COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Northern Africa's Plodding Progress on Women's Rights

Photo: Women's rights activist speaking at the 2005 International Conference of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association in Cairo, Egypt; Photo Credit: Flickr user cactusbones

Despite the enormously improved legal provisions for women’s rights in Morocco that resulted from the 2004 Moroccan Family Law, the lag time between passage and implementation has disappointed Moroccan women. In a recent article, the Inter Press Service reported that the law has yet to resolve the country’s difficult environment for women’s rights. A July report from the Moroccan Association for Human Rights noted a strong “perseverance of segregation and violence against women,” especially within the family. When Amnesty International Secretary-General Irene Khan visited Morocco in March, she condemned the persistence of violence, stating, “King Mohamed VI’s government must now consolidate…progress by criminalizing violence against women.” Also troubling is the recent finding that the Family Law has resulted in a rise the number of marriages to minor girls, especially in rural areas. Although the 2004 law raised the legal age for marriage from 15 to 18, a loophole states that a judge can grant an exception to this rule. Family court judges received 39,000 requests for marriages to minors in 2007, 68% of which were approved. The law has also failed to curb polygamy, despite the fact that it imposed strict conditions on the practice.

Many women’s rights activists have argued that the law has been loosely enforced due to family judges’ unwillingness to implement a code that stands to fundamentally challenge the traditional patriarchal structure of Morocco’s Muslim society. Indeed, Rabia Naciri, president of the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, claims that “Moroccan politicians have argued that the law is not applied because society is not ready for it.” Thus, the widespread view that Morocco has joined Tunisia as a regional exemplar for women’s rights may be premature. Indeed, the law serves as a case study on how deeply ingrained views about an issue—in this case, women’s subordinate role in society—can result in both the persistence of traditional injustices at home and half-hearted implementation of the laws that attempt change.

That said, it is beyond dispute that the new Family Law has expanded women’s rights and rectified several of the injustices formerly present in the Moroccan legal system. The law secured each woman’s right to self-guardianship, divorce, and child custody, and imposed a set of punishments for sexual harassment. In many cases, the formal enshrinement of these rights has served to empower Moroccan women and compel them to exercise their new rights in courts, or at least to make them aware of their right to do so.

In addition to bringing about change within the country, this law has served as an inspiration and model for the women’s rights movement in other North African countries. Indeed, family law reform was soon carried out in several of Morocco’s neighbors. For example, Algeria amended its family code in 2005, in large part due to the advocacy efforts of women’s rights organizations similar to those functioning in Morocco. Notably, the amendments expanded the rights of Algerian women by allowing them to seek divorce and vastly increased the protections afforded them when undergoing this process. The law grants women custody over children in most cases and requires the ex-husband to provide housing for his ex-wife and children. In addition, the law now allows women to transmit citizenship and nationality to her children and spouse.  Furthermore, Egypt granted women the right to a no-contest divorce in 2005. Finally, in Tunisia, which is widely considered to be one of the most progressive Arab countries where women’s rights are concerned, has also adopted a few additional reforms in recent years. For example, in 2008, a new amendment to the country’s already favorable family code granted divorced women with custody the right to be provided housing. These reforms were carried out for the most part due to the increased advocacy efforts of women’s rights organizations.

Nevertheless, as is the case in Morocco, a resilient current against change remains prominent in spite of the promulgation of these laws. Enforcement remains the most serious problem facing the women’s rights movement in North Africa. In some cases, this is due to the fact that both women and men living in rural regions are unaware of the laws’ existence. In other cases, the law is not implemented due to the resistance of judges. This is largely due to the widespread opinion in Islamic fundamentalist circles that Shariah law, and particularly marriage, is being attacked by the women’s rights movement. As a consequence, measurable change has been difficult to achieve. In Algeria, despite the promulgation of the new housing law, divorced women continue to wind up on the streets, or, if they are provided housing, are often forced to live in slums. Men have found ways to circumvent the laws, while judges have often sided with them in court. This situation is predominantly the result of the persistence of traditional societal values and views on women’s role in society. Although women may theoretically have the right to seek a divorce in these countries, for example, the stigma against it remains strong, which deters women, their husbands, and legal officials from implementing the law. As Leila Rhiwi, the women’s rights coordinator for the Maghreb for the UN Development Fund for Women states, “What we have seen is a change in the law, not a change in society.” 

