COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Former Army Chief Poses Surprising Challenge in Upcoming Sri Lankan Elections

Photo Credit: flickr user foto.rajith

On Sunday, General Sarath Fonseka, the former chief of Sri Lanka’s army, officially announced his candidacy for the country’s presidency, challenging current President Mahinda Rajapaksa, General Fonseka’s wartime partner. Referring to the current president as a “tin-pot dictator,” Fonseka in his announcement promised to “scrap the executive presidency within six months, hold parliamentary elections and adopt a new constitution that will uphold democracy, social justice and media freedoms.” With these words, Fonseka has presented an unexpected and potentially viable competition in the January 26th elections.

The contest will be held in a political climate dominated by the end, last May, of the decades-long war between the government and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE – commonly called the Tamil Tigers) – a war which intensified greatly after Rajapaksa came to power in 2005. By stepping up the campaign, Rajapaksa managed to defeat the rebel group and kill almost all of its leaders. The war’s conclusion, however, was accompanied by a large increase in human rights abuses and persistent allegations that the president was becoming more authoritarian, including by stifling dissent and condoning violent attacks against his opponents. His administration’s attitude toward freedom of the press has worsened from an already less-than-laudable situation: the state dominates the media sector, using highly restrictive slander and libel laws to prevent media criticism of public officials and failing to protect journalists from harassment, intimidation, and, increasingly, physical attacks.

Additionally, as Fonseka implied in his announcement, during his tenure as president Rajapaksa has centralized considerable power in the hands of him and his brothers. Though Sri Lanka’s constitution, which is modeled on the French constitution, does not outline a clear division of power between the three branches of government, Rajapaksa has created an executive branch with much more sweeping powers than its predecessors. His brothers hold major government posts, and effectively most controls over decision making and public spending are in Rajapaksa’s and his brothers’ hands. Rajapaksa has ignored Supreme Court rulings, usurped the powers of the constitutional council, and directly appointed loyalists to important posts in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the police force. In his announcement on Sunday, Fonseka indicated that he intends to limit executive rule.

Rajapaksa has also failed to address the Tamil grievances that contributed to the strength and duration of the Tigers’ insurgency. In order to unify the country in the postwar era, analysts argue that the Sri Lankan government must go beyond freeing Tamils from camps for the internally displaced and take more long-term steps, like repealing the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which allows for the detention of LTTE suspects without legal representation or safeguards, or establish a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate the final weeks of the war.

Fonseka is not without his own potential vulnerabilities on rights questions; indeed, critics protest that his military strategy killed thousands of civilians. However, although he is perceived as sympathetic to nationalist groups, in his speech Fonseka attempted to undermine the president’s populist appeal by condemning the poor conditions of the displaced persons camps in which tens of thousands of Tamils remain, promising to shift more power from the presidency to the parliament, and accusing Rajapaksa of failing to bring together the country after the war’s end. By bringing the grievances of the Tamils to the forefront, Fonseka may be able to gain an advantage among voters who fear the insurgency will return should Tamil grievances remain unaddressed.

At the same time, even though Fonseka provides a glimmer of hope for the Sri Lankan opposition, President Rajapaksa perceives that the defeat of the LTTE will carry him through another election, as long as the balloting happens soon. While the elections were scheduled for November 2011, Rajapaksa signed a decree last month to hold elections in January 2010 in order to maximize political gains from his current popularity. The majority of his support comes from the Sinhalese-dominated south, where, according to the Washington Post, army families sang songs calling him king following the victory over the Tigers. However, dissent against Rajapaksa exists—thousands of protesters marched in November, pointing to encroaching dictatorship, increasing corruption, and a sinking economy.

Though Fonseka’s announcement on Sunday was the first time he formally announced his candidacy, his potential challenge was no secret. Like the president, Fonseka has the victory of the civil war to count on. According to the New York Times, Fonseka’s wartime strategy struck “a mortal blow” to the Tamil army. And his retirement from his post in November, more than a month before the end of his term, prompted rampant rumors that the general would compete in next year’s elections. His letter announcing his retirement to President Rajapaksa was not greeted warmly; though Fonseka requested to retire on December 1st, Rajapaksa said Fonseka could pack his bags and be out two days later, minus his security detail and official residence. The pair’s relations had been strained since the end of the war, when Rajapaksa placed Fonseka in a largely ceremonial post, leading Fonseka to accuse Rajapaska of sidelining him and suspecting him of plotting a coup.

