COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

Corruption-Fighters in Indonesia Feel Pushback

Photo credit: Flickr user London Summit

Indonesian President began his second five-year term on Tuesday, following a resounding electoral victory in July. His success at the polls has been attributed in part to his tough stance on corruption—not an easy challenge to confront in a country rife with graft. However, in recent weeks efforts to provide greater transparency, which are considered indispensable to provide more tools to corruption-fighters, have faced significant resistance from the country’s parliament.

At the end of September, Indonesia’s parliament diluted the powers of the country’s special Corrupt Crimes Court and the independent Corruption Eradication Commission (known as the KPK), arguing that their powers were too far-reaching. The KPK can conduct wiretaps without a warrant, while the Court is known to hand down harsher sentences than Indonesia’s regular judiciary. But advocates of the institutions claimed that the impact of the highly-effective Court and KPK will decline if constraints are imposed and that any backtracking will raise red flags among investors.

In the end, much to the dismay and resistance of President Yudhoyono, parliament managed to weaken both institutions. Although intervention by the president prevented the dissolution of the KPK’s right to prosecute and tap telephones, the bill passed by parliament allows for the Court to staff a majority of its judges from the regular justice system. Previously, a majority of the judges had to come from outside of the government—including practicing lawyers, academics, and retired prosecutors, among others. As career judges do not tend to have impeccable reputations in corruption cases in Indonesia, such a requirement was seen to allow the court more independence.

The weakening of the KPK and the Corrupt Crimes Court was not the only blow to Indonesia’s anticorruption efforts last month. On September 15, Indonesian police named two of the four deputy chairmen of the KPK as suspects in a bribery case. The facts of the crime are a bit dubious (according to the Economist, one of the suspects was in Peru when he allegedly took a bribe in Jakarta), but nevertheless the two have been formally accused of abuse of power and taking bribes. To top off the anticorruption campaign’s woes, the well-respected head of the KPK went on trial in early October for allegedly masterminding the drive-by shooting of Nasrudin Zulkarnaen, the state-owned pharmaceuticals company director, in what appears to be a love triangle-turned-deadly.   

Finally, the president’s new cabinet—expected to lack experience to carry out substantial economic overhaul—raises doubts among analysts that necessary institutional reforms to combat corruption will take place in the near future.

Combating graft is always a frustrating endeavor, let alone in one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and resistance to such efforts is nothing new.  Corruption is endemic to the expansive web of Indonesian bureaucracy as a result of Suharto’s 32-year-long presidency, a kleptocracy marked by brutality and cronyism. Following his death in 1998, corruption was so entrenched in the Indonesian bureaucratic apparatus that bribes were an expected part of nearly all citizen interactions with the state. Despite efforts to reduce opportunities for corruption, such practices have not been sufficiently abated. Note that petty corruption can be combated much more effectively through technocratic reforms than grand corruption, which inevitably hinges on political will.The KPK was created in 2003 to investigate large-scale corruption, defined as official misconduct that cost the state more than US$85,000. Its success at first was highly mixed and it was criticized for failing to convict prosecutors and police. According to Freedom in the World, a 2008 survey revealed that while the KPK is considered highly credible relative to other Indonesian government institutions, almost three-fourths of those polled thought the Commission had not created enough of a “culture of shame” to prevent state officials from engaging in corruption.

However, in more recent years, the Commission has been lauded for its progress, albeit modest, in rooting out corruption and improving Indonesia’s image. According to the New York Times, since 2003 the commission has achieved a 100 percent conviction rate in 86 cases of bribery and graft brought to trial. In 2008, specifically, a string of high-level prosecutions helped solidify the legitimacy of the Commission and fostered an increased fear of prosecution within Indonesia’s political institutions. That October, the former governor of the Bank of Indonesia was slapped with a five-year sentence for embezzling US$10.3 million in central bank funds. Though critics claimed that such a sentence was not harsh enough to serve as an effective deterrent, generally speaking it was seen as a step in the right direction.

Efforts to combat corruption have been made on a more macro level as well. Direct elections at the local level, held since 2005, have helped to reduce patronage. A number of local initiatives, for example, have reduced the likelihood of bribery by simplifying the process of obtaining business permits and making secondary school applications an online process. Such efforts bumped up Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index; in 2007, Indonesia was ranked 143rd of 180 countries (with 180 being Somalia, the most corrupt), while in 2008, it moved up to 126th place.

