Freedom at Issue

Clinton embraces the freedom agenda

by Charles Dunne
Director for Middle East and North Africa Programs

 
Eight years and a day after President George W. Bush laid out a broad agenda in support of freedom and representative government in the Middle East at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stood before the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on November 7 to essay a detailed overview of the Obama administration’s response to the Arab Spring. The secretary’s remarks did much to advance and clarify the administration’s policy. But their historical continuity with the Bush policy was equally striking. Call it the Bush Freedom Agenda 2.0.

South Africa’s press freedom tug-of-war

by Karin Deutsch Karlekar
Project Director, Freedom of the Press

Threats to media freedom in South Africa—which has had one of the most open press environments on the continent since the end of apartheid more than 15 years ago—have increased in recent years, raising fears of backsliding in a country seen as a model in the region. These threats have occurred in the context of multiple challenges to democratic consolidation, including recent encroachments on judicial independence and other institutions that provide checks and balances on executive power. In addition, an upsurge of inflammatory rhetoric directed at the white minority, particularly by the faction headed by Julius Malema, president of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) Youth League, has led to the overt injection of race into various debates on political and socioeconomic issues and resulted in increased self-censorship by non-blacks on a range of issues.

Will winds of change sweep Cuba?

by Daniel Calingaert
Vice President for Policy and External Relations

President Raúl Castro introduced market reforms in Cuba earlier this year to preserve, not dismantle, the communist system. He retains a tight grip on power and seems intent on pursuing a Chinese model of market economics combined with political repression. The reforms have, however, brought about a significant change in attitudes in Cuba, according to a recent Freedom House survey. Optimism is growing, expectations are rising, and Cubans want more freedom. Will the Chinese model work in Cuba?

The government shows no intention of opening up the political system.  At the Communist Party congress in April, when Castro welcomed a “new generation” of leaders, they were led by revolution-era geriatrics like himself.  Political repression meanwhile remains intense. The heavy-handed response last week to a gathering of the dissident Ladies in White was typical. Twenty members of the group, which advocates on behalf of political prisoners, were detained on their way to a meeting to discuss the organization’s future following the death of its leader, Laura Pollán.

China’s growing army of paid internet commentators

by Sarah Cook
Senior Research Analyst, Freedom on the Net
*With research assistance provided by Maggie Shum

Since 2005, observers of the Chinese blogosphere have noted the presence of users who are paid to support the authorities in online discussions, often referred to as the “50 Cent Party” for the alleged fee they collect for each posted comment. Several incidents in recent weeks have once again drawn domestic and international attention to this effort by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to manipulate public debate. Last month, the Propaganda Department in a small county in Hubei Province accidentally posted online a video showing local officials training progovernment internet commentators. The media quickly took interest in the revelation, which stipulated commentators’ duty to guide public opinion in a “constructive” way and engage the internet as “an important battlefield of ideology.” Meanwhile, at a seminar in Beijing at the end of September, the vice minister of public security said that the police should use microblogs as a communication platform to “release correct information and dispel misunderstandings.”

Chinese Cyberdisappearance in Action

As governance in China has slid backwards in recent years, restrictions on the media and internet spheres have been a key feature of this dynamic, as evident from the findings of Freedom House’s 2011 Freedom on the Net report. Since early 2011, dozens of prominent activists and lawyers have been abducted by Chinese security forces. As this crackdown was taking place, the editors of the Freedom House’s weekly China Media Bulletin noted corresponding censorship directives and other restrictions that effectively reduced the detained individuals’ presence on the Chinese internet, a practice that might be termed “cyberdisappearance.”

To investigate this phenomenon in greater detail, the editors selected a sample of eight prominent activists, lawyers, and journalists, many of whom have used the internet as part of their activism. Freedom House staff then conducted searches for their names on Google.hk (a Hong Kong–based site that is largely free of Chinese Communist Party censorship) and compared the results to those produced by Baidu.com, the dominant Chinese search engine; Yahoo.cn, the China-based version of the U.S. internet portal; and the search function of China’s popular Sina Weibo microblogging service—all three of which are subject to Communist Party restrictions. Although Yahoo.cn represents less than 1 percent of China’s search-engine market, it was included because its performance demonstrates the censorship requirements imposed on foreign internet companies seeking to operate in China.

The aim of the test was to simulate the experience of an average Chinese user who has heard the activists’ names and wants to learn more about them. While both the censorship apparatus and netizens are often sophisticated enough to identify terms that refer to activists indirectly, without using their actual names, China Media Bulletin editors felt that a name-based test nevertheless provides some sense of the user experience.

The findings reveal not just clear evidence of significant restrictions, but also the nuance with which the Chinese censorship apparatus imposes those restrictions. Ultimately, they provide a window into the distorted version of reality available to most Chinese internet users, as well as the Communist Party’s extensive efforts to isolate activists who cross an ever-shifting red line and limit their access to large audiences.

At this link are brief profiles of the selected activists, followed by a chart summarizing the results of the search-engine tests. In addition to the results related to each individual, several broad trends emerged from the testing:

• Heavy restrictions on Sina Weibo. For seven of the eight names tested, Sina Weibo provided no search results on the activists in question. By way of explanation, users are presented with the following message: “According to related laws and policy, some of the results are not shown here.”
• Yahoo.cn matches or exceeds the restrictions on Baidu. Despite being part of a U.S.-based company, Yahoo.cn produces search results that are as heavily restricted and dominated by Chinese government links as those of Baidu, which holds over 80 percent of the domestic search market. In some cases, Yahoo.cn appears to be even more restrictive than Baidu. 
• A nuanced spectrum of restrictions, corresponding to perceived political sensitivity. For those who have fallen seriously out of favor with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—like Gao Zhisheng, Ai Weiwei, and Liu Xiaobo— search results are heavily censored, and there is almost no access to their writings. For others who have run into official repression but are not yet considered “enemies”—like Teng Biao, Jiang Tianyong, and Chang Ping—censorship is more nuanced. Chinese users may still have access to many of their writings, but the available material may be limited to topics deemed acceptable by the CCP. For example, their advocacy for Tibetans or Falun Gong practitioners would be proscribed, but their work on death penalty or corruption cases would remain online. Even for the activists considered to be more politically sensitive—such as Gao Zhisheng, Ai Weiwei, and Chen Guangcheng—information about their careers before they ran afoul of the authorities may still be available.
• The number of search results on Google.hk or Yahoo.hk is far greater than on Baidu.com or Yahoo.cn. In some instances, millions or hundreds of thousands of results appear on the outside search engines, while only a few dozen or hundred appear on the mainland Chinese sites. Whether the difference is due to the companies’ respective algorithms or deliberate censorship, the effect is that Chinese people using local search engines have a much more limited range of information at their disposal, not only in terms of quality, but also of quantity. 

Beyond the freedom of expression dimension, these findings and such extensive censorship targeting leading reformers also have implications for governance in China more generally. Indeed, in some respects, they are a reflection of some of the key governance challenges facing China today.

• First, the opacity and arbitrariness with which censorship decisions are made reflect the lack of transparency emblematic of CCP rule. The above-mentioned activists have no avenue for appealing the censorship of their writings or their names, nor did they receive any official notice explaining when or how they came to be included on such a blacklist.
• Second, censorship targeting the names of key democracy activists is only one of numerous methods used by the CCP to squash dissent and limit the possibility of an organized political opposition emerging in China, including via the use of social media tools.
• Third, the targeting of lawyers and other legal activists working to expose and seek justice for a range of human rights violations—from corruption to repression of minorities to torture—has far-reaching implications for the development of the rule of law. In many respects, these individuals are a microcosm of bigger problems in China. Suppressing information about them also translates into the cover-up of the severe violations suffered by their clients and a reinforcement of the cycle of impunity for the perpetrators of such abuses.
• Fourth, the collaboration of private companies in Chinese censorship—be they domestic firms like Baidu or Sina or international corporations like Yahoo—reflects how the CCP uses bureaucratic and economic carrots and sticks to coerce non-governmental entities to do its bidding, a governance strategy of the party that extends beyond the realm of the internet.

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Press Freedom under Continued Threat in Emerging Democracies

 

Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press survey was released this week in honor of World Press Freedom Day on May 3. The results reveal a continued and troubling decline in freedom of expression across the world. While inspiring in many ways, the events of the so-called “Arab Spring” have demonstrated both longstanding and emerging threats to freedom of expression and access to information in emerging democracies—the unprecedented and complete closure of the internet in Egypt, crackdowns on social media across the Arab world, and bizarre state media responses to popular protests. As a global survey, Freedom of the Press 2011: A Global Survey of Media Independence offers a broad look at the wide range of threats to freedom of expression across the world. As the summer release of Countries at the Crossroads 2011 grows nearer, Freedom of the Press findings illustrate some troubling trends in the countries featured in the 2011 publication. While Countries at the Crossroads 2011 will cover wide range of democratic governance issues in a set of countries that ranges in governance quality from Greece to Libya, the press results highlighted in Freedom of the Press are telling. Unfortunately, a regional overview shows striking uniformity in the direction of press freedom across the globe.

Given the benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising that freedom of expression came under fire in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010. With the extent of popular discontent becoming obvious, it is clear that governments sought to suppress dissent in all forms, in part by constricting the space within which media outlets could operate. Libya and Syria, both of which have a long history of media repression, experienced score declines, in part because of crackdowns on independent media and arrests of bloggers.  Egypt’s now-vanished Mubarak regime, however, was the source of the most dramatic regional change. Mubarak and the National Democratic Party’s decisive crackdown on virtually all forms of media prior to the November 2010 parliamentary elections resulted in a downgrade of the country’s status from Partly Free to Not Free. As explored in this blog post, and elsewhere, the Mubarak regime shut down talk shows and newspaper columns, physically and legally harassed journalists and bloggers, and even suspended live television broadcasts prior to the elections to try to ensure that the widespread fraud and other violations that took place during the electoral season were not discussed publically. Of course, as subsequent events demonstrated, such increased pressure served only to tighten the lid on a pressure cooker that was primed to explode.