Fonseka appears to have a substantial following, providing a surprising dose of choice in a country that is often seen as subject to increasingly personalized rule. According to the Washington Post, Fonseka’s Facebook page is covered in messages of “adulation,” including a mock billboard that bore a striking resemblance to the famous Barack Obama “Hope” poster. When rumors arose that Fonseka would appear on the ballot, the country’s other political forces sprouted up to claim him for their own. Former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP) hinted that Fonseka would be their candidate, and urged the Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to support the UNP’s bid. However, the JVP wants Fonseka for itself, and the TNA has not declared their support for the general. As a party that was once seen as a proxy for the Tamil Tigers, they have a history of antipathy toward Fonseka, even having once deployed a suicide bomber to assassinate him.

Signs indicate that Fonseka will not win without a fight, but Rajapaksa already appears nervous. In a particularly lurid manifestation of this insecurity, the president had the nation’s most popular astrologer jailed for nine days this summer for being a threat to national security after the astrologer predicted that Rajapaksa would be kicked out of office or killed. Moreover, after Fonseka criticized the “appalling conditions” of the camps and hinted that he would focus on the treatment of those living there, the Sri Lankan government freed hundreds of thousands of Tamils on December 1. Knowing that even a relatively small Tamil turnout could swing the vote in January, this could be a calculated step on the part of Rajapaksa to attract some of those votes, or at least defuse the issue as a political hot button. Either way, the future of Sri Lankan politics now looks more unpredictable than was anticipated just a few short months ago.

Can Incremental Change Turn the Tide in Tumultous Pakistan?

Photo Credit: Flickr user U.S. Department of State

In July and August, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, announced two high-profile reform initiatives to improve governance: an electronic governance program and a wide-ranging reform of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The E-governance initiative envisages the computerization of government services from voting to the viewing of land records, thereby increasing the ease and frequency of people’s interaction with the state and promoting transparency and reliability. The reform of the FATA is a far more ambitious project as those regions have previously had a centralized regime with political activity banned, a system reminiscent of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. Zardari plans to bring the population of the territory into the mainstream political system by allowing them to join and vote for parties and ending particularly hard-edged tribal measures such as detention without trial and communal punishment.

These are indeed significant strides, but it is debatable whether Zardari, with limited experience in public service and political capital stemming mainly from his status as the widower of the assassinated Benazir Bhutto, will be able to successfully implement such ambitious changes. Expectations were low at the onset of his presidency. Even though Zardari publicly expressed his commitment to gradual democratization during and after his presidential campaign, he is widely believed to have forsaken the Charter of Democracy, which was the outcome of a May 2006 meeting between Bhutto and her long-time political rival, Nawaz Sharif. In that meeting, they established common ground against the Pervez Musharraf-led military junta, including rescinding the power of the president and ending the executive appointment of judges. Zardari has officially signed on to this agreement, but has taken no steps to implement it. One of the primary issues is Article 58(2)(b): allowing for the dissolution of the National Assembly and sacking of the prime minister by the president. Zardari has deemed the internal security situation too serious for this and other powers of the president to be stripped and fears that restoring the judiciary would undermine his rule. Another hallmark of the military’s rule that has stayed fully implemented are the oaths of loyalty extracted from judges, a controversial step initiated by Musharraf in 2007. Furthermore, Zardari’s mindset brings him into frequent conflict with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, who is unenthusiastic about Zardari’s policies and appointment of friends with no political experience into important positions.

In addition to adopting this undedicated approach to democratic reform, Zardari has implemented several policies with distinctly authoritarian features. For example, he recently passed the Cyber Crimes Act, under which jokes that insult the political leadership electronically can be traced and the people responsible prosecuted. Furthermore, Zardari’s decision to authorize the use of force against protestors demonstrating in favor of the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to his post earlier this year also raised eyebrows.