That said, 126th place is still not an enviable place to be. Corruption is still rampant in all branches of government on both the local and national level and impunity is pervasive. Moreover, with the recent pushback by Parliament, it appears that the reform project is at risk of backsliding.

Few countries have managed to successfully wage the battle against corruption without setbacks. However, given the fight’s centrality to the future of Indonesia’s institutions and the country’s ability to sustain economic growth, President Yudhoyono should certainly consider spending some of his hard-earned political capital to ensure that Indonesia’s reputation as a country on the right trajectory remains intact.           

Can a Concert Kill Cambodian Corruption?

Photo: Billboard depicting the official symbol of the Cambodian Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption's 1 Million Signatures Campaign; Photo Credit: Flickr user chrislang

On May 30, Cambodian nongovernmental organizations including Pact Cambodia and members of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations Against Corruption joined together to put on the “Clean Hands Concert,” an event that was geared towards raising awareness of the country’s grave corruption problem. Roughly 50,000 people attended the event, an enormous turnout for such an event.  The concert took place on the 1 year anniversary of the 1 Million Signatures Campaign, a movement that was geared towards garnering support and political will for the passage of an anticorruption law. In the opening speech, U.S. Ambassador Carol Rodley claimed that corruption was a major impediment to economic growth in the country. She argued that corruption costs Cambodia up to $500 million per year in lost revenue. In response, the Cambodian government vehemently denied these claims.  Hor Nambora, the Cambodian ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated that Rodley had joined forces with such anticorruption agencies as Global Witness, “which continually engages in virulent and malicious campaigns against the Royal Government of Cambodia.”

Both the concert’s high turn-out and the government’s harsh rhetorical response to the concert speak volumes about the immense magnitude of Cambodia’s corruption problem. The 2006 Countries at the Crossroads Report on Cambodia echoes Ambassador Rodley’s recent claim, noting that roughly 10% of Cambodia’s GDP is lost to corruption. The report explains that the possibilities for graft are endless in the country’s “cumbersome, politicized, and unregulated” bureaucracy. In addition, it notes that corruption permeates all of Cambodia’s institutions, especially the judiciary. Over the past few years, the scourge of corruption has continued unchecked. In a recent report, Global Witness argues that Cambodia is run by a kleptocratic elite that clandestinely and corruptly allocates rights to oil, gas, and mineral exploitation. Unsurprisingly, Transparency International also ranked Cambodia  a dismal 166th out of 180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, in Transparency’s 2009 Corruption Barometer, fully 47% of Cambodian respondents reported paying a bribe in the last 12 months.

Despite the clearly negative consequences created by the problem, the administration of Prime Minister Hun Sen has been extremely recalcitrant on the issue of anticorruption measures. Sen, a former Khmer Rouge and key leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) who became Prime Minister after staging a coup in 1997, has not succeeded in passing any notable anticorruption legislation. The long-awaited Anticorruption Law, which was first drafted in 1994, has remained in the hands of the Council of Ministers since 2006. Although the Coalition against Corruption presented the government with a petition signed by more than 1 million citizens requesting the enforcement of the anticorruption law, little further progress has been made on the matter. While several Cambodian parties responded to the group’s request, the ruling CPP remained entirely silent. As a result, there are still no functioning independent anticorruption bodies. In addition, even if this law is eventually passed, it presently falls short of international standards.

While an effective response to Cambodian corruption lags, several developments have at least served to bring increased domestic and international attention to the issue. The signature campaign and the concert underscore the strength of the country’s anticorruption civil society movement, along with the high level of domestic support for anticorruption measures. In addition, a high-profile judicial corruption case has increased international awareness of the pervasive corruption plaguing the country’s judicial system. The UN is currently investigating charges that Cambodian personnel employed by the UN-backed Khmer Rouge Tribunal, were forced to pay kickbacks in order to obtain and retain their positions. While this case certainly made the problem more apparent to international actors, it also highlighted the immensely graft-ridden nature of Cambodian government and society.

Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging the problem and working with both the domestic and international civil society movement to combat corruption, the Cambodian government has assumed the defensive. Since the Clean Hands Concert, the government has frequently claimed that anticorruption organizations are united in a struggle to undermine the Cambodian government with false and disparaging remarks. On June 6, popular comedian Chy Koy characterized anticorruption NGOs as “money hungry fabricators of non-existent corruption” when he appeared on the CPP-owned television station. This NGO-related conspiracy theory is one of many contrived by the Cambodian government of late. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the government allows these NGOs to operate relatively freely, and in this case to organize a high-profile concert aimed at chiding the government for its inaction on corruption, provides some evidence that the environment in Cambodia is not entirely repressive.   