Freedom of the press was similarly restricted in Asia. Thailand’s government used the 2007 Computer Crimes Act to discourage critical discussion online, for example by demanding the removal of comments critical of the government, and continued to use its lèse-majesté laws to silence opposition voices by declaring any criticism an insult to the king. This resulted in a downgrade of the country’s press freedom status from Partly Free to Not Free. China, in addition to its regular practice of limiting coverage of a wide range of issues of public interest, clamped down yet further on its media after imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Both countries, along with a set of states such as Pakistan and the Philippines, where tension exists between a vibrant press and a sometimes lawless environment, will be featured in the upcoming edition of Crossroads.

The only region with modest improvements was Sub-Saharan Africa, where at least three Countries at the Crossroads countries improved their scores over the course of the year. Senegal’s score improved after a decrease in advertising boycotts designed to silence opposition sources, and Mauritania’s score got better following a law enabling private investment in broadcasting. These gains, however, are marred by deteriorating press freedoms elsewhere in the region.  Madagascar’s ongoing political instability provided an environment for the government to constrict independent media by harassing and expelling journalists and pursuing spurious criminal defamation charges. Eritrea, a perennial opponent of freedom of expression continued to jail independent journalists imprisoned without reason after the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.

The Latin American countries that experienced the most dramatic changes in press freedom – particularly Mexico and Honduras, which moved from Partly Free to Not Free – were featured in Countries at the Crossroads 2010. Of the countries in the upcoming edition, Bolivia and Ecuador continued a trend of decline in recent years. In Ecuador in particular, President Rafael Correa’s acute sensitivity and eagerness to vilify the press exacerbated an already polarized environment. On the other hand, Colombia and Peru, each of which had declined in 2009, managed to halt their slide (Peru) or experience a mild increase (Colombia). Venezuela, which will complete the set of Andean countries included in the 2011 edition of Crossroads, remained, after Cuba, the most restrictive country in the hemisphere with respect to press freedom.

This view of the state of freedom of expression in a set of countries that will be explored in greater breadth in Countries at the Crossroads 2011 suggests that press freedom continues to be under threat in emerging and consolidating democracies. Press freedom has occasionally been dubbed the “canary in the coal mine” as it relates to the democracy’s trajectory. Nonetheless, the broader context of threats against the media is critical, and it is precisely this context that will be explored in Countries at the Crossroads 2011. For example, the limitations in the rule of law and judicial systems that allow such attacks on journalists to go unanswered, as well as the political pathologies – personalized rule, corruption, etc – that create incentives to silence the press will be assessed. Conversely, for countries undergoing where the governance evolution has been positive, it will also demonstrate the centrality of a vibrant press to the democratic process. But as the results of Freedom of the Press 2011 make clear, far too many states remain subject to the unfortunate irony that those countries most unable or unwilling to ensure an open media environment are often the ones that most desperately need vibrant and diverse media coverage.

Egypt's democratic facade continues to crumble

Photo credit: Flickr user Sarah Carr

Egypt’s November parliamentary elections saw, as expected, a sweeping victory for the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), though that triumph occurred amid allegations of the worst fraud, electoral rigging, and political repression that Egypt has ever seen.  Much has been said in recent weeks about the deeply flawed campaign period and elections but, as protests continue, it is clear that the uproar is about more than electoral politics. The issue, it seems, is not that Egypt’s ailing electoral system will contaminate other facets of the governing structure, but that the electoral problems are just one symptom of the Mubarak regime’s more systemic governance failures. A quick overview of problems over the course of the year reveals the extent to which unaccountable institutions and repressive actions permeate the Egyptian system. These maladies raise serious doubts about the government’s interest in altering the basic rules of the game in a way that will increase confidence in the system as the 2011 presidential election approaches. 

Perhaps most notable about 2010 was the steep increase in police brutality and torture.  In June, police publically beat to death Khaled Said, a 28-year old Alexandrian, after he posted incriminating videos of local police officers.  Protests in Alexandria and across the world apparently did not spur reform by November, when Ahmed Shabaan was found dead in a gutter after having been arbitrarily arrested by police in the same precinct. Most recently, Alexandrian police allegedly beat to death Mustafa Attia, and appear to be withholding information to prevent the outcry that the other two cases have engendered. These deaths are in addition to the everyday accounts of torture and harassment that repeatedly surface about Egypt’s security services.  The level of criminality in the security sector and the fact that police can apparently act with nearly complete impunity sends the message that the government either views such behavior as a low priority or, worse, prefers the current set of institutional incentives.

Freedom of expression has also taken a serious hit. Though the state has always had a dominant role in Egyptian media, 2010 has been an especially tough year for Egyptian journalists and bloggers.  Ibrahim Eissa, a prominent government critic, was fired as editor of the independent newspaper al-Dustour after publishing an opinion piece critical of the military, and also abruptly left his position as host of a political talk show in the middle of the season.  His producers denied that his exit from the show was politically motivated, but Eissa himself refused to comment on the situation, fueling rumors that he was dismissed because of political pressure.  In addition, several political talk shows and opinion columns were cancelled following disputes with government agencies. The popular show “Al Qahira Al Youm” was cancelled after a government-owned studio accused the show’s producers of failing to pay its rental fees; however, as was the case with most media closures, people close to the show argued that the cancellation was simply a government attempt to control content in a tense political period. 

Sectarian clashes between the Muslim and the Coptic Christian communities are common in Egypt and 2010 has been no exception.  Riots spread throughout the country in January, after six Coptic Christians were killed in a drive-by shooting following a Coptic mass, an apparent act of retaliation for the alleged rape of a Muslim girl by a Coptic man.  In July, conflicting stories about the missing wife of a Coptic priest, rumored in some accounts to have been forcibly prevented from converting to Islam and in others to have been kidnapped by Islamists, incited violent protests in Muslim and Christian communities alike.  Government mismanagement of both episodes enabled what could have been isolated unrest to spread throughout the country.  The government has in the past used the threat of sectarian violence as an excuse to implement politically repressive measures, but it has been continually unable or unwilling to quell interreligious tensions before they reach the point of violence. 

Nor does it seem that the judiciary can play a mediating role in any of these problems. The police who killed Khaled Said were eventually arrested, but were charged with mistreatment rather than Said’s death.  Further, it was only a few months ago that the death penalty ordered for a billionaire businessman found guilty of soliciting the murder of his actress girlfriend was summarily overturned and replaced with a 15-year jail sentence before his retrial was even complete. Years after the judiciary was excised from electoral oversight, it is unclear if its attempts to assert independence, most notably in a group of unrelated court cases advancing public freedoms (for example, by expelling police from university campuses, and ruling against the government’s position on SMS regulations can create any real democratic advances.

It is widely thought that the November elections were a trial run for the 2011 presidential elections and that increased repression is a nervous attempt to maintain stability leading up to what will almost certainly be a tumultuous year.  Actors within Egypt and abroad have issued post-election calls for sweeping electoral reform that implore the Egyptian government to dissolve the fraudulently-elected parliament and establish a fair and effective framework in time for the 2011 election.   Judging by the government’s performance in a range of other areas, however, the state’s attitude toward better governance appears to be “maybe later,” and there is little reason to expect that the elections will be any different.

ANC Proposals Threaten Press Freedom

Photo credit: Flickr user kool_skatkat

As noted in a recent Freedom House press release and in increasing coverage in South Africa and abroad, South Africa’s parliament, dominated by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, is under fire for two contentious proposals to regulate the media. The Protection of Information Bill currently before parliament dramatically decreases the threshold for the classification of information and establishes heavy penalties, including jail, for the leak or publication of official or classified material. The bill, an earlier draft of which was rejected because of concerns that it would create excessive official secrecy, also establishes broad barriers to accessing classified information. Among these barriers is the stipulation that appeals of the classification process must be directed to the very bodies that originally classified the information in question. Up for party review in September is a second measure that would create a Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT), a statutory body accountable to the parliament that would adjudicate complaints against media outlets, including the application of punitive powers. The ANC has defended the measures as necessary steps to encourage media responsibility, but critics in South Africa and the international community have denounced the proposals as fundamental threats to press freedom and have questioned their constitutionality.

As Freedom House’s press release states, South Africa moved from Free to Partly Free in the Freedom of the Press 2010 survey. This decline was due to an increase in hostile rhetoric toward the media on the part of government officials and government encroachment on the independence of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The 2010 Countries at the Crossroads South Africa report further documents the ANC’s increasing sensitivity to media criticism, including a 2008 defamation lawsuit launched by ANC president Jacob Zuma over a political cartoon that depicted Zuma unbuckling his belt in front of a woman who is being constrained by ANC colleagues. A banner across the woman’s body suggests she is a symbol of the judicial system, the implication being that Zuma and other ANC leaders were “raping” that system. Zuma, now president of South Africa, charged not only the cartoonist, but also the paper that printed the piece and the paper’s holding company, in the US$700,000 lawsuit. More recently, journalist Mzilikazi wa Afrika was arrested without a warrant shortly after he coauthored an article on an illegal lease agreement in which the police national commissioner was involved.

The proposed measures raise a number of problems. Primarily, they represent a serious threat to the media’s traditional role as a watchdog of government and business. The provisions of the information bill and the MAT would prevent journalists from freely reporting on allegations of parliamentary corruption or exposing government incompetence. Predicting that the proposals will create a “society of secrets,” the African Democracy Institute argued that the threat of prosecution would encourage regular citizens to engage in self-censorship to avoid prosecution, an effect that would dramatically threaten freedom of speech. Apartheid-era laws and the 2009 Film and Publications act already discourage critical coverage of the government; the recent proposals might very well banish it.

The proposals also constrict access to commercial information.  Speaking in favor of economic freedom, Business Leadership South Africa chairman Bobby Godsell declared that “the economic freedom on which business depends flourishes best when citizens are able to rely on an unfettered flow of information that is free from excessive government control and regulation.” He also expressed concern that growing international concern over the matter tarnished South Africa’s image in important international markets. The fact that the organization, which represents companies that pay 80 percent of corporate taxes in South Africa, has expressed concern that the ANC’s proposals raise “the prospect of a media answerable to political bosses” suggests that the ANC will face entrenched opposition beyond its traditional adversaries in the media if it continues to pursue these measures.