If there is one area where Zardari’s influence is more positive, it is his view of Pakistan’s security situation. Zardari is not immersed in the military’s security culture, which has centered on India as Pakistan’s primary adversary to such a degree that tolerance and even cooperation with militant groups has been notoriously common. Zardari, whether out of conviction or in response to international admonitions, has shown greater signs than did Musharraf of understanding that the primary threat to the government may in fact come from within and internal militants must be confronted. However, it has yet to be seen whether his viewpoint will be translated into effective action; while the Pakistani security forces have made some strides in reclaiming the Swat valley from militants and putting pressure on radical forces in South Waziristan, the prospects of improving governance enough to make these gains sustainable remains uncertain at best.

To make matters worse for the population, the economy has come close to complete collapse since 2008, with the agricultural sector – which provides employment for 44% of the workforce – taking especially severe hits in the last two decades due to economic modernization as well as crop failure in 2007-2008. Combined with the political instability that has ravaged the country this decade, both GDP and the nation’s exports have fallen significantly. Though this is not entirely Zardari’s fault, there has been a marked absence of plans for agricultural reform or the building of infrastructure, and many segments of the population, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas, are slowly falling back upon remittances sent by family working abroad to live. According to Minister of Finance Shaukat Tarin, this lack of planning is largely the result of bureaucratic mismanagement. More specifically, Shaukat argues that “there’s no performance management…no merit, a lot of nepotism.”

This economic decline has only been exacerbated by rampant corruption. Two examples in particular of companies being stripped of their assets are the crashes of Pakistan Steel and Pakistan International Airlines, both great domestic successes whose resources were whittled away. The downfall of these two companies was largely brought about by the corrupt practices of the government cronies who made up their upper management. For firms with looser government ties, corruption, and more particularly graft, is an equally destructive problem. A recent World Bank report found that “Corruption…is largely associated with the business-government interface…it is common for firms in Pakistan to pay informal payments to government officials to get things done.” The report noted that 57% of Pakistani firms consider corruption to be a severe constraint. Unfortunately, Zardari has not made a dedicated effort to tackle this destructive governance scourge since taking office. Under Zardari’s tenure, investigation into corruption allegations, especially those stemming from Musharraf’s reign, has been negligible. Alarmingly, both foreign assistance and internal funding for social welfare programs have also been lost to corruption. A recent Foreign Policy article reported that U.S. aid has enriched officials in the Pakistani army and intelligence service, whose influence in the country has enabled them to form their own powerful patronage networks, rather than contributing to the building of a stronger civilian government with greater control over these institutions. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International ranked Pakistan a dismal 134 out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perception Index.

As the above shows, Zardari has yet to take the steps necessary to achieve qualitative government improvements. As such, while the passage of new governance reforms is in itself encouraging, the chances that the E-governance initiative and the FATA reforms will be fully carried out, let alone bring about real change, is questionable. Zardari’s dubious degree of dedication, along with his understandable preoccupation with the country’s worsening security situation, suggests that these initiatives may well join others on the long list of Pakistan’s stalled reform efforts.

Post-conflict Sri Lanka Faces Serious Governance Deficit

Upon the May 19th death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government jubilantly announced the end of a 25-year civil war and the dawn of a new era of peace. Prior to the death of their leader, even the most pessimistic of analysts had already admitted that the LTTE could not have continued their conventional war against the state’s forces following the latter’s decisive winter offensive and would revert back to guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. With their tactical defeat on the battlefield and loss of their top leaders, the LTTE, one of the most infamous militant groups in the world, has been thoroughly crushed. However, the task ahead for the Sri Lankan government will now only become more intricate and complicated if it wants a stable peace.