Unfortunately, however, the government's tolerance for civil society and criticism seems to be waning. In September of 2008, Sen exclaimed that "Cambodia has been a heaven for NGOs for too long...the NGOs are out of control...". At the same time,he called for the revival of a restrictive NGO law.  In addition, the government's verbal attacks on anti-corruption NGOs are being carried out alongside agreater campaign against government criticism. For example, the government has used criminal defamation laws to intimidate and imprison activists, union leaders, and journalists alike.  In this inauspicious climate, it seems unlikely that the Cambodia will engage in a dialogue with the government-critical anticorruption movement. The fight against graft officially remains a high-priority government issue for the 2008-2013 mandate. Nevertheless, the government’s past reluctance and present state of denial seem to spell further delays, and even setbacks, in the effort to rid Cambodia of this governance scourge.

Thailand's Military: A Constant Amongst Turmoil

Shortly after political unrest rocked Thailand yet again in April, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva quietly transferred several senior military officers who were classmates of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at the Armed Forces Preparatory School to inactive posts. The general public has interpreted the government’s actions as a thinly veiled attempt to eradicate Thaksin’s remaining allies from the country’s political scene. This military reshuffle should come as no surprise, considering the skepticism that has arisen surrounding the military’s response to the April protests. While the military ultimately played an instrumental role in quelling the political violence that shook the nation for three weeks, their loyalty to the government was questioned at various times. These most recent events highlight one of Thailand’s most persistent and troubling rule of law issues: the continued lack of civilian control over the security sector and debilitating impact of this phenomenon on reform efforts.

Thailand’s most recent political chaos erupted when the red-shirted supporters of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a movement that is spearheaded by the self-exiled Thaksin, charged the resort where an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting was to be held, assailed Abhisit’s offices, home, and car, and seized control of a large area in Bangkok’s government district, clashing with adherents of the pro-Abhisit People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) at various points along the way. As the New York Times explains, the fact that Thaksin’s supporters were able to overrun security forces at the easily-protected location of the Asean summit, among other places, raised questions about the military’s allegiance to the Abhisit government. In addition, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul has accused Thaksin's military allies of carrying out an assassination attempt against him on April 17. It has been rumored that Thaksin still has several loyal allies within the military, and the accusations and peculiarities noted above fueled widespread rumors of a possible Thaksin-orchestrated military coup throughout the protests. It is important to note that the security forces eventually contained the violence by surrounding the main protest camp. In response to this, however, UDD protestors accused the military forces of discriminating against them in favor of the PAD, pointing out the fact that military forces failed to use emergency powers to put an end to the PAD’s occupation of Bangkok’s airport last year, which was seemingly a greater security threat. In any case, these events demonstrate that the subordination of the military forces to civilian rule remains subject to constant questioning, while the professional, politically impartial nature of the military is extremely suspect.

As the 2007 Countries at the Crossroads Report explains, the Thai military and police forces have played an influential and oftentimes deplorable role in the country’s political history. The military has traditionally assumed the role of veto player in Thai politics. Due to the power wielded by Thailand’s military institution, the success of any political regime has been largely determined by military judgment; in short, military approval has translated into political success while disapproval has led to failure, oftentimes in the form of a military-led overthrow. The military’s instrumental role in this process is largely tied to its strong relationship with Thailand’s monarchy. Over the course of Thailand’s history, the two institutions have oftentimes worked together to guide or force Thailand’s political trajectory in their desired direction. From 1932-1992, the military played a direct role in the country’s political process by staging numerous coups, and the security forces retained a prominent position during the rule of Thaksin, with whom they were strongly allied. During his reign, Thaksin, a former police officer, awarded his cronies with key security posts in order to consolidate his control over the security sector and the country. Later on, however, members of the military directly interfered in Thailand’s democratic process yet again by carrying out a coup against Thaksin and installing a former army commander as prime minister. After ruling the country for 15 months following the coup, the military returned to the barracks, although it has continued to play a central role in Thai politics from outside. In fact, Abhisit was propelled to his current position as prime minister in part due to the military’s support.