The outcry against the proposals has come from both foreign and domestic sources. South African journalists have come out strongly against the proposals. In an August 8 declaration, 36 print editors expressed deep concern over the proposed legislation and tribunal and appealed to the ANC to “abide by the founding principles of our democracy” by abandoning the proposals. The Federation of African Journalists, the African Regional Organization of the International Federation of Journalists, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and the International Press Institute have all condemned the proposals. Most recently, a group of South African writers, many of whom were silenced by apartheid censorship, declared publicly that the proposals threatened a return to the strict media controls of that era.

The ANC has launched a vehement defense of the proposals, claiming that they are necessary steps to increase accountability in the media. Under the current regulatory system, a press ombudsman fields media-related disputes. The ANC argues that this system is biased toward journalists, given that the current ombudsman is himself a former journalist, and that its lack of punitive powers renders its rulings inconsequential. The ombudsman has in fact issued strong rulings against the media, including ordering the publication of several prominent apologies, but the highly controversial ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema says that this is not enough. Claiming that the current system allows journalists to act as if they are above the law, he declared, “These people are dangerous. They write gossip and present it as facts.” 

Zuma himself defended the proposals on the party’s website, where he characterized the media as inadequately reflective of the South African population, particularly its poor communities, and argued that it is dominated by biased commercial interests that incentivize salacious reporting. It is unclear, however, how the tribunal or the information bill would rectify any of the shortcomings he outlines. Critics have called on the ANC to prove that parliamentary appointments to the tribunal would be fair, to demonstrate that the current system is failing, and to provide statistics on the number of citizen complaints about the current media appeals system. Zuma’s case fails to answer any of these questions.

The question of monopolistic media ownership and its effect on representative media in fact figures prominently in media battles everywhere. A parallel to South Africa’s current debate can be found in a recent entry on Latin America that documents ways in which media wars can reflect political power struggles and the long-term challenges of updating legal frameworks for media in post-authoritarian countries.  Cases in both Ecuador and Argentina show how ruling parties can use valid critiques of media ownership and bias to advance policies that considerably expand government control over the media. If the sizeable backlash against such policies in those cases is any guide, the ANC is likely to find its proposals mired in controversy for quite some time. If the ANC wishes to avoid the pitfalls that these and other regimes have suffered, it should identify ways to encourage media responsibility that do not involve extensive government (and party) control. A responsible and vibrant press is vital to democratic development. Occasionally offending the delicate sensibilities of politicians is a feature, not a bug.

The Battle Rages on: Media Wars (and their Soldiers) in Ecuador and Argentina

Photo Credit: Flickr user Presidencia de la República del Ecuador

By: Natalie J. Kitroeff

In the aftermath of years of economic and political turmoil, some Latin American states find themselves entrenched in a new kind of battle: a no holds-barred media war. The recent surge in the number of left-populist governments in power in the region has deepened polarization, with economic elites strongly opposing the new leaders’ political and economic platforms. In some cases, the media has been the primary battleground on which these broader political disputes are fought. Ecuador and Argentina are two such countries; in each, the context of the rancorous press wars merits examination, including historical causes, the implications of increasing state influence in the media, and the fierce backlash that government action has engendered.

The circumstances surrounding the media in Ecuador and Argentina are microcosms of the power struggles that define their respective political realities. In Ecuador currently, and in Argentina before the passage of the 2009 Audiovisual Service Communication Law (SCA), antiquated laws established during periods of dictatorship governed the media landscape. In both countries, the dictatorship–era laws allowed for government censorship of the press, mandated broadcasts of official messages, and facilitated almost complete control over the media by a few economic elites. With the advent of democracy, enforcement of the laws became more lax, yet in each country the private media remains concentrated in the hands of a limited number of powerful companies.

Oligopolistic owners have generally been opposed to the leftist economic and social policies implemented by President Rafael Correa in Ecuador and the dual Argentine administrations of former president Nestor Kirchner and his wife, current president Cristina Fernandez. These policies, especially changes to the tax code and steps to expand the role of the state in the economy, tend to conflict with the business interests of the media conglomerates and their investors, which in part accounts for their harsh criticism of many government programs.

Like politicians everywhere, the Correa and Fernandez governments are acutely aware of the power of the media. Both governments are highly sensitive to criticism and disinclined to compromise with media outlets, who they view as the primary opposition force in political environments characterized by disorganized opposition parties. In response to the onslaught of criticism, particularly in the television and print sectors, Correa and the Kirchners have intervened in the media in distinct ways that international observers and human rights groups describe as occasionally repressive and in some cases undemocratic.

The most significant of the efforts to expand state influence in the press have been projects to enact new media laws. Both governments claim that the principal objective of their respective communications laws is to replace ineffective dictatorship–era legislation and break up monopolies held by media giants. While Ecuador’s proposed communications law approaches the issue by “explicitly prohibiting monopolies and oligopolies in media ownership,” Argentina’s SCA seeks to diversify ownership of the press through less direct means, mainly by reforming the process by which media licenses are distributed. In mandating more frequent renewal of licenses for all media outlets and allowing a broader range of groups access to such licenses, the law promises to democratize the highly concentrated private media. While many civil society actors consider these goals to be legitimate—even opposition groups recognize the importance of revising old media regulations—the legitimacy of various provisions in the laws are disputed. 

Of most concern in Argentina is the implementation of new licensing requirements established in the SCA. The opposition contends that tasking the distribution of licenses to a broadcast regulatory body whose members are appointed by a process that “ensure[s] ruling party control”, promises to tighten the government’s grip on the media and limit press freedom. Opposition to the Ecuadorian communications law has been serious enough to stall debate and a final reading in the National Assembly for months. Opposition forces and international human rights groups’ critique has centered around the vague wording of stipulations that critics say pave the way for the regulation of information disseminated by news outlets by a communications council that, like the SCA’s regulatory committee, will have close links to the incumbent government. Press freedom advocates also call for the revision of articles that require high educational qualifications in order to work in journalism.

Less concretely, criticism of both laws essentially amounts to a fear that their implementation could result in too much state control over the press. Given the constant attacks on the private media by both the Correa government and both Kirchner administrations, these suspicions are not entirely unfounded. Since 2008, both Kirchner and Fernandez have been engaged in what has become a vicious personal battle with the media conglomerate Grupo Clarin, which owns 73% of all broadcast licenses in Argentina as well as the nation’s most prominent newspaper. The government has subjected the company to an onslaught of tax audits, accused its owner of adopting babies stolen during the dictatorship, and attempted to limit the circulation of its newspapers by intervening in the directorate of Prensa Papel, the newsprint paper company of which Clarín is the largest shareholder. 

The Correa government’s response to critical coverage is similarly hostile, and arguably more aggressively interventionist. Since his election in 2006, Correa has brought under state ownership three national TV stations, two prominent newspapers, and one radio broadcaster. While the state-owned  outlets affirm their independence, recent firings and resignations over journalists’ disagreement with a government program in the state-run paper El Telegrafo casts some doubt on the impartiality of the media under government control. A ferocious ad campaign designed by the regime to discredit the private media that ran during the World Cup this July only exacerbated tensions between the government and the private press.

The raging media wars in Argentina and Ecuador should be understood, therefore, as products of both structural and politically contingent elements of democracy in these countries. Rather than merely the power grab the opposition portrays them as, the contests are manifestations of longstanding political clashes between left-populist governments and the traditional economic elite. However, as citizens of almost any Latin American country can testify, governments in the region tend to use power aggressively for political ends. The heightened sensitivity of both Correa and Fernandez toward critical media coverage compounds tensions between progressive populists and the ever-powerful, right-leaning elite deeply rooted in the countries’ political and economic pasts. With the media playing such an active political role in so many countries, this combustible mix is likely to plague political systems across Latin America for years to come.

Indonesian Sex Tape Scandal Reopens Debate on Free Speech

Photo Credit: Flickr user KamalSelle

On June 23, Indonesian pop star Nazril “Ariel” Ilham was arrested for his appearance in two sex tapes that since early June have been distributed rapidly throughout the country via social networking sites and cell phones. He was charged under both the 2008 Anti-Pornography law and the Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which provides for sanctions of up to six years imprisonment for the electronic dissemination of insulting information. In response to the scandal, government officials have expressed their desire to revisit the issue of internet controls. In February of this year, a bill imposing stricter regulations on the internet was introduced, but it was ultimately shelved due to substantial civil society opposition. When commenting on the scandal, Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring of the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party spoke of plans to introduce a filter to block internet users from accessing sites featuring pornography, blasphemy, gambling, and violence. Furthermore, President Susilo Yudhoyono stated, “We have increasingly realized that our nation should not stay naked and be crushed by the information technology frenzy, because there will be many victims.” The House commission in charge of information and defense then ordered the Ministry of Information to resume work on a draft internet content regulation measure. In addition, the government also responded to the incident by sending out teams to set up firewalls in over 2,000 internet cafes, authorizing school officials to search students’ cell phones for the tapes, and beginning to remove online links to the videos. While some Indonesians supported the government’s efforts to protect the morality of the country’s internet users, others expressed fears that freedoms of speech and information were being violated. Meanwhile, Ariel and his girlfriend claim to be the victims of defamation, stating that the tapes were fabricated as a form of character assassination.

The response to the sex tape scandal highlights the presence of strong crosscurrents in Indonesian society and politics when it comes to issues related to freedoms of the press and expression. When social issues are at play, the sparring often pits those who promote the adoption of Sharia law-inspired norms in the country, which is 85 percent Muslim, against those who promote secularism. This tension is playing a part in the current scandal, and Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party have been at the forefront of the calls to impose new censorship regulations in order to protect societal morality. The scandal also sparked nationwide protests by conservative Islamic groups condemning the celebrities’ behavior. The still-lingering legacies of the Suharto dictatorship, which came to an end in 1998, also fuel these tensions and complicate democratic progress, as longstanding law and  undemocratic practices, which often serve the interests of the same political elite that have dominated Indonesian politics for decades, face resistance from reformers and a burgeoning civil society.

