Freedom at Issue

Filipino Muslims' Grievances and the Difficult Path to Peace

In a February report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) assessed the prospects for a resolution of the ongoing conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The report, which was released six months after the dissolution of autonomy negotiations between the two entities, is predominantly pessimistic. According to the ICG, settlement of the autonomy issue is entirely out of the question before the end of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term in 2010.

The conflict between the Philippines government and the MILF is by no means new. The MILF is an offshoot of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an organization which first began to advocate the formation of a separate Islamic state in the Philippines in the 1960s. The MILF split from the MNLF in 1978, when the MNLF became resistant to the idea of an armed insurgency. After the MNLF reached a semi-autonomy agreement with the Philippine government in 1987 and then a cease-fire agreement in 1996, the MILF took the helm of the resistance movement and has, with the exception of short periods of cease-fire, continued to fight for more expansive rights and autonomy in the Mindanao region ever since. The most recent surge of violence erupted after the Supreme Court ruled that the autonomy agreement reached between the MILF and the government this past August was unconstitutional. The subsequent toll was severe: hundreds died and several hundred thousand people were displaced in the months following the breakdown.

The grievances of the MILF are numerous. Most of them, however, are linked to the group’s allegation that Filipino Muslims, most of who belong to the Moro ethnic group residing on Mindanao, suffer persecution and discrimination at the hands of both their government and their fellow citizens. While Muslims make up between 5 and 9 percent of the Filipino population, over 90 percent of the population is Christian. The MILF claims that members of Christian religions dominate all sectors of society, while Muslims are at best ignored and at worst victimized. The group has thus demanded more extensive provisions for self-government and greater control over resources in Mindanao. In a 2001 interview, Hashim Salamat, the founder of the MILF, explained that “the situation here in Mindanao is very, very difficult for the Muslims in general. Our people here have been oppressed for a very long time. This province has been totally neglected.” Where governance is concerned, this is especially problematic. Namely, it raises questions about respect for religious freedom in the country.

At first glance, freedom of belief and conscience is ostensibly well protected in the Philippines. The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion and the Philippine government has not made any overt attempt to restrict the right of Muslims to practice in recent times. This is corroborated by the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, in which the Philippines received a score of 5.33 out of 7.0 in the Freedom of Conscience and Belief subcategory. In addition, in its 2008 International Religious Freedom Report on the Philippines, the U.S. State Department claims that the Philippines government actively supports the practice of Islam through such agencies as the Office of Muslim Affairs.

Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the situation reveals a darker picture. While the rights of Muslims may be officially upheld, the trials they face in their daily lives are substantial. Findings from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report are especially illuminative. Most notably, according to the report, the effort made by the government to promote development amongst the Muslim population in Mindanao has been less than satisfactory. Today, Filipino Muslims are concentrated in the country’s poorest region and often lack basic services.
In addition, the attempt made by the government and the Christian majority to integrate Muslims into the country’s social fabric can only be described as half-hearted. The disproportionately sparse Muslim representation in the country’s political scene is especially salient. According to the report, there are 10 Muslim district representatives and 2 Muslim party list representatives in the House of Representatives, a body which has a total of 236 members. In addition, the Department of State’s 2009 Human Rights report revealed that discrimination against Muslims is especially pronounced in the workplace. For example, Muslims claim to have trouble finding work unless they use Christian pseudonyms and wear Western clothing. The report explains that the predominantly Christian “national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal, and regional loyalties, created informal barriers whereby access to jobs or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or group network.” This hostile treatment of the Muslim population has only been exacerbated by the intermittent terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim extremist groups like the Abbu Sayyaf Group.

While the situation of Muslims is rather grim, this is not to say that the Philippine government has completely turned a deaf ear to the issue. In the education sector, the government’s endeavor to modernize the madrassahs in the Mindanao region by improving the schools’ math, science, and English programs is especially commendable. What’s more, the government is not entirely to blame for the problem. Many Muslims have been to a certain extent unwilling to make a strong effort to become integrated into a greater Filipino society to which they feel no strong ties. The MILF, for its part, has at times maintained an ambiguous relationship with more radical Islamist groups responsible for the Philippines’ worst terror attacks.

