, and the sense among aspiring officials that pleasing party elites is the key to professional advancement, will serve as a serious obstacle to effective and sustained reform.

Corruption-Fighters in Indonesia Feel Pushback

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Indonesian President began his second five-year term on Tuesday, following a resounding electoral victory in July. His success at the polls has been attributed in part to his tough stance on corruption—not an easy challenge to confront in a country rife with graft. However, in recent weeks efforts to provide greater transparency, which are considered indispensable to provide more tools to corruption-fighters, have faced significant resistance from the country’s parliament.

At the end of September, Indonesia’s parliament diluted the powers of the country’s special Corrupt Crimes Court and the independent Corruption Eradication Commission (known as the KPK), arguing that their powers were too far-reaching. The KPK can conduct wiretaps without a warrant, while the Court is known to hand down harsher sentences than Indonesia’s regular judiciary. But advocates of the institutions claimed that the impact of the highly-effective Court and KPK will decline if constraints are imposed and that any backtracking will raise red flags among investors.

In the end, much to the dismay and resistance of President Yudhoyono, parliament managed to weaken both institutions. Although intervention by the president prevented the dissolution of the KPK’s right to prosecute and tap telephones, the bill passed by parliament allows for the Court to staff a majority of its judges from the regular justice system. Previously, a majority of the judges had to come from outside of the government—including practicing lawyers, academics, and retired prosecutors, among others. As career judges do not tend to have impeccable reputations in corruption cases in Indonesia, such a requirement was seen to allow the court more independence.

The weakening of the KPK and the Corrupt Crimes Court was not the only blow to Indonesia’s anticorruption efforts last month. On September 15, Indonesian police named two of the four deputy chairmen of the KPK as suspects in a bribery case. The facts of the crime are a bit dubious (according to the Economist, one of the suspects was in Peru when he allegedly took a bribe in Jakarta), but nevertheless the two have been formally accused of abuse of power and taking bribes. To top off the anticorruption campaign’s woes, the well-respected head of the KPK went on trial in early October for allegedly masterminding the drive-by shooting of Nasrudin Zulkarnaen, the state-owned pharmaceuticals company director, in what appears to be a love triangle-turned-deadly.   

Finally, the president’s new cabinet—expected to lack experience to carry out substantial economic overhaul—raises doubts among analysts that necessary institutional reforms to combat corruption will take place in the near future.

Combating graft is always a frustrating endeavor, let alone in one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and resistance to such efforts is nothing new.  Corruption is endemic to the expansive web of Indonesian bureaucracy as a result of Suharto’s 32-year-long presidency, a kleptocracy marked by brutality and cronyism. Following his death in 1998, corruption was so entrenched in the Indonesian bureaucratic apparatus that bribes were an expected part of nearly all citizen interactions with the state. Despite efforts to reduce opportunities for corruption, such practices have not been sufficiently abated. Note that petty corruption can be combated much more effectively through technocratic reforms than grand corruption, which inevitably hinges on political will.The KPK was created in 2003 to investigate large-scale corruption, defined as official misconduct that cost the state more than US$85,000. Its success at first was highly mixed and it was criticized for failing to convict prosecutors and police. According to Freedom in the World, a 2008 survey revealed that while the KPK is considered highly credible relative to other Indonesian government institutions, almost three-fourths of those polled thought the Commission had not created enough of a “culture of shame” to prevent state officials from engaging in corruption.

However, in more recent years, the Commission has been lauded for its progress, albeit modest, in rooting out corruption and improving Indonesia’s image. According to the New York Times, since 2003 the commission has achieved a 100 percent conviction rate in 86 cases of bribery and graft brought to trial. In 2008, specifically, a string of high-level prosecutions helped solidify the legitimacy of the Commission and fostered an increased fear of prosecution within Indonesia’s political institutions. That October, the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia was slapped with a five-year sentence for embezzling US$10.3 million in central bank funds. Though critics claimed that such a sentence was not harsh enough to serve as an effective deterrent, generally speaking it was seen as a step in the right direction.