The tensions regarding internet freedom are illustrative of similar complications regarding Indonesia’s progress on media freedom in general. It is important to note that Indonesia’s media environment is generally free. Since the end of the dictatorship, the country’s media landscape has become increasingly vibrant. Independent media outlets have grown from 300 to 800 since 1998, and the government has recently passed laws to better protect media freedom, one of which notably removed a provision allowing for punishment for slander against the government. Nevertheless, restrictions remain, especially within the legal environment, which is still marred by frequently employed criminal defamation laws. The government has even expanded the penalties for criminal defamation in recent years, most notably through the 2008 Electronic Information and Transaction Law, which increased prison terms and fines for those who commit defamation online. In addition, the antipornography law provides for journalists, along with ordinary citizens, to be jailed for disseminating pornography, which is vaguely defined as “any means of public communication or demonstration which stimulates sexual arousal and/or infringe public moral.” And although the 2008 Freedom to Access Public Information Law marked an important advance, it sets out a one-year jail term for those who “misuse” information. This legal environment has resulted in infringements on the rights of journalists and ordinary citizens alike. In one extreme case in February, 18-year-old Farah Nur Arafah was convicted of defamation and received a suspended jail sentence for calling a friend a “pig” and a “dog” on Facebook. This follows the 2009 case of Prita Mulyasari, who was jailed after an email message in which she claimed that a hospital had misdiagnosed her mumps was made public, prompting the hospital to sue.

In addition to regulating general media content, the government has acted to restrict reporting on certain contentious issues, most notably the separatist movements in Papua and the southern Molucca islands. For example, a French journalist who was filming a peaceful student protest in Papua was arrested earlier this month for allegedly attempting to portray Indonesia in a negative light by filming an illegal protest. A similar case occurred in 2009, when four Dutch journalists were detained for covering a demonstration held without a permit. Unsurprisingly, domestic residents who voice separatist sentiments face even harsher limits on freedom of expression. A recent Human Rights Watch report on political prisoners in Papua and the Moluccas revealed that over 100 activists are currently imprisoned for peacefully expressing their pro-independence views.

While Indonesia has made great strides towards consolidating democratic practices in the short period of time that has passed since the end of the dictatorship, Indonesia’s leaders must ensure that further improvement on key governance issues does not become a casualty of the political tensions explored above. In addition to the battles over freedom of speech, Indonesia has yet to adequately address such daunting challenges as rampant corruption and weak rule of law, all of which will require enormous time, effort, resources and political will. Democratic transitions always bring a wide array of political issues, some of which inevitably lend themselves to deep culture clashes or even demagoguery. Finding ways to address these political tensions while maintaining pluralism and protecting basic principles will be a long-term project.

The Ever Increasing Expansion of China's Internet Controls

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While Google’s departure from China generated the headlines and international attention, recent months have also witnessed other important developments related to the expansion and institutionalization of internet controls in China. The People’s Republic already has the most sophisticated, multilayered internet control apparatus in the world. In April 2009 Freedom House published a pilot study of digital media freedom in 15 countries. The findings on  China highlighted the fact that not only is there pervasive filtering of political and religious content, but also extensive “outsourcing” of censorship to private companies and proactive “guidance” of online discussion by government-paid agents.

Control is not absolute: in particular, one aspect of the internet landscape that contributes positively to free expression is users’ ability to anonymously post comments online. Despite the party-state’s sophisticated content controls, the sheer volume of internet traffic and the speed with which information can spread has created some space for exposés of local government malfeasance and open political discussion. In one case in August 2009, a local newspaper in Shaanxi published a short article about lead poisoning among children caused by pollution from a nearby smelting plant. The popular web portal Netease quickly reposted the story (portals are barred from producing their own content), drawing national attention to the incident. However, in response to this and other incidents where news reflecting poorly on government oversight spread quickly, both central and local authorities have taken steps to boost the effectiveness of internet controls.

Looking at developments in recent months, there have been several notable trends regarding the new media environment and regulatory framework:

•    Institutionalizing “outsourcing”: In practice, most internet service and mobile phone providers cooperate closely with the authorities to monitor users, censor content, and transmit private communications to security forces upon request. This is either because the providers are state-controlled or because they face license revocation if they do not comply. Nonetheless, as the system is not foolproof (in some cases, due to intentional “negligence” on the part of moderators), the government has taken measures to strengthen provider liability with the force of law. On April 29, the National People’s Congress passed an amendment to the state secrets law requiring internet service providers and operators to work closely with security officials on investigating leaks of “state secrets.” The new amendment states that internet companies must immediately block any leak they encounter and report the violation to state authorities or else face punishment. The amendments did little to clarify the vague and arbitrary process for defining “state secrets,” a term that has been applied to a wide range of content and used to sentence activists to long prison terms without due process.

•    Increased restrictions on anonymity: For months, information has been circulating that news websites had begun requiring real name registration for users wishing to post comments on articles. On April 30, Wang Chen, head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO, one of the primary bodies overseeing internet controls), verified for the first time that major news and business portals had indeed implemented a new no-anonymous comment rule. He also announced that the authorities intend to extend the practice to other sites including online forums and chat rooms and are currently “exploring an identity authentication system” for such websites. In a similar development, a March 19 article in the Chongqing Evening News reported that the local political-legal committee was preparing to implement a new program that would subject microblogs, cell phone text messages, and some forms of instant messaging to monitoring. The plan would also reportedly require real name registration by users logging into such services. Though the full details and timeline of the plan are not yet clear, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “this is the first time [real name registration] regulations are being applied to microblogs and QQ groups [a form of instant messaging], two of the most popular forms of online communication in China.”

•    Creation of another Internet control agency: In mid-April, the Chinese government confirmed that it had created two new entities under the SCIO: Bureau 8, which would regulate foreign news and information outlets doing business in China, and Bureau 9, a new Internet News Coordination Bureau. The latter joins Bureau 5, which until now was the SCIO’s only arm dealing solely with online content. According to the New York Times, the old bureau will continue its work pushing the party line on domestic websites, while the new one will likely devote its efforts to monitoring user-generated content, particularly social networking sites and online forums, which have been harder for the government to control than news sites. An official statement announcing the bureau’s creation described its responsibilities as “’guidance, coordination and other work related to the construction and management of Web culture.’”

•    Decentralization of online monitoring and manipulation: In addition to central agencies expanding their capacity to control online content, local governments—often seeking to limit exposure of official malfeasance—have been ramping up their own internet control apparatus. The above-mentioned monitoring plan in Chongqing is to be implemented by local police forces. Meanwhile, as officials realize that they cannot censor everything undesirable that appears on the web, a key element of their internet control strategy in recent years has been to proactively manipulate online discussions using government-paid commentators. These are often termed the “50 Cent Party,” a reference to the small payment received for each progovernment posting. According to David Bandurksi of the China Media Project: “Internet commentators…have now been trained up and used by all sorts of government units at all levels, and they are one of the most open dirty secrets of Internet control in China.” Bandurski goes on to describe how on May 18, several news outlets reported that Guangzhou’s corps of “city inspectors,” a security agency whose officers have been criticized for their sometimes brutal methods of enforcing order, would likely be receiving its own squad of internet commentators. The head of Guangzhou’s City Inspectors Committee, Li Yangui, was quoted as saying that the team’s goal would be to “track and analyze online public opinion, preventing the spread of undesirable information and thereby generating positive guidance of public opinion.”  In a similar vein, Lanzhou’s Western Business Post reported in January that the Gansu’s provincial authorities had decided to establish a squad of 650 online progovernment commentators.

These developments raise a number of questions related to governance – how much do these added resources cost? What public services might the funds otherwise be dedicated towards? How many users will be more likely to face retribution for their online writings given fewer possibilities for anonymity? How many items of public interest—from information about tainted food products to environmental disasters to the torture of petitioners or the harmlessness of Falun Gong practitioners—won’t be posted and circulated because potential authors fear repercussions if they must use their real names?

The answers to these questions are not easily found. But one governance-related point is certain – the authorities don’t necessarily want users to know about these new restrictions on privacy and free expression. Indeed, as an indication of the opacity surrounding censorship decisions in China, party and government bodies issued censorship directives to restrict comments and circulation of the very news items announcing the above developments.

 On April 28, the government reportedly banned the media from “hyping content” referencing the internet-related amendments to the state secrets law and ordered that all such discussions be deleted from forums and news comment spaces. In January, shortly after its publication, the above-mentioned news story from the Western Business Post was quickly “expunged from the Internet.” According to Jonathan Ansfield of the New York Times, the head of the new bureau under the SCIO had participated in meetings with foreign diplomats and Chinese officials for weeks, but public acknowledgment of the structural change came only in early April after the Times queried the government about the new agency.

The officials’ desire to restrict publicity of the expansion of internet controls is not surprising. Beyond the Communist Party’s general tendency towards secrecy, such wariness responds at least in part to past experiences, when notice of new restrictions prompted significant popular backlash and ultimately, forced retraction of controls. One of the most dramatic examples was the Green Dam fiasco last year. In May 2009, the government announced regulations that would require the installation of censorship and surveillance software called Green Dam Youth Escort on all computers sold in China. Activists, lawyers, and ordinary users mobilized quickly to protest the directive. With added pressure from the international business community and human rights groups, the authorities were forced to withdraw the orders in June, though installation reportedly continued in schools and internet cafés.

So what might the future hold? As Qian Gang of the China Media Project explains: “China’s Internet is a chaotic space. There are times when controls are more strict, and other times when controls momentarily relax. Some places in China are controlled more tightly by local party leaders, while others are more open.”

“The only true constant is the government’s determination to exercise control.”

Does Bahrain Corruption Case Signal Improved Trajectory?