In many ways, the military’s perennial independence from the government can be easily understood. Thailand has been plagued by political instability for years. Since 2006, the country has been ruled by four different prime ministers, one of whom was a former military commander and two of whom were forced from office for violating provisions of the Constitution.  As such, for the military, allegiance to any of these short-lived, unsteady governments has proved to be both unnecessary and imprudent.  Regardless of this fact, however, the military’s power and politicization has had decidedly negative consequences for governance. First, in addition to wreaking havoc on the electoral process, it has constituted a major impediment to the implementation of much-needed political reforms. As the 2008 Freedom in the World Report notes, it has often been quite difficult for civilian leaders to enact reforms that in any way affect the military’s privileged position and to address some of the remaining repressive laws that were set in place during the recent period of military rule. In other cases, military-fueled unrest has been responsible for foiling plans for reform.  For example, since Abhisit’s election in December of 2008, his reform agenda, which is rooted in the modification of the largely undemocratic constitution, has been rendered impossible to implement by turmoil that has been at least partly exacerbated by Thaksin’s manipulation of the security sector. As the Economist explains, Thaksin counted on several members of the security forces, who for the most part belong to the same classes as the UDD protestors and have demonstrated their partiality towards Thaksin in the past, to abandon Abhisit during the protest.

Secondly, military power has also blocked Abhisit, along with other past prime ministers, from addressing the numerous allegations accusing members of the security forces of committing human rights abuses. Abhisit is in many ways dependent upon the military due to the institution’s political role. Without the military’s support, Abhisit’s position as prime minister would likely become untenable. Thus, appeasing the military is essential. Unfortunately, this situation has seriously negative consequences for rule of law. Over the years, the power of the security forces has provided its members with immunity from judicial prosecution, which has allowed them to commit flagrant human rights violations without punishment. One of the military’s most brutal campaigns was carried out during Thaksin’s 2003 war on drugs. As Human Rights Watch reports, security forces committed an extraordinarily large number of arbitrary killings during this war. In addition, as Amnesty International reports, the military has committed human rights violations including torture throughout the counter-insurgency campaign it has carried out since 2004. Unfortunately, these abuses continue today. The State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report revealed that there were several allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrest being committed by security forces, especially during counter- insurgency efforts. Most recently, security forces have been accused of beating refugees from a minority Muslim group in Myanmar and subsequently casting them out to sea without supplies. While the government has investigated some of these instances, members of the security forces have not been prosecuted for their actions thus far. While Abhisit has promised to address this culture of impunity surrounding military abuses, it is extremely unlikely that he will risk upsetting the military members upon whose support his position depends.

Thus, the lamentable lack of civilian control over the military has had numerous and varied negative effects on governance. Unfortunately, until the current political crisis between anti- and pro-Thaksin factions is resolved, the chances of consolidating civilian control and depoliticizing the military are slim to none. While Thailand’s political situation remains unstable, the military will continue to defy civilian power and exert its influence in myriad ways. As an upshot, the military will retain its ability to commit abuses with impunity.

Photo Credit: Flickr user interactimages

Governance Around the World: Updates

Yesterday, China released an official student death toll for the deadly earthquake that struck the country last May. The government reported that 5,335 children were dead or missing, while 546 were left disabled. Before releasing these numbers, authorities had largely ignored or stifled persistent requests for more information. Shortly after the earthquake, we discussed the initial Chinese response in a blog post. At the time, we noted that the level of transparency surrounding the earthquake was better than in the past.  However, this was not indicative of any extensive changes in policy. After the earthquake, the government continued to restrict reporting and use its propaganda machine to influence coverage. However, several Chinese journalists ignored government restrictions, which led to a notable increase in independent reporting on the calamity and allowed an impressive citizen response to the earthquake to emerge. Unfortunately, release of the death toll figures does not show that the government has made any strides over the last year. Indeed, the government actually ramped up its efforts to silence the parents and arrest the reporters who requested more detailed information as the anniversary of the disaster grows near. Finally, China has remained mute to allegations that school building corruption was responsible for the disproportionate number of collapsed school buildings and student deaths in the earthquake. In short, the hope that the earthquake response represented a more flexible turn in Beijing’s strategy was a false one.

In Yemen, developments are even more disheartening. In the past several weeks, a separatist movement in southern Yemen has become increasingly visible. Last week, demonstrations broke out after troops established checkpoints in the southern Lahij Province, and political leaders became more vocal in their calls for southern independence. This movement represents yet another serious challenge to a country already racked by insurgencies in the North and a growing level of Al Qaeda attacks. In general, the smoldering violence, political unrest, and regional antagonism reflects a lingering and increasingly dangerous legacy of Yemen’s 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. In a blog post last June, we discussed the rising violence in Yemen and the country’s festering governance problems. At that time, our major concern was the brutal struggle between the army of Zaidi rebels, a separatist movement, and the government in the capital of Sana’a. The government pursued these rebels both on the battlefield and via active targeting and persecution in the country’s judicial and media sectors. As an upshot of this fighting, governance practices took a major hit in the country as President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to forcefully reinstate order by ruling with an iron fist. Lamentably, as we survey the situation in Yemen a year later, little has changed, except for the worse. In fact, the new surge in violence and instability may lead to a further decline in civil liberties, press freedom, and rule of law as Saleh attempts to retain his ever more tenuous grasp over his country.