Furthermore, although recent laws and amendments have advanced women’s rights, further legal reform will be essential in order to fully address the trials and tribulations women in the region continue to face. In all of the cases noted above, family law codes continue to contain discriminatory provisions, while recent reforms have themselves sometimes contained questionable caveats. For example, as the 2009 Freedom in the World Report on Algeria notes, women still suffer from unequal rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Egypt’s 2005 law granting the right to a no-contest divorce also states that women may lose their dowry if they choose to exercise this right. Unfortunately, the resistance to change is not only prevalent on a micro-level, but often plays itself out at the upper echelons of government. While Moroccan King Mohamed VI has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to promote women’s rights, most notably through spearheading the movement to reform the family code, this strong political will is absent in some of the country’s neighbors. Alarmingly, following the passage of the 2005 family code amendments, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika told women’s rights activists, “You have obtained vested rights today. Do not demand more.”

The recent strides to advance women’s rights in Northern Africa through legal reform should certainly be applauded. As Leila Rhiwi notes, “changes in law allow for changes to occur in society.” In all of the above cases, it will take several years to convince the countries’ traditional Muslim societies of the compatibility of women’s rights with Shariah law, and consequently to bring about real change. The Tunisian case is illustrative. Since the 1956 personal status code was promulgated, the country has been engaged in a difficult battle to ensure that women are entitled to equal treatment.  Encouragingly, however, the country’s quest has yielded successful results. In fact, a 2007 World Economic Forum index ranked women’s status in Tunisia as the second highest in the Arab world. Thus, while the road to comprehensive women’s rights reform in Northern Africa will be long, it is not likely to meet a dead end as long as both local and international activists keep the movement on track.

Evolution of Lebanon's Hizbullah Remains Uncertain

Photo Credit: Flickr user hazy jenius

As the results of the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections came in, outsiders were surprised to find that Hizbullah, the Shiite Islamist group, and its allies – the favourites to win – had been beaten and had seemingly accepted their continued fate in opposition. Regardless of the results, the relatively smooth voting process was a victory for Lebanese democracy and human rights; however, the internal situation in Lebanon remains precarious and a continued parliamentary majority for the Western-oriented, Sunni-led March 14th alliance will not likely challenge Hizbullah’s continuing reign over large portions of Lebanese territory.

For the last half a century Lebanon has been the Middle East’s battleground, where various factions from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to the Syrian and Israeli intelligence services have fought proxy wars in order to weaken real and perceived threats from their foes. Even before the civil war began in 1975, there had been severe clashes between Lebanon’s three dominant ethno-religious groups, Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims, which resulted in the creations of militias outside of the state military for the protection of each sect as well as the subjugation of their opponents – a zero-sum game that has continued to some degree ever since. The PLO took up residence in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in 1970, upsetting the delicate Christian-Shiite-Sunni balance, and began attacking Israel, prompting a number of military retributions and an occupation that ended only in 2000. Hizbullah’s history runs in parallel with Lebanon’s violent past. Founded in 1982 as a group for the protection of the Shiite community in southern Lebanon that had been abandoned by the state to face Israeli retribution alone, Hizbullah quickly emerged as a formidable anti-Israeli force, an efficient provider of services for Shiites living in the south and east of the country, and an effective defender of Shiite interests within Lebanon.

Understanding the rise of Hizbullah requires navigating the complex history of Shiism in the Middle East and in Lebanon in particular. Shiites, which comprise 10% of the Muslim population worldwide, have historically been discriminated against by the Sunni majority in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Bahrain. Though Shiites were given political space in post-independence Lebanon, Shiite political leaders tended to be unrepresentative political bosses who ran large patronage networks and oversaw the increased impoverishment of their respective population.   

With the increasing politicisation of Palestinians in the south of Lebanon (where most Shiites live) in the late 1960s, the reassertion of Shiism in Iran after 1979, and the rise of Islamism after the hopes of pan-Arabism faded with the death of Nasser,  Shiite politics in Lebanon underwent massive changes. The rise of the Amal movement witnessed the assertion of popular Shiite political power into Lebanese politics for the first time. Yet as the Iranian revolution gained strength and extended its reach, Amal’s secular oriented leadership was challenged by its religious offshoot which would eventually come to be known as Hizbullah (or, “the Party of God”).  Though Hizbullah’s stated goal was the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese territory, it quickly became a provider of social services to Shiites who would witness the organization’s commitment to their security firsthand during the civil war.