In brief, although the conflict between the LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated government has been raging on-and-off since 1983, it has become particularly severe since the Sri Lankan foreign minister was assassinated in August 2005 and a bellicose government took over three months later under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Three years later, government troops began to make headway into LTTE-controlled territory and gradually routed the rebels over the subsequent six months. The war, and especially the government’s most recent campaign, has been devastating on the Tamil population, leaving nearly 10,000 dead and a third of a million displaced. The Tamil population arrives into camps where they are relentlessly terrorised, abducted, and murdered. Not only are the physical needs of this group pressing, but if the government does not move quickly in the restitution of their property and reconstruction of their houses, bitter resentment at perceived foot-dragging could poison inter-ethnic relations for years. As such, the government’s attention must immediately shift to the issue of resettlement, along with the restoration of the civil liberties that were gradually repressed by the state to free its hands in the conflict, such as media freedom and minority rights.

One lesson that could be drawn from the Balkans is the importance of investing in the local economy to boost town level businesses and allow the IDPs to fully participate in the nation’s recovery. Sri Lanka has experienced notable growth, with per capita income at US $1,350; however, the majority of the Tamil areas are destitute from war and politically motivated government investment. As a result, 70% of the 190,000 Tamils in the north live below the poverty line. To make matters worse, the state has blocked Red Cross and other agencies from accessing certain areas in the north, and rejected offers of aid from other private companies, citing national pride.

Besides the immediate physical concerns of the Tamils and the need to put the community back onto its feet, the government must also deal with the fact that, inexcusable abuses aside, they enjoyed extensive support. The nation’s political divisions must be settled rapidly or the Tamils will, in time, once again rebel – and the odds are strong that recalcitrant factions will continue to stage terror attacks, which could be used by the regime to justify a continued hard line toward all Tamils. Indeed, strong government initiative to promote reconciliation looks unlikely. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to power on a position of ending the peace process, has reverted back to using the term ‘devolution’ when referring to any political change that may occur, rather than the ‘federalism’ that  Tamils consider a prerequisite for peace but Colombo rejects because it is perceived as the first step to independence. Besides the topic of how much power the Tamils will be able to exercise, there is disagreement about whether the two Tamil areas in the eastern and northern parts will be able to unite to form one political entity. This would enhance their negotiating position vis-à-vis Colombo in any future issue, but is naturally opposed by the government.

Perhaps equally pertinent to the future of governance in the country, there are also issues of profound importance that the government has gradually pushed aside in favor of waging war. Now, with the end of formal hostilities, infringements on civil rights and media freedoms and corruption in public affairs can no longer be dismissed. The most important of these is the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act which allows suspects to be detained without charge indefinitely; furthermore, these suspects have no right to even contact an attorney or family member once incarcerated. According to the Freedom in the World Report, provisions of this act have allowed Sri Lankan security to abduct, detain, and torture hundreds of political activists, journalists, and Tamil civilians for acts of terrorism, which are very broadly defined by the 1979 act. This legislation is coupled with the overwhelming power of the president, who controls the judiciary and uses the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. The media has likewise been attacked by the state, most notoriously just this January, when armed men raided private TV networks and an editor was assassinated by what is widely believed to be government-sponsored gangs that targeted ‘pro-Tamil’ people and organisations. In actuality this simply means that they were against the manner in which the state waged its war. The government’s view of such dissent can be summarised in the statistic that Sri Lanka holds the record for the highest number of disappearances reported to the UN.

Another visible aspect of Sri Lanka’s distorted governance is the prevalence of corruption, a major issue that has severely restricted the country’s growth. As in most countries, its true extent is hard to calculate; however, what one can certainly discern is the utter lack of institutional safeguards. Even the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption has remained ineffective. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa’s popularity will likely soar in tandem with his forces’ advance, and efforts to curb such activity will likely fail in the short-term. Furthermore, considering Colombo’s disdain for international condemnation, there is little one can do without reinforcing criticism with financial incentives and punishments. However, with the crucial justification of fighting a war gone, the government will need to eventually adjust its policies or risk open revolt and pariah state status.

Photo Credit: Flickr user jessicamulley

The Challenge of Bangladesh's Combustible Security Forces

The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutiny that started on the morning of February 25th – less than 2 months after Sheikh Hasina assumed the office of Prime Minister – has a myriad of implications for Bangladesh. Not only is it a security threat to the state, but it reflects the troubled civil-military relations that have plagued the nation since its independence.