Nicaragua’s negative governance trend has also continued unchecked. With President Daniel Ortega at the helm, almost all remaining vigor in the democratic process has been removed from the country’s political scene. On November 9 of last year, Nicaragua held municipal elections in 146 towns and cities. In the run-up to the election, political and media freedom and equal campaigning opportunities were notably weak. Reporters including Nicaragua’s influential investigative journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro were harassed, civil society organizations were targeted, and both international and national election observers were barred from presiding over the election proceedings. According to the government’s official tallies, Ortega’s Sandinista Party won 94 municipalities. The opposition, however, has claimed that these elections were rife with fraud. In a blog post last July, we commented on the declining state of democracy in Nicaragua. At this time, we discussed the Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Court’s decision to eliminate the legal status of two major opposition parties and the regrettable consequences this decision stood to have on the country’s party plurality. The post raised alarm over the Sandinista party’s growing control over the country’s political apparatus. As the events surrounding the 2008 elections show, the state of affairs has only deteriorated.

In Nepal, political disorder rose dramatically this week as Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal  (aka Prachanda) resigned his post. On May 4, Dahal handed in his resignation after President Ram Baran Yadav declared Dahal’s decision to fire army chief General Rookmangud Katawal unconstitutional. Following this, on May 7, activists marched towards the president’s house in the capital in an effort to force his resignation for reinstating the army chief to his post. These events come after other developments had rendered Dahal’s post increasingly precarious. Specifically, two of Dahal’s alliance partners had left the government, leaving the ruling coalition led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) without a majority in the constituent assembly. Last August, when Dahal first assumed his position, we wrote a blog post about the challenges facing the new Maoist prime minister. At this time, Dahal and the Maoists had recently gained a place in the country’s formal political scene after waging a guerrilla war for 10 years. We commented that the ruling coalition would likely have some problems maintaining their authority in the constituent assembly and retaining the support of their allies during the drafting of the new constitution. We also noted that dealing with the decommissioning of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) and controlling the state army could prove quite difficult. As the events surrounding Dahal’s resignation show, these problems not only presented themselves, but largely proved decisive in bringing about the downfall of the current coalition. Over the past year, conflict abounded as differences between the parties hampered the constitution-making process.  Furthermore, for the Maoists, revamping and attaining control over Nepal’s institutions, most notably the judiciary and military, proved enormously complicated and polemical. In fact, the proximate cause of this final dispute was the army chief’s opposition to the UN-required induction of former MPLA fighters into the army.  While Dahal has announced that he will be stepping down for the greater good “of democracy and peace” in Nepal, the chaos left in this week’s wake will be an additional obstacle to additional reform once the dust settles.

Finally, in Indonesia, the recent detention of anti-corruption chief Antasari Azhar cast a shadow over the country’s positive advancements in the realm of governance. On May 4, Azhar, the leader of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), was declared a suspect in the March murder of prominent businessman Nasrudin Zulkaraen. According to local news sources, Azhar and Zulkaraen both had an affair with the same golf caddy. Last October, we addressed the issue of Indonesian corruption. We noted that while serious institutional reform was still needed in order to eradicate Indonesia’s pervasive, decentralized corruption problem, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had made some preliminary progress towards addressing the daunting issue.  Furthermore, we commented that the 2003 creation of the KPK, a body invested with the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations, was an especially “potent force for change.” While this organization was widely supported by the public due to its perceived integrity, the involvement of the KPK’s chief in the murder case at hand stands to shatter that image. As a result of Azhar’s detention, the KPK’s legitimacy, along with its past and future achievements, will undoubtedly be tainted. Consequently, the fight against corruption in Indonesia, a country that currently ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, will be encumbered.     

