COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS GOVERNANCE BLOG

New Cabinet Dynamics and Same OId Trouble in Zimbabwe

The last two weeks have provided much analytical fodder for Zimbabwe’s many outside observers. On Wednesday, 11 February, MDC party and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister, the culmination of a drawn-out power-sharing accord process that began last July. But two days later, the MDC’s nominee for deputy minister of agriculture, Roy Bennett, was imprisoned on charges including supporting terrorism, a move that many perceive as an attempt to scuttle the power-sharing agreement.

The prime minister’s oath was administered by President Robert Mugabe, who has dominated the political, social, and economic life of Zimbabwe’s thirteen million citizens since 1980. Tsvangirai earned a plurality of votes in the first round of the 2008 presidential election, but not enough to win outright. Realizing that he would lose the run-off, Mugabe initiated a reign of terror against MDC supporters, and later claimed to have won 86% of the second-round vote in June. It took the international community three months of intense pressure – including sanctions against Zimbabwe and the freezing of administration members’ accounts abroad – to force Mugabe to accept a power sharing agreement whereby Tsvangirai would become prime minister and appoint a number of cabinet ministers. Even then, negotiations between Mugabe’s party, ZANU-PF, and the MDC came essentially to a stand-still while ZANU-PF refused to relinquish any meaningful cabinet positions. Further international pressure was required to make ZANU-PF relinquish fifteen cabinet posts.

Bennett has been charged with “illegal possession of arms for the purposes of committing banditry, insurgency, and terrorism,” for which he could face a life sentence. The charges are related to the discovery of an arms cache in the home of Peter Michael Hitschmann in 2006, and the government maintains that the two men were conspiring together. Bennett, like many MDC supporters, has been detained and tortured repeatedly by Zimbabwean security forces. He also spent eight months in prison in 2004 for assaulting the former justice minister during a debate in parliament. Mugabe’s choice of target is unsurprising: his traditional bogeymen and scapegoats are white land-owners like Bennett. Tsvangirai has suggested that the move may be a deliberate attempt by ZANU-PF to scuttle the deal, theorizing that some party members are fearful of being prosecuted for human rights violations committed during Mugabe’s long tyranny. The fact that Mugabe celebrated his 85th birthday on Saturday contributes to a sense of unease about the future among his supporters. The apparent seizure of scores of white-owned farms in the last few days might well be related to fears that ZANU-PF members better take full advantage of their untrammeled power while they still can.

The major question is what the MDC will be able to actually do with the power it has wrested from ZANU-PF. The home affairs post is the most meaningful concession that MDC was allowed: it is the ministry that controls the police force. Zimbabwe’s police, like every other part of its government, are deeply corrupt and form a key part of Mugabe’s powerful patronage network. The head of the police force even stated prior to the run-off that he would not allow the opposition to take over. Moreover, the military and the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and national security remain entirely under Mugabe’s control, leaving him with the bulk of real power.

In terms of governance, the MDC’s appointment of Tendai Biti as minister of finance is a good sign for a country where half the population requires food aid and the currency has been devalued to utter worthlessness in recent years. London’s Daily Telegraph calls Biti “a top lawyer widely regarded as incorruptible and one of the MDC's leading lights.” But more disappointment could await: the real power to make economic policy and support the currency has been arrogated to the discredited governor of the Reserve Bank, Gideon Gono, who has been reappointed for another five years.

Outside of the controversy surrounding his arrest, Roy Bennett is a potentially interesting candidate for deputy minister of agriculture. Zimbabwean agriculture is in desperate need of help. The government began seizing farm land from whites – including Mr. Bennett’s – in 2000 and redistributing it to war veterans and supporters of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The results were catastrophic: output fell dramatically, and with it, Zimbabwe’s GDP and living standards.

Bennett’s is not the only appointment to a very, very difficult position. MDC also chose the ministers of health and public services. The lack of public services in Zimbabwe is an enormous problem, given the staggering rates of lethal disease. Three thousand people have died from cholera in Zimbabwe in the past few months in an outbreak which Mugabe alternately called imaginary, under control, and an attempt by the imperial forces of England to re-colonize Zimbabwe. In addition, more than 2.5 million people in Zimbabwe are infected with HIV. In this light, ZANU-PF’s power-sharing agreement has an air of dumping the consequences of decades of corruption on the shoulders of the MDC.