Efforts to combat corruption have been made on a more macro level as well. Direct elections at the local level, held since 2005, have helped to reduce patronage. A number of local initiatives, for example, have reduced the likelihood of bribery by simplifying the process of obtaining business permits and making secondary school applications an online process. Such efforts bumped up Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index; in 2007, Indonesia was ranked 143rd of 180 countries (with 180 being Somalia, the most corrupt), while in 2008, it moved up to 126th place.

That said, 126th place is still not an enviable place to be. Corruption is still rampant in all branches of government on both the local and national level and impunity is pervasive. Moreover, with the recent pushback by Parliament, it appears that the reform project is at risk of backsliding.

Few countries have managed to successfully wage the battle against corruption without setbacks. However, given the fight’s centrality to the future of Indonesia’s institutions and the country’s ability to sustain economic growth, President Yudhoyono should certainly consider spending some of his hard-earned political capital to ensure that Indonesia’s reputation as a country on the right trajectory remains intact.           

Heavy Hitters Face Hardcore Challenges in Haiti

 Photo Credit: Flickr users World Economic Forum and M-J Milloy

On August 11, Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, named Dr. Paul Farmer as his deputy. These posts were recently created by the UN in an effort to more effectively promote economic development in the turmoil-racked country. In recent years, both Clinton and Farmer have demonstrated their dedication to aiding Haiti, the Western Hemisphere’s poorest nation. As president, Clinton sent the U.S. military into Haiti in 1994 in order to return democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his post, subsequently turning the operation over to a UN force. While this effort was not successful in the long-run, Clinton remained committed to assisting the nation through other means, in large part through his foundation’s work to combat HIV/AIDS and support recovery efforts after 2008’s destructive hurricanes. Paul Farmer, the co-founder of Partners in Health, an international nonprofit that provides health care services to the Haitian poor and carries out research and advocacy work, has received international acclaim for the work he has done to provide free medical treatment and promote social justice in Haiti throughout the past 3 decades.

With these two heavyweights now serving at the forefront of Haiti’s international advisory team, it is possible that the country might have a greater chance at combating its monumental economic, political, and environmental troubles. Both Clinton and Farmer bring impressive skills and a strong sense of optimism to the table. In fact, Clinton has stated, “I think Haiti, notwithstanding the total destruction of four storms last year, has the best chance to escape its dark history in the 35 years I've been going there …What I want to do is help the Haitian people take control of their own destiny." Nevertheless, Clinton and Farmer have their work cut out for them. The most dire and pressing issue facing Haiti is the nation’s soaring poverty level, which is complicated by a severe food shortage and deteriorating health conditions, along with the destruction left in the wake of last year’s storms. Over 80% of Haitians live in poverty, with the unemployment rate hovering around a shocking 90%. As the island is highly dependent on imports, the 2008 global food crisis hit it especially hard and sparked intense protests. The health of Haiti’s poor is deplorable; the country’s child mortality rates are sky-high, and 6% of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS. These problems are exacerbated and complicated by the government’s poor governance record. Haiti suffers from an extreme lack of services, unsurprising given the country’s political instability, ailing rule of law, and rampant corruption. While the country has recently made some governance improvements that will facilitate Clinton’s and Farmer’s efforts to drive development, colossal challenges remain.

In a March 2009 report, the International Crisis Group stressed that a major focal point of the Haitian government must be electoral and institutional reform efforts. Since its independence, Haiti’s political history has been dominated by instability including foreign intervention, military coups, flawed elections, and multiple authoritarian interludes. Most recently, the 2004 re-ouster of President Aristide split Haiti and left it with no functioning political institutions. Nevertheless, the country has made some strides toward institutional rebuilding in the past few years. In 2006, Haiti elected Rene Preval, who has received international acclaim for his attempts to address unemployment and poverty during a previous term, to the presidency in a free and fair contest that was lauded as “a step toward political stability” and subsequently restored an elected parliament. However, yet another political crisis shook Haiti when Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis was ousted from his post by a Senate vote in the midst of last April’s deadly food protests; the post remained vacant until September, when Michele Pierre-Louis was approved. Furthermore, congressional elections originally scheduled for December 2007 were postponed until this year, which resulted in Senate inactivity as the body was frequently inquorate. The country’s persistent state of institutional instability has effectively stymied any progress on the development of anti-poverty and healthcare programs, along with the effective use of foreign assistance. In fact, it has led most international donors to filter money through NGOs rather than the government – the lack of accountability within the country’s civil society sector notwithstanding.