The demands of the mutineers were relatively simple and primarily involved a rectification of their subordinate position vis-a-vis the military. As it stands, the 67,000-man force is tasked with defending Bangladesh’s borders and is classified as a paramilitary organisation. As a result – and in contrast to the army – it is not permitted to be deployed under the UN banner for peacekeeping operations, for which soldiers receive a substantial pecuniary benefit. Furthermore, the BDR is led by army officers seconded to it, who have commensurately little institutional loyalty. Consequently, the ranks of the BDR complain that these officers ignore their grievances and exclude them from special privileges. The BDR claim that the mutiny was a result of these pent-up frustrations.

The immediate result of the mutiny was an estimated death toll of 74, overwhelmingly comprised of officers, but including the wife of the commander of the BDR. Many of the bodies were found in collective graves, mutilated, indicating far more than a surgical decapitation of the officers against whom grievances had arisen. Furthermore, the vast scale of the mutiny means that it cannot be seen as a haphazard attack against a single set of callous officers, but a coordinated rebellion. That the mutiny occurred with seemingly no warning is a sign of a catastrophic intelligence failure in the Bangladeshi security services

The BDR has a rich history and tradition, even compared to centuries-old European units. It is held in very high esteem in South Asia as a professional force dating back to 1795 when the British East India Company formed the Ramgarh Local Battalion, and as the East Pakistan Rifles it fought with great gallantry in 1971 during the war of independence against Pakistan, for which it has earned the nation’s heart, and the nickname The Vigilant Sentinels of Our National Frontier.

The BDR’s continued status as a paramilitary force has two advantages for the state. As it is controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs it represents a significant military asset not controlled by the army – already rumors are rife that the mutiny was engineered by Sheikh Hasina to rid the BDR of its army officers, and so create a private army for her. As a separate issue, the BDR’s role in guarding Bangladesh’s border with India is a highly contentious issue as there are frequent skirmishes between the BDR and India’s Border Security Force (BSF). Stories of the BSF’s incursions into Bangladesh are ubiquitous in the local press, causing outrage and helping provoke the skirmishes between the two forces. These are sources of serious problems between the two nations, but the BDR’s and BSF’s statuses as a paramilitary forces provide insulation against involving their respective militaries proper – potentially leading to full-scale war.

After subduing the mutineers by calling in the army, Sheikh Hasina has requested the combined expertise of the FBI and Britain’s Scotland Yard as there has emerged a seemingly widespread opinion that the revolt was not merely over pay, but a part of a larger attack aimed at toppling government. The government’s use of outside help in this matter has two important consequences. Hopefully, it means that the findings of the investigation will not be swept under the carpet to be used at a later date against political opponents, but will become public knowledge. This could increase the current government’s international standing. However, it also signals that the government does not believe itself to be strong enough to deal with the threat by itself, and the military will be watching anxiously.

The military has a history of taking control when civilian incompetence begins to severely threaten the state, not always with the disapproval of the populace. Indeed, the January 2007 army-backed takeover from the previous civilian government was met with widespread gratitude by citizens tired of feuding politicians. Under the latter’s aegis corruption had risen to crippling levels, with Transparency International labeling Bangladesh the globe’s most corrupt country for five years. The caretaker government declared the rooting out of corruption to be their foremost aim, and the anticorruption campaign’s perceived (though questionable) success meant that following the coup the top echelons of the military had an excuse to drag their heels on relinquishing even indirect control in favor of a civilian government. Essentially, a military that sees civilian governments as breeding corruption to such an extent as to endanger the state is a military over which it is difficult to assert civilian control.

Sheikh Hasina is certainly an embodiment of this fear. She had a very turbulent relationship with the previous military-backed caretaker government. During its reign Hasina was accused of extortion, leading to her being barred from entering the country in mid-2007 and subsequently arrested in July. Similar charges were leveled at her principal political opponent, Khaleda Zia. The fact that the entire episode represented the military’s efforts to rid Bangladesh of the two personalities that have fought over the nation for decades, rather than any action targeting solely Sheikh Hasina, does little to mitigate the poor relations between Hasina and the military.