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On March 22, King Hamad Bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain removed Minister of State Mansour Bin Rajab from his post. The dismissal was handed down four days after Minister Rajab had been arrested and interrogated by the Interior Ministry in connection with his alleged involvement in an international money laundering scheme uncovered by the Anti-Money Laundering Directorate, which has been investigating Rajab for the last year. The next day, Rajab was formally accused of laundering at least US$8 million, although reports indicate a possible total of up to US$31 million. The actions against Rajab are historically significant in terms of both Bahrain’s record of limited anticorruption efforts and the immunity that has traditionally been afforded senior government officials. Rajab became the first government minister to be criminally charged since Bahrain gained independence in 1971 and the highest Bahraini government official to ever be charged with corruption. As such, a first glance the Rajab case serves as a rare example of a concrete government attempt to quash high-level graft, and possibly as an indication of stronger government commitment to its campaign against official corruption. That said, the context of Bahrain’s recent governance trajectory means that any enthusiasm about the significance of a given case must be tempered.

As an important government official who previously served on the country’s Consultative Council (Majils al-Shura) and also as minister of municipalities and agriculture, Rajab’s fall should be viewed as a positive development insofar as past corruption cases have almost exclusively targeted low and mid-level officials. As the 2010 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, despite the fact that the government has in recent years ramped up its efforts to uproot graft within the lower-level bureaucracy, in addition to improving levels of government transparency, high-ranking government officials have continued to abuse their offices for private gain while enjoying de facto immunity. Although the government has pursued cases against the heads of state-owned enterprises, it has generally neglected to prosecute officials in the upper echelons of the administration, many of who either belong or retain close ties to the royal al-Khalifa family.

Nevertheless, the positive implications of the Rajab case may not be so cut and dry. Other senior officials, including members of the royal family who have historically been above the law, may have also been involved in the scheme. If this limits the scope of the case, the importance of Rajab’s removal will be viewed as a tentative, incremental step toward cleaner government rather than a serious blow against corruption. The announcement on March 25 of a ban on media reporting on the case is one warning sign. Unfortunately, Bahrain’s decision to muffle public discussion of the matter is perhaps a more accurate illustration of the country’s recent governance climate than the Rajab case. As the 2010 Crossroads report details, Bahrain has registered a downward trend on several governance issues after showing signs of improvement following the 2006 parliamentary elections. The significant deterioration on freedom of expression forms just one part of a general decline on Accountability and Public Voice issues. Most significantly, the number of cases brought against journalists who cover contentious issues such as corruption scandals and human rights abuses has been on the rise. Bahrain also slipped on civil liberties protections, as attacks against government-critical political activists and citizens increased, freedom of association was restricted, and freedom of religion declined as the tensions between the Sunni government and the Shiite majority heightened. Likewise, a downgrade in the Rule of Law section reflected weak judicial independence and capacity. All of these troubling elements point to the continued existence of a closed regime in which the royal family and other high-level officials concentrate power in their own hands while restricting political space for public commentary and criticism.

Bahrain has a chance to prove that its stated commitment to combating corruption and equality before the law is more than just rhetoric. As mentioned, Bahrain has already begun to address some aspects of its corruption problem, which enabled the country to receive an upgrade on its Anticorruption and Transparency record in this year’s survey. Nevertheless, the persistence of other unfavorable governance practices means that much more than one dismissal and arrest will be needed before any discussion can occur about a definitive trend toward improved democratic governance.

Evidence of Cambodian Governance Backsliding Accumulates

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In a recent Human Rights Watch press release on Cambodia, Brad Adams, the organization’s Asia Director, commented that “Hun Sen seems intent on reversing the political pluralism that has been created over the past two decades.” Adams’ statement was directly referring to the January 27 conviction of opposition leader Sam Rainsy on charges of fueling racial tensions and destroying demarcation posts on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Rainsy was tried in absentia and sentenced to two years in prison and a fine of 8 million riels (US$2,000). His case is representative of the situation currently faced by most government-critical activists and politicians in the country, as Prime Minister Hun Sen has increasingly clamped down on dissent and strengthened his hold over the country, plunging Cambodia into a governance downslide.

As Rainsy’s case highlights, the undermining of the rule of law in has become increasingly prevalent in Cambodia. Rainsy’s unfair trial exemplifies the political perversion of the Cambodian justice system, which continues to be manipulated by Cambodia’s high-level officials. Rainsy has been the frequent target of politically motivated charges since the 1990s, with government officials engaging in repeated attempts to jail the opposition leader. Unfortunately, he is not alone. As most judges and prosecutors are members of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, Hun Sen and other high-level government figures have been able to use the court system to target opposition leaders, activists, and journalists with defamation suits. The government’s use of the judiciary as a political tool has become even more flagrant of late, with at least ten government critics being sued for criminal defamation in 2009, including two additional opposition parliamentarians, a Sam Rainsy Party youth activist, and four journalists. In addition to lacking independence, the Cambodian judiciary is also plagued by corruption, an issue that gained international awareness when a kickback scheme was uncovered within the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal in 2007.

Another particularly troubling rule of law issue relates to property rights, specifically the escalating issue of forced evictions and land confiscations. According to Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia’s epic of forced evictions of the urban poor and confiscation of farmers’ land in the countryside reached crisis proportions in 2009.” Land grabs have become increasingly common in recent years, a practice that is made possible by a convoluted land-titling system that has favored the wealthy elites, leaving 80 percent of citizens in rural areas without title deeds. The weak legal regime, combined with the ability of powerful officials and businessmen to manipulate the system, has left ordinary Cambodians without an avenue to protect their rights or receive adequate compensation in cases of eviction. High real estate prices and new development projects in both rural and urban areas have been especially to blame for this problem in the past years.

Most alarmingly, the security forces charged with carrying out evictions frequently engage in excessive force against civilians, who are rarely informed of evictions in advance. For example, in January 2009, 250 police hired by the company 7NG, which claimed ownership of the land, evicted 152 families from the Dey Kraham community, using tear gas to disperse the crowd. Furthermore, villagers and activists who protest against the unjust confiscation of land are often arrested and even shot, as was the case with four Che Kreng villagers in one March 2009 clash with the police. More than 60 people are imprisoned or awaiting trial for charges related to land conflicts, an indication that ordinary citizens who rebel against the government’s policies have not escaped the crackdown experienced by the formal opposition. Activists working on human rights and land and trade union issues, along with opposition journalists, have been especially subject to harassment, attacks, and even killings, and crimes are often committed by the security forces. In 2008, the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association investigated the murders of 40 Cambodians, six of them political activists, by security force members. 

In yet another egregious example, a recent Human Rights Watch report chronicles the abuses endured by drug users who are sent to “rehabilitation centers.” According to the report, drug users detained in the center are beaten, raped, subjected to forced labor, and tortured rather than provided with effective treatment for their addictions. Many of the detainees end up in the center after being arbitrarily arrested in mass police round-ups of prostitutes, homeless people, the mentally-ill, and drug-users alike, and are often left in the dark as to the charges against them. In response to allegations regarding these abuses, the government has occasionally recognized these practices, although it normally justifies them as a necessary part of drug rehabilitation.

Cambodia’s governance backsliding is especially distressing due to the generous amount of funding the country receives from international donors. International assistance makes up over half of Cambodia’s annual budget. Most of Cambodia’s major development partners, which include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, the European Commission, and the United States, among others, have invested in a variety of projects geared towards advancing judicial reform, addressing past abuses (most notably through the UN-funded Khmer Rouge tribunal), instituting training programs on human rights issues, addressing health issues such as HIV/AIDS, and fostering economic development. However, these donors have had minimal success in ensuring that the government takes its international human rights commitments seriously. This is partly due to the fact that although investors will occasionally issue formal criticisms of the Cambodian government and urge reform, the aid keeps coming. Their limited achievements in this realm, and the recent backsliding on any progress made in the past, are also at least partly the result of China’s high levels of investment in the country, which has largely been funneled towards infrastructure development. As we discussed in a previous post, China’s assistance is not conditioned on the adoption of reforms, and thus increased Chinese assistance has afforded the Cambodian government a greater ability to turn its back on good governance efforts with lesser financial consequences, and to use China’s ever-mounting assistance as a bargaining chip when dealing with other donors.

Cultivation of Corruption Among South Africa's Elites

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Criminal proceeding against Jackie Selebi, the South African police commissioner, began in Johannesburg this month. Selebi, whose CV includes positions such as former ambassador to the United Nations and chief of the international crime group Interpol, is on trial for corruption and other serious crimes. In one of the more colorful moments of the trial thus far, Glenn Agliotti, one of the country’s more notorious drug smugglers, testified to picking up the tab for Selebi’s designer clothing. He also bought couture handbags for Mr. Selebi’s wife, and paid the commissioner about $135,000 in cash in exchange for sensitive information.

Agliotti, for his part, is accused of murdering a corrupt mining magnate in a separate trial, and made a deal with the state to testify in exchange for indemnity for his dealings with Selebi. 

South Africa is far from the most corrupt country in the world (it ranked 54th best out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index), yet neither is the anticorruption record of the country’s leaders impeccable. In 2004, Tony Yengeny, the anti-Apartheid activist and former African National Congress (ANC) speaker of parliament, was convicted for taking bribes from a weapons manufacturer. He served four months of a four-year prison sentence. And Jacob Zuma, the current president, was charged with corruption in 2005 and sacked from his position as deputy president, though after years of legal battles all charges were dropped in April 2009. The now-dormant charges against Zuma were related to a multi-billion dollar arms purchase in the 1990s an illustrative case as the awarding of government contracts has been an area of activity plagued by graft accusations.

The ANC’s overwhelming control of the executive and legislative branches lends itself to the cultivation of corruption, as accountability mechanisms are rendered ineffective. The Parliament has been criticized for failing to sufficiently investigate corruption scandals of members of the executive branch. In addition, political interference hampers the ability of the judiciary to fully combat corruption. The politicization of the judiciary was especially apparent in the corruption prosecution of Zuma and the suspension of Vusi Pikoli as National Director of Public Prosecutions by justice minister Brigitte Mabandla. In the latter case, it became apparent that the suspension was related at least partially to the fact that Pikoli approved an arrest warrant for Selebi.