In the end, the most direct way to ensure that the rights of the Filipino Muslims are protected would be to grant their request for greater autonomy in the Mindanao. As this is unfeasible for the time being, a micro-level approach aimed at addressing the basic needs of the Muslim population by investing in socio-economic development and fostering inter-faith dialogue would be a step in the right direction.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Mark Navales

Migration: Another Pressure Point for China's System

The global economic crisis that has resulted in 20 million Chinese migrant workers losing their jobs, in combination with the prominence of last summer’s Beijing Olympics, have resulted in somewhat sustained attention to the issue of freedom of movement in China. While the economy was strong and the dollars pouring in, officials were able to occasionally place on the reform agenda the ancient and cumbersome hukou, a household registration system greatly restricting travel and maintaining a huge rural-urban divide (discussed here in January). The strong demand for Chinese goods also served as an incentive to allow millions of migrants to come to urban centers and work factory jobs. No more.

As of 2008, the hukou system continued to deny Chinese migrants public benefits such as education for children and medical care. The government did introduce temporary household registration for migrant workers, but only a small percentage of workers have been able to obtain it. At the Third Plenum of the 17th Party Congress held on October 12, 2008, it was announced that the “old rural-urban divide” can now give way to “a combined development of urban and rural areas.” Recently, some cities, such as Jiaxing City in Zhejiang, abolished the designation of “agricultural households,” and Yunnan province eliminated the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou. Despite the changes, however, critics note that discrimination against migrants in terms of what types of benefits they receive still exists. The recent creation of 20 million jobless migrant laborers and the current lack of an adequate welfare system serve to highlight this fact.

Members of China’s Uighur Muslim minority have been particularly notable victims of movement restrictions: they have faced oppression for years, and existing travel restrictions became even tighter in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics. During this time, Uighurs were discouraged or in some cases, barred from air travel and access to Beijing was limited. Every year during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan, Uighur passports are confiscated by the Chinese government, forcing Uighurs to join government-run tours to Mecca, rather than traveling there on their own, which is illegal. Today almost no Uighurs have passports, an especially problematic issue for business owners. Similarly, Tibetans face strict limitations on their movement and are required to have travel permits to leave the areas in which they are registered to live. 

Besides increasing travel restrictions, the Beijing Olympics resulted in forced evictions so that new stadiums could be built. A common estimate, noted in this post, put the number at 1.5 million Chinese moved to make way for Olympic construction, though it notes this has occurred over an eight year period leading up to the games. “Undesirables,” migrants and the homeless were also removed from the city in preparation for the Olympics. In addition, the games were used as a pretext to arrest an estimated 1,500 members of China’s Falun Gong movement. Many members were removed from the sites of Olympic venues and sent to labor camps.

It seems clear that as the financial crisis worsens and attention to reform is diverted, hukou will continue to pose a problem in 2009. Many of the millions of Chinese workers who lost their jobs no longer possess the skills to work in the agriculture sector; in some cases, they simply do not want to return to rural life and its low-paying, backbreaking jobs. The clock is ticking for China to comprehensively enact reforms to ensure that migrant laborers in the cities have access to the same benefits as traditional urban dwellers. If not, the millions of unemployed and bitter migrants may pose a dangerous challenge to Chinese authorities. After all, as has been mentioned innumerable times by advocates of greater democracy in China, the rigidity of the country’s political system means there is little in the way of escape valves – among the most important one in a democratic system being elections and a free press. Without these valves, this may be the moment when the system’s internal contradictions are laid bare.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Kongharald

Conflict in the Niger Delta Simmers on and Flares Up

When President Umaru Yar’Adua came to power a year and a half ago in Nigeria, a country with 140m people speaking some 250 languages, he detailed a seven-point agenda (energy, security, wealth creation, education, land reform, mass transit, and the execution the Niger Delta plan) to propel development via good governance. Topping President Yar’Adua’s agenda was achieving progress in the Niger Delta Region, where 23 percent of Nigerians reside and where instability reigns, with frequent inter-ethnic clashes over the allocation of oil wealth and resources. The Delta has always been a source of conflict: since initial oil deposits were founded in 1956, residents have been paid pittances, lost their lands, and suffered environmental degradation. Though there have been a few encouraging signs of incremental decreases in tensions, the complexity of the problem means that there is still little hope of an imminent resolution.