Hizbullah’s defining moment - and ironically, the first stage of its forced transformation – came in 1992 , when, after 15 years of civil war, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon. An internal debate within the organization as to whether or not stand for elections ensued. Several of the organization’s ruling clerics were opposed to running for elections on the basis of it being “un-Islamic,” yet important leaders such as the current Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, opted for running. Hizbullah representatives trounced their Shiite counterparts in the south and the Bekaa valley to the east in a deeply flawed election that was largely stage managed by Syria. Beyond their immediate relevance, the 1992 elections effectively brought Hizbullah into the Lebanese political fold, splitting the organization into two parts and ensuring broader Shiite representation in the Serail. Indeed, Hizbullah’s decision was also a signal that it would, at least for the time being, abandon attempts to forcefully impose an Islamic government on the country.

Hizbullah’s second transformative moment came in 2000 when, after a nearly two decades long war of attrition, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon. However, with Israel’s departure from Lebanon, Hizbullah lost its original raison d’être. Although the group disputed the withdrawal as complete, arguing over a piece of land called the Shebaa Farms, some soul-searching began within the organisation and in Lebanese society as a whole. Although Hizbullah’s overall existence was never brought into question given that it operates on a number of non-military levels, issues concerning its maintenance of a significant arsenal in peacetime were raised, and proved to be a serious source of contention in Hizbullah’s relationship with the state and with the international community Indeed, after a spate of political assassinations of Syrian opponents in Lebanon, possibly carried out with implicit or explicit help from Hizbullah, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1559, whose third operating paragraph calls for the disbanding of all militias operating in Lebanon. Given Hizbullah’s quasi-monopoly on force in Lebanon, the resolution was never carried out.

The tense relationship between the state and Hizbullah was exacerbated with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Hitherto Hizbullah had been politically protected by its Syrian patrons, who had occupied Lebanon at the international community and Lebanese state’s behest in 1976. Over the next two decades, Hizbullah had little concern for domestic politics as Damascus ensured that the Lebanese state and military were weak. Furthermore, it was largely due to Syrian influence that Hizbullah was not required to disarm along with the other sectarian militias in 1989 under the Taif Agreement, allowing it to become the strongest military actor in Lebanon. With Sunni leader Rafik Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 and the mass anti-Syrian protests known as the Cedar Revolution that paralysed the country and prompted the Syrian departure, Hizbullah was forced to  openly declare its support for Syria  and lead an opposition movement (March 8^th) against the pro-Western ruling alliance (March 14^th).

The fissure has had serious consequences for Lebanese politics and society. First, it has divided Lebanese society into two camps creating unlikely divisions and even more unlikely allies. Second, it has exacerbated religious tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, who are clearly divided into their respective alliances, with the Christian population spanning both. Third, it has worked to pit Iran against the Sunni Muslim world, particularly Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States and France in a bid to define the future of the Lebanese state.

This split has also had unintended consequences for Hizbullah. In the past it had avoided involvement in the sectarian bloodletting, but as various groups sought to fill the security vacuum caused by Syria’s departure and Hizbullah looked to assert the demographic weight of the Shiite population, it began using its militia domestically. The situation exploded in May 2008, when the March 14 government attempted to fire the Hizbullah aligned head of security at Beirut’s international airport. Furthermore, the government sought to investigate Hizbullah’s private telecom network that it had created to wage war against Israel. After repeated assurances that it would never turns its arms on Lebanese citizens, Hezbollah and its allies took to the streets conquering large swathes of Beirut and Mount Lebanon while the Lebanese army looked on helplessly, fearing internal divisions would plunge the country into a larger crisis. The government was quick to back down in the face of a coup, but the political damage had already been done. In the end, the Doha Agreement ended the fighting and gave Hizbullah and its allies a veto in the cabinet, a position Hizbullah had long sought.

Though Hezbollah’s acceptance of its electoral defeat in June was comfort to some observers, it represented a temporary maintenance of the status quo. Yet the Lebanese political arena under the current dual alliance system continues to evolve.  With the return of General Michel Aoun, the Maronite Christians are abdicating their traditional support of the state for vague promises from Hizbullah. General Aoun, like a good many Christians who came to prominence as a military leader, seeks to be president – the constitution requires the office holder to be thus. However, unlike his predecessors, Aoun has allied with Hizbullah, formally signing a memorandum of understanding in February 2006, whereas previously the Christians had always supported the sovereign state. With this move he risks trading long-term influence for short-term safety. Likewise, the fourth main ethno-religious group in Lebanon, the Druze, have attempted to hedge their bets by improving relations with Shiites, although it is unlikely that this fiercely independent faction will formally align itself to one side anytime soon.