The absence of effective rule of law in the country is equally troubling. As an ICG report explains, “The state is able to guarantee neither the security of its citizens nor the rights of defendants.” More specifically, lawlessness and crime have reigned supreme since the collapse of the police force following the events of 2004. Gangs have gained control of large areas and committed kidnappings, murders, and other violent crimes against helpless citizens. Unfortunately, these crimes are largely met with impunity due to the dysfunctional state of the country’s judicial system.  Nevertheless, according to the UN, the security situation has been moderately ameliorated. Crime rates are down following efforts by the Haitian police, with the assistance of UN forces, to dismantle the gangs and reinstate control over gang territories. In addition, the UN forces have succeeded in increasing the number of police from 5,000 in 2005 to 9,000 today. Nevertheless, as another ICG report argues, much remains to be done in order to consolidate effective security sector reform.  The report claims that the police force requires further professionalization and that the vetting and training process must become more transparent in order to address concerns regarding personnel guilty of human rights violations and corruption. Human Rights Watch corroborated this, arguing that kidnappings and other crimes persist at an alarming rate while both police lawlessness and a lack of justice continue unchecked. As such, the internal security crisis continues to undermine domestic and international efforts to implement anti-poverty and hurricane recovery efforts and attract foreign direct investment.

Finally, endemic corruption continues to be an especially pernicious problem. In its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Haiti 177 out of 180 countries, with only Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia in worse condition. Preval has made some efforts to eradicate corruption by requiring the disclosure of top government officials’ assets and purging corrupt police officers from the force, but the entrenched, pervasive nature of the problem will require a more systematic approach.

There is no denying the fact that Haiti and its new UN envoys have a long road ahead of them. The country continues to face substantial challenges in all realms of governance and as a result, sustainable progress on economic development issues will be slow. That said, Haiti’s institutions have been rebuilt since the post-2004 nadir and political stability and internal security have improved mildly. In addition, as the new UN appointments, recent U.S. trade legislation offering Haiti duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets, and international pledges of additional aid demonstrate, the international community, especially the United States, may have finally become more committed to encouraging development in the country. While UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s statement that “Haiti stands a better chance than almost any emerging economy…to prosper” may be somewhat hyperbolic, that he said it all symbolizes an important change in expectations for the country.

Can Incremental Change Turn the Tide in Tumultous Pakistan?

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In July and August, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, announced two high-profile reform initiatives to improve governance: an electronic governance program and a wide-ranging reform of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The E-governance initiative envisages the computerization of government services from voting to the viewing of land records, thereby increasing the ease and frequency of people’s interaction with the state and promoting transparency and reliability. The reform of the FATA is a far more ambitious project as those regions have previously had a centralized regime with political activity banned, a system reminiscent of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Zardari plans to bring the population of the territory into the mainstream political system by allowing them to join and vote for parties and ending particularly hard-edged tribal measures such as detention without trial and communal punishment.

These are indeed significant strides, but it is debatable whether Zardari, with limited experience in public service and political capital stemming mainly from his status as the widower of the assassinated Benazir Bhutto, will be able to successfully implement such ambitious changes. Expectations were low at the onset of his presidency. Even though Zardari publicly expressed his commitment to gradual democratization during and after his presidential campaign, he is widely believed to have forsaken the Charter of Democracy, which was the outcome of a May 2006 meeting between Bhutto and her long-time political rival, Nawaz Sharif. In that meeting, they established common ground against the Pervez Musharraf-led military junta, including rescinding the power of the president and ending the executive appointment of judges. Zardari has officially signed on to this agreement, but has taken no steps to implement it. One of the primary issues is Article 58(2)(b): allowing for the dissolution of the National Assembly and sacking of the prime minister by the president. Zardari has deemed the internal security situation too serious for this and other powers of the president to be stripped and fears that restoring the judiciary would undermine his rule. Another hallmark of the military’s rule that has stayed fully implemented are the oaths of loyalty extracted from judges, a controversial step initiated by Musharraf in 2007. Furthermore, Zardari’s mindset brings him into frequent conflict with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, who is unenthusiastic about Zardari’s policies and appointment of friends with no political experience into important positions.