Crossroads Dispatch – Notes from the Field: Peru

In the spirit of last week’s post on Colombia, what follows are observations by Crossroads staff regarding governance in Peru. While not in a state of internal conflict like its neighbor Colombia, Peru also exhibits serious shortcomings in a number of the spheres of governance analyzed in Countries at the Crossroads. As in Colombia, the nation is headed by a charismatic, media-comfortable, US-and-market friendly president; unlike Alvaro Uribe, however, Peru’s Alan Garcia has had little success in translating rapid economic growth into high approval ratings.

Crossroads Dispatch – Notes from the Field: Colombia

Countries at the Crossroads staff recently visited Colombia, a nation featuring the Western Hemisphere’s longest-running and perhaps most complicated internal conflict. Security gains and economic growth in recent years have improved the situation of many Colombians and resulted in an astronomic approval rating for President Alvaro Uribe. Yet in terms of governance there remain serious unresolved issues in nearly all the spheres of governance analyzed in Countries at the Crossroads. While not all the Crossroads categories were investigated in-depth during this visit, meetings with a range of civil society actors permitted observations regarding a number of key aspects of governance. Note that because the term governance by definition emphasizes state behavior, the focus here is on government actions.

Taking the Wheel in Nepal, Maoists Face a Rocky Road

Former rebel leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by the nom de guerre Prachanda, was sworn in as Nepal’s prime minister on August 18, confirming his status as the country’s most powerful political leader. While the achievement sealed the victory of his Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in its long struggle with the now-defunct monarchy, it came at the cost of a grueling 1996–2006 insurgency and some 13,000 lives. The new government will have to address the simmering instability and institutional wreckage left in the wake of the conflict, all while managing an uncertain political coalition and coping with urgent problems like food shortages and rising fuel prices.

State Rewards Islamist Thuggery in Indonesia

The ostensibly pluralist Indonesian government issued a decree last month that instructed the minority Ahmadiyah sect to halt its activities or face legal sanctions, including up to five years in prison for violators. While the vaguely worded decree stopped short of an explicit ban on the heterodox Muslim group, it represented a victory for a small but potent alliance of radical Islamists and their gangs of street-fighting supporters. A new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) warns that the extremists have used classic interest-group lobbying methods, combined with real and threatened violence, to achieve a level of influence far beyond their miniscule electoral support. If their many political opponents and the state itself fail to stand up to them, their list of demands will only grow, dragging the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country toward its ideological fringe and undermining an otherwise promising Southeast Asian democracy.

Spotlight on Indigenous Rights

The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has released the final report on its seventh annual session, held between April 21 and May 2. The gathering focused on the issue of global climate change, highlighting the fact that indigenous peoples were already suffering disproportionately from the phenomenon despite having contributed very little to its causes. The report also warned that many of the proposals for halting global warming could negatively affect indigenous groups without proper consultation. In other words, climate change countermeasures could become the latest in a long line of state-supported development campaigns that largely ignore the needs and rights of indigenous peoples. Observance of those rights is often a revealing indicator of a country’s performance on broader governance issues, including rule of law, property rights, political representation for minorities, and freedom of expression.

Malaysia's Ruling Party on the Ropes

The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has governed Malaysia since independence from Britain in 1957, maintaining its hold on power with a blend of authoritarianism, macroeconomic growth, and race-based patronage. However, UMNO and its coalition of more than a dozen smaller parties, the National Front, suffered what may prove to be a mortal blow in the March 8 parliamentary elections, losing their two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat, the lower house of Parliament, for the first time despite control over the media and other advantages. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s government now hangs on a 30-seat margin in the 222-seat chamber, and the opposition People’s Alliance, a coalition that rode to victory in five of federal Malaysia’s 13 states on a platform of racial harmony and reform, has vowed to woo away defectors. The weakened administration has already been forced to adopt elements of the opposition’s program, which could have positive and lasting effects on the country’s beleaguered institutions.