Though Hezbollah has certainly proven that it is willing to respect Lebanese democracy in some ways, it is clear that the central government’s lack of a monopoly on force is a constant threat to Lebanese democracy and stability. This should certainly be a cause for concern for governance-watchers. Some observers take concern even further. For instance, Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a fellow at Chatham House, declares that “the (Lebanese) state is not the state, the actual state is the state of Hizbullah. That’s the functioning state, it has an army which is efficient, well funded and well trained... it is the de facto power.” Furthermore, Mr. Hussain suggests that the eventual goal of Hizbullah is a state in which which Shiites reign supreme.

Whatever the true intentions, the concept of a ‘resistance movement’ coexisting alongside the Lebanese state is problematic at best.  Given Hezbollah’s overwhelming force and superior arsenal, there is little chance that the militia will be defeated on the battlefield. And although the strategy of trying to bring Hezbollah further and further into the Lebanese political fold appears to be working on the surface, it is a task fraught with danger and will not likely result in the group surrendering its arms.

Though it is still unclear if Hezbollah will be given formal veto power in the next cabinet, it remains that by force of arms, Hezbollah maintains a de facto veto power unknown in liberal democracies – a veto power which it did not hesitate to use in May 2008 and may not hesitate to use in the future.

In the end, Hezbollah will need to have a third transformative moment in which it finally decides whether to be a party for Lebanon or a party that is beholden to its financial and ideological masters Iran and Syria. It will also need to decide if it will remain a party of grievance or a party of broad appeal. Other actors, both within Lebanon and without, will be influential in this decision, but Hizbullah largely has the power to choose its path. Military strength, after all, brings with it the responsibility to make historic decisions.

Iran's Presidential Factional Maze

 

With Iran’s June 12 presidential election fast approaching, the factional dynamics in the political system are shifting furiously and causing notable political strife. Although the election is effectively a referendum on the incumbent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his neoconservative Islamism characterized by a bellicose anti-western foreign policy and a financially crippling domestic policy, opposition groups – both liberal and conservative – are highly fractured, and the battle lines ever-evolving.

Ahmadinejad’s principle competitors for the presidency are Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a reformist who seeks to ease pressures on the media and engage abroad while maintaining the system’s basic structure. He was the last prime minister of Iran between 1981 and 1989 and was popular during his tenure. Mehdi Karroubi, a politician and cleric and the other “reformist” in the race, is more moderate and pragmatic regarding domestic reform in Iran and changing its foreign policy; he served as the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) for a total of seven years over two terms.

Ahmadinejad has been fiercely attacked on all sides for his militarization of Iranian politics. The President’s base of support is firmly embedded in the military and paramilitary elements and extremist clerics of the Haqqani school – an archconservative Shiite sect that unequivocally adheres to the notion of a divine state and leaves no room for popular sovereignty. The most important and influential of these clerics is Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the spiritual adviser to Ahmadinejad and a member of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with electing the Supreme Leader. This makeshift radical alliance had been pushed to the margins of the Iranian power structure before Ahmadinejad’s rise, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s level of commitment to their continued preservation in power has always been extremely vague to outsiders. Furthermore, although in the last four years Ahmadinejad has managed to promote his allies to positions of power, with Ahmad Jannati, another founding member of the Haqqani school, serving as the chairman of the powerful Guardian Council, three other key institutions remain outside the incumbent’s control. These are the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory body to Ayatollah Khamenei helping to resolve issues with parliament, and the Majlis.

Ahmadinejad’s role in increasing the influence of the army and extremist clerics in everyday life has earned him powerful enemies who would be classified as conservative by western standards, but juxtaposed to the current administration appear rather more moderate. One of these is Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former two-term president and current chairman of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council. Though the dynamic has changed somewhat, the principle issue that has separated Ahmadinejad from the more pragmatic conservatives – let alone the reformists – is relations with the US. Whereas the former and his ilk are willing to accept great sacrifices in their striving for a “pure” Islamic republic, the latter are less confrontational and more actively seek engagement. This debate takes place in the wider context of evaluating Iran’s position in the world and is manifested at every level of domestic politics, especially during election season. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment explains that Ahmadinejad is attempting to balance his clerical backers, who believe that one of the “fundamental pillars of the revolution, and one of the central identities of the Islamic republic, to retain an adversarial relationship with the United States.” However, Iran also has a very young population, much of which wants to normalize relations with the western world and sees the current antagonism as crippling Iran economically and isolating it politically, socially, and culturally. Walking the line between the ire of both groups is a constant challenge for the president.

Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy has also cost him support among conservatives. Mohsen Rezai, the former head of the Revolutionary Guards and an ally of the president in the 2005 elections, has recently criticized Ahmadinejad and announced his candidacy for the race. This move crucially splits the Principalists, a major conservative faction, who are far more inclined towards a free market economy than Ahmadinejad and the Haqqani school. As with Rezai, the Principalists fully supported Ahmadinejad in 2005, yet after four years of ever increasing inflation and unemployment, and crude government injections of money to support food subsidies and massive wage boosts, people have clearly realized that Iran’s development policy is lacking in coherence. Furthermore, Rezai has even declared his support for dialogue with the US. Whether this was done out of real conviction, or merely to raise support, or even out of purely economic considerations, the emerging consensus that there is a need to engage with the US can only be seen as a positive step.

Such dissent from Rezai might not be so disconcerting to Ahmadinejad – the former is not seen as a primary contender – had it not been for Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent public disapproval of the incumbent, as a recent New York Times article indicated. Furthermore, during Ahmadinejad’s recent visits to provincial capitals to raise support the state media took the step of specifically not airing coverage of Ahmadinejad’s trip. It is always possible to read too far into such signs, especially with Iran, where western knowledge of the local higher echelon politics is limited at best; however, the series of recent blows he has taken are certainly significant, even if potentially overestimated.

Yet while Ahmadinejad’s group appear to be under pressure to amend their stringent domestic policies, the reformist camp is faring little better. In February, Mohammad Khatami, a former president and candidate until he withdrew from the race in favour of Mousavi, was forced to abandon his advocation of democracy and publicly reaffirm the supremacy of the Islamic system as the foundation of any future state. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad is employing the full powers of the state against Mousavi and Karroubi, including the distribution of checks in poor neighborhoods and the persuasion of generals to endorse him. The greatest shock came in the last week of April, when the elections supervisor at the Ministry of the Interior predicted a clear Ahmadinejad victory. Naturally the state’s more coercive instruments have also been used to attack a wide range of opposition groups, from human rights activists to those pressing for democratization.

Although the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads report affirms that the independence of the judiciary has somewhat improved in recent years, these gains seem to have been put on hold with the elections so close. One example relates to one of the few developments in Iran’s factional battles that is easily observable from abroad: the case of Roxana Saberi, an American-Iranian journalist with US citizenship who was arrested for espionage. Her detention in itself seemed surprising; although Saberi wrote about the moderately taboo issue of the gender segregation in social life, she was careful to not aggravate the authorities with confrontational articles. That Saberi was arrested and her trial rushed through the courts was seen as evidence of the conservatives flexing their muscles to warn both international and domestic opponents ahead of the elections. However, Ahmadinejad’s subsequent call for Saberi’s case to be examined more closely by the judiciary, and her subsequent release, further highlights the factionalism in the conservative bloc, Ahmadinejad’s interest in avoiding choking off the possibility of dialogue with the west, and – perhaps most of all – the degree to which, in the current season, outside observers must largely simply watch and wait.

Filipino Muslims' Grievances and the Difficult Path to Peace

In a February report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) assessed the prospects for a resolution of the ongoing conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The report, which was released six months after the dissolution of autonomy negotiations between the two entities, is predominantly pessimistic. According to the ICG, settlement of the autonomy issue is entirely out of the question before the end of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term in 2010.

The conflict between the Philippines government and the MILF is by no means new. The MILF is an offshoot of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an organization which first began to advocate the formation of a separate Islamic state in the Philippines in the 1960s. The MILF split from the MNLF in 1978, when the MNLF became resistant to the idea of an armed insurgency. After the MNLF reached a semi-autonomy agreement with the Philippine government in 1987 and then a cease-fire agreement in 1996, the MILF took the helm of the resistance movement and has, with the exception of short periods of cease-fire, continued to fight for more expansive rights and autonomy in the Mindanao region ever since. The most recent surge of violence erupted after the Supreme Court ruled that the autonomy agreement reached between the MILF and the government this past August was unconstitutional. The subsequent toll was severe: hundreds died and several hundred thousand people were displaced in the months following the breakdown.