In addition to adopting this undedicated approach to democratic reform, Zardari has implemented several policies with distinctly authoritarian features. For example, he recently passed the Cyber Crimes Act, under which jokes that insult the political leadership electronically can be traced and the people responsible prosecuted. Furthermore, Zardari’s decision to authorize the use of force against protestors demonstrating in favor of the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to his post earlier this year also raised eyebrows.

If there is one area where Zardari’s influence is more positive, it is his view of Pakistan’s security situation. Zardari is not immersed in the military’s security culture, which has centered on India as Pakistan’s primary adversary to such a degree that tolerance and even cooperation with militant groups has been notoriously common. Zardari, whether out of conviction or in response to international admonitions, has shown greater signs than did Musharraf of understanding that the primary threat to the government may in fact come from within and internal militants must be confronted. However, it has yet to be seen whether his viewpoint will be translated into effective action; while the Pakistani security forces have made some strides in reclaiming the Swat valley from militants and putting pressure on radical forces in South Waziristan, the prospects of improving governance enough to make these gains sustainable remains uncertain at best.

To make matters worse for the population, the economy has come close to complete collapse since 2008, with the agricultural sector – which provides employment for 44% of the workforce – taking especially severe hits in the last two decades due to economic modernization as well as crop failure in 2007-2008. Combined with the political instability that has ravaged the country this decade, both GDP and the nation’s exports have fallen significantly. Though this is not entirely Zardari’s fault, there has been a marked absence of plans for agricultural reform or the building of infrastructure, and many segments of the population, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas, are slowly falling back upon remittances sent by family working abroad to live. According to Minister of Finance Shaukat Tarin, this lack of planning is largely the result of bureaucratic mismanagement. More specifically, Shaukat argues that “there’s no performance management…no merit, a lot of nepotism.”

This economic decline has only been exacerbated by rampant corruption. Two examples in particular of companies being stripped of their assets are the crashes of Pakistan Steel and Pakistan International Airlines, both great domestic successes whose resources were whittled away. The downfall of these two companies was largely brought about by the corrupt practices of the government cronies who made up their upper management. For firms with looser government ties, corruption, and more particularly graft, is an equally destructive problem. A recent World Bank report found that “Corruption…is largely associated with the business-government interface…it is common for firms in Pakistan to pay informal payments to government officials to get things done.” The report noted that 57% of Pakistani firms consider corruption to be a severe constraint. Unfortunately, Zardari has not made a dedicated effort to tackle this destructive governance scourge since taking office. Under Zardari’s tenure, investigation into corruption allegations, especially those stemming from Musharraf’s reign, has been negligible. Alarmingly, both foreign assistance and internal funding for social welfare programs have also been lost to corruption. A recent Foreign Policy article reported that U.S. aid has enriched officials in the Pakistani army and intelligence service, whose influence in the country has enabled them to form their own powerful patronage networks, rather than contributing to the building of a stronger civilian government with greater control over these institutions. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International ranked Pakistan a dismal 134 out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perception Index.

As the above shows, Zardari has yet to take the steps necessary to achieve qualitative government improvements. As such, while the passage of new governance reforms is in itself encouraging, the chances that the E-governance initiative and the FATA reforms will be fully carried out, let alone bring about real change, is questionable. Zardari’s dubious degree of dedication, along with his understandable preoccupation with the country’s worsening security situation, suggests that these initiatives may well join others on the long list of Pakistan’s stalled reform efforts.