South Africa’s constitution outlines three institutions meant to combat corruption, but for various reasons, none of them are fully effective. The Office of the Auditor General is responsible for reporting to the National Assembly on the finances of any agency that receives public funding, but suffers countless deficiencies such as a lack of resources and incomplete reporting by agencies. The Public Prosecutor investigates complaints on the part of the public against governmental officials, but its independence has been called into question, especially since the current PP, Leonard Mushwana, is a former ANC MP and has been accused of inhibiting investigations of senior ANC members and the party itself. Finally, while the Independent Electoral Commission regulates the public finances through the Represented Political Parties’ Fund, private contributions are totally unregulated, and parties do not have to reveal the size or sources of their donations. There are a handful of other, smaller agencies in the government that combat corruption, but all have similar limitations.

Furthermore, while South Africa has an independent media, government and especially ANC-affiliated officials have accused investigative journalists of treason or racism. A number of private newspapers and magazines—among them, the Mail & Guardian, the Cape Times, and the Sunday Times—express sharp criticism of the government, to which the ANC has been particularly sensitive. As a result, many private media outlets have been issued gag orders and lawsuits related to investigations into corruption, and the ANC has in some cases even threatened to withdraw advertising. 

As a result, about half of South Africa’s population believes corruption is widespread among government officials and civil servants. This perception is intensified by a heightened awareness of inequality between South Africa’s elites and the population as a whole. While much of South Africa’s society is poor and lacking running water, electricity, and toilets, members of the ruling class flaunt luxurious lifestyles. Haroon Bhroat, an economist at the University of Cape Town, reported that South Africa now harbors “the most unequal society in the world.” According to Bhroat’s calculations, South Africa’s Gini coefficient, which measures the level of income inequality in a given country, is at 0.679 (0 is completely equal, 1 is completely unequal). He warned that the situation could lead to social instability and, indeed, protests comprised of citizens from the lower rungs of society have recently broken out in Johannesburg.

President Zuma says he is committed to rooting out corruption, and in fact he has made some progress in certain fields. A “mood of intolerance” toward corruption is newly noticeable and criminal charges, rather than light wrist slaps, are becoming a more regular punishment for accused officials. He is also trying to make public finances more transparent and to create more barriers between companies that perform work for public bodies and public sector employees, forbidding the latter to seek employment with the former. How effective such measures will be has yet to be determined, and it’s perhaps a bit difficult to believe that Zuma--  whose involvement in one of South Africa’s most serious corruption scandals was thrown on out due to prosecutorial transgressions rather than a determination of innocence-- when he talks about rooting out graft. If the experience of other single party-dominant regimes is any guide, the overwhelming control of the ANC in South African politics, and the sense among aspiring officials that pleasing party elites is the key to professional advancement, will serve as a serious obstacle to effective and sustained reform.

Mexico's Media: Violence Not the Only Constraint

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On August 26, Pablo Pasillas Fong, an assistant to the lead federal investigator in the case of Mexican crime journalist Armando Rodriguez, who was murdered last November in Ciudad Juarez, was himself shot and killed. This occurred less than a month after the former lead investigator met the same fate. Mexico’s problems protecting reporters from the violence raging between organized criminal groups are increasingly well-known. Over the past few years violence against journalists has become rampant. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2008 Attacks on the Press report, at least 24 journalists have been killed since 2000. The country’s National Human Rights Commission puts the death toll even higher: 46 killings of journalists over the same period, with an additional 7 journalists disappeared in the country since 2005. As conflict has intensified, Mexican journalists who cover such polemical issues as organized crime, the drug trade, and police corruption have been targeted by both criminal organizations and law enforcement agencies, which has in turn fueled a growing trend of self-censorship. The legal system has failed the victims throughout, with very few of these crimes investigated and prosecuted. As Reporters without Borders has argued, this impunity has been fueled by the widespread corruption of public officials, who are sometimes either directly involved in organized crime and drug trafficking networks or are bribed to look the other way.

In addition to the threat of violence, journalists must also contend with other unfavorable aspects of the Mexican media environment. The legal sphere is one trouble zone. While Mexico has promoted several legal initiatives geared towards boosting press freedom in the past few years, most of these reforms have been marred by either inherent inadequacies or half-hearted implementation. For example, in 2007, President Felipe Calderon promulgated a law that decriminalized libel, defamation, and slander at the federal level, rendering it impossible for journalists to face prison sentences for such offenses. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Mexico’s legal system operates on separate federal and state levels, the law’s impact was significantly constrained due to the fact that states are not forced to comply. At the time, the World Press Freedom Committee has reported that several Mexican states “possess some of the most stringent and restrictive defamation laws in the entire region.” While state governments were required to decriminalize their own defamation laws, this has not come to pass in most cases. ARTICLE 19 recently reported that criminal defamation laws remain in place in 21 out of 32 states. 

An effort to pass a constitutional amendment that would grant federal authorities the power to prosecute crimes against freedom of expression is more promising, but has dragged on for several years and is also likely to prove insufficient. On March 18, Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies passed the amendment to Article 73 of the Constitution, which would incorporate crimes “committed against freedom of expression exercised through the practice of journalism” into the federal penal code and impose prison sentences of up to 5 years in prison for such crimes, independent of existing penalties. The reform measure is currently awaiting approval by the Senate, which will review the law when Congress meets again this month. President Calderon has personally pledged his commitment to the project. While this represents a positive step toward a more dedicated response to the rising violence, several press freedom organizations have argued that the initiative falls short in various regards. ARTICLE 19 has suggested that federal investigators’ hands will remain tied as, among other problems, the amendment fails to provide federal officials with the authority to investigate cases covered by local jurisdiction.

Finally, despite featuring what is in many ways a vibrant media sector, the country’s economic and political environment restricts freedom in a different, though equally significant, way. Specifically, freedom of expression is limited by the dominance of two media giants, Televisa and TV Azteca, in the country’s television sector. The power that this duopoly wields over the Mexican television market has rarely been challenged. The 2006 Radio and Television Law, more commonly known as “Ley Televisa,” which ostensibly sought to modernize the country’s broadcasting infrastructure, effectively consolidated the duopoly’s control over the airwaves. In a positive 2007 development, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that many of the law’s provisions violated the constitution along with the principles of “equity, competition, and democratization of the broadcasting spectrum” and subsequently threw those provisions out. However, the congress has failed to follow through with this judicial decision, and the Televisa/Azteca powerhouse continues to enjoy substantial political clout. Most recently, ties between Televisa and Enrique Pena Nieto, the PRI governor of the State of Mexico who most consider to be the frontrunner for the 2012 presidential elections, have come to light through journalist Jenaro Villamil’s book If I Were President: Pena Nieta’s Reality Show, which reveals that the image-conscious presidential hopeful used state funds to pay Televisa to expand his publicity and boost his popularity and image.

In some ways, the Mexican media is a microcosm other Mexican institutions, which are still experiencing growing pains subsequent to the country’s 2000 democratic transition. As with limitations to its democracy, Mexico is not a country where press constraints are obvious to the casual eye. Crime still gets reported (though without bylines for papers based in the conflict zones), diversity of opinion (especially in Mexico City newspapers) is strong, and the government does not actively censor. However, this freedom remains both thin and fragile. That the levels of violence have increased self-censorship is nearly indisputable. The weaknesses of the legal regime, both in terms of libel/defamation and the level of criminal impunity, means that freedom of expression still relies far too much on journalistic courage rather than affirmative protections. The power of dominant broadcasters like Televisa inhibits the growth of a competitive broadcast sector with the capacity to provide balanced, comprehensive monitoring and reporting. Reforming the state as a whole will inevitably be a long and difficult process. However, a dose of political will from the president and congressional leaders that translates to improved legal protections and economic dynamism could go a long way toward helping Mexico’s vulnerable press sector improve its capacity to play a positive role in the critical years ahead.

Updates Post: Jordan, Tunisia, Mauritania, Honduras, Venezuela

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On July 15, Jordan’s Upper House of Parliament passed several amendments to the controversial civil society law signed by King Abdullah II in December 2008. While civil society groups had hoped that Jordan would take advantage of this opportunity to address the widespread international and national criticism of the restrictive 2008 laws and adopt some of the revisions recommended by civil society groups, this did not come to pass. The approved amendments fail to revoke the 2008 law’s provisions that grant the executive branch extensive control over the registration and activities of the country’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  NGO registration will continue to depend on an opaque approval process rather than an administrative notification procedure. In addition, executive authorities will retain their ability to monitor NGO activities by directly appointing NGO delegates to General Assembly meetings, controlling some personnel appointments, and reviewing annual activity plans. Furthermore, the new version of the law strictly regulates financing by prohibiting NGOs from receiving foreign funds without approval by the Council of Ministers. Finally, as was the case in the 2008 law, NGOs will be prohibited from pursuing political objectives and carrying out activities that threaten social order.  In response to the House’s decision, civil society groups lamented Jordan’s failure to eliminate excessive government interference in the NGO sector, which is considered by some to be one of the country’s major obstacles to democratic reform. Last July, we blogged on freedom of association in Jordan following the initial introduction of the two draft NGO laws to the Jordanian parliament.  Both the passage of the law last year and the recent failure of the government to ease its clampdown on the sector are unfortunate, considering the country’s continued rhetorical commitment to deepening liberalization.