MDC did manage to collect a few cabinet positions that could become meaningful. It is surprising that an increasingly despotic regime would surrender control of the Ministry for Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, although Mugabe’s control of the military could easily make the rule of law irrelevant at any moment. MDC also gained control of the Information Ministry, which has censored – even violently suppressed – opposition voices. Another astounding gain for MDC is the Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Corruption. Graft and patronage are the linchpins of ZANU-PF’s strength, and it is surprising that they would give MDC a weapon to attack them. One powerful ministry that it makes sense, however, for Mugabe to relinquish is that of economic development, where an MDC member will have far more credibility with the foreign donors Zimbabwe is totally reliant upon.

The degree of change represented by the swearing-in of Morgan Tsvangirai, in a nation that has suffered terribly under the rule of an aging despot, is hard to overstate. Even though it seems like MDC’s cabinet ministers inherit more catastrophes than positions with real potential, it is nonetheless an improvement from a government dominated entirely by a single party. Given Mugabe’s age, ZANU-PF’s utter ossification, and Zimbabwe’s near collapse, there is little question that change will eventually come. What comes next, however, gives reason for fear as well. For Zimbabwe’s citizens to have any hope, the MDC has no choice but to prove it is actually capable of governing; the alternative is too depressing to contemplate.

THE LEADER FOR LIFE, CONTINUED

In March of this year, we posted on the subject of presidential succession (The Leader for Life), noting the absence of a meaningful rotation of power in a number of strategically important countries and its negative impact on democratic governance.  Among other things, these countries exhibit exceedingly high levels of corruption. A chart detailing time in office for leaders in 20 states indicated that none of these politically managed systems could perform better than 105 (out of 179 countries examined) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Egypt came in at 105; the next best were Yemen and Iran at 131.

Since that time, several critical countries have made news by virtue of their leaderships’ determined effort to extend their term in office.

In Zimbabwe, discredited President Robert Mugabe said on December 19 that he would “never surrender”.  To emphasize the point, Mugabe added that “Zimbabwe is mine”.  Meanwhile, his beleaguered and impoverished country is suffering from a growing list of severe problems, including an outbreak of cholera that has killed hundreds of people. A BBC video clip explains in horrifying detail the devastating price cholera is exacting on ordinary Zimbabweans.

In Russia, CNN reported that the country’s upper house of parliament on December 22 approved an extension of the presidential term from four years to six, a step that could presage former President Vladimir Putin’s return to the nation's top office. Putin now serves as prime minister but is viewed by many as the country’s paramount leader.  The speedy move to amend the constitution comes at a time when low energy prices are putting increasing pressure on the Russian leadership’s ability to maintain the social and economic model that has been forged under Putin.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is also working diligently to remove institutional checks on his power.  On December 22, Chavez suggested that a referendum could be held on February 15, 2009 that would among other measures lift term limits. A December 2007 referendum that included a host of measures that would have removed checks on presidential power was narrowly defeated. Like Russia’s leadership, Chavez confronts a rapidly shifting and less predictable political landscape, as the energy resources that have been integral to his power dwindle.

A December 19 Washington Post editorial observes that while democracy advocates might welcome a vote of this sort in Venezuela, it carries real risks because:

"elections in Venezuela are no longer free and fair. Mr. Chavez has turned national television into a state propaganda outlet, and the Miami Herald reported [on December 14] that the government spent tens of millions of dollars to buy votes in the recent state and local elections. The state election authority, which is controlled by Mr. Chavez's loyalists, delayed the announcement of his defeat in last year's referendum; reliable sources say the president conceded only after he was told by military commanders that they would not put down protests against a falsified result. The official results, showing the margin of Mr. Chavez's loss, have not been released".

Unlike the Russian petrostate, where opposition has tended to be muted, in Venezuela opposing voices still make themselves heard.

Zimbabwe and Kenya - Power-Sharing, or Reckonings Postponed?

Following their well-publicized post-electoral meltdowns, Zimbabwe and Kenya are working through tricky governance issues involving power-sharing among multiple, mutually suspicious political parties. These situations are important to monitor as sub-Saharan Africa has all too rarely seen harmonious transitions even when the handover of power is straightforward, let alone when it involves powerful personalities and deep grievances. Ideally, these nations will succeed in peacefully distributing authority among the stakeholders, but the fragility of the processes is severe.