A Tale of Two Southeast Asian States

A recent article in the Economist dubbed Indonesia “South-East Asia’s only fully functioning democracy.” Considering the great strides the country has made towards democratic consolidation since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, this accolade is for the most part well-deserved. In fact, Indonesia is the only South-East Asian country to receive the “free” distinction in the Freedom in the World survey. The country’s reformasi, or reform movement, has given rise to an increasingly open political system characterized by respect for basic civil and political liberties. Indonesia’s democracy is certainly not beyond reproach. As the Economist notes, corruption continues to be prevalent, while the electoral process tends to be overcomplicated, chaotic, and at times overtly undemocratic. Nevertheless, the country’s political climate does boast a robust, competitive party system and a strong degree of pluralism – as befits such an ethnically and geographically diverse land – which has been regularly exemplified during the run-up to the country’s April 9 parliamentary elections and July 8 presidential elections.
The Economist described the campaign for Indonesia’s parliamentary election as a “carnival of democratic competition.” Over the past few months, candidates from a multitude of parties hit the campaign trail with a flurry of rallies featuring both political speeches and singing and dancing. There are currently 38 national parties registered in Indonesia. The assimilation of Islamist parties into this system, and more particularly their willingness to compromise and join forces with secular parties, is quite remarkable considering Indonesia’s past problems with Islamic extremism. During this election season, these parties were able to freely campaign without any restrictions on their activity by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The Election Day proceedings also demonstrated how far Indonesia’s electoral institutions have come. On April 9, 100 million Indonesians headed to the polls. While all of the votes have not yet been tallied, it looks likely that Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party will win the most seats with roughly 20% of the national vote. Polls show that the parties of the Suharto era, the Golkar Party and the Democratic Party of Struggle, have both sustained a substantial decrease in popularity. In addition, several of the smaller Muslim parties took a hit. Regrettably, 5 were killed in Papua, a province in which a separatist movement remains strong. Nevertheless, this outbreak pales in comparison to the bloodshed that once dominated Indonesia’s political scene.

When Indonesia is compared to other Southeast Asian countries, its relative superiority in terms of accountability and public voice is obvious. Thailand’s recent political history has been plagued by military rule and mounting instability, which reached a peak in recent days with the failure of an ASEAN summit and significant violence in Bangkok caused by anti-government protesters. The situation in the Philippines is equally troubling. Supposed coup attempts against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have abounded, while recent elections have been extremely violent. Generally, Malaysia can also be lumped with these troubled countries. Nevertheless, recent developments in this country serve as an indication that at least one of Indonesia’s neighbors may be taking baby steps towards a more democratic future.

In comparison to Indonesia, the political state of affairs in Malaysia is primitive. The corrupt, authoritarian United Malays National Organization (UNMO) party has ruled the country since 1957. In late March, the UMNO selected Najib Razak, a party insider who has been accused of the brutal murder of a Mongolian woman, to succeed Abdullah Badawi as Malaysia’s next prime minister. The UMNO and its coalition, the National Front, have wielded complete authority over the country’s political system despite the fact that a multiparty system formally exists. Throughout UMNO’s reign, opposition activities have been repeatedly restricted. As the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report explains, campaign periods are extremely short, and with strong control of the media by the government. During the run-up to both the March 2008 parliamentary election and the by-elections that followed, the government’s interference in the campaign activities of the opposition was as bold as ever. At the end of this March, for example, police broke up an opposition rally by seizing DVDs and detaining an opposition leader. They also fired tear gas into a crowd while opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was giving a speech. Harassment of Anwar is no surprise; the repeated charges against the opposition’s most popular leader have epitomized UMNO’s style of frontal combat style politics.

That said, there are signs that the UMNO’s monopoly over Malaysia’s political scene may be waning. In comparison with previously, pluralism is at a new high in the country. Recently, the strength of the opposition, as well as its participation in mainstream politics, has steadily mounted. The opposition is made up of a coalition of three parties: the Malay-dominated Parti Keadilan, the Chinese Democratic Action Party, and the Islamic Pan Malaysian Islamic Party. As a previous post explains, the UMNO lost their two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections of 2008. In this election, the opposition achieved victories in 5 of 13 Malaysian states. They have subsequently lost seats in two by-elections. The most recent loss took place on April 7, when UMNO lost a state parliament seat. In addition, the opposition won another seat in the national parliament in Perak.

Surprisingly, under the newly elected prime minister, the government itself has made some preliminary efforts to respect, or at least not directly smother, the country’s burgeoning competitive party system. For example, Prime Minister Najib lifted the three-month ban on Harakah and Suara Keadlin, two opposition newspapers. However, on the whole, Najib's initial performance has left observers unimpressed.