The current crisis, coming so soon after the return of a truly independent civilian government will be incredibly frustrating for the military establishment, whose fears have been confirmed once again. Besides the momentary collapse of Bangladesh’s borders, allowing free rein for smugglers, many of the BDR fled once the army were deployed against them, removing heaps of weapons and military grade explosives. They were followed by local criminal groups who likewise looted the various BDR compounds, and it is feared that these weapons will be sold on the black market to Bangladesh’s Islamist groups.

Sheikh Hasina’s government needs to move quickly to fulfill its duties and gain the public’s confidence, or there is a strong possibility that the military will retake control. That would be catastrophic for attempts at the consolidation of civilian supremacy in Bangladesh, and next time around the army not give up power so easily again. Given Bangladesh’s staggering array of social, economic, and political challenges, this fluidity regarding the most basic facets of governance bodes poorly for policy coherence going forward.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Russell John

Pakistan's Long-Brewing Political Showdown

Three days of violence in Pakistan’s Punjab province was the popular reaction to the Supreme Court’s barring of ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from politics last week. The ruling was generally viewed as a blatantly political act by an unpopular and unconstitutional court that is beholden to President Asif Ali Zardari, who broke a campaign promise to restore an independent Supreme Court.

In the Asian Human Rights Commission’s report on the year 2008 in Pakistan, the Commission describes the popular resistance to the Supreme Court and the Zardari administration that has been building since ex-strongman Pervez Musharraf dismissed nine of the fourteen Supreme Court Justices in late 2007. Last year’s parliamentary elections, the first credible elections in Pakistan in a decade, were supposed to mark a return to the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, Zardari made written promises before his election in September that he would restore the 2007 court within 30 days of taking power. Instead, only three Supreme Court justices were restored. They, and the other new appointments, were made to take loyalty oaths much like those that Musharraf demanded of his tame appointees. Pakistani lawyers were the most active protesters against Musharraf’s illegal firings, and continued their protests when it became clear that the Zardari government meant to keep a puppet court instead of restoring justices who would defend the constitution. Zardari’s credibility was damaged further by the violent police reaction to the protests, the arrest of more than one hundred lawyers on criminal charges, and the suspension of five lawyers’ license to practice law.

The AHRC followed up by releasing a note on March 3 stating that the Supreme Court was sabotaging democracy in Pakistan. The ruling banning Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz from politics was described as “a two sentence, non-reasoned order.” They went further to state that the court’s “allegiance is not to the people of the country, but pledged to those in power.” Nawaz Sharif, whose presidency followed that of Zardari’s wife, Benazir Bhutto, was barred from politics on the basis of his criminal convictions, which were handed down by a kangaroo court under Musharraf. The charges of irregularities in the election of Shahbaz are slightly more credible, but also not lacking elements of political motivation.

The Supreme Court has lacked credibility since 2007, when Musharraf declared a state of emergency to extend the powers he had seized by force. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chuadhry and eight others declared the move unconstitutional, for which they were dismissed at gunpoint. Justices of the new court were sworn in under a Provisional Constitutional Order that included language declaring their loyalty to Musharraf and not the Pakistani constitution. Musharraf’s party was soundly defeated in the February 2008 elections, and the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N branch) formed a coalition government dedicated to restoring the constitution. The chairmen of these parties were Zardari and Sharif, respectively, and the two men managed to put aside their ambitions long enough to force Musharraf’s resignation. After Zardari’s election, it became clear that he intended to keep the Supreme Court as a political tool, and PML-N split with the PPP.

The fallout between the PML-N and the PPP and the animosity between their leaders represents Pakistan living down to its traditional dysfunction. In the eyes of most analysts, both men have always put their own good before Pakistan’s. While Bhutto was Prime Minister, her husband Zardari was known as Mr. Ten Percent for the kickbacks he demanded in return for patronage positions. The corruption of the Bhutto/Zardari regime was quite well documented, as shown in this enormous Times piece. Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister both before and after Bhutto and was deposed and exiled by Musharraf. He was considered equally corrupt – if less successful. At least in his case some irony tempers the tragedy of his abuses; his stunningly lengthy corruption rap sheet is marred by accusations against the prosecutor. Thus, Pakistanis can be forgiven for seeing little new in all the machinations.