The grievances of the MILF are numerous. Most of them, however, are linked to the group’s allegation that Filipino Muslims, most of who belong to the Moro ethnic group residing on Mindanao, suffer persecution and discrimination at the hands of both their government and their fellow citizens. While Muslims make up between 5 and 9 percent of the Filipino population, over 90 percent of the population is Christian. The MILF claims that members of Christian religions dominate all sectors of society, while Muslims are at best ignored and at worst victimized. The group has thus demanded more extensive provisions for self-government and greater control over resources in Mindanao. In a 2001 interview, Hashim Salamat, the founder of the MILF, explained that “the situation here in Mindanao is very, very difficult for the Muslims in general. Our people here have been oppressed for a very long time. This province has been totally neglected.” Where governance is concerned, this is especially problematic. Namely, it raises questions about respect for religious freedom in the country.

At first glance, freedom of belief and conscience is ostensibly well protected in the Philippines. The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion and the Philippine government has not made any overt attempt to restrict the right of Muslims to practice in recent times. This is corroborated by the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, in which the Philippines received a score of 5.33 out of 7.0 in the Freedom of Conscience and Belief subcategory. In addition, in its 2008 International Religious Freedom Report on the Philippines, the U.S. State Department claims that the Philippines government actively supports the practice of Islam through such agencies as the Office of Muslim Affairs.

Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the situation reveals a darker picture. While the rights of Muslims may be officially upheld, the trials they face in their daily lives are substantial. Findings from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report are especially illuminative. Most notably, according to the report, the effort made by the government to promote development amongst the Muslim population in Mindanao has been less than satisfactory. Today, Filipino Muslims are concentrated in the country’s poorest region and often lack basic services.
In addition, the attempt made by the government and the Christian majority to integrate Muslims into the country’s social fabric can only be described as half-hearted. The disproportionately sparse Muslim representation in the country’s political scene is especially salient. According to the report, there are 10 Muslim district representatives and 2 Muslim party list representatives in the House of Representatives, a body which has a total of 236 members. In addition, the Department of State’s 2009 Human Rights report revealed that discrimination against Muslims is especially pronounced in the workplace. For example, Muslims claim to have trouble finding work unless they use Christian pseudonyms and wear Western clothing. The report explains that the predominantly Christian “national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal, and regional loyalties, created informal barriers whereby access to jobs or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or group network.” This hostile treatment of the Muslim population has only been exacerbated by the intermittent terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim extremist groups like the Abbu Sayyaf Group.

While the situation of Muslims is rather grim, this is not to say that the Philippine government has completely turned a deaf ear to the issue. In the education sector, the government’s endeavor to modernize the madrassahs in the Mindanao region by improving the schools’ math, science, and English programs is especially commendable. What’s more, the government is not entirely to blame for the problem. Many Muslims have been to a certain extent unwilling to make a strong effort to become integrated into a greater Filipino society to which they feel no strong ties. The MILF, for its part, has at times maintained an ambiguous relationship with more radical Islamist groups responsible for the Philippines’ worst terror attacks.

In the end, the most direct way to ensure that the rights of the Filipino Muslims are protected would be to grant their request for greater autonomy in the Mindanao. As this is unfeasible for the time being, a micro-level approach aimed at addressing the basic needs of the Muslim population by investing in socio-economic development and fostering inter-faith dialogue would be a step in the right direction.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Mark Navales

A(nother) New Dawn of Saudi Reform?

Two weeks ago a slight but noticeable rumble took place at the very highest levels of Saudi state power that could result in a myriad of interconnected changes for the kingdom’s politics and society. Essentially, King Abdullah moved against entrenched conservatives in the religious establishment. However, the ‘reforms’ will also rein in the religious police, could signal the coming of preliminary steps to enhance the role of women in public affairs, and may help modernize practices in some of the most anachronistic realms of Saudi society.

First on the agenda was the dismissal of Sheik Ibrahim al-Ghaith, head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice – which oversees the religious police – after numerous complaints about their overzealous repression of the populace’s perceived un-Islamic behaviour. As recently as a few years ago, such citizen outrage could never have even been aired publicly, let alone resulted in action to by a monarch to rectify the complaint. As other key personnel have changed little, the responsibility for acting upon the long-standing issue should be attributed to the king.

King Abdullah also removed Sheik Saleh al-Lihedan, chief of the Supreme Court of Justice, a man who in September advocated the lynching of TV network owners who aired ‘morally corrupt’ programmes. This is a very welcome change indeed, and may stem bouts of uncontrolled extremism as well as gradual moderation within the judiciary; however, if King Abdullah does not institutionalize his reforms, they will remain only as effective as his successor.

