COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Violence in Peru: The Government's Role

Last Friday a brutal clash occurred between Peruvian police attempting to open up a highway and the hundreds of Amazonian indigenous protesters that had been blocking the road for weeks. At least a dozen police and 9 protesters – though possibly many more – were killed during the protests; Saturday brought the discovery of another dozen dead police who had been held hostage by protesters. The protests, which have mobilized a number of different tribes throughout the vast Peruvian Amazon, are based on a series of decree laws issued by the government in the first half of 2008. The protesters perceive that these laws will violate their ancestral territorial rights by opening their lands to resource exploitation. In addition, they were not consulted – as is necessary under international agreements to which Peru is a party, including International Labor Organization Convention 169 – prior to the enactment of the decrees. Thus, their stance was that the laws must be rescinded entirely. The government refused to cede, arguing that the laws were necessary for Peru’s modernization and that the violence was entirely the fault of the protesters. President Alan Garcia has been particularly aggressive in declaring that the violence was the result of a conspiracy carried out by malign forces, both international and domestic, that who do not wish to see Peru advance.

No proof has been offered for what appear to be these absurd accusations. Moreover, while the government is absolutely correct that the killings of the police are unacceptable and must be investigated and perpetrators held accountable, the government’s own attitudes and actions have been determinant during the course of the conflict. President Garcia’s statements, which repeatedly state that the indigenous are being manipulated by outsiders, treat them like sheep and deny them all agency. The government also seems to lack any context – regardless of the content of these specific decrees, the government should be able to understand why a group of people who have been excluded from policy decisions regarding their ancestral lands for hundreds of years might have justifiable suspicions regarding their future. The protesters have undoubtedly made serious mistakes, but the government’s attitude has represented the worst facets of a state that is prone to Lima-centric political fiddling while the jungle (or mountains, or anywhere else outside the capital) burns. Below is the translation of a column from Tuesday’s La Republica in which the well-known, centrist Peruvian political scientist Martin Tanaka provides some of that context.

The State, Organizer of the Protest

Martin Tanaka, La Republica (Lima), 6/9/09

Social organization in the Amazon, like the country as whole, has been marked in recent years by localism and fragmentation. It could be argued that the broad protest movement throughout the Amazon is the consequence of government action: the adoption of the DL [decree laws] without indigenous consultation created the perception that the indigenous way of life was at risk, triggered the memory of historical grievances and feelings of regional exclusion and distance from the state, and laid the foundations for a conflict in which the general identity and dignity of the Amazon was at stake. It also created a common demand (the repeal of the DL) and a single adversary, the central government, which must be addressed. AIDESEP ended up circumstantially channeling these demands, as it was the organization best positioned to lead the demands of the widely heterogeneous groups.

The demand for the repeal of the decrees is also the creation of the state. Since the protests of September of last year and until very recently the government gave signals that it would repeal the decrees in question (like 1090, which was declared unconstitutional by the [congressional] Constitutional Commission on May 20). It was only in recent weeks that the government took the position of defending the constitutionality of the decrees, and proposed a comprehensive revision of these decrees in the PCM [council of ministers].

Too late: the government created the image of having been “rocking” the indigenous peoples. This led to the radicalization of the protests. The violence unleashed as a result of attempting to clear the Fernando Belaunde roadway is also the creation of the state; many leaders in the area are reserve soldiers, former patrolmen and members of self-defense groups, ex-soldiers from Cenepa [ed.: a reference to the brief 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru]. The existence of these capabilities for mobilization explains why the resistance to police action has been so fierce.

The government’s mishandling of the whole situation can help one to understand the ease with which extremist speeches are propagated, irresponsible leaders are exalted, false information is taken as true (such as the information that speaks of the killing of tens or even hundreds of indigenous people), all of which results in the brutal assassination of policemen. Those who sympathize (and we do sympathize) which the demands of the indigenous population should be the first to say clearly that no protest, no matter how just it may be, that confronts a democratic government, however misguided it may be, justifies the murder of unarmed policemen.

The worst thing is that even today the government’s answer continues to create conditions for more protests and violence. The persecution of indigenous leaders, the talk of manipulation, ignorance, misinformation, and the presence of foreign interests only increase the anger and annoyance of the Amazonians. The president of the republic himself has made frankly irresponsible declarations. A path of relaxation, prudence, and dialogue such as that being promoted by the Ombudsman must be opened.

Photo Credit: Flickr user powless

20 Years After Tiananmen, a Different Form of Undermining Democracy

Freedom House has just released a new report, Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, describing the efforts of authoritarian states including China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to sustain their autocratic models and even advance alternatives to democracy in other countries. The report explores how these leading authoritarian regimes are threatening democratic development by promoting repressive policies and manipulating and distorting democratic discourse. Their efforts to redefine – and ultimately empty out – the concept of democracy have not only been pursued within their borders, but have also been exported abroad.

Among the tools that these regimes have used to further their interests internationally, the promotion of “win-win” economic arrangements and “no-strings-attached aid” stand out. In April, we addressed this issue in a blog post about China’s aid policy towards Africa in particular. At the time, we discussed the dangers of championing China’s unique development model, along with the pernicious effects that China’s offers of unconditional aid can have for governance. Because Beijing’s foreign assistance isn’t conditioned on the adoption of reforms and a general respect for human rights, it opens the door for corruption and neglect of the rule of law. Undermining Democracy includes a more comprehensive analysis of China’s foreign assistance efforts, along with those of other authoritarian regimes, analyzing the modern strategies and methods used to project authoritarian influence.