Tunisia has also witnessed discouraging recent developments. Specifically, the run-up to the October presidential and parliamentary elections has been fraught with violence. In the past few months, opposition members, journalists, and human rights defenders alike have been the victims of physical attacks. Criticism of the government of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who is seeking a fifth term in office, has been met with increased repression by state security officials. Furthermore, the campaign activities of the opposition have been severely restricted. Opposition papers including Al Mawkif, Mouatinoun, and Attarik El Jedid have been repeatedly harassed, which has caused their distribution to be disrupted. This aggressive assault against the opposition is being carried out despite the fact that President Ben Ali‘s victory in the election, along with the dominance of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (RCD) in the parliamentary elections, is basically predetermined. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report notes, there is no real opportunity for rotation of power in the country. This is largely the result of the country’s winner-take-all system, which provides the RCD with strong advantages given the country’s past experience of single-party rule. Last November, we blogged on Tunisia’s poor prospects for reform, especially in the realm of electoral politics, calling attention to the gap between the government’s rhetoric, which supports democracy and human rights, and the reality of Tunisia’s political and social situation, which is characterized by oppressive laws and practices that restrict free expression and generally thwart democratic advancement. Although Ben Ali has continued to employ democratic rhetoric by making promises that the run-up to the election will be open and competitive and followed his words with deeds by working with the National Observatory of Presidential and Legislative Elections to ensure that “neutrality, transparency, and independence” is observed, the credibility of the process remains tenuous at best when observed alongside its offensive against the opposition.

In the nearby nation of Mauritania, the latest developments are more complicated. On July 18, General Muhammad Ould Abdel Aziz, head of the junta that gained power in Mauritania following a military coup in August 2008, won the country’s presidential election. General Abdel Aziz defeated his main opponent, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the former speaker of the parliament who had vehemently opposed the coup, with 53% of the vote. While the holding of elections would normally be considered a positive development, especially in light of Mauritania’s recent history of military rule and political uncertainty, the circumstances surrounding these elections cast doubt upon the degree of democratic advancement they represent. The fact that General Abdel Aziz, who ousted the country’s first-ever democratically elected president from power last year after already being involved in two prior coups, included his name on the election ballot, raised eyebrows. In addition, several of Abdel Aziz’s opponents have called the election a charade. They have specifically claimed that there were too few observers, although international actors such as the African Union, along with several diplomats, have disagreed.  Following last year’s coup, we blogged on the country’s major democratic setback, along with its history of coups and excessive military involvement in the country’s political affairs. At that time, we noted that the Mauritanian military had yet again shown its unwillingness to relinquish its dominant role in the country’s politics, reflecting a longstanding tradition of weak civilian control over the military. General Abdel Aziz’s refusal to bar junta members from competing in the recent elections, and his successful attempt to fill the presidential shoes himself, are yet another example. Also troubling is Abdel Aziz’s governance record over the past year. As the 2009 Freedom in the World report on Mauritania notes, the Abdel Aziz-led junta imposed restrictions on press freedom along with other basic civil rights. Thus, if past record is a good indication of his future performance Mauritania’s prospects for democratic progress will remain questionable.

Finally, in several Latin American countries, press freedom has taken a major hit. The press environment in Honduras and Venezuela has become especially restrictive. In Honduras, television and radio stations were completely shut down immediately following the June 28 military coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya from the presidency. Since this time, a selective news blackout has been continuously imposed, with media regarded as critical of de-facto President Roberto Micheletti’s government being obstructed and censored. Reporters without Borders has reported that the broadcasts of eight radio and TV stations have been periodically interrupted during the past month, oftentimes following coverage of pro-Zelaya material. On the contrary, media outlets supportive of the de-facto government have escaped persecution. Furthermore, local broadcasting of international TV stations including Telesur and CNN has been stopped. In early April, we blogged on Honduran media freedom as part of a post on Central-American government-media relations. At the time, we noted that the Honduran media tended to be quite critical of President Zelaya, which was unusual considering the fact that the country’s political and media elite were historically one and the same. This reflected a more ominous situation than most observers realized at the time. The powerful anti-Zelaya media sector has undoubtedly facilitated the coup-leaders’ agenda, especially in the beginning, when several outlets immediately echoed their statements that a coup had not occurred. In the current political environment, these outlets have come to largely dominate the Honduran media landscape, while the few pro-Zelaya outlets have been forced into silence. This is yet another reason that the government installed by the coup, which has been widely denounced by international bodies including the UN and the OAS, deserves not a sliver of legitimacy when compared to the democratically elected Zelaya government.

In June, we blogged on President Hugo Chavez’s assault on the media, and especially his battle with the rabidly anti-government channel Globovision.  Throughout July, the Venezuelan government continued its campaign against opposition media by shutting down 34 radio stations due to alleged violations, while also opening an additional procedure against Globovision, this time for airing an advertising campaign that used the image of an unclothed, pregnant woman in the name of defending private property. In addition, on August 3, 30 pro-government militants reinforced the offensive against Globovision by storming the organization’s headquarters. This act was apparently a bridge too far: the leader of the militants, well-known activist Lina Ron, was arrested and charged with a number of crimes. However condemnable Ms. Ron’s acts, it bears noting that she has a good reason to feel cognitive dissonance: the fever pitch of anti-Globovision rhetoric expressed by President Chavez and his top allies undoubtedly encouraged supporters like herself, who consider themselves the vanguard of the Bolivarian movement, to carry out such actions. This all comes in the context of the ill-fated draft “media crimes bill” that would have imposed jail sentences for a variety of ambiguous “media offenses.” Much like 2008’s notorious intelligence bill, however, the swift and fierce international outcry by everyone from the UN press rapporteur to pro-Chavez websites caused legislators to bury the legislation. Nonetheless, relations between Chavez and against critical media show no signs of achieving equilibrium anytime soon, and many outlets continue to wait for the next step in what seems to be a permanent offensive. 

Shadows Over the Horn: Press Freedom in Eritrea

Eritrea remains the only country in Africa not to have a single private news agency.  In a surprisingly frank and lengthy recent interview with Sweden’s Tv4, Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afewerki, attacked independent journalists in his country “as funded by the CIA.”  President Afewerki brushed off questions about jailed journalist Dawit Isaak, an Eritrean with Swedish nationality, stating that Sweden has “no right” to raise the issue. The President said that Sweden’s demands for more accountability surrounding the case was “part of a larger campaign waged by the CIA against Eritrea.” Regarding the case of Isaak, President Afewerki, obviously annoyed by the interviewer’s insistence, said “I don’t even care, I don’t even know what he is doing. He did a big mistake and he is accountable for what he did and I don’t waste time knowing what he is doing.” As for a free and fair trial, Afewerki replied, “We will not release him nor take him to trial. We know how to deal with him and others like him.”

Indeed, Eritrea has dealt with journalists in some of the most harsh and brutal ways of any nation in recent years. Starting in 2001, all independent media was closed and journalists were targeted in a widespread campaign to suppress freedom of expression and, more particularly, criticism of the ruling party, which was deemed “harmful to national security.” Afewerki, a former guerilla commander who helped secure his country’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, has become Africa’s largest jailer of journalists and fourth largest worldwide after China, Cuba, and Burma. Though estimates are difficult given government secrecy and repression, Reporters without Borders has reported that there were at least 17 journalists imprisoned in Eritrea at the start of 2009. In addition, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, several journalists have died in custody since the 2001 crackdown. Moreover, countless others have fled the country into Sudan.

One of the latest journalists to be imprisoned is Daniel Kibrom, a journalist employed by Eritrea’s state-owned Eri TV. Kibrom has been held since October 2006 in a prison camp in the south of the country, where he is serving a sentence of five years of forced labor for trying to cross the border into Ethiopia, according to a report by Reporters Without Borders. According to a former prison guard who escaped Eritrea, Kibrom is likely working on a farm or quarry owned by a party elite or Afewerki ally.

In another incident in February 2009, Eritrean authorities ordered a raid on the premises of Radio Bana, a small station in the heart of the capital that puts out educational programs under the sponsorship of the education ministry. Its entire staff of around 50 journalists were arrested and taken without explanation.  Some of the staff were released, but several remain in custody.

Eritrea was also put on Reporters without Borders’ Internet Enemies list due to the government’s insistence on blocking foreign news websites and blogs critical of the regime and its monitoring of internet cafes with armed guards. Moreover, attacks on press freedom are only one of a series of worrying trends in Eritrea. In its report State Repression and Indefinite Discrimination in Eritrea, Human Rights Watch outlines appalling human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, abysmal detention conditions, forced labor, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship. During the Tv4 interview Afewerki stated, “We will not have elections at any time like the European model. We have our own ways of allowing participation. [Elections] are not an option.” Questioning the democratic bona fides of Europe and North America, Afewerki said bluntly, “Democracy is a way of cheating people.”

Tv4’s interview with Afewerki revealed the deep-seated paranoia in which the Eritrean government operates, particularly through its sense of betrayal towards the West, which has favored Ethiopia as a strategic regional partner, and through its own antipathy towards Ethiopia, against which it fought a decades-long war of independence. In its 2007 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that “the government continued to raise the specter of Ethiopian aggression to justify its absolute control over the media.” Moreover, in 2007, Bush administration officials called Eritrea a “state-sponsor of terror,” further isolating the regime and making it suspicious of Western motives.

Though often overlooked, Eritrea has become one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Basic rights and freedoms are flouted as opposition members and members of the press are jailed or pushed into exile.  In November 2009, Eritrea will be compelled to explain its poor human rights record to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its Universal Periodic Review. One of the most important foci for the review should be Eritrea’s obligations under article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed and ratified. The review will give activists and concerned countries another opportunity to speak out against human rights violations in Eritrea and make the names of journalists imprisoned there be heard. Those names include: Mattewos Habteab, Temesgen Gebreyesus, Dawit Isaak, Isaac Abraham, Girmay Abraham, Dimtsi Hafash, Mulubrhan Habtegebriel, Meles Negusse, Fessehaye "Joshua" Yohannes (presumed dead), Dawit Habtemichael, Yusuf Mohamed Ali, Medhanie Haile, Temesgen Ghebreyesus, Emanuel Asrat, Said Abdulkader and Tura Kubaba.

PEN American Center has actively fought for the rights of many of the above mentioned journalists with a letter writing campaign found here.

Chavez's Post-Referendum Offensive

Photo Credit: Flickr user !Que comunismo!