The form of the Grand Ulema Commission – the ultimate religious authority in the nation, which also issues religious edicts – has also been changed; for the first time, it will represent a far more diverse range of Sunni sects, instead of solely the conservative Hanbali group that has controlled it to date. This is an important step in diluting the influence of hard-liners and will allow Saudi Arabia to engage the problems in the Middle East in a far more conciliatory and diplomatic way, even as national leaders are still able to derive all-important moral and spiritual legitimacy from the Commission.

Lastly, a woman was appointed as Deputy Minister for girls education - the highest rank a women has ever held in the state. As a recent Freedom House special report elaborated upon in detailed, women’s rights are not supported in any way, shape, or form in the kingdom and so they are unduly affected by every socioeconomic ill, from rampant rural poverty to the sub-par education system.

Relations between the monarchy and the religious establishment have never been entirely calm. As the House of Saud derives a great deal of its legitimacy by claiming to safeguard Sunni Islam – in 1986 Fahd bin Abdul Aziz took the title ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,’ effectively clarifying his personal view of his mission – the support of the clerics is vital to the regime’s continued rule. Yet this has not stopped previous clashes of interests. For example, in December 1992 King Fahd ousted seven senior clerics because two months previously they had not denounced religious figures who opposed the continued stationing of US military personnel on Saudi soil.

However, the new shake-up appears to have a very different purpose. It does not merely seek to replace a few clerics who have frustrated the monarch; rather, it seeks to revise the basic power distribution between the various factions of the Sunni majority. This has occurred in tandem with efforts to review the kingdom’s official relationship with other religions and perhaps even start a new era of inter-faith and inter-denominational collaboration.

For instance, in November 2007 King Abdullah visited the Pope in the Vatican to promote dialogue, a key issue as Saudi Arabia’s 1.5m Christians are not permitted to worship openly. In June 2008, a three day Sunni-Shia conference was held in Mecca with the goal of improving relations between the two sects. King Abdullah brought former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as his guest of honour. The two wanted to present a Sunni kingdom that could look favourably upon its moderate Shia subjects, and the following month the monarch co-chaired an interfaith dialogue conference in Madrid that brought together representatives of many major religions to reinforce the common values shared by their respective faiths.

The significance of these measures is very much debatable. They can be dismissed as superfluous since apart from a few personnel, little has changed, and the religious conferences were more symbolic than politically significant. Powerful conservatives certainly seem inclined to view things in this light. Nevertheless, King Abdullah may well be trying to reinvigorate his reputation as a reformist, which has taken a hit due to his cautiousness since ascending the throne. If all goes well, this could even be the beginning of a more moderately Islamic state that is capable of collaboration with, among others, its Shia counterparts. The reshuffle has given King Abdullah room to manoeuvre, but whether he intends or is able to use it to begin to truly modernise Saudi Arabia will not become apparent for some while. In the meantime, there is little the outside world can do but sit and watch.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Shabbir Siraj

Using the Scarf to Unveil Turkey's Broader Issues

On October 14 The New York Times ran a story entitled "Youthful Voice Stirs Challenge to Secular Turks" that discussed how Turkish youths are redrawing the lines between both freedom and devotion and modernization and tradition in a country that already blurs the existing distinctions between East and West. An accompanying online video presentation featuring the article’s protagonist, Havva Yilmaz, also alluded to the issue of respect for minorities, particularly Kurds. Although the article did not address the effects of greater religiosity upon minority groups in Turkey, the redrawing of normative lines by Turkish youths raises important questions about Turkey’s direction and the issue of tolerance, whether for minorities or for greater visibility of religion in public life. These questions are of course, inseparable from Turkey’s status as both a secular “democratic experiment that is unique in the Muslim world” and a state engaged in efforts to fully accede to the European Union.

State Rewards Islamist Thuggery in Indonesia

The ostensibly pluralist Indonesian government issued a decree last month that instructed the minority Ahmadiyah sect to halt its activities or face legal sanctions, including up to five years in prison for violators. While the vaguely worded decree stopped short of an explicit ban on the heterodox Muslim group, it represented a victory for a small but potent alliance of radical Islamists and their gangs of street-fighting supporters. A new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) warns that the extremists have used classic interest-group lobbying methods, combined with real and threatened violence, to achieve a level of influence far beyond their miniscule electoral support. If their many political opponents and the state itself fail to stand up to them, their list of demands will only grow, dragging the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country toward its ideological fringe and undermining an otherwise promising Southeast Asian democracy.