Battening Down the Hatches in Yemen

Violence continues to flare up in and around Sana’a, Yemen’s capital—and President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government is backpedaling on its commitments to better governance. The pressures of an ongoing civil war and shortages in food and water have led Saleh and the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) to substitute the rule of force for the rule of law. Despite advances like a promised liberalization of broadcast media and the recent election of governors by an apparently free popular vote, accountability, public voice, and civil liberties are waning in Yemen. The Saleh government has proven unable to manage popular demands through transparent democratic governance.

Another Brilliant Putin Legacy

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Taken in a place with no name (See more photos or videos here)

As President Vladimir Putin’s eight years as titular head of the Russian state come to an end this week, the event will be greeted by some form of protest by the opposition Other Russia party. But one prominent sign of Russia’s increasing authoritarianism under Putin is the fact that hurdles to any sort of peaceful protest – especially action centered on demands for greater political openness – are high, and seemingly becoming ever higher. The denial of Other Russia’s application for a march, along with the reversal of a decision to allow gay rights activists to stage demonstrations throughout the May holidays, suggest that freedom of assembly will continue to be severely restricted after the May 7 handover from Mr. Putin to hand-picked successor Dmitri Medvedev.

Recent May Day demonstrations, which drew more than 2 million citizens into cities across Russia, were dominated by economic concerns over inflation and food prices. May Day also provided a platform for speeches by prominent opposition leaders, including a demonstration by Other Russia in St. Petersburg. This came amid a backdrop of several moves to curtail freedom of association in Russia, however.

On April 21st, Other Russia filed an application for a “March of Dissent” to take place on May 7 in Moscow. The application was denied eight days later on the grounds that space was limited and that an application by the pro-Kremlin Young Russia had been received first. The denial inspired a lawsuit claiming that the government broke its own laws by not suggesting an alternative location and by failing to respond to the request within three days, as the law stipulates.

Previous Marches of Dissent have been flashpoints for confrontation between the opposition and Russian authorities. The first such demonstration, in 2006, inspired raids on the offices of Garry Kasparov’s United Civil Front. Arrests of opposition activists following a subsequent march in November 2007 led to widespread international condemnation and pressure for their release. Yuri Chervochkin, an activist involved with organizing that protest, was killed in a mysterious beating that took place hours after he called a colleague to say that he was being followed by officials he recognized as belonging to the police. Colleagues were briefly detained on the way to his funeral in December and his fiancé has recently fled Russia for Ukraine following intimidation by the authorities. In March, an unsanctioned protest against Medvedev’s election resulted in more than 100 arrests.

The political opposition is not alone in having its efforts undermined by the state. Legitimate gay rights activists in Russia have also in recent years been subjected to restrictions on their freedom of assembly that have intensified in the run-up to the inauguration. One example: after initially being granted the right to hold a Moscow demonstration in May in conjunction with the International Day of Silence orchestrated by gay rights activists worldwide, the application was denied on the grounds that the European Convention on Human Rights’ Article 11 allows for restrictions on activities likely to have a negative impact on public order. A small group of protesters in St. Petersburg took advantage of the fact that protests by individuals are allowed without a permit, but were assaulted upon leaving the scene of the protest. Late reports suggest that negotiations between activists and authorities in Moscow have produced a compromise in which a rally, as opposed to a march, will be held. More broadly, violence surrounding previous gay rights marches in Russia has inspired lawsuits both domestically and in the European Court of Human Rights, along with widespread criticism of the Putin regime. In another illustrative incident, a Russian journalist reportedly responded to a classified advertisement calling for volunteers willing to pose as gay activists and reported that he was told the purpose of the bogus ad was to distract from the March of Dissent and discredit gays in the country.