Hugo Chavez has continued his attacks on his chief television adversary, Globovision, with a personal phone call two weeks ago to the station’s executives warning them to “behave correctly.” Invective against Globovision is nothing new, with Chavez frequently calling for its closure and even labeling its work as “media terrorism.” The station has been a vociferous critic of Chavez and has been accused by the president of trying to thwart the efforts of the elected government and even promoting his assassination. In an address to Latin American diplomats in Washington last April, Andrés Izarra, a former media executive and now Venezuelan government official, likened Globovisión's coverage to Rwandan radio broadcasts that helped provoke genocide in 1994. 

Chavez has recently stepped up his criticism of the channel, matching words with actions. This month, the station was slapped with a US$4.19 million fine for alleged unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the station’s top executive’s home was raided in May by more than 100 Venezuelan police officers accusing him of running a car smuggling ring  (Globovision’s President, Guillermo Zuloaga, co-owns a Toyota dealership). Both investigations were undertaken at the request of pro-Chavez lawmakers. New charges were brought against the station for supposedly breaking the Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television (Ley Resorte), a vague law criticized by human rights groups for its potential to hinder media freedoms.

Indeed, the media has been a battleground since Chavez’s election in 1998 and, more acutely, since a brief 2002 coup. RCTV, Venezuela’s oldest television channel, was not allowed to renew its terrestrial broadcast license in 2007 after being accused of supporting the coup against Chavez and the subsequent oil strike that sought to topple the government. The recent campaign against Globovision is also directly linked to the network’s involvement in opposition activities. In the case at hand, Globovision has been accused of giving air-time to opposition organizations including Women for Liberty and Democratic Renewal, without paying the requisite taxes. 

RCTV, Globovision, and two other networks, Televen and Venevision, had openly supported the unseating of Chavez and played key roles in the 2002 coup attempt through media blackouts and selective coverage. Few contest the fact that RCTV and other stations have taken sides, often aggressively, against Chavez, with commentators openly calling for his demise. Pressure on the government by Televen and Venevision eased notably in following years, however, and unsurprisingly, they have been the target of far less official attention.

"I'm happy that the institutions are working, we have to keep moving against impunity. Let them say what they'll say," Chavez is quoted as saying by AFP. Indeed, several weeks before, Chavez ordered the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to “fulfill your obligation” and take action against Globovision in light of their breaking a story on a minor recent earthquake which the government had not yet reported. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in particular, makes clear that Chavez’s notion of “institutions working” apparently does not include the idea of separation of powers.

Such moves against Globovision must be seen in light of a broader effort by the Chavez government to deepen the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” after the February referendum that removed term limits for public officials, thus allowing Chavez to run for a third term in 2012. Chavez terms this new push the “third phase” of the revolution.

Following the election, Michael Shifter, of the US-based think-tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that “[Chavez is] going to be very emboldened. He’s going to move ahead in radical fashion with his revolution.” Shifter’s words were prescient.

Chavez’s efforts to bolster the revolution post-referendum have principally focused on a specific set of issues: 1. Reining in unruly media outlets, especially Globovision; 2. Undermining the power of both private and public sector unions; 3. Continuing with his agenda of nationalization and expropriation of foreign companies operating in Venezuela; 4. Weakening opposition parties; and 5. Accruing powers for the central government at the expense of local governments.

Chavez’s attempts at undermining the power of unions that oppose or contradict his revolutionary vision is not new. In its report, A Decade Under Chavez, Human Rights Watch states,"The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by promoting state interference in union elections, refusing to bargain collectively with established unions, and engaging in favoritism toward pro-government unions. It has also punished workers with job dismissals and blacklisting for legitimate strike activity. And it has supported the creation of alternative labor organizations that undercut the country's labor laws, risk undermining established unions, and leave workers particularly vulnerable to political discrimination."

This judgment was echoed by a Freedom House report from last year, Freedom of Association Under Threat. A bill that was recently introduced in the National Assembly would cripple unions by eliminating collective bargaining and giving powers in regards to labor matters to “worker’s councils,” usually controlled by ruling party members.

Chavez has also continued his plan to nationalize both foreign and domestic companies. In March, Chavez expropriated local operations of US food giant Cargill, accusing the company of avoiding price controls. While the petrochemicals industry has already witnessed substantial intervention, along with steel, cement, electricity and telecommunications, the May announcement that a set of privately owned oil services firms would be taken over marked a new foray into the country’s dominant economic sector.

Chavez has also continued to undermine democratic freedoms through attacks on opposition members and weakening the country’s local leaders. Manuel Rosales, the main opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and recently elected mayor of Venezuela’s second largest city, was recently forced to seek asylum in Peru after being charged with corruption. Other prominent opposition members including former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel have also been placed under investigation on corruption charges. In addition, Chavez has stepped up his offensive against regional governors, who won victories in some important states in last November’s regional and local elections, by pushing a law through the Parliament which would see their powers diminished by regional “vice presidents” subordinate to the President.

With oil prices rising again, opposition members fleeing the country, and media outlets in the crosshairs, it looks as though there is little to slow Chavez’s offensive in the short term. In a recent statement reported by Reuters, Chavez stated to his party stalwarts: "I've said it before and I repeat, we must keep up the offensive, bulldozing the counter-revolution. We can no longer be the idiots we were." If Chavez has made one thing clear during his ten years in power, it’s that when he says he’ll do something, it probably will happen. Such is the personalist nature of 21st century socialism.

Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

Photo Credit: Flickr user jessicamulley

The Fading Shadow of Brazil's Dictatorship

On April 30, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal abolished the country’s 1967 Press Law after ruling that the law violated constitutional guarantees of free expression. This act, which came into effect during the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1961 and 1985, sought to repress criticism of the dictatorship by setting prison terms of up to 3 years for journalists convicted of defamation crimes. Such crimes were defined in very expansive terms and included “reporting deemed offensive to public morals; reporting that a plaintiff finds damaging to his reputation or offensive to his dignity; reporting that is considered subversive to public and political order; and reporting ‘true’ facts that are considered distorted or provocative.” The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that both during and after the dictatorship, the law was used by businessmen and politicians in thousands of cases to attack critical journalists. As such, the long overdue abolition is a momentous victory for freedom of the press in the country. In addition, it should be viewed as an important accomplishment in the country’s attempt to slowly chip away at the lingering legacies of dictatorship.

Brazil’s military dictatorship left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics and society. The brutal military regime not only passed repressive laws like the one above, but also committed extensive human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and large-scale arbitrary detention during its campaign to suppress a communist guerrilla movement. According to official government tallies, roughly 400 people were killed, 160 were disappeared, and hundreds of others were tortured during the dictatorship. Moreover, Brazil lags far behind its neighbors in its attempts to confront the shrouded events of its military past and unveil the details of the regime’s activities to Brazilian citizens. In 1979, the Brazilian government passed an amnesty law that protected military and public officials and political dissidents from prosecution for crimes committed during the dictatorship. As a result, no one has been prosecuted for human rights offenses committed during the period. In addition, Brazil has not convened a truth commission, nor has the country given a full account of the military regime’s activities, although it did publish a 500 page report on disappearances in 2007. 

The remaining legacies of the dictatorship have had important consequences for governance. Most obviously, laws such as the Press Law have continued to restrict Brazilian civil liberties in the 25 years since the country’s transition to democratic rule. However, the country’s failure to fully address the misdeeds of the dictatorship has had other damaging results. While the military has argued that Brazil’s pacted transition was a reasonable price to pay in order to bring about a peaceful transition to civilian rule, others have argued that allowing the military to maintain their power and escape punishment has hampered the country’s process of democratic consolidation. Most notably, rule of law has suffered. Indeed, one of Brazil’s most troubled governance issues is the ineptitude and corruption of the justice system, which has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.  Unfortunately, rather than using fair, unbiased human rights trials to build confidence in the justice system (as recently done in Peru, Argentina, and others), the government’s treatment of past crimes has reinforced the culture of
impunity. 

Thus, directly confronting the events of the military dictatorship is crucial to the attainment of a truly democratic future for the country. Fortunately, Brazil’s recent repeal of the Press Law has been accompanied by other steps towards confronting the past. Recently, federal prosecutors have requested that investigations against several individuals suspected of committing human rights violations be carried out. In October 2008, a Sao Paulo civil court found a military colonel civilly responsible for human rights violations committed while serving as director of an intelligence agency. In addition, last week, Brazil launched a website containing information about the events that occurred in the country between 1964 and 1985. The site includes official documents from the dictatorship that are part of the national archives. At its launch, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva acknowledged the link between national reconciliation and the country’s democratic well-being when he proclaimed “We are doing Brazilian democracy a service when we unveil some of the mysteries that persist about our past.” Finally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal is preparing to review the 1979 Amnesty Law in the face of several pending cases that challenge the law’s legitimacy. Among these cases, the court will consider the Brazilian Bar Association’s assertion that the current interpretation of the law erroneously provides for the protection of state agents from prosecution in all cases when in reality, it should not shield them from prosecution for crimes such as torture.

Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts may be ramped up in the future. On April 8, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that amnesties and statutes of limitations should not be applied to crimes against humanity that were committed during Brazil’s dictatorship. This is the first international decision to be made regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil during this era. While the decision is not binding, concerns over international legitimacy and approval may compel Brazil to become more open to a reinterpretation of the amnesty law.

Brazil should be lauded for breaking out of its decades-long resignation to allowing several of the debilitating legacies of the dictatorship to persist.  Nevertheless, the country still has a long road ahead. It has yet to fully open military and police archives to the public, and the active prosecution of human rights offenders is a long way off even if the court rules against the current interpretation of the amnesty law. Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation of this law is a very polemical issue. The Brazilian military, which staunchly opposes all efforts to reinterpret the amnesty law, is an extremely powerful and influential institution. Furthermore, while Lula has taken measures to disclose more information about the military dictatorship to the public, his solicitor general’s office has officially opposed challenges to the law. In recent years Brazil has sought to pose as both a leader and model for developing countries. Confronting the past while strengthening democracy and justice can only improve the country’s standing and add further momentum to a South American success story.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Samory Santos