Since Zardari’s puppet court banned the Sharifs from politics, popular displeasure has run high. Shahbaz was chief minister of a Punjab, which is Pakistan’s richest province and is home to half of its population. Both brothers called for protests, which unsurprisingly turned violent. Nawaz Sharif feigned disapproval of the violence, but claimed that it was the will of the people; Zardari used military force against the protestors; Sharif moved closer to the edge, saying that violence will continue if Islamabad attempts to regain control, and even telling the police not to obey the federal governor.

With Sharif calling for a march on Islamabad and adopting the pose of a revolutionary, Zardari has been goaded into cracking down even further, barring the gathering of groups of more than four people in Punjab and Sindh and arresting and harassing numerous Sharif supporters. What happens over the weekend could be momentous in determining Pakistan’s short- and medium- term political future. All this is occurring, of course, at a moment when the rest of the world is begging the country to focus its attention on Islamic militancy and the effects of the economic crisis. If there’s one thing Pakistan’s political class has repeatedly demonstrated, however, it’s that it has no time for such interruptions of its ongoing soap opera.

Photo Credit: Flickr user orionoir

Bangladesh's Fizzled Makeover

Bangladesh’s current government is an interim regime installed by the military in a January 2007 coup. The government was supposed to direct the country away from its entrenched politics based on patronage and personality to a cleaner, more democratic form of governance. The primary goal was to create an alternative to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, and the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina. The two parties, bitter rivals, have long dominated Bangladeshi politics: Zia was prime minister from 1991-1996 and 2001-2006, and Hasina was prime minister from 1996-2001. They are known as the two “begums” – Muslim women of high rank – and each of their administrations was characterized by rampant corruption and a cult of personality centered on the respective leader. Since the coup, the army has tried to push the begums aside, jailing them and splitting their parties. However, by calling elections that will likely include both begums, the military has implicitly admitted that its mission has been less than successful.

Taking the Wheel in Nepal, Maoists Face a Rocky Road

Former rebel leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known by the nom de guerre Prachanda, was sworn in as Nepal’s prime minister on August 18, confirming his status as the country’s most powerful political leader. While the achievement sealed the victory of his Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in its long struggle with the now-defunct monarchy, it came at the cost of a grueling 1996–2006 insurgency and some 13,000 lives. The new government will have to address the simmering instability and institutional wreckage left in the wake of the conflict, all while managing an uncertain political coalition and coping with urgent problems like food shortages and rising fuel prices.

Spotlight on Indigenous Rights

The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has released the final report on its seventh annual session, held between April 21 and May 2. The gathering focused on the issue of global climate change, highlighting the fact that indigenous peoples were already suffering disproportionately from the phenomenon despite having contributed very little to its causes. The report also warned that many of the proposals for halting global warming could negatively affect indigenous groups without proper consultation. In other words, climate change countermeasures could become the latest in a long line of state-supported development campaigns that largely ignore the needs and rights of indigenous peoples. Observance of those rights is often a revealing indicator of a country’s performance on broader governance issues, including rule of law, property rights, political representation for minorities, and freedom of expression.

Setting Anticorruption Priorities in Bangladesh

Freedom House recommended in the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads survey that the Bangladeshi Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) be given the powers and autonomy needed to “confront rampant extortion and bribery.” The ACC was founded in 2004 and worked sluggishly through 2006. Following a bloodless military coup on January 11, 2007, its pace picked up, although concerns about partisan policies and financial dependence on the government remained. Last month, the Commission launched a drive to put more than 25,000 offenders behind bars. This news looks positive, but must be weighed carefully.

Nepal's Triumphant Rebels

As of May 28, the 240-year monarchy of Nepal has been replaced by the new Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal amidst surprisingly little violence, and the king has been politely asked to vacate the royal residence-turned-heritage-museum. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) dominated the April 10 elections for the 601-seat constituent assembly, the body charged with writing a new Nepalese constitution over the next 30 months, securing 33% of the popularly elected seats. Their success shocked not only the Nepalis and the rest of the world, but the Maoists themselves as well.