It is obvious that the current situation in Malaysia leaves much to be desired.  It will still take a sizeable effort to effectively challenge or even to significantly influence the agenda of the entrenched UMNO party. Nevertheless, healthy pluralism has a higher chance than ever before of becoming firmly established in the country. Interestingly enough, Malaysia’s level of true pluralism could one day overshadow that of its neighbor should this prove to be the case. While the number of parties represented in Indonesia’s system is impressive, the diversity of interests and ideas espoused by these parties is not. As both the 2006 Countries at the Crossroads report and The Economist note, most of Indonesia’s parties share strikingly similar platforms. The candidates’ policy proposals and opinions on key issues are fairly comparable. Unfortunately, their plans for the future are also equally vague. This dearth of ideological competition may soon contribute to a standstill in Indonesia’s path towards governance reform. 

Conversely, the ideas represented in Malaysia’s party system are more diverse than ever before. The interests, beliefs, and political ideologies of the majority of Malaysia’s inhabitants have finally entered the political scene. Most notably, the concerns of traditionally marginalized non-Malays, including the Chinese and smaller indigenous populations, have become part of political discourse. Opposition parties have also come forward with an abundance of ideas about how to address the problems currently debilitating Malaysian politics and society. Thus far, conflict has been the norm in Malaysia’s system. Nevertheless, if the opposition continues to increase its influence just as the negative effects of the global economic slowdown reach Malaysia’s shores, this exchange of ideas may become crucial. Malaysia certainly has a long road ahead. Nevertheless, for the first time in 50 years, there is a chance that it may one day join Indonesia as one of the region’s democratic exemplars.

Photo Credit: Flickr user 12th St. David

Filipino Muslims' Grievances and the Difficult Path to Peace

In a February report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) assessed the prospects for a resolution of the ongoing conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The report, which was released six months after the dissolution of autonomy negotiations between the two entities, is predominantly pessimistic. According to the ICG, settlement of the autonomy issue is entirely out of the question before the end of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term in 2010.

The conflict between the Philippines government and the MILF is by no means new. The MILF is an offshoot of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an organization which first began to advocate the formation of a separate Islamic state in the Philippines in the 1960s. The MILF split from the MNLF in 1978, when the MNLF became resistant to the idea of an armed insurgency. After the MNLF reached a semi-autonomy agreement with the Philippine government in 1987 and then a cease-fire agreement in 1996, the MILF took the helm of the resistance movement and has, with the exception of short periods of cease-fire, continued to fight for more expansive rights and autonomy in the Mindanao region ever since. The most recent surge of violence erupted after the Supreme Court ruled that the autonomy agreement reached between the MILF and the government this past August was unconstitutional. The subsequent toll was severe: hundreds died and several hundred thousand people were displaced in the months following the breakdown.

The grievances of the MILF are numerous. Most of them, however, are linked to the group’s allegation that Filipino Muslims, most of who belong to the Moro ethnic group residing on Mindanao, suffer persecution and discrimination at the hands of both their government and their fellow citizens. While Muslims make up between 5 and 9 percent of the Filipino population, over 90 percent of the population is Christian. The MILF claims that members of Christian religions dominate all sectors of society, while Muslims are at best ignored and at worst victimized. The group has thus demanded more extensive provisions for self-government and greater control over resources in Mindanao. In a 2001 interview, Hashim Salamat, the founder of the MILF, explained that “the situation here in Mindanao is very, very difficult for the Muslims in general. Our people here have been oppressed for a very long time. This province has been totally neglected.” Where governance is concerned, this is especially problematic. Namely, it raises questions about respect for religious freedom in the country.

At first glance, freedom of belief and conscience is ostensibly well protected in the Philippines. The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion and the Philippine government has not made any overt attempt to restrict the right of Muslims to practice in recent times. This is corroborated by the 2007 edition of Countries at the Crossroads, in which the Philippines received a score of 5.33 out of 7.0 in the Freedom of Conscience and Belief subcategory. In addition, in its 2008 International Religious Freedom Report on the Philippines, the U.S. State Department claims that the Philippines government actively supports the practice of Islam through such agencies as the Office of Muslim Affairs.

Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the situation reveals a darker picture. While the rights of Muslims may be officially upheld, the trials they face in their daily lives are substantial. Findings from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report are especially illuminative. Most notably, according to the report, the effort made by the government to promote development amongst the Muslim population in Mindanao has been less than satisfactory. Today, Filipino Muslims are concentrated in the country’s poorest region and often lack basic services.
In addition, the attempt made by the government and the Christian majority to integrate Muslims into the country’s social fabric can only be described as half-hearted. The disproportionately sparse Muslim representation in the country’s political scene is especially salient. According to the report, there are 10 Muslim district representatives and 2 Muslim party list representatives in the House of Representatives, a body which has a total of 236 members. In addition, the Department of State’s 2009 Human Rights report revealed that discrimination against Muslims is especially pronounced in the workplace. For example, Muslims claim to have trouble finding work unless they use Christian pseudonyms and wear Western clothing. The report explains that the predominantly Christian “national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal, and regional loyalties, created informal barriers whereby access to jobs or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or group network.” This hostile treatment of the Muslim population has only been exacerbated by the intermittent terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim extremist groups like the Abbu Sayyaf Group.

While the situation of Muslims is rather grim, this is not to say that the Philippine government has completely turned a deaf ear to the issue. In the education sector, the government’s endeavor to modernize the madrassahs in the Mindanao region by improving the schools’ math, science, and English programs is especially commendable. What’s more, the government is not entirely to blame for the problem. Many Muslims have been to a certain extent unwilling to make a strong effort to become integrated into a greater Filipino society to which they feel no strong ties. The MILF, for its part, has at times maintained an ambiguous relationship with more radical Islamist groups responsible for the Philippines’ worst terror attacks.

In the end, the most direct way to ensure that the rights of the Filipino Muslims are protected would be to grant their request for greater autonomy in the Mindanao. As this is unfeasible for the time being, a micro-level approach aimed at addressing the basic needs of the Muslim population by investing in socio-economic development and fostering inter-faith dialogue would be a step in the right direction.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Mark Navales

Indonesian Corruption: Can Slow and Steady Win the Race?

Indonesia is currently preparing for critical parliamentary and presidential elections in 2009. A central issue will be corruption, often termed “the bane of Indonesia’s political transition” in the post-Suharto years. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected in 2004 based in part on his promises to tackle corruption, and as he seeks a second term he has vowed to keep up the fight. Indonesia has made significant improvements in addressing the problem, and perceptions about the country are improving. Nonetheless, Indonesia remains a very corrupt place, with a populace accustomed to system-wide graft. Corruption has checked economic growth, scared off foreign investors, and made life difficult for the average citizen. As noted in the Countries at the Crossroads country report, Yudhoyono’s administration has made progress in Indonesia’s anticorruption fight, but “the magnitude of the challenge is enormous, because corruption is woven into the very fabric of political and economic life.”

Crackdown in Progress in Vietnam

Rapid economic growth in countries like Vietnam and China has fed the debate regarding the tradeoff between democracy and development. Although not free, citizens of these nations have benefited from significant wealth increases and poverty reduction. Yet not only has the expansion of freedom been slow, but the gains are often quite fragile. Indeed, facing setbacks to economic growth, undemocratic governments may quickly reverse advances in liberty. This appears to be the case in Vietnam. Like neighboring China, Vietnam has experienced impressive economic growth after pursuing market-oriented reforms. Yet Vietnam also shares with China a profound reluctance to permit political reforms. And now, in the face of recent financial reversals, Vietnam’s government has once again moved to stifle outcroppings of freedom and democracy in the country.

State Rewards Islamist Thuggery in Indonesia

The ostensibly pluralist Indonesian government issued a decree last month that instructed the minority Ahmadiyah sect to halt its activities or face legal sanctions, including up to five years in prison for violators. While the vaguely worded decree stopped short of an explicit ban on the heterodox Muslim group, it represented a victory for a small but potent alliance of radical Islamists and their gangs of street-fighting supporters. A new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) warns that the extremists have used classic interest-group lobbying methods, combined with real and threatened violence, to achieve a level of influence far beyond their miniscule electoral support. If their many political opponents and the state itself fail to stand up to them, their list of demands will only grow, dragging the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country toward its ideological fringe and undermining an otherwise promising Southeast Asian democracy.

Spotlight on Indigenous Rights

The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has released the final report on its seventh annual session, held between April 21 and May 2. The gathering focused on the issue of global climate change, highlighting the fact that indigenous peoples were already suffering disproportionately from the phenomenon despite having contributed very little to its causes. The report also warned that many of the proposals for halting global warming could negatively affect indigenous groups without proper consultation. In other words, climate change countermeasures could become the latest in a long line of state-supported development campaigns that largely ignore the needs and rights of indigenous peoples. Observance of those rights is often a revealing indicator of a country’s performance on broader governance issues, including rule of law, property rights, political representation for minorities, and freedom of expression.