Nigeria's Stumbling Electoral Reform

Nigeria is the definition of a struggling democracy. While all of the country’s institutions are in need of extensive reform, the state of the country’s electoral process – the sine qua non in a democracy – is particularly deplorable. The necessity of election reform first became a high-priority issue in Nigeria following the country’s 2007 elections. According to the Freedom in the World report on Nigeria, these elections were the worst of the few free contests Nigeria has conducted since the end of military rule. The 2007 presidential, state, and legislative elections were characterized by both widespread violence and irregularities including fraud, vote buying, vote-rigging, and ballot-stuffing. Following the balloting, the winner, Umaru Yar’Adua of the PDP, acknowledged in his inaugural address that the elections that brought him to power were deeply flawed. He then pledged to reform the ailing electoral process during his tenure as president.

Nevertheless, recent events have cast light on the persistence of Nigeria’s electoral woes. On April 25, re-run elections in the Ido-Osi local government of Ekiti State were closely followed by local and international observers who hoped to see that progress had been made since 2007. The controversy and intrigue surrounding these elections, however, illustrates that Nigeria’s electoral process is still in dire straits. This week, 31 Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) officials faced interrogation regarding their involvement in the N250 million (US$1.7 million) bribery scandal. These officials, who presided over the re-run election, have been accused of receiving 250 million Nairas from one of Nigeria’s political parties. John Onaji, the presiding officer at the elections, blew the whistle on the scandal after another INEC official involved allegedly failed to share the money. This newest twist in the saga of Nigeria’s electoral mishaps occurred after the INEC had been forced to delay the Ekiti elections due to security concerns over gang-related violence that had probable connections to Nigeria’s political parties. An additional difficulty was created when Ayoka Adebayo, Ekiti’s Residential Electoral Commissioner, resigned due to an unwillingness to participate in a process that went “against her conscience,” but then returned to her seat after conferring with the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). After the election, the INEC delayed its release of the results for several days before declaring the PDP candidate the winner. Nigeria’s Action Congress (AC) party has, however, disputed the results.

While these most recent events provide substantive evidence that little headway has been made, this does not mean that the president has turned a deaf ear to the issue. After his election, Yar’Adua succumbed to popular pressure and convened an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) under the leadership of Justice Muhammad Uwais. Chief among the recommendations was that the INEC be made actually independent – currently, the president appoints all members of the commission. The ERC urged the government to establish three new bodies: an Electoral Offences Commission, a Constituency Delimitation Commission, and a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission, to relieve the INEC of some of its duties.

In response, the government has followed some of the ERC’s recommendations. On March 11, the federal government released a white paper stating that it would implement some of the report’s recommendations. It agreed that funding for the INEC should be guaranteed and independent of the executive. In addition, the INEC was given responsibility for state elections, replacing the troubled state election committees. Most importantly, it instituted a secret ballot system. INEC’s Chairman, Maurice Iwu, praised these reforms but, in an eyebrow-raising statement, also stated his support for “the power of the president to appoint the chairman of INEC.” Of course, this is hardly surprising, considering that he was appointed by the party in power. Nonetheless, on April 30, the president submitted 7 bills addressing election reform issues to the National Assembly. In these bills, the president proposed the removal of both the INEC’s control over the party registration process and its supervisory powers over parties. He has also proposed the creation of a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC) to assume these duties in place of the INEC, along with an Electoral Offences Commission. As of today, the government has accepted 73 out of 83 recommendations made by the ERC.

While the president’s reform efforts seem quite extensive, however, he has unfortunately remained intransigent on one of the most crucial reform issues. On May 12, the president reiterated his strong belief that the power to appoint the chairman of the INEC belongs to the president. He argued that transferring this power to the judicial branch would violate the separation of powers. The president’s continued control over the INEC, however, means that the president will retain his power to unfairly influence elections in favor of his party. The widespread victories achieved by the PDP both during and after the 2007 elections have been attributed, at least in part, to the use of the state machinery to manipulate the electoral process. With the newly proposed electoral reforms reducing the powers and responsibilities of the INEC, this phenomenon may become slightly less problematic in the future. Nevertheless, the bills contain provisions which would protect the president’s control over the new electoral bodies. For example, one of the bills states that the governing board of the new PPRRC is to be appointed and directed by the president. As such, not much stands to change.