As Undermining Democracy explains, China’s is systematically developing its own brand of “soft power.”  After becoming aware of the necessity of increasing its clout in an increasingly interdependent international system, China began to ramp up efforts to promote its own model of political and economic development in its international relations. Due to China’s impressive economic development, the model is often touted as a superior alternative to Western prescriptions.

As it happens, Undermining Democracy has been released on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. An article in the Financial Times last week traced China’s political trajectory since the crackdown, explaining how China’s Communist Party weathered both extensive criticism and countless predictions of its demise to propel its country to a leading role in the world sphere. As it notes, Chinese officials have ceased to adopt an outwardly apologetic stance towards their more repressive political policies, instead becoming increasingly confident in their model’s superiority over its Western counterpart. Most importantly, it argues that China’s remarkable ability to persevere and prosper can be attributed to its willingness to adapt and modernize. In other words, whereas mere repression might not have been enough to counteract the pre- and post-Tiananmen calls for change, China has survived and flourished due to its policy of economic opening. While these reforms have boosted growth and ameliorated some citizen complaints, more fundamental reforms of accountability and transparency have been absent.

China’s economic success has created a major dilemma for advocates of good governance. This success has obvious appeal as a formula for economic prosperity for struggling developing countries.  Nevertheless, there are some important points to consider. First, by championing the undemocratic Chinese model, the benefits in terms of basic ethics and justice of democratic rule in comparison to China’s oppressive political regime are ignored. The coercive nature of China’s political regime cannot be underemphasized. China is a highly repressive state, which is evidenced by the regime’s dismal human rights record. China has, every year, by far the highest number of executions of any country and has consistently and arbitrarily applied state power to restrict basic freedoms including freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

Secondly, it is important to realize that the Chinese model of adaptation is not the norm. As the Financial Times article notes, China was successfully able to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes and to become aware of the need to “adapt and change or atrophy and die.” If any lessons are to be learned from the past, however, China’s adaption method is the exception: authoritarians are often drawn to the repressive part of the model while ignoring the technocratic, adaptive element. Some but certainly not all developing countries will be able to follow China’s trajectory. For example, in the past few months, Hugo Chavez has frequently praised the comparative advantages of the Chinese model over the Washington Consensus at the same time that he has ramped up his efforts to curb trade union autonomy and freedom of the press in the country.  In addition, Kremlin officials have frequently evoked the Chinese success story to justify Russia’s autocratic policies. In addition to providing these leaders with validation for their despotic ventures, the opportunities the model provides for corrupt practices are extensive, as is evidenced by China’s ranking of 72 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Moreover, it is not just the model in conceptual terms that is a threat to the democratic order, but also China’s means of promoting it. Most notably, China has sought to facilitate the model’s advancement by offering “win-win” economic arrangements to foreign countries and coupling its aid provision with a promise of “non-interference” in domestic affairs. Apart from the African countries listed in our previous post, China has provided unconditional assistance to numerous Latin American countries and several Asian countries, most notably Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, many of which have questionable or downright execrable human rights records. As we noted in our previous post, the negative consequences of providing unconditional aid are a real threat to democratic governance.  As Undermining Democracy argues, these arrangements also threaten democratic development on a greater scale. By framing these new economic relationships in “win-win” terms, China seeks to tarnish the legitimacy of the Western development model, and more particularly the traditional Western requirement that aid be conditional upon reform and respect for human rights standards.

Other contemporary authoritarian regimes have used foreign assistance of one sort or another to exert influence. Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, for instance, have used their oil wealth to court developing nations, leading them to ignore governance reform.  While these active efforts are providing new competition to reform-based assistance, the authoritarians’ approach is not perfect. As Undermining Democracy notes, China’s increasingly powerful position – and even more so the other states – has its own inherent flaws. The global economic crisis, along with other factors, could hamper its efforts to propel the new model; alternatively, discontent at home could herald a loosening of the authoritarian reins. In any case, 20 years after Tiananmen, the Chinese authorities have modernized their authoritarianism and, for the time being at least, offer a serious challenge to the notion that economic growth in China would inevitably lead to political liberalization and sounder governance. 

Thailand's Military: A Constant Amongst Turmoil

Shortly after political unrest rocked Thailand yet again in April, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva quietly transferred several senior military officers who were classmates of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at the Armed Forces Preparatory School to inactive posts. The general public has interpreted the government’s actions as a thinly veiled attempt to eradicate Thaksin’s remaining allies from the country’s political scene. This military reshuffle should come as no surprise, considering the skepticism that has arisen surrounding the military’s response to the April protests. While the military ultimately played an instrumental role in quelling the political violence that shook the nation for three weeks, their loyalty to the government was questioned at various times. These most recent events highlight one of Thailand’s most persistent and troubling rule of law issues: the continued lack of civilian control over the security sector and debilitating impact of this phenomenon on reform efforts.