Weekly Governance Links: Africa

Africa has drawn greater than its usual portion of international attention recently; unfortunately, this has mostly been due to negative factors such as the ethnic violence in Kenya and scandal in South Africa; as well as electoral developments in Zimbabwe, where the balance of positive and negative are yet to be determined. The Countries at the Crossroads survey observes the fragility of institutions and governance across seventeen nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though many states are much improved, the majority remain threatened by persistent corruption, weak rule of law, and political repression. Below are some links to recent developments on the governance front across the region.

Beginning with the story grabbing headlines at the moment, the wait for election returns in Zimbabwe continues as embattled president Robert Mugabe fights to remain in power.  Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai claims to have cleared the 50% threshold necessary for a majority victory, though all indications point toward a massaged vote count that will force a run-off with Mugabe. Tensions are high and opposition supporters are bracing for a possible crackdown as Mugabe tightens the screws following the March 28th vote. Four American citizens were arrested on Thursday, and two individuals  – a New York Times journalist and a democracy assistance worker –remain in custody without any public acknowledgment by the Mugabe regime. As a testimony to the historic significance of the election, it has already been confirmed that the ruling ZANU-PF lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1980; however, the Financial Times notes that internal disputes within the MDC resulted in the attainment of a strong plurality rather than an outright parliamentary majority.

While it appeared that the fragile truce mediated by Kofi Annan in Kenya was on the verge of collapse, this week the main rival groups reached a compromise on forming a new coalition government. Many international organizations, such as Berlin-based Transparency International, have criticized factions loyal to both President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister-designate Raila Odinga for the sluggish pace in forming a government, thereby furthering weakening state institutions and creating a power vacuum in which corruption can thrive. For in-depth coverage, Human Rights Watch recently published “Ballots to Bullets,” a comprehensive report on the governance challenges facing Kenya in the wake of the ethnic violence following the disputed December 27th general elections. On a separate note, the IMF recently released a review of fiscal transparency in the country, an area in which gains will be fundamental to effectively combating the country’s sustained high levels of corruption as well as assuring Kenya’s fractious groups that revenues are being distributed equitably.

Inconsistent anticorruption efforts appear to remain the name of the game in Nigeria following the January sacking of Nuhu Ribadu, the young, crusading head of the nation’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The move was roundly condemned by Human Rights Watch as “a thinly veiled attempt to gut the only law enforcement agency that has tried to hold prominent ruling party politicians to account for their many crimes.” Nonetheless, the EFCC made good on a promise made by Ribadu in 2007 by recently opening a corruption probe against former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Ironically, the EFCC was formed in 2002 at the behest of Obasanjo in his internationally-encouraged effort to fight the endemic corruption that has plagued Nigeria throughout its existence. Transparency International offers fresh analysis of Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts following the election of President Umaru Yar’Adua in April, 2007. Two recent articles in the FT also represent the sporadic nature of anticorruption efforts: last week two ministers were fired over corruption allegations, but this week the privatization of a major steel plant was halted following the discovery of major abuses.

All is not gloom and doom, however, as Mozambique continues to make strides toward boosting state capacity and improving governance. Recently, the Mozambican government proposed increasing the number of municipalities in the country from 33 to 43, thereby devolving certain powers to local authorities and encouraging improvements in local governance. Furthermore, in a move that will undoubtedly please the World Bank’s “Doing Business” researchers, the Minister of Industry and Trade recently issued a decree that will streamline the registration process for business by creating one-stop shops for the issuance of licenses and permits.

In other encouraging legislative news in the region, the government of Zambia is moving to implement a Freedom of Information law that will strengthen the practice of journalism and hopefully provide a useful tool for all citizens to hold the government accountable. Zambia has also been active on the anticorruption front, summoning ex-President Frederick Chiluba to the Task Force on Corruption to answer allegations of rigged commodities deals during his reign in the 1990s. Such developments are certainly welcome, but as Michael Gerson observed in an op-ed in the Washington Post, rule of law remains fundamentally weak in Zambia, particularly protections for women and girls.

Several other miscellaneous links provide useful information about cross-border issues. Transparency International released a report discussing the variety of corruption-mapping tools being used in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank, meanwhile, surveys the region’s general macroeconomic prospects and emerges cautiously optimistic. On a similar note, a report from the Center for Global Development affirms that growth prospects have improved, and gives significant credit to increased democratic stability. Finally, another World Bank report examines a very topical issue: the lessons China’s development strategy holds for African nations.