Not surprisingly, the government’s tentative steps towards reform have not been widely embraced by Nigerians. Following the president’s initial drafting of an electoral reform bill in March, a coalition of opposition parties cried foul and urged the people to take to the streets and defend their voting rights by force. Alhaji Bashir Tofa, a former candidate, used some of the most inflammatory language, saying: “Civil society and labour must mobilise and organise to resist the insult and affront.” Sam Aluko, a famed economist, has “called on Nigerians to defend their votes with guns.” Since the president sent the new bills to the Legislative Assembly, opposition has been slightly less fierce. However, the events of the Ekiti re-run election reinvigorated the movement. On May 14, civil society groups began to plan a nationwide rally in support of a bill requiring the implementation of all of the reforms recommended by the ERC, rather than just the set approved by Yar’Adua.

Yar’Adua’s recent efforts to reform Nigeria’s electoral process could be a small step in the right direction. In addition, the interrogation of the INEC officials involved in the recent scandal may serve as evidence that the culture of impunity surrounding electoral fraud is being slowly ameliorated. However, these changes will not be enough to expunge Nigeria’s undemocratic political culture and revamp Nigeria’s electoral process. Events such as the botched Ekiti re-run elections have made Nigerians increasingly suspicious and skeptical of their country’s political process in general and the INEC in particular. Nigerians have come to believe that the outcomes of elections are determined by political thugs rather than the will of the people. In order to bring credibility to the most critical element in any democracy, far-reaching reform is necessary. The perception wrought by the 2007 elections means that partial reform will not suffice. Without change from the ground up, civilian apathy (at best) and violent political unrest at worst will continue to cast a shadow over the Nigerial electoral landscape.

Photo Credit: Flickr user usnico

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

Algeria's Election Heralds Continuation of Status Quo

Algeria’s recent presidential elections yielded unsurprising results. On April 9, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika , who has ruled Algeria since 1999, was re-elected to a third term with 90.23% of the national vote. This extremely high margin of victory is undoubtedly inflated. While the participation rate was officially measured at 74.5%, the opposition estimated that roughly 24% of eligible voters participated. According to official tallies, opposition candidate Louisa Hanaoune came in second place with 4.5% of the vote, while none of the other candidates were able to garner more than a few percentage points.

While these results were expected, they are troubling nonetheless. Both the run-up to the election and the balloting itself were decidedly undemocratic. The president’s reelection bid was only made possible after the parliament approved his proposed amendment to the constitutional provision that had previously set a two term limit on the presidency. This amendment essentially determined the outcome of the election in advance. During the presidential campaign, the absence of a viable opposition was striking. This was partially the result of direct government interference in the campaign activities of the opposition. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, the development of a competitive party system in Algeria has been hampered by the government’s practice of refusing to award legal status to opposition parties. Without official authorization, parties are generally unable to participate in elections. As a result of this, the presidential election featured opposition candidates with little popular support. These candidates were widely considered to be “token opponents.” Several opposition leaders who were barred from participating attempted to stage a mass boycott as a last-ditch effort to influence the election’s results, but the protests were predictably stifled. Meanwhile, President Bouteflika utilized the resources of the state to exert control over the media and win over supporters on the campaign trail with extensive political handouts.

Apart from the government’s meddling, equally disconcerting is the prevailing environment of political apathy in which the election took place. Among both the general public and the formal opposition, the predominant line of thought seems to be that measurable change is unfeasible. While the opposition’s poor showing was principally the result of unfair government restrictions, a general lack of popular support and mobilization for the opposition was also a factor.

Unfortunately, in the realm of governance, a change of course is exactly what Algeria needs. Although the country must implement substantial reforms before governance can be improved, let alone democratized, Bouteflika failed to include any innovative policy proposals in the campaign. Instead, he repeatedly promised to boost economic growth and protect stability and security – important issues, to be sure, but far from visionary. The president’s health is another complication. Over the past few years, the 72- year-old president has been repeatedly hospitalized, possibly for stomach cancer. On top of all of this, he will likely have to focus much of his attention on the recent surge of terrorist attacks committed by the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. As a result of these factors, chances are slim that further headway will be made on crucial reforms with Bouteflika at the helm.