Many analysts have ventured predictions about whether Russia under Medvedev will experience a degree of political opening, but there is little consensus on the issue. What is clear is that the over the last several years the authorities have honed and perfected their techniques for limiting public expressions of dissent, whether in the media or on the streets. While academic debate rages about the sustainability of economic progress under authoritarian governments, the Countries at the Crossroads 2007 report makes clear that there are many important governance issues that are not being addressed in Russia’s stifling political environment. Absent a fundamental change in attitude on the part of the government or a full-blown social or economic crisis, dissenting voices will continue to face severe obstacles in their efforts to broaden and deepen the debate about Russia’s future.

Photo of Russian gay rights protester taken by Flickr user bowbrick

Bahrain's Volatile Demographic Mix

Bahrain’s demographics and politics are rather unlike those of most states. In terms of citizenry, it is the only Shiite majority nation still ruled by Sunnis. However, the foreign-born, non-citizen population nearly equals that of actual citizens. Now, a reported 82.5% rise in the foreign-born population, combined with a 15% rise in the number of citizens over the past year, has rekindled fears that Bahrain’s ruling Sunni minority is implementing a rumored plan to suppress the country’s Shiites. Those fears, along with economic discontent, have resulted in riots and protests outside of the capital, Manama.

In 2006, a former government consultant wrote a 216 page report alleging that the ruling Sunni minority had devised a plan to marginalize Bahrain’s majority Shiite community. The report described a wide conspiracy involving planting false news articles in the local press, naturalizing foreign-born Sunnis, and inciting campaigns against opposition figures via cell-phone text messages. The ensuing controversy, dubbed “Bandargate” by the local media after the report’s author, inspired protests in the capital, led to expulsion on charges of sedition against its author (a British citizen), and resulted in a walkout by Shiite lawmakers after their request for an investigation into the allegations was defeated. Recent rumors that citizenship papers were being distributed to wealthy Saudis has brought the controversy back to the forefront.

As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report noted, tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities in Bahrain flared during the mid-1990s alongside general political ferment. Accusations of “political naturalization” also followed a move in 2002 to extend voting rights to Syrians, Yemenis, and Baluchis working in Bahrain’s police, military, and intelligence services. Moreover, absent official government statistics, estimates of unemployment within the majority Shiite community go as high as 50%, with their wages depressed by the large population of low-skill foreign workers.

Nor do Bahraini Shiites’ problems stop at the border. Kuwaiti authorities have recently denied re-entry to Bahraini Shiites returning from pilgrimages to holy sites in Iraq at the Al-Abdelli border crossing because their names appear on a blacklist allegedly provided by Bahraini security services. Charges of collusion between Sunni leaders in Bahrain and Kuwait highlight the regional implications of the imbalance between Sunni and Shia in Bahrain, where Sunnis have stoked fears that the country risks becoming the tip of the much-discussed “Shiite Crescent” dominated by Iranian influence.

Despite the “political naturalization” issue, the foreign-born are by no means immune from the ethno-religious tensions: at the Gulf Cooperation Council in December, Bahrain’s Labor Minister, Majid Al-Alawi, proposed a six-year residency limit for unskilled foreign workers. He cited, in part, the danger hosting such a large population of unassimilated foreign workers presents to local culture. Meanwhile, in an interview earlier this year, he also laid some blame at the feet of Gulf Arabs for being “lazy” and “spoilt,” warning that the “Asian Tsunami” of foreign workers is “worse than an atomic bomb or Israeli attack.” 

So how will Bahrain deal with its race (and as the Economist article notes, class) issues without increased violence or repression? An obvious starting point would be greater political openness. After all, one of the great benefits of electoral politics is its ability to channel discontent. But this would, of course, threaten the powers of the monarchy and Sunni elites as much as than sporadic violence. Nobody expects the monarch’s imminent abdication, but even granting parliament somewhat increased powers could help. Nonetheless, the country will need to adopt a more strategic manner of dealing with these issues if it hopes to maintain stability and keep up with its prosperous Gulf neighbors.

Bahrain protest photo by Flickr user Chan'ad