Thailand’s most recent political chaos erupted when the red-shirted supporters of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a movement that is spearheaded by the self-exiled Thaksin, charged the resort where an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting was to be held, assailed Abhisit’s offices, home, and car, and seized control of a large area in Bangkok’s government district, clashing with adherents of the pro-Abhisit People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) at various points along the way. As the New York Times explains, the fact that Thaksin’s supporters were able to overrun security forces at the easily-protected location of the Asean summit, among other places, raised questions about the military’s allegiance to the Abhisit government. In addition, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul has accused Thaksin's military allies of carrying out an assassination attempt against him on April 17. It has been rumored that Thaksin still has several loyal allies within the military, and the accusations and peculiarities noted above fueled widespread rumors of a possible Thaksin-orchestrated military coup throughout the protests. It is important to note that the security forces eventually contained the violence by surrounding the main protest camp. In response to this, however, UDD protestors accused the military forces of discriminating against them in favor of the PAD, pointing out the fact that military forces failed to use emergency powers to put an end to the PAD’s occupation of Bangkok’s airport last year, which was seemingly a greater security threat. In any case, these events demonstrate that the subordination of the military forces to civilian rule remains subject to constant questioning, while the professional, politically impartial nature of the military is extremely suspect.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report explains, the Thai military and police forces have played an influential and oftentimes deplorable role in the country’s political history. The military has traditionally assumed the role of veto player in Thai politics. Due to the power wielded by Thailand’s military institution, the success of any political regime has been largely determined by military judgment; in short, military approval has translated into political success while disapproval has led to failure, oftentimes in the form of a military-led overthrow. The military’s instrumental role in this process is largely tied to its strong relationship with Thailand’s monarchy. Over the course of Thailand’s history, the two institutions have oftentimes worked together to guide or force Thailand’s political trajectory in their desired direction. From 1932-1992, the military played a direct role in the country’s political process by staging numerous coups, and the security forces retained a prominent position during the rule of Thaksin, with whom they were strongly allied. During his reign, Thaksin, a former police officer, awarded his cronies with key security posts in order to consolidate his control over the security sector and the country. Later on, however, members of the military directly interfered in Thailand’s democratic process yet again by carrying out a coup against Thaksin and installing a former army commander as prime minister. After ruling the country for 15 months following the coup, the military returned to the barracks, although it has continued to play a central role in Thai politics from outside. In fact, Abhisit was propelled to his current position as prime minister in part due to the military’s support.

In many ways, the military’s perennial independence from the government can be easily understood. Thailand has been plagued by political instability for years. Since 2006, the country has been ruled by four different prime ministers, one of whom was a former military commander and two of whom were forced from office for violating provisions of the Constitution.  As such, for the military, allegiance to any of these short-lived, unsteady governments has proved to be both unnecessary and imprudent.  Regardless of this fact, however, the military’s power and politicization has had decidedly negative consequences for governance. First, in addition to wreaking havoc on the electoral process, it has constituted a major impediment to the implementation of much-needed political reforms. As the 2008 Freedom in the World Report notes, it has often been quite difficult for civilian leaders to enact reforms that in any way affect the military’s privileged position and to address some of the remaining repressive laws that were set in place during the recent period of military rule. In other cases, military-fueled unrest has been responsible for foiling plans for reform.  For example, since Abhisit’s election in December of 2008, his reform agenda, which is rooted in the modification of the largely undemocratic constitution, has been rendered impossible to implement by turmoil that has been at least partly exacerbated by Thaksin’s manipulation of the security sector. As the Economist explains, Thaksin counted on several members of the security forces, who for the most part belong to the same classes as the UDD protestors and have demonstrated their partiality towards Thaksin in the past, to abandon Abhisit during the protest.

Secondly, military power has also blocked Abhisit, along with other past prime ministers, from addressing the numerous allegations accusing members of the security forces of committing human rights abuses. Abhisit is in many ways dependent upon the military due to the institution’s political role. Without the military’s support, Abhisit’s position as prime minister would likely become untenable. Thus, appeasing the military is essential. Unfortunately, this situation has seriously negative consequences for rule of law. Over the years, the power of the security forces has provided its members with immunity from judicial prosecution, which has allowed them to commit flagrant human rights violations without punishment. One of the military’s most brutal campaigns was carried out during Thaksin’s 2003 war on drugs. As Human Rights Watch reports, security forces committed an extraordinarily large number of arbitrary killings during this war. In addition, as Amnesty International reports, the military has committed human rights violations including torture throughout the counter-insurgency campaign it has carried out since 2004. Unfortunately, these abuses continue today. The State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report revealed that there were several allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrest being committed by security forces, especially during counter- insurgency efforts. Most recently, security forces have been accused of beating refugees from a minority Muslim group in Myanmar and subsequently casting them out to sea without supplies. While the government has investigated some of these instances, members of the security forces have not been prosecuted for their actions thus far. While Abhisit has promised to address this culture of impunity surrounding military abuses, it is extremely unlikely that he will risk upsetting the military members upon whose support his position depends.

Thus, the lamentable lack of civilian control over the military has had numerous and varied negative effects on governance. Unfortunately, until the current political crisis between anti- and pro-Thaksin factions is resolved, the chances of consolidating civilian control and depoliticizing the military are slim to none. While Thailand’s political situation remains unstable, the military will continue to defy civilian power and exert its influence in myriad ways. As an upshot, the military will retain its ability to commit abuses with impunity.