The details of the presidential elections serve as evidence of the country’s lack of progress in the sphere of accountability and public voice. While the election was generally free of violence, it was rife with fraud. In addition, Bouteflika has consolidated authority in the executive branch, largely through the support of the powerful military establishment. The president himself verified his half-hearted respect for important democratic principles: following the ratification of the constitutional amendment on term limits, he stated that democracy cannot “constitute a single, universal model…a model that must be adhered to and applied at all times and in all places.”

Moreover, Algeria’s level of respect for human rights and the rule of law is complicated by the president’s continuing focus on a particular conception of national reconciliation. As the 2008 Freedom in the World report on Algeria reports, the excessive amnesty laws passed by the government have resulted in an undermining of the justice system. As Human Rights Watch notes, terrorists and militants who committed heinous crimes during the civil conflict of the 1990s, during which 150,000 Algerians died and 6,000 disappeared, have escaped punishment, while groups representing the victims have been ignored and even actively harassed by the government. More recently, Bouteflika has expressed his willingness to pardon Islamic extremists responsible for organizing suicide bombings. In response to this, Amnesty International released a document earlier this year which denounced Bouteflika’s “legacy of impunity.” Due to the fact that reconciliation remained Bouteflika’s top campaign issue, nothing is likely to change in the near future. Relatedly, the state of emergency, which has been in effect for 17 years, gives the government the authority to unjustly imprison journalists and political dissidents, and Bouteflika has shown no inclination towards the revocation of the act.

Finally, the level of transparency in Algeria’s government is lamentable. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, corruption is entrenched in the country. In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Algeria ranked 90th out of 180. Despite his early promises to sweep Algeria’s political scene of corrupt officials, Bouteflika has largely turned a blind eye. Backroom dealings, often including cash handouts, were pervasive throughout the election. The separation of politics from business remains moribund, as do efforts to reform the military's role in commercial enterprise.

In essence, the president’s conduct during election season provides no evidence that Algeria’s poor governance record will be rectified. Real change in Algeria will require a changing of the guard. Given the constraints on the opposition, it is questionable how this will come about other than via a decline in Bouteflika’s health, which would create a dangerous vacuum. For now, then, Algerian governance will remain at the mercy of global economic fortunes and the interests of a narrow political class, and dispatches from the country will continue to feature descriptors like “stagnation” and “weak prospects” rather than “reform” and “justice.”

Photo Credit: Flickr user Franck Prevel

1000 Days of Alan Garcia: the Peruvian Take

Wednesday marked the 1000th day of the presidency of Peru's Alan Garcia, and there are various potential perspectives on his presidency. First, it is critical to recall that the first Garcia administration, from 1985 to 1990, is widely regarded as the worst in Peruvian history, an era when the country came perilously close to failed state status. This carried two implications entering the current term. First, it was obvious that Garcia would seek, above all, to maintain macroeconomic stability in order to inoculate himself against the fear that this term would turn out like the previous one. Second, many hoped that he would energetically devote himself to a wide range of reforms in order to assure that the legacy of his second term would serve as his primary political epitaph.

At this point, the latter set of hopes have been largely extinguished. Especially from abroad, Peru's fundamentals looked strong before the crisis hit. GDP growth was enormous, poverty rates fell, and inflation remained contained. Yet the hope that such a favorable economic environment would lead to broader reforms in critical areas, such as the justice system, anticorruption, environmental conflict, and the country's appalling social breaches, have been largely dashed. For a mix of reasons, the Garcia government has stagnated in all these areas and more, with only incremental achievements in most areas where reform is urgently necessary.

But don't take this blog's word for it. Below the fold is a translation of a report giving a critique of the first 1000 days from the perspective of Peru.21, one the country's more centrist newspapers. While not shy about criticizing the administration, it is the type of media outlet that could have been won over had Garcia decided to govern as he said he would during his campaign (i.e., as a center-leftist) rather as he actually as (largely from the right).