Map Credit: NPR

The Leader for Life

The managed nature of the Russian election process has brought into sharp relief a set of countries that are sidestepping a rotation of power and whose systems are not open to the rise and fall of competing political parties and groupings. The leader for life governance model is apparent in a regionally diverse and strategically important set of states, where power is retained indefinitely by an individual or through the managed transfer of power within families or to close associates. Other countries from the Countries at the Crossroads set that fall into this “leader for life” category include Angola, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Kazakhstan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. View the linked Crossroads reports for detailed explanations of the problems wrought by the lack of rotation of power in each country. Looking at set of Crossroads country data from 2007, the correlation between low scores in certain categories and lack of rotation of power is evident.

Among the other large public policy challenges seen above, the sting for ordinary citizens in these settings is felt from the enormous corruption that flourishes in such unaccountable and non-transparent systems. A table showing a number of states that fit the leader for life mold – alongside performance on Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perception Index – helps to tell the story. All the states in the table are in the bottom quartile of the survey, with failed states such as Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, and one party or military dictatorships such as Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar.

See also this commentary on the subject by Freedom House Director of Studies Christopher Walker.

Will Mugabe’s Feet finally be Held to the Fire?

Zimbabwe is swirling with pre-election intrigue as high-level defections from the ruling party signal what is potentially the strongest challenge in years to the autocratic rule of 83 year-old President Robert Mugabe. Political developments in Harare have accelerated since February 5th, when former Finance Minister Simba Makoni, 57, declared his intention to run for president in elections scheduled for March 29th.

“Lion King” analogies aside, Simba Makoni’s announcement has widened an internal rift within the ruling Zanu-PF party, as forces once loyal to Mugabe continue to dissociate themselves from the economic ruin sowed by his 28-year reign and defect to the opposition. As Zimbabwe observer Isaac Dziya has noted, “The effects of the economic situation do not cushion even the diehard supporters of Mugabe. Everyone is suffering just like everyone else in the country and this includes Zanu-PF supporters right across the country.” In recent days, several Zanu-PF stalwarts have broken from the party, including current Minister of Finance Dr. Samuel Mbengegwi. Both Makoni and Mbengegwi hail from the Masvingo province, a traditional base of support for Mugabe and the Zanu-PF. Upon announcing his candidacy as an independent, Makoni was swiftly expelled from the party, and analysts predict a similar fate for party members openly opposing Mugabe in the run-up to the elections.

The emergence of Makoni has given new hope to forces within Zimbabwe seeking Mugabe’s ouster. The former finance minister is considered in Harare to be a reform-oriented technocrat whose image is not besmirched by corruption allegations. Makoni may represent the best hope for breaking Mugabe’s stranglehold on democracy, and Western governments are placing bets on the opportunity presented by this election cycle. Mugabe’s press machine recently noted British overtures to “cause regime change in Zimbabwe,” as the UK has contributed £3.3 million to pro-democracy NGOs, including anti-government lawyers and opposition elements. On his tour of Africa, President Bush blasted Mugabe as a “discredited dictator” and continued to pledge support for freedom in Zimbabwe, though past efforts have all been resounding failures.

While Mugabe’s political bases may be eroding ahead of the elections, Makoni’s challenge faces an uphill battle. As the Economist notes, the opposition in Zimbabwe lies in shambles, as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – the political party long at the forefront of the anti-Mugabe campaign – has yet to overcome an acrimonious split following its refusal to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, Mugabe continues to exploit all administrative levers to shore up his base of support, redirecting the flow of fuel and foodstuffs, already in short supply, to political patrons.
Moreover, some Africa observers are less sanguine about Makoni, who has served in Mugabe’s cabinet since the country declared independence in 1980 but only recently has raised his voice in opposition to his political benefactor.

Makoni’s success will depend upon his ability to unite the splintered opposition and continue to attract members of the ruling Zanu-PF disillusioned with Mugabe’s rule. For his part, Makoni is aware of the grave danger in challenging Mugabe through the ballot box and called on his opponents to settle their political disputes peacefully in a “contest of ideas, a contest of vision and commitment to the people.” Zimbabwe continues to rank as one of the least democratic nations in the world analyzed in Freedom House’s Countries at the Crossroads report, and few believe the vote will occur without incident.  In the positive scenario, as March 29th approaches observers inside Zimbabwe and without will be feverishly speculating whether this presidential election will truly present a unique moment to break Mugabe’s iron grip of this failed state. Just as likely, sadly, is that Mugabe will turn the screws and the contest will represent one more missed opportunity for Zimbabwe.

Photo Credit: Flickr user Candlemaker