Photo Credit: Flickr user interactimages

Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

Photo Credit: Flickr user jessicamulley

The Fading Shadow of Brazil's Dictatorship

On April 30, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal abolished the country’s 1967 Press Law after ruling that the law violated constitutional guarantees of free expression. This act, which came into effect during the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1961 and 1985, sought to repress criticism of the dictatorship by setting prison terms of up to 3 years for journalists convicted of defamation crimes. Such crimes were defined in very expansive terms and included “reporting deemed offensive to public morals; reporting that a plaintiff finds damaging to his reputation or offensive to his dignity; reporting that is considered subversive to public and political order; and reporting ‘true’ facts that are considered distorted or provocative.” The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that both during and after the dictatorship, the law was used by businessmen and politicians in thousands of cases to attack critical journalists. As such, the long overdue abolition is a momentous victory for freedom of the press in the country. In addition, it should be viewed as an important accomplishment in the country’s attempt to slowly chip away at the lingering legacies of dictatorship.

Brazil’s military dictatorship left a lasting imprint on the country’s politics and society. The brutal military regime not only passed repressive laws like the one above, but also committed extensive human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and large-scale arbitrary detention during its campaign to suppress a communist guerrilla movement. According to official government tallies, roughly 400 people were killed, 160 were disappeared, and hundreds of others were tortured during the dictatorship. Moreover, Brazil lags far behind its neighbors in its attempts to confront the shrouded events of its military past and unveil the details of the regime’s activities to Brazilian citizens. In 1979, the Brazilian government passed an amnesty law that protected military and public officials and political dissidents from prosecution for crimes committed during the dictatorship. As a result, no one has been prosecuted for human rights offenses committed during the period. In addition, Brazil has not convened a truth commission, nor has the country given a full account of the military regime’s activities, although it did publish a 500 page report on disappearances in 2007. 

The remaining legacies of the dictatorship have had important consequences for governance. Most obviously, laws such as the Press Law have continued to restrict Brazilian civil liberties in the 25 years since the country’s transition to democratic rule. However, the country’s failure to fully address the misdeeds of the dictatorship has had other damaging results. While the military has argued that Brazil’s pacted transition was a reasonable price to pay in order to bring about a peaceful transition to civilian rule, others have argued that allowing the military to maintain their power and escape punishment has hampered the country’s process of democratic consolidation. Most notably, rule of law has suffered. Indeed, one of Brazil’s most troubled governance issues is the ineptitude and corruption of the justice system, which has perpetuated a strong culture of impunity in the country.  Unfortunately, rather than using fair, unbiased human rights trials to build confidence in the justice system (as recently done in Peru, Argentina, and others), the government’s treatment of past crimes has reinforced the culture of
impunity. 

Thus, directly confronting the events of the military dictatorship is crucial to the attainment of a truly democratic future for the country. Fortunately, Brazil’s recent repeal of the Press Law has been accompanied by other steps towards confronting the past. Recently, federal prosecutors have requested that investigations against several individuals suspected of committing human rights violations be carried out. In October 2008, a Sao Paulo civil court found a military colonel civilly responsible for human rights violations committed while serving as director of an intelligence agency. In addition, last week, Brazil launched a website containing information about the events that occurred in the country between 1964 and 1985. The site includes official documents from the dictatorship that are part of the national archives. At its launch, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva acknowledged the link between national reconciliation and the country’s democratic well-being when he proclaimed “We are doing Brazilian democracy a service when we unveil some of the mysteries that persist about our past.” Finally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal is preparing to review the 1979 Amnesty Law in the face of several pending cases that challenge the law’s legitimacy. Among these cases, the court will consider the Brazilian Bar Association’s assertion that the current interpretation of the law erroneously provides for the protection of state agents from prosecution in all cases when in reality, it should not shield them from prosecution for crimes such as torture.

Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts may be ramped up in the future. On April 8, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that amnesties and statutes of limitations should not be applied to crimes against humanity that were committed during Brazil’s dictatorship. This is the first international decision to be made regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil during this era. While the decision is not binding, concerns over international legitimacy and approval may compel Brazil to become more open to a reinterpretation of the amnesty law.

Brazil should be lauded for breaking out of its decades-long resignation to allowing several of the debilitating legacies of the dictatorship to persist.  Nevertheless, the country still has a long road ahead. It has yet to fully open military and police archives to the public, and the active prosecution of human rights offenders is a long way off even if the court rules against the current interpretation of the amnesty law. Not surprisingly, the reinterpretation of this law is a very polemical issue. The Brazilian military, which staunchly opposes all efforts to reinterpret the amnesty law, is an extremely powerful and influential institution. Furthermore, while Lula has taken measures to disclose more information about the military dictatorship to the public, his solicitor general’s office has officially opposed challenges to the law. In recent years Brazil has sought to pose as both a leader and model for developing countries. Confronting the past while strengthening democracy and justice can only improve the country’s standing and add further momentum to a South American success story.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Samory Santos

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

The SSSC: Syria's Rule of Law Black Hole

The Syrian court system recently came into the limelight with a detailed report issued by Human Rights Watch focused specifically on the notorious Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), which prompted a re-examination of Syria by a number of European newspapers such as the Guardian. The primary shift inducing this re-examination is the latest “thaw” in relations between Syria and the western world, and the fear that the power of foreigners to alter Syria’s internal conduct remains uncertain but is likely quite limited. Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, has received a number of very high-profile visitors, including John Kerry, Nicolas Sarkozy, and various EU foreign ministers, yet he continues to judge that due to realpolitik considerations Syria’s external relations will remain the focus of diplomatic engagement. Thus can Bashar continue to defy calls for domestic liberalization, be it political, economic, or social.

The HRW report maintains that the court, which was founded during the state of emergency declared in 1963 and is the lead instrument in Syria’s persecution efforts, continues to incapacitate the rule of law in Syria. More specifically, the SSSC is utilized as political tool to suppress the opposition and political minorities through the use of unjust trials.Coupled with Syria’s emergency decrees, the SSSC is authorized to take any civilian into its military-style system, where any rights the defendant may theoretically have had quickly disappear. The court is exempt from Syria’s rules of criminal procedure. Furthermore, SSSC decisions cannot be appealed to any higher judicial body – a requirement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Syria became a signatory in 1969. Due to the fact that the SSSC was created as an exceptional court, it is accountable solely to the Minister of the Interior.

The frightening amount of power delegated to the court has had serious ramifications for the rule of law. Where the SSSC is concerned, respect for the equality before the law simply does not exist. In fact, the SSSC has been utilized almost exclusively to attack and punish political opponents through the exercise of arbitrary justice. First and foremost, the SSSC has been used to target ‘Islamists,’ but recently the state has set its sights on political activists, including journalists and bloggers. In doing so, the state has ardently attacked freedom of expression in the country.

Persecution of political and human rights activist by the state broadly falls into four classifications: Article 278 is evoked when acts and/or speeches (supposedly) expose Syria to aggressive acts; Article 285 is cited when people (supposedly) weaken national sentiment; Article 286 is evoked for (supposedly) spreading false information that in turn weakens national sentiment; and Article 307 is used for inciting strife between various domestic groups.

Of the recent arrests, the highest profile were those of twelve pro-democracy activists detained last year for having taken part in an anti-government coalition. Habib Saleh received three years for ‘weakening national sentiment’ under Article 285 and ‘broadcasting false or exaggerated news which could affect the morale of the country’ – Article 286. The evidence used against him was a number of internet articles on domestic political issues. Mohammed Amin al-Shawa and nine other men were arrested by military intelligence in August, and five months later, still in military custody, al-Shawa died from torture.

Even the scope of arrests has widened. In the last year even mildly insulting the state, president, or government officials in private conversations, with no political involvement from any party, warrants three year jail sentences.

For the Kurds – 9% of the population – the situation is even direr. The Kurds have been frequently attacked through the SSSC and the greater justice system. The state does not even pretend to serve their needs, and the Kurds’ persecution is conducted on various levels. According to the Human Rights Watch report, the SSSC frequently convicts Kurdish citizens on charges of undertaking “acts, speeches, writings or other means to cut-off part of Syrian land to join it to another country.” Several Kurds have received this sentence after protesting in favor of expanding the rights awarded by the Syrian government to the traditionally marginalized and repressed Kurdish population. This conduct is particularly extreme considering that Syria’s Kurds do not partake in the fierce Islamism the state considers its greatest internal security threat. Both of the most recent Kurdish victims in the state’s judicial system, Hassam Hussein and Mustafa Jum’ah, were arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression and association; neither are bellicose advocates of violent secession – the Syrian state’s primary fear from its Kurdish community. They are merely members of the Kurdish political party: however, as the ruling Ba’ath party is the sole party allowed to operate in Syria, all others are classified as illegal organizations.

Due to the fact that the SSSC exists mainly to carry out these political purges, due process guarantees are foreign concepts within its walls. As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report on Syria explains, legal assistance is often denied to those citizens tried in the security courts. According to the Human Rights Watch report, defendants are often detained for months before being informed of the charges against them. In addition, both during and after their trials, defendants are rarely given the opportunity to consult with their lawyers. The experience of the twelve democracy activists mentioned above serves as evidence of this conduct. According to Amnesty International, the twelve were detained without trial and tortured into signing false confessions, while their lawyers were denied access to the accused and vital information was withheld.

The negative consequences that this dismal situation poses for governance are endless. As long as the SSSC lords over Syria’s judicial system, the rule of law will persist in its weak, debilitated state. Political dissidents, ethnic minorities, and ordinary citizens will continue to be held prisoner to a dangerous, compromised system which is dominated by powerful political puppet-masters. As both the Human Rights Watch and the Countries at the Crossroad reports argue, the only effective and permanent solution to the crisis of justice which has plagued Syria in recent years is the dissolution of the SSSC through the revocation of the state of emergency. While this is certainly a tall order, increased international pressure could go a long way towards getting the ball rolling. This will require patient engagement, but also the willingness to move beyond basic realpolitik concerns and challenge the totality of Syrian misconduct, including inside its own borders.

Photo credit: Flickr user madmonk

Turkey's Slow Road Toward EU Rights Standards

In March, Turkey’s state-run Islamic body announced that it would translate the Koran into Kurdish. Kurds, who comprise at least 12 million of Turkey’s 70 million people, are not a recognized minority in the country. Officially, they are not distinct from the Turkish majority, and expressions of cultural uniqueness are banned. They are discriminated against economically, subject to violence, and may even be jailed for using their language in large groups or on paper. The Koran translation step is thus a positive step, but a small one compared with the changes that will be necessary to bring Kurdish rights to acceptable levels.

Since Turkey began EU accession talks began ten years ago, the EU has published convergence requirements that Turkey must meet, and thus far the country has demonstrated at least some efforts to comply. The requirements include measures for the equality and economic inclusion of Kurds, the defense and education of women, drastically reduced persecution and abuse of the press, and significant reductions in violence perpetrated by the security forces. A look at these issues reveals that in each case the reform record is mixed.

On the first issue, although Kurds and other minorities are still not recognized by the government, the government has created a Kurdish-language channel on state television, along with other programming in languages spoken by unrecognized minorities. Establishing a TV network or enabling the translation of religious texts in Kurdish can be done with a wave of a pen from Ankara. Dismantling systemic de facto and de jure discriminations against Kurds cannot. In the early 1920s, as Turkey took the place of the Ottoman Empire, the principal of national unity was the dominating concern, and no linguistic or cultural differentiation was permitted between the country’s Muslim populations. Since then the government has echoed Brazil’s stance: “What racism? There are no races – we are all the same.” In Turkey, a strongly complicating factor has been the existence of a terrorist separatist movement, the PKK, which has been at war with the government for decades. The group’s activity has provided the government with a rationale for its discrimination. In the name of unity, use of the Kurdish language in official communications or political speeches can result in imprisonment, as can public or printed expressions of support – or even sympathy – for the PKK.

Excessive violence and lengthy prison terms are routine facets of Kurdish affairs in Turkey. In December, a journalist was sentenced to fifteen months in prison for writing that the PKK should not be considered a terrorist organization. While this may be morally objectionable – and groups as diverse as NATO and Human Rights Watch feel the same about the PKK – doing so makes for a questionable criminal offense. Also that month, a court decided that making pro-PKK speeches was functionally equivalent to membership, and convicted an MP of being part of a terrorist organization, for which he will serve ten years in prison. Even more shocking was the government’s violent response to last year’s illegal Kurdish New Year celebrations, which left three people dead and others severely beaten. As remains all too typical of police brutality in Turkey, no investigation was ever carried out. The law also permits children as young as 15 to be tried as adults, and in 2006-2007 almost 200 children under 18 were convicted. Despite the efforts of Ankara’s EU accession ministry, the government’s encouragement and condoning of abuses remains well-documented.

With respect to women’s rights, the European Commission’s enlargement commissioner praised a new women’s rights bill, but said it had yet to be implemented in any meaningful way. Women’s rights in Turkey have been subject to similar lip-service improvements, although conditions have improved somewhat. The EC concedes that the legal framework for protecting women’s rights represents real progress. Ankara has had difficulty convincing the rest of the country to follow the law, however. Especially in poorer, rural, religious areas tradition has tended to triumph over law. The ban on “honor killings” – where a woman or girl is killed by her brother or father to cleanse the family after she has been raped or has refused to marry – has resulted in a dramatic increase in so-called suicides, which run from family coercion to murder concealed with the help of local authorities. This is not to say that no progress at all has been made – the existence of these laws is certainly an improvement over their absence, and the gender gap in education has narrowed to 2.3%. Nonetheless, the country has far to travel by both EU and international human rights standards.

As far as media freedom, violence and politically-motivated charges and detentions against journalists and civilians actually increased markedly in 2008. In December, Turkey opened the negotiation chapter with the EU on “information society and media.” This has always been a sensitive topic in Turkey, whose laws on insulting Turkey, Turkishness, the government, or Ataturk have been used to imprison and intimidate countless journalists, authors, and other public figures. According to BIA Media Monitoring, International PEN, and Reporters Without Borders, 2008 saw a marked increase in censorship and charges against writers. The sincerity of Turkey’s commitment to European standards of freedom of speech is thus particularly questionable. Even more disturbing is a fine of nearly $500 million levied by the government on Dogan Media. It is hard not to connect the penalty to Prime Minister Erdogan’s months of verbal attacks on the company, which published detailed accusations of corruption against the PM and his AK party.

As many analysts have noted, Turkey’s hopes of joining the EU anytime in the medium-term seem rather implausible for reasons unrelated to internal rights, including the status of Turkish-controlled Cyprus and the fear of admitting a majority-Muslim state to the EU. However, the Turkish government would certainly help its cause, while at the same time moving toward compliance with international human rights treaties to which it is a party, by continuing the reform process. Some of the aforementioned progress in Ankara is unprecedented – the government has never before guaranteed women’s rights or promoted use of the Kurdish language. Yet they remain superficial. Thus, those concerned with tolerance and pluralism in Turkey must hope that where ethical-moral calls for change have failed, geopolitical interest will be successful.

Will the Rule of Law Apply to All Bolivians?

On March 7, a mob of Bolivians occupied the home of Victor Hugo Cardenas, an indigenous politician who served as vice president under former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. The group, which justified the action as an expropriation based on a provision of the new constitution requiring that land holdings serve a social function, also acted roughly with Cardenas’ wife and children. The mob explicitly stated that they specifically targeted Cardenas due to his opposition to the new constitution. The responses of government officials to this seizure have been contradictory and unclear thus far. High-level officials including Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and Deputy Interior Minister Marcos Farfan, however, have implied or stated outright their support for the action. Unfortunately, the incident is but one in a series of occurrences that have observers – even those sympathetic to the Morales administration – scratching their heads regarding the government’s relationship with the rule of law.

In the Cardenas case, indigenous Bolivians determined that the provision on land holdings gave them the green light to apply indigenous communal justice. While it is certainly important to protect the rights of the traditionally exploited indigenous majority, it is very much in the Bolivian government’s own interest that a line be drawn between community justice and mob rule. As a previous post explains, numerous lynchings have been carried out in the name of communal justice. This is in large a product of the lack of an effective state-run judicial system in the countryside, and is by no means unique to Bolivia. While the government has consistently ruled that lynchings cannot be considered a permissible form of communal justice, the will to investigate and punish perpetrators has been lacking, thereby providing ammunition to opposition members who argue that under MAS rule the less progressive elements of community justice will be extended throughout the country.

Another complaint concerns the lack of respect for basic judicial procedures and protections. Since last fall, the situation has been especially troubling. The most egregious violation of habeas corpus transpired during and after the infamous Pando Massacre of September 11, when the government was justifiably preoccupied with apprehending both material and intellectual perpetrators. In the days after the incident, police forces arrested 14 participants in the conflict without showing a court order and used violence both during the initial arrest and the resulting confinement.  In February, months after the massacre, several additional Pando residents were questionably detained. In an ironic twist, the tactics bear an uncanny resemblance to administration those used in the past by anti-drug units against coca growers –many of whom now staff the administration.

Bolivia’s respect for the principle of equality before the law has also been suspect. Since Morales’ election, opposition members have been targeted on a consistent basis. This has frequently played itself out at the upper echelons of Bolivia’s government. Investigations have been initiated into the conduct of several of Bolivia’s former presidents.  Some of the accusations made by Morales and the MAS are plausible (the case against former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada is probably the best example). In several cases, however, allegations have seemed shaky at best and politically motivated at worst. The investigation into former President Eduardo Rodriguez’s involvement in the destruction of Bolivian anti-aircraft missiles in 2006 is illustrative.  While the details of the mysterious transfer of 28 missiles to the United States for destruction are still hazy, Morales immediately called for the indictment of Rodriguez, a well-regarded former head of the judiciary with center-right leanings, on charges of treason.

In addition to former presidents, members of the high courts have been frequently beleaguered when they have protected the rights of opposition members instead of bowing to the wishes of the MAS.  For example, when the Supreme Court ruled that the arrest of Governor Leopoldo Fernandez and others in connection with the Pando massacre was illegal, the government responded by initiating an investigation of two of the Court’s Justices for aiding a fugitive. More recently, the MAS has moved to investigate Justice Eddy Fernandez, the current head of the judiciary, for delaying judicial proceedings in the cases against opposition members including former Minister of Health Tonchy Marinkovic and former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.

In response, the opposition has accused the MAS of undermining the justice system. They certainly have a strong case: as there is currently no quorum in the Constitutional Tribunal, the country’s highest legal authority, the court has been inactive during a period in which numerous pressing constitutional questions have arisen. The Supreme Court also is just one vacancy away from being inquorate; in the case of neither court has the government shown any interest in appointing replacements. The unstated goal is likely to be delay until justices can be elected, as provided for in the new constitution. However, the willingness to allow such prolonged institutional paralysis seems to symbolize the Morales administration’s highly ambivalent attitude toward separation of powers and the rule of law.

The chaos currently shaking the foundations of Bolivia’s rule of law is largely rooted in the inability or unwillingness of President Evo Morales and the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party to work within the confines of the country’s political system. In the early 2000s, the MAS was created to challenge a preexisting institutional framework which perpetuated the exclusion of the indigenous majority. Resistance and opposition are at the very core of the party. Thus the generous interpretation of the crisis is that Morales, the embodiment of this social movement, has yet to break free from his confrontational cocalero mentality in favor of a more accommodating approach. The less generous take – offered daily by the opposition – is that the MAS is simply an authoritarian movement. Either way, the result is the persistence of sharp divisions between MAS supporters and Bolivians residing in the opposition stronghold known as the Media Luna.

Thus far, Morales has proved reluctant to adapt himself and his party to the formal workings of government under both constitutions old and new. He has been loath to negotiate with or appease the opposition in any way. At the government level, conflict and debate within the congress have been quite heated. In some cases, Morales has even threatened to bypass Congress in order to implement his agenda. For example, before the new constitution was approved, Morales declared his intention to implement the document’s new provisions through the use of decrees if the Congress should prove uncooperative. At other times, the MAS has utilized the cerco to exert pressure on the Congress.  More specifically, the bases of the MAS have surrounded the Congress in order to impel members to vote in favor of such measures as the Constitutional referendum proposal. In the most extreme cases, the MAS rank and file blocked opposition members from entering the building. To be fair, however, the opposition has often been just as disobliging and hostile throughout these deliberations. Nonetheless, the use of coercive tactics, aside from its essential ethical and legal shortcomings, can easily become an irresistable temptation that creates a downward spiral.

The administration seems to have adopted a “we must destroy the institutions in order to save them” stance. The rule of law in Bolivia cannot begin to be protected and enhanced unless President Morales and the MAS send clearer signals that they embrace the concept. An unwillingness to demonstrate magnanimity even at notably strong moments, may even be counterproductive, insofar as it contributes to further polarization and gives the opposition the opportunity to adopt a mantle of democratic righteousness. Despite the violence, judicial inefficiency, and general disorder that has gripped the nation in recent times, Bolivia’s problems are not unresolvable. The compromise on the draft constitution, despite its less than ideal conditions (see above), proved that common ground is possible. For any country with aspirations of progress, however, some things are nonnegotiable. Until Bolivia decides that the rule of law is a priority, the prospects of sustained success will remain cloudy at best.

Photo credit: Flickr user germeister

The Challenge of Bangladesh's Combustible Security Forces

The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutiny that started on the morning of February 25th – less than 2 months after Sheikh Hasina assumed the office of Prime Minister – has a myriad of implications for Bangladesh. Not only is it a security threat to the state, but it reflects the troubled civil-military relations that have plagued the nation since its independence.

The demands of the mutineers were relatively simple and primarily involved a rectification of their subordinate position vis-a-vis the military. As it stands, the 67,000-man force is tasked with defending Bangladesh’s borders and is classified as a paramilitary organisation. As a result – and in contrast to the army – it is not permitted to be deployed under the UN banner for peacekeeping operations, for which soldiers receive a substantial pecuniary benefit. Furthermore, the BDR is led by army officers seconded to it, who have commensurately little institutional loyalty. Consequently, the ranks of the BDR complain that these officers ignore their grievances and exclude them from special privileges. The BDR claim that the mutiny was a result of these pent-up frustrations.

The immediate result of the mutiny was an estimated death toll of 74, overwhelmingly comprised of officers, but including the wife of the commander of the BDR. Many of the bodies were found in collective graves, mutilated, indicating far more than a surgical decapitation of the officers against whom grievances had arisen. Furthermore, the vast scale of the mutiny means that it cannot be seen as a haphazard attack against a single set of callous officers, but a coordinated rebellion. That the mutiny occurred with seemingly no warning is a sign of a catastrophic intelligence failure in the Bangladeshi security services

The BDR has a rich history and tradition, even compared to centuries-old European units. It is held in very high esteem in South Asia as a professional force dating back to 1795 when the British East India Company formed the Ramgarh Local Battalion, and as the East Pakistan Rifles it fought with great gallantry in 1971 during the war of independence against Pakistan, for which it has earned the nation’s heart, and the nickname The Vigilant Sentinels of Our National Frontier.

The BDR’s continued status as a paramilitary force has two advantages for the state. As it is controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs it represents a significant military asset not controlled by the army – already rumors are rife that the mutiny was engineered by Sheikh Hasina to rid the BDR of its army officers, and so create a private army for her. As a separate issue, the BDR’s role in guarding Bangladesh’s border with India is a highly contentious issue as there are frequent skirmishes between the BDR and India’s Border Security Force (BSF). Stories of the BSF’s incursions into Bangladesh are ubiquitous in the local press, causing outrage and helping provoke the skirmishes between the two forces. These are sources of serious problems between the two nations, but the BDR’s and BSF’s statuses as a paramilitary forces provide insulation against involving their respective militaries proper – potentially leading to full-scale war.

After subduing the mutineers by calling in the army, Sheikh Hasina has requested the combined expertise of the FBI and Britain’s Scotland Yard as there has emerged a seemingly widespread opinion that the revolt was not merely over pay, but a part of a larger attack aimed at toppling government. The government’s use of outside help in this matter has two important consequences. Hopefully, it means that the findings of the investigation will not be swept under the carpet to be used at a later date against political opponents, but will become public knowledge. This could increase the current government’s international standing. However, it also signals that the government does not believe itself to be strong enough to deal with the threat by itself, and the military will be watching anxiously.

The military has a history of taking control when civilian incompetence begins to severely threaten the state, not always with the disapproval of the populace. Indeed, the January 2007 army-backed takeover from the previous civilian government was met with widespread gratitude by citizens tired of feuding politicians. Under the latter’s aegis corruption had risen to crippling levels, with Transparency International labeling Bangladesh the globe’s most corrupt country for five years. The caretaker government declared the rooting out of corruption to be their foremost aim, and the anticorruption campaign’s perceived (though questionable) success meant that following the coup the top echelons of the military had an excuse to drag their heels on relinquishing even indirect control in favor of a civilian government. Essentially, a military that sees civilian governments as breeding corruption to such an extent as to endanger the state is a military over which it is difficult to assert civilian control.

Sheikh Hasina is certainly an embodiment of this fear. She had a very turbulent relationship with the previous military-backed caretaker government. During its reign Hasina was accused of extortion, leading to her being barred from entering the country in mid-2007 and subsequently arrested in July. Similar charges were leveled at her principal political opponent, Khaleda Zia. The fact that the entire episode represented the military’s efforts to rid Bangladesh of the two personalities that have fought over the nation for decades, rather than any action targeting solely Sheikh Hasina, does little to mitigate the poor relations between Hasina and the military.

The current crisis, coming so soon after the return of a truly independent civilian government will be incredibly frustrating for the military establishment, whose fears have been confirmed once again. Besides the momentary collapse of Bangladesh’s borders, allowing free rein for smugglers, many of the BDR fled once the army were deployed against them, removing heaps of weapons and military grade explosives. They were followed by local criminal groups who likewise looted the various BDR compounds, and it is feared that these weapons will be sold on the black market to Bangladesh’s Islamist groups.

Sheikh Hasina’s government needs to move quickly to fulfill its duties and gain the public’s confidence, or there is a strong possibility that the military will retake control. That would be catastrophic for attempts at the consolidation of civilian supremacy in Bangladesh, and next time around the army not give up power so easily again. Given Bangladesh’s staggering array of social, economic, and political challenges, this fluidity regarding the most basic facets of governance bodes poorly for policy coherence going forward.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Russell John