Mugabe’s Bishop Guides Flock with a Truncheon

In his ongoing effort to cow the Zimbabwean electorate ahead of the June 27 presidential runoff vote, President Robert Mugabe has deployed cudgel-wielding security forces and party militias against political activists, trade unionists, journalists, and any other members of society who are suspected of disloyalty to the regime. This campaign has even extended to the country’s Anglican parishioners, as major media outlets have noted. For several weeks, the police and other agents of the state have been invading churches in Harare and beating men, women, and children who attempt to worship in communion with the internationally recognized Anglican hierarchy, headed locally by Bishop Sebastian Bakare. The actions are meant to enforce the authority of Mugabe’s man in the miter, Nolbert Kunonga, who was dismissed as bishop of Harare by the Anglican Church of the Province of Central Africa (CPCA) in late 2007.

Will Egypt Lead the Way on Apostasy?

Criminal penalties for apostasy, a highly sensitive subject that has drawn international attention before, have recently resurfaced as an issue in several Muslim countries featured in Countries at the Crossroads. Malaysia, Iran, and particularly Egypt have each been the scene of controversial rulings and proposals with respect to the theme.

Apostasy is defined as abandonment of one’s religious faith, political party, principles, or cause. Muslim theology equates apostasy with treason, for which some applications of Islamic Shari’a law stipulate execution as punishment. In many interpretations of Shari’a law, Muslims are forbidden from converting away from Islam.

In the 2006 Crossroads Malaysia report, Freedom House noted that the legal sanction required to convert from Islam to another religion is rarely granted.  The case of Lina Joy, a Christian convert from Islam attempting to have her identity papers revised in order to marry her Christian boyfriend, became a flashpoint in the struggle between secular and religious factions within the country. After years of appeals, in 2007 Malaysia’s Supreme Court upheld a ruling that recognition of her conversion would require the sanction of Shari’a courts, which rarely grant such a right. Indeed, in July 2007, a Shari’a court sentenced four men to 20-month prison sentences for apostasy in Kelantan, the only state governed by the conservative opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

In the case of Iran, death sentences for apostasy to date have been based on the judge’s discretion, but a draft law recently put before Iran’s Parliament would institute a mandatory death penalty for apostasy. In 1994, Pope John Paul and others successfully pressured Iran not to carry out a death sentence for apostasy against Mehdi Dibaj, a Christian convert. Although the campaign to keep the sentence from being carried out was successful, Dibaj was abducted and killed later that year. As the 2007 Crossroads report notes, the prospect of facing charges of apostasy is particularly menacing to the country’s oft-repressed Baha’i population.

Egypt is another Crossroads country where the issue remains controversial. In 1993, an Egyptian court ordered Cairo University Professor Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid to divorce his wife after it ruled that his writings constituted a renunciation of Islam, which precluded him from being married to a Muslim. The order to divorce was suspended in 1999 after the couple filed an appeal from exile in the Netherlands, but the case was a high-profile example of the effects of legal provisions on apostasy could interfere with freedom of religion, as well as how they these norms could be wielded to restrict academic freedom.

A more recent Egyptian case concerned a group of 12 Coptic Christians who had converted to Islam in order to obtain divorces and were fighting to convert back to Christianity. The country’s highest civil court overruled a lower court decision barring the “reconversion.” Weeks earlier, courts overruled limits on government services provided to citizens not belonging to one of the three “heavenly” religions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. However, as the linked article notes, while these cases suggest a movement towards more freedom for converts in Egypt, just weeks earlier the same court had denied Mohammad Ahmed Hegazy, a converted Muslim, the right to update his identity papers, displaying the restrictions placed on Muslims attempting to leave their faith.

Egypt’s mufti, Ali Goma’a has entered the debate, declaring in comments posted to a Washington Post discussion board, subsequently published in an Egyptian newspaper in July 2007, that there should be no worldly punishment for apostasy. While he was subsequently pressured to condone punishment for apostates who are “actively engaged in the subversion of society,” calls for moderation from such an authoritative figure within Egypt are an encouraging sign.

There are indications that Egypt is making significant, yet incomplete, progress in addressing the conditions which warranted a Freedom of Conscience and Belief score of just 2.33 (on scale 0-7) in Countries at the Crossroads 2007. The same cannot be said for Malaysia or Iran. As activists point out, not until conversion rights are extended to Egyptian Muslims will Egypt stand as a regional model for